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Abstract 
 
The traditional view of judicial behaviour posits that only the evidence and the law 
form the basis of a judicial decision. However, research shows that judging is 
influenced by a variety of legal and non-legal factors, particularly in cases involving 
judicial discretion. Whilst there is a wealth of empirical research that explores the 
interplay between religion and judging in other jurisdictions, particularly in the US 
where judges’ faith has been found to affect judicial decisions in certain legal areas, 
much less scholarly attention has been paid to this relationship in the context of the 
British courts. This socio-legal study uses semi-structured interviews with barristers 
and an online questionnaire completed by solicitors, both predominantly practising 
in employment or family law, to explore whether the religious beliefs of judges are 
perceived by lawyers to influence individual judicial decision-making in the English 
courts and, if so, how. 
The study finds that judges’ faith is perceived to potentially influence the decisional 
process in cases which, directly or indirectly, involve religious issues. However, the 
effect of such influence is considered to be marginal, being generally confined to that 
which is unconsciously manifested and not determinative of case outcomes. 
Constraints on judging are thought to be central in ensuring that judicial decision-
making remains within the limits of the law. Whilst lawyers are largely confident 
that the influence of religious beliefs is not a cause of concern in judicial decision-
making in the English courts, the evolving religious and legal landscapes in Britain 
means that there is no room for complacency. Judicial training, both in relation to 
understanding religiously sensitive issues and the role played by unconscious biases, 
is vital to ensure that judgments are reached on the basis of sound legal reasoning 
and not on the basis of judges’ personal proclivities.  
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…if the judge is not a machine, however ingeniously constructed, that is to work a 
mechanical system, it does very much matter what personal quality he brings to 
his work, because it is not going to be only his command of the reasoning process 
or his knowledge and learning that will determine his interpretation, but in the 
end, his experience of life and the structure of thought and belief that he has built 
upon it. 
       Lord Radcliffe
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 Lord Radcliffe, Not in Feather Beds (1
st
 edn, Hamish Hamilton Ltd 1968). 
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CHAPTER 1 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introducing the research issue 
 
‘Christian BA worker loses appeal over cross’1 
‘Christian B & B owners lose Supreme Court battle over gay discrimination’2 
‘Muslim woman must remove burka in court, judge insists’3 
‘Judge rules Jehovah’s Witness boy can receive blood transfusion’4 
 
Baroness Butler-Sloss recently wrote: ‘…it is rare for a day to pass in which religion 
does not feature in one way or another in the news headlines’.5 One of the key areas 
in which it does so concerns matters involving the interface between law and 
religion. The headlines above offer a snapshot of the sorts of religious issues that the 
courts have been required to adjudicate in the twenty-first century. The first relates to 
the high profile case of Eweida v. British Airways plc,
6
 in which the domestic courts 
held that the claimant, a practising Coptic Christian, had not been discriminated 
against because of her religion when her employer refused to allow her to wear a 
small, but visible cross whilst at work.
7
 In Bull v Hall,
8
 the ‘Christian B & B owners’ 
case, the court held that Christian hoteliers who had refused to let out a double room 
to a homosexual couple on the basis that to do so was contrary to their religious 
                                                 
1‘Christian BA worker loses appeal over cross’ The Guardian (London 12 February 2010) 
<<www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/feb/12/christian-british-airways-worker-cross> accessed 12 June 
2017. 
2‘Christian B & B owners lose Supreme Court battle over gay discrimination’ The Telegraph (London 
27 November 2013) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10477636/Christian-BandB-owners-lose-
Supreme-Court-battle-over-gay-discrimination.html> accessed 12 June 2017. 
3
 Rosa Silverman, ‘Muslim woman must remove burkas in court, judge insists’ The Telegraph 
(London 23 August 2013) www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10261550/Muslim-
woman-must-remove-burka-in-court-judge-insists.html accessed 12 June 2017.. 
4
 Judge rules Jehovah’s Witness boy can receive blood transfusion’ The Guardian (London 8 
December 2014) www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/08/judge-rules-jehovahs-witness-boy-blood-
transfusion accessed 12 June 2017. 
5
 Javier Garcia Oliva and Helen Hall, Religion, Law and the Constitution: Balancing Beliefs in Britain 
(Routledge 2017). 
6
 [2010] EWCA Civ 80.  
7
 cf the subsequent decision of the ECtHR in Eweida v UK (2013) ECHR 37. 
8
 [2013] UKSC 73. 
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beliefs had unlawfully discriminated against on grounds of sexual orientation. In R v 
D(R),
9
 the court considered whether a female defendant was entitled to wear the 
niqaab during criminal proceedings against her. In this much publicised case, the 
court directed that the defendant could wear the niqaab during her trial, except for 
when she gave evidence, and that she could give evidence from behind a screen or 
by live TV link, so long as she was visible to the judge, the jury and counsel. The 
final headline relates to the case of NHS Trust v B,
10
 in which Moylan J ordered that 
a blood transfusion could be administered to a child who needed a skin graft having 
suffered severe burns, despite the objections of the parents who opposed this 
treatment on grounds of their religious beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
Whilst these examples relate to cases expressly involving the manifestation of 
religious beliefs, there are many other situations in which religiously sensitive issues 
may arise in court: right to life or right to die disputes,
11
 matters relating to  
education,
12
 and disputes in relation to marriage or divorce,
13
 to name but a few. 
Given the importance of religion in many people’s lives and on-going debate about 
the role played by religion in the public fora, such headlines, together with cases 
involving religious issues which do not attract media attention, raise a simple 
question: Does a judge’s faith ever affect his or her judicial decision-making? With 
the principle of judicial impartiality forming part of the foundation of a democratic 
civil society, to claim that there is a personal dimension to judicial decision-making 
which sometimes influences how cases are reasoned is controversial; as Rackley 
asserts, ‘the merest whiff that an outcome of any case rests – to any extent – on the 
personality, preferences or characteristics of the judge that hears it causes 
                                                 
9
 [2013] Eq LR 1034. 
10
 [2014] EWHC 3486 (Fam). 
11
 Eg R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61 in which the question was whether the 
husband of a terminally ill patient would be given immunity from prosecution from the DPP if he 
assisted her suicide and, if not, whether s2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 was incompatible with, inter 
alia, ECHR art 9; also the controversial case of Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates [2017] EWCA 
Civ 410 (CA) in which the court had to determine whether it was in a baby’s best interests to have life 
support withdrawn or if his parents’ wish for the baby to receive experimental treatment in the US 
should be granted.  
12
 Eg R(R ) v Leeds City Council [2005] EWHC 2495 in which the question was whether the local 
authority should be required to provide free transport to Orthodox Jewish Children based in Leeds 
who wanted to attend a Jewish school in Manchester. 
13
 Eg in Al-Saffar v Al-Saffar [2012] EWCA Civ 1103 (CA) the court ruled that, contrary to the 
Muslim tradition where maintenance is not usually paid to the ex-wife irrespective of whether  there 
are children involved, a Muslim married under Sharia Law would have to pay his ex-wife 
maintenance in accordance with English law. 
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considerable consternation and upset among litigants and the general public’.14 Yet, 
is it realistic to suppose that judges are always able to dissociate personal factors, 
including their religious beliefs, from their legal analysis and other aspects of their 
decision-making, particularly in cases involving religiously sensitive issues such as 
those above? If not, how can this be reconciled with the need for judicial 
impartiality? These questions drive the central claim underpinning this thesis: 
Judges’ religious beliefs, like other personal factors, inevitably play a role in 
judging, particularly in cases involving religiously sensitive issues. Crucially, 
however, a judge’s professional role commitments, together with other legal and 
non-legal constraints, are sufficiently robust to curb the influence that religious 
beliefs (and other judicial personal factors) may otherwise have on the process of 
judicial decision-making.  
There is an existing body of empirical research that explores how judges’ religion 
and other personal factors affect how decisions are reached, most of which emanates 
from studies of judging in the US appellate courts (this will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3). Although this research is generally inconclusive in relation to many legal 
areas, when the focus is more narrowly drawn to cases involving religiously 
sensitive issues, the evidence suggests that judges’ faith may sometimes be a salient 
factor in how judicial decisions are reached. In contrast, there is a dearth of extant 
empirical research that explores how religion and other non-legal factors affect the 
judicial decision-making process in relation to the British courts.  
 
This thesis fills an important gap in the literature by undertaking an empirical 
investigation into whether the religious beliefs of judges are perceived to influence 
judicial decision-making in the English courts. The relationship is explored from the 
unique perspective of lawyers who appear before judges, specifically barristers and 
solicitors.
15
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Erika Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity (Taylor and 
Francis 2012) 134. 
15
 Throughout the thesis, ‘lawyers’ is used to refer to barristers and solicitors only. 
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The overarching research question is simply stated: 
 
Do lawyers perceive that a judge’s religious beliefs influence his or her 
individual judicial decision-making, and if so how? 
 
In exploring this question directly, the following questions are also considered: 
 
 Whether, and if so how, judges’ personal factors are perceived by lawyers to 
impinge on the process of judging? 
 How do judges alleviate the influence of such factors i.e. how do they 
demonstrate professionalism? 
 Do lawyers think that judges understand and are sensitive to religious issues? 
 Would increasing religious diversity in the judiciary make a difference to 
lawyers’ perceptions of how judges adjudicate religious issues? 
 If judges’ religious beliefs are perceived to affect how decisions are reached, 
should there be a general requirement for judges to disclose their religious 
beliefs? 
 
1.2 Background: Changing landscapes 
 
Rise of judicial power and the ‘juridification’ of religion16 
 
In the last few decades there has been an unprecedented expansion in the power and 
reach of the judiciary in the UK, especially compared to the other branches of 
government.
17
 A rise in the political significance of the judiciary in particular, what 
Bogdanor has described as a ‘quiet but profound revolution’,18 can be traced to a 
number of factors. These include, but are not limited to: the UK’s accession to the 
European Union (which means that the UK courts may have to disapply UK law 
when inconsistent with EU law); the vigorous growth of judicial review which 
requires the courts to review the propriety of action taken by a public body in 
exercising a public function; the growth of the welfare state; the effects of 
                                                 
16
 Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (CUP 2011). 
17
 Alan Paterson and Chris Paterson, ‘Guarding the guardians? Towards an independent, accountable 
and diverse senior judiciary’ (2012) CentreForum < www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/guarding-the-
guardians.pdf> accessed 10 December 2016. 
18
 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Parliament and the judiciary: the problem of accountability’, Lecture to the UK 
Public Administration Consortium, February 9 2006. 
19 
 
devolution; the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which 
incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)  into domestic law 
(and gives the courts the power to uphold specific rights under the ECHR and to 
make declarations as to the compatibility of domestic law with Convention rights, 
whilst crucially preserving the sovereignty of Parliament by not permitting the courts 
to strike down incompatible legislation); changes brought about by the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, including increased leadership and administrative 
responsibilities for judges (such tasks were previously undertaken by the Lord 
Chancellor and his officials), and the establishment of the UK Supreme Court 
(UKSC), which contributes to the strengthening of the judiciary, at least 
symbolically, by providing a physical and functional separation of the UKSC from 
the legislature (even though, arguably, the powers of the court are not radically 
different to those enjoyed previously by the Law Lords).
19
 
 
One consequence of this growth in the judicial remit is that the courts are 
increasingly called upon to adjudicate disputes which involve novel, controversial or 
sensitive issues. As Lady Hale acknowledges, one such area concerns cases that, 
directly or indirectly, involve the interface between law and religion.
20
 Indeed, since 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, there has been a proliferation of cases with 
a religious dimension. Such cases arise in a variety of legal contexts, examples of 
which are legion: race and religious discrimination disputes in the workplace,
21
 the 
provision of goods or services,
22
 or in education;
23
 asylum claims on religious 
freedom grounds;
24
 religious upbringing disputes in family law;
25
 medical cases 
involving life-sustaining medical treatment,
26
 religiously motivated crimes;
27
 and 
                                                 
19
 Erin Delaney, ‘Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom’ (2014) 108 NW U 
L Rev 572. 
20
 Lady Hale,‘Secular judges and Christian Law’ (2015) 17 Ecc LJ 170. 
21
 Eg Eweida (n6). 
22
 Eg Bull (n8). 
23
 Eg R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL15 concerning 
religious dress at school. 
24
 Eg MT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKUT 00277(IAC) in which fear of 
religious persecution was held to be a ground for claiming asylum. 
25
 Eg Re G [2012] All ER (D) 50 in which the court had to determine whether the best interests of 
children from an ultra-orthodox Jewish family could be served by being educated at their mother’s 
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questions about funerary rites.
28
 The growth in the number of cases involving 
religious issues has largely been precipitated by significant developments in both the 
quantity and ambit of laws which regulate or affect religion, particularly, but not 
exclusively, in relation to human rights and discrimination law. Sandberg describes 
this phenomenon as the ‘juridification of religion’.29 It might be expected that judges 
are more likely to consciously or unconsciously reflect upon and/or be influenced by 
their own religious values when dealing with religiously sensitive cases compared to 
those without a religious dimension. 
Decline in religious affiliation 
 
Contemporaneously, the religious landscape in Britain is in flux. Whilst still 
officially regarded as a Christian state, Woodhead observes that the cultural 
monopoly once enjoyed by the institutionalised forms of Christianity in the UK has 
waned.
30
 Dawkins goes further; he suggests that  ‘religion under the aegis of the 
established Church has become little more than a social pastime’.31 Such views are 
supported by evidence that indicates that the proportion of people who describe 
themselves as having no religion in England and Wales now exceeds that of those 
who define themselves as Christian – 48.5% as compared to 43.8%.32 Moreover, it is 
unclear whether those who do align themselves with a particular faith are: (1) active 
members of the religious group; (2) those who ‘believe without belonging’, what 
Voas describes as ‘a fuzzy intermediate’;33 or (3) those who essentially belong 
without believing, most typically by reason of family tradition or cultural 
expectation, and whose religiosity is nominal at best. Concomitant to this decline, 
there has been an increase in people who identify with minority religious groups, 
                                                                                                                                          
27
 Relevant legislation includes Crime and Disorder Act 1998 amended by Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 and Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Incitement to religious hatred under the 
Public Order Act 1986. 
28
 Eg R (Ghai) v Newcastle City Council [2010] EWHC 978 (Admin) concerning whether domestic 
laws accommodated the wishes of a Hindu to have an open-air cremation. 
29
 Sandberg (n16). 
30
 Linda Woodhead and Rebecca Catto, ‘Religion or belief’: Identifying Issues and Priorities 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 48, 2010). 
31
 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Black Swan Publishers 2007). 
32
 Harriet Sherwood, ‘People of no religion outnumber Christians in England and Wales – study’ The 
Guardian (London, 23 May 2016). 
33
 David Voas and Alasdair Crockett, ‘Religion in Britain: Neither Believing nor Belonging’ [2005] 
39 Sociology 11. 
21 
 
both Christian and non-Christian.
34
 Principally attributed to immigration following 
the aftermath of the Second World War, other causes include a growth in break-away 
religions based on, but different to, traditional faith groups, and a steady rise in new 
religious movements.
35
  
 
Together, these changes have led Freedland and Vickers to argue that the UK is in a 
theoretical state of transition from one of tolerance in which Christianity enjoys 
primacy over other religions (but recognises that other faiths must not be 
disadvantaged through their own beliefs) to a diverse and multi-cultural climate in 
which all faiths are equal before the law.
36
 This trend is unlikely to abate given the 
current ‘unsettled and unsettling context of the international environment’,37 such as 
the recent surge of migrants entering Europe as a result of the current state of turmoil 
and unrest in areas such as the Middle East and East Africa. In fact, some research 
suggests that active adherents of minority faiths or those with no religion will 
continue to increase in the UK and are forecast to outnumber the Christian 
community by 2050.
38
  
 
New Challenges 
 
It is widely acknowledged that many of the fundamental values which undergird the 
British legal system are founded in a Judaeo-Christian heritage. When national life 
was still essentially Christian-centric (when, it is suggested, those sitting in judgment 
and those involved in lawsuits were very likely to have a similar Christian outlook) 
there was limited scope for religion-induced tension in the courtroom, be it based on 
religious differences between the parties or as a result of faith issues clashing with 
the law. As Munby LJ observes, a little over a century ago, ‘the purpose of the law 
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was the enforcement of morals. And that morality was of course, Christian’.39 This is 
clearly exemplified in the legal approach relating to sexual issues and the common 
law offence of blasphemy and blasphemous libel.
40
 
However, shifting contours in both the judicio-legal and religious landscapes have 
given rise to a new climate. Whilst once Christian beliefs were central, the courts 
now have a very different approach. In R (Johns) v Derby City Council, the 
Divisional Court explained that today: 
The laws and usages of the realm do not include Christianity, in whatever 
form. The aphorism that ‘Christianity is part of the common law of England’ 
is mere rhetoric; at least since the decision of the House of Lords in Bowman 
v Secular Society Limited [1917] AC 406 it has been impossible to contend 
that it is law.
41
 
In the landmark case of Bowman v Secular Society Limited,
42
 the relatives of the 
testator, Bowman, sought to invalidate a pecuniary legacy bequeathed by him to the 
Secular Society. They  argued that as Christianity was part of the law of the land, and 
the objects of the Secular Society illegal in that they constituted blasphemous libel 
(because they involved a denial of Christianity), the bequest was invalid. Overruling 
Cowan v Milbourn,
43
 the Lords found that as the memorandum and articles of the 
Secular Society were not morally subversive or contrary to the law, the bequest was 
valid. As Lord Parker stated, to find otherwise would wrongly preclude courts from 
giving effect to trusts for the purposes of religions which did not accept the 
fundamental doctrines of Christianity.
44
 
It was further observed in R(Johns) v Derby City Council  that: 
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Although historically this country is part of the Christian west, and although it 
has an established church which is Christian, there have been enormous 
changes in the social and religious life of our country over the last century. Our 
society is now pluralistic and largely secular. But one aspect of its pluralism is 
that we also now live in a multi-cultural community of many faiths. One of the 
paradoxes of our lives is that we live in a society which has at one and the 
same time become both increasingly secular but also increasingly diverse in 
religious affiliation.
45
 
Thus, unlike their forebears, judges today sit in secular courts serving a religiously 
plural society.
46
 The approach of the common law is respect for, and an essentially 
neutral view of, an individual’s religious beliefs, together with ‘a benevolent 
tolerance of cultural and religious diversity’.47 The courts do not recognise religious 
distinctions and are reluctant to pass judgment on religious beliefs or the tenets, 
doctrines or rules of any particular section of society.
48
  
This approach has been reinforced by the coming into effect of the HRA, section 3 of 
which has placed an obligation on judges, so far as it is possible to do so, to read and 
give effect to domestic primary and subordinate legislation in a way which is 
compatible with the rights and freedoms protected under the ECHR. These changes 
present new challenges for the judiciary, both at a collective and individual level. For 
example, the growth in cultural and religious pluralism means that the religious 
beliefs of those appearing in court are often different from, and unfamiliar to, the 
judges hearing the cases. The court may have to decide what constitutes ‘religion’ 
and consider whether specific religious beliefs and practices qualify for legal 
protection. This in itself is no easy task; as McCrudden observes, it ‘involves the 
difficult epistemological question of how courts can truly understand a normative 
system other than a legal system’.49  Moreover, as Mnookin has argued in relation to 
family law cases involving  issues such as what is in the best interests of a child, a 
plurality of values in society makes it more difficult for the courts to determine what 
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values should be used in judicial determinations.
50
 A similar argument can be 
advanced in relation to other areas of law.  
Most importantly, the cases coming before the courts now often involve religiously 
sensitive issues about which there is often no legal precedent. As Singh LJ reflects, 
in cases where the rules are not clear-cut or run out, the question is ‘Where are 
values to be found if not in the subjective views of the individual judge?’51 Plainly, 
these previously unexplored issues challenge judicial preconceptions and the 
expectations that others have of judges.
52
  
Whilst judges are increasingly tasked with deciding cases involving religious issues, 
the junction between judges’ religion and judging, like many other aspects of judicial 
decision-making, remains largely unexplored in relation to the British judiciary.
53
 
This exploratory study aims to add a new and important dimension to a small but 
growing body of academic literature which seeks to further the understanding of how 
judges judge in the UK, with a view to helping plug what Genn describes as the 
‘information black hole’ that exists in our current understanding of judicial decision-
making.
54
 Moreover, it seeks to contribute to judicial diversity debate; if religion is 
considered to play a role in how judges decide cases, is there a case for religion to be 
considered in future judicial diversity initiatives? 
At the same time, it is important to note that the researcher is not suggesting that 
religion is the only or most important factor that affects how judges reach decisions; 
the researcher agrees with Genn who posits that the complexities of decision-
making, particularly in a juridical context, are far too great to draw firm conclusions 
as to the impact of factors such as religion on case outcomes.
55
 Rather, the central 
objective of this doctoral study is to serve as an entry point from which the hitherto 
unexplored relationship between judges’ religion and judicial decision-making in the 
British courts can be examined. 
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1.3 Explaining the focus on religion 
 
Above, it was explained that the judiciary’s sphere of influence has grown 
considerably over the last few decades. Until recently, this expanding judicial remit 
has not been met with a commensurate growth in academic enquiry leading Thomas 
to describe the lack of in-depth knowledge about the UK judiciary as ‘unacceptable 
and dangerous’.56 Despite a now burgeoning interest in judicial studies and 
judgecraft in relation to the British courts, difficulties in, and the sensitive nature of, 
conducting research relating to judges’ religious beliefs mean that scholars continue 
to be reticent to engage in theoretical or empirical studies that explore the role of 
judges’ faith in judging.57 Indeed, the claim that using empirical legal studies to 
understand judging is ‘practically impossible’ has particular resonance in this 
context.
58
 Nevertheless, there are three main reasons why this topic merits further 
investigation. 
Allay concerns about bias 
The extent to which religion should permeate the public realm is one of the most 
hotly debated issues of the present day.
59
 Although in a juridical context, religion 
is said not to be the business of government or the secular courts,
60
 the judiciary 
are increasingly called upon to determine cases with overt or underlying religious 
dimensions. Judges, as professional decision-makers, are expected to decide these 
cases, as all others, solely on the facts and the law. However, where a judge has 
particularly strong religious beliefs on a matter concerning religious issues about 
which they must adjudicate, questions may be asked as to whether the judge is 
able to, or has determined the case before them without their own religious views 
affecting the judicial decision-making process. 
Where there is a lack of knowledge or understanding as to what factors affect 
judicial decisions makes it impossible to support or refute allegations that 
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judgments may have been improperly influenced by personal factors such as 
religion. A recent case illustrates these points well. In R v. Sarah Louise Catt,
61
 
the defendant was found guilty of administering drugs to procure her own 
miscarriage, 39 weeks into her pregnancy, contrary to the Offences against the 
Persons Act 1861. The presiding judge, Cooke J, a former vice-president of the 
Lawyers’ Christian Fellowship, was heavily criticised by the media for the length 
of sentence handed down to the defendant.
62
 Moreover, concerns were expressed 
about his sentencing remarks, particularly the following: 
There is no mitigation available by reference to the Abortion Act, whatever 
view one takes of its provisions which are, wrongly, liberally construed in 
practice so as to make abortion available essentially on demand prior to 24 
weeks with the approval of registered medical practitioners.
63
  
Some commentators interpreted Cooke J’s remarks as indicating his tacit disapproval 
of abortion in line with his conservative Christian beliefs. An alternative 
interpretation may simply be that Cooke J considered the Abortion Act 1967 to have 
been construed in a way not intended by Parliament. What is clear, however, is that 
in the absence of a better understanding of how judges reach decisions, criticism 
about the sentence and sentencing remarks cannot be supported or discredited.
64
 
Whilst empirical data exploring religion and judging would not provide unequivocal 
evidence as to whether individual judgments were subject to proper or improper 
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influences, it could be used to indicate consistency (or indeed inconsistency) in 
judging, and support or dampen claims that judges’ decisions may occasionally be 
inappropriately influenced by non-legal factors.  
As explained above, judges do not generally decide religious matters where the 
tenets of religious belief or faith are disputed, or the correctness of religious practices 
is in question. However, where religious issues do fall within the justiciability of the 
courts and they must determine whether the religious rights of an individual or 
religious organisation have or have not been breached, the judiciary may once again 
find itself subject to criticism. On these cases, rather than questioning the 
impartiality of a judge with particular religious beliefs (or non-religious beliefs), it 
may be argued that the religiously neutral approach of the courts is itself a form of 
partiality – the favouring of a secular view.  
This can be seen in McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd,
65
 in which Lord Carey, former 
Archbishop of Canterbury, launched a scathing attack on senior judges for having 
what he regarded as an anti-religious (anti-Christian) stance. McFarlane, a devout 
Christian and relationship counsellor, brought an unsuccessful claim against his 
employer for discrimination contrary to the Employment Equality (Religion or 
Belief) Regulations 2003 (EERBR). He was dismissed after refusing to provide 
psycho-sexual therapy for same-sex couples on the grounds that to provide such 
would be contrary to his Christian faith. In a strongly worded witness statement 
lodged in support of McFarlane’s application for leave to appeal against the decision 
of the EAT, Lord Carey criticised the judiciary for recent ‘disturbing judgments’, 
such as in Eweida
66
 and Ladele.
67
 He claimed that Christian faith was increasingly 
being undermined by legal reasoning which threatened ‘future civil unrest’,68 and 
demonstrated a ‘worrying lack of awareness of Christian religious and cultural 
manifestations’.69 He further asserted that, because judges were unaware of basic 
issues relating to Christian faith, it was difficult to see how the judiciary could 
appropriately adjudicate cases involving minority religions where practices were 
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even further removed from more familiar Christian traditions.
70
 Clearly, such claims 
that judges are theological illiterate are unsubstantiated in the absence of further 
evidence or understanding of how judges decide religiously sensitive cases. 
Judicial diversity 
A second justification for this research is rooted in judicial diversity debate. A 
central argument in support of diversity in the judiciary is that if the judiciary is to 
successfully earn the public’s trust and respect, a heterogeneous bench which fairly 
reflects contemporary society is required.
71
  The problem with religious diversity in 
this respect is that, unlike visible characteristics such as gender, individuals’ 
religious beliefs are often hidden (sometimes through choice). As such, it is difficult 
to determine whether the judiciary are representative of an increasingly religiously 
pluralistic society. Even if the judiciary is religiously heterogeneous, the fact that it 
is not immediately obvious may render it of little symbolic significance to the wider 
public. Here, it is suggested that a greater understanding of the nexus between 
judges’ religion and judicial decision-making can serve as an alternative means by 
which to foster public confidence in the judiciary. That said, at the same time there is 
a risk that digging deeper could have the opposite effect. 
An additional argument emanating from the judicial diversity debate is that based on 
the notion of difference (this theme is touched upon in Chapter 3).
72
 The standard 
application of difference-based theory to judging posits female judges have certain 
perspectives and life experiences which means they adjudicate differently from their 
male counterparts. In the same way that female or feminist judges may bring a new 
dimension to decision-making, so it can be argued that other judicial characteristics 
such as religion may positively affect judging.
73
 In particular, at an appellate level 
where collegiate decisions are common, it has been suggested an amalgam of 
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different personal values and experiences may be more likely to result in a just 
decision.
74
 On this basis, excluding judges’ religious affiliations from studies that 
investigate the ways in which non-legal factors influence judicial decision-making 
fails to capture a complete picture of how judges judge.  
Raising awareness and improving judging 
Finally, perhaps a less obvious reason for conducting such research is that it may 
improve how judges judge. As Hallett LJ, chairman of the Judicial College 
acknowledges, even though judicial decision-making is at the core of the judicial 
role, judges know very little about the judicial decision-making process itself.
75
 
Accordingly, as Sisk has argued, evidence which sheds light on whether, inter alia, 
judges’ religious beliefs influence judgments, or are perceived to affect judging, may 
be useful in raising judicial self-awareness as to how personal preferences inform 
judicial decisions which could help improve judging.
76
  
 
1.4 Lawyers’ perceptions 
 
Part one of this study involved qualitative interviews with barristers to gain insight 
into the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision-making. 
In part two, solicitors were invited to complete an online questionnaire (SPQ) in 
which they were asked for their views about the same. The resulting data was 
integrated at the interpreting and reporting stages of the study. This section sets out 
the justification for this approach. 
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Lack of judicial co-operation 
It is well known that researchers, especially early stage researchers, are faced with a 
number of challenges when attempting to conduct empirical research involving the 
judiciary.
77
 The first, and arguably most difficult, obstacle to overcome is securing 
access to members of the judiciary. If the researcher is granted access, the next major 
challenge is how to obtain a sufficiently large and representative number of willing 
participants, particularly if involvement from those at the most senior levels is 
sought.
78
 Even if these challenges are overcome, there may be certain questions that 
judges cannot be asked or they refuse to answer. For example, Darbyshire explains 
how a question about judges’ political backgrounds was censored from her interview 
schedule when carrying out observational research of judges in the lower and higher 
courts.
79
  
Notwithstanding these potential difficulties, the most obvious starting point for this 
enquiry was to ask judges directly whether, and if so how, their own faith affects 
their judicial reasoning.
80
 In fact, the original research plan was to explore the nexus 
between judges’ faith and judging from a dual perspective, that of judges and 
barristers. However, disappointingly, the researcher’s application for judicial 
participation was refused (Appendix 1). The Judicial Office advised as follows: 
As you will be aware, on appointment to judicial office all judges take the 
judicial oath and undertake to ‘do right to all manner of people after the laws 
and usages of this realm without fear or favour, affection or ill will’.  It is, 
therefore, our view that judges administer the law in accordance with the 
judicial oath and any perception that judges allow matters other than the 
evidence and arguments presented in court to influence their decision-making 
could potentially undermine public confidence in the judiciary. 
That the judiciary, at least at an institutional level, are reluctant to enter into 
conversations that touch upon sensitive topics such as religion, judicial impartiality 
and objectivity brings into sharp focus the sensitivities of, and problems associated 
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with, any investigation into the personal dimension to judging. The reply above, 
made on behalf of the Lord Chief Justice and Senior President of Tribunals, is all the 
more interesting given that many senior judges readily acknowledge that personal 
values do play a part in their adjudication (discussed in Chapter 2.4). Clearly there 
are legitimate questions to be asked about the role of personal factors in the process 
of judging, even though these may be questions which members of the judiciary find 
difficult to discuss. 
Which lawyers? 
Notwithstanding the unsuccessful request for judicial participation, it was decided 
that the objectives of this study could instead be fulfilled by exploring religion and 
judging by an alternative means; through the lens of barristers and solicitors. The 
pragmatic approach taken in this study is consistent with the view of Baldwin and 
Davis who point out that where obstacles prevent legal researchers from examining 
certain subjects in the way that they wish, studies of sensitive subjects must often 
proceed on the basis of ‘second-best approaches’.81  Here, in the absence of a judicial 
perspective, it is suggested that an empirical examination of lawyers’ perceptions of 
the religion-judging relationship, at the very least, provides the ‘second-best’ option.  
As specialist legal advisers and courtroom advocates, barristers appear before and 
interact with judges on a regular, often daily basis in the lower and higher courts. 
Paterson identifies the dialogue between judges and counsel as a key factor in 
understanding judicial decision-making in the Supreme Court.
82
 As such, barristers 
are well placed to offer an informed perspective on the research topic. Their views 
are given slight priority over the solicitors who participated in this study due to the 
method used to collect their data (which provided a more in-depth insight than the 
SPQ allowed). Solicitors were identified as an alternative source from which to 
investigate the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judging. Like 
barristers, they are expert legal advisers.  Working directly with clients, solicitors 
often negotiate on behalf of their clients and will, if necessary, represent them in the 
lower courts. Solicitors with higher rights of audience can represent clients in the 
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higher courts (Crown Court, High Court and Court of Appeal).
83
 If they do not carry 
out their own advocacy and counsel is instructed, a solicitor may still attend court 
and provide assistance to the barrister as required. Thus, like those at the Bar, 
solicitors who attend court on a regular basis have relevant first-hand knowledge of 
how judges reach decisions. Of course, both barristers and solicitors may also be 
aware of judges’ personal factors from social relationships with judges outside of the 
courtroom (for example, if a judge has acted as pupil Master to a barrister or from 
social events).
84
  
 
It is acknowledged that exploring the relationship between judges’ religion and 
judging through a lawyers’ lens is open to criticism for representing lawyers’ 
perceptions of reality, rather than the reality of judicial decision-making itself.
85
 
Notwithstanding this criticism, it is contended that lawyers’ perceptions of judges, 
the courts and the justice system are a useful means by which to understand how 
judges judge. First, as Murray Gleeson, former Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia observes, lawyers, particularly those whose work regularly takes them into 
the courts, can exert a strong influence on the way in which the public sees the 
courts;
86
it is often lawyers who tell litigants what to expect in terms of court 
procedure and process, likely outcomes and what the presiding judge is like. For 
many members of the public who have limited or no courtroom experience, and 
whose knowledge of the law and judging is probably driven by media 
representations of the justice system, lawyers’ perceptions offer an insight into 
judging from those who are at the coalface, but  more accessible to the public than 
the judges themselves. Second, the study may be useful to the judiciary in so far as it 
sheds light on how their work is perceived by other professional legal actors; in this 
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respect, it could be seen as an elementary form of peer review. Academics may also 
be interested in this study to see whether research that explores the relationship 
between judges’ faith and adjudication is a viable area of further enquiry.  The study 
may also be of interest to a generalist legal audience. In conclusion, the views of 
lawyers who come into contact with judges in the course of their work offer a novel, 
but valuable, distinct and informed insight into the process of judicial decision-
making for a variety of audiences. In this regard, despite the absence of a judicial 
perspective, this study makes an original contribution to the existing literature on 
judicial behaviour. 
Which courts? 
Most of the studies that examine judging in practice, particularly those relating to the 
US, focus on adjudication in the appellate courts, most usually the final court of 
appeal. The main justification for this is that it is in these courts where judges are 
most likely to exercise judicial discretion, therefore creating an environment in 
which judicial personal factors may, consciously or unconsciously, enter the 
adjudication process. This study takes a different approach wherein judging is 
explored from the perspective of lawyers who appear in both higher and lower courts 
rather than spotlighting a specific court. This approach is driven by several 
considerations. First, from a practical perspective, cases involving overtly religiously 
sensitive issues are relatively few and far between in the UKSC. Limiting the survey 
only to those lawyers who are involved in these cases is unduly restrictive and 
unlikely to yield meaningful results. Whilst it is agreed that the scope for judicial 
discretion is at its greatest in disputes heard by the appellate courts, it is not only in 
these courts in which discretion is exercised. Judges up and down the land must 
exercise their value-judgment on a daily basis.  In trying to get some sense of what 
practitioners think about the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and 
judging, at least in an exploratory study, it makes sense to look at the issue wherever 
it arises in the court hierarchy, rather than limiting the study to a single court. In any 
case, as Cowan et al. point out, a focus on the higher courts rests on challengeable 
assumptions about the ‘radiating effects’ of the law’;87 or in Galanter’s words, ‘that 
the authoritative pronouncements of the highest courts penetrate automatically – 
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swiftly, costlessly, without distortion – to all corners of the legal world’.88 Here, by 
concentrating on the issue horizontally across courts, rather than the decision-making 
of a particular court, spotlights judges as individuals, rather than within the broader 
institutional context.  
 
Which areas of law? 
 
The lawyers involved in the study are primarily employment law or family law 
specialists.  Lawyers with expertise in these fields were specifically chosen because 
employment and family cases were identified by the researcher as being two areas of 
law where religious issues may be central to the disputes in question (such as 
religious discrimination in employment claims and issues concerning the religious 
upbringing of children).
89
  
 
Many of those who took part have extensive experience of representing litigants in 
the employment tribunals and County Courts. The barristers, together with a small 
number of the solicitors who said that they have civil higher rights of audience, also 
appear in civil proceedings in the higher courts. The family law barristers and 
solicitors who attend court on a regular basis typically appear at first instance in the 
Family Court, usually in front of District Judges in the County Court or in the 
Family Proceedings Court.
90
  Several barristers and a small number of the solicitors 
indicated that they have experience of High Court and appellate work.  
The views of solicitors who, at the time of the study, attended court infrequently are 
included in this study. It is acknowledged that this data is of limited value, not least 
because these solicitors’ perceptions of how judges judge may be based on little 
more than supposition rather than actual courtroom experience. Despite this 
limitation, the views of these practitioners are included for three reasons. Firstly, 
many of these solicitors indicated that whilst they do not attend court on a regular 
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basis (more than once a month, see Chapter 4) they attended court on a more 
frequent basis shortly before their participation in this study. Secondly, these 
solicitors are acculturated in, and part of the same legal system as the other lawyers 
who participated in the study. Thirdly, it provides the researcher with an opportunity 
to consider whether lawyers’ perceptions of how judges reach decisions differ 
according to whether they are based on judging in practice (views of the regular 
attendees at court) or views about how judges ought to judge (views of non-frequent 
attendees). Where the views of solicitors who attend court less frequently have been 
included in the research results, these are distinguished from the regular attendees. 
 
Alternative approaches considered and rejected 
Consideration was given to alternative approaches by which to explore the 
relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judging.  
First, given the unsuccessful request for judicial participation in the study, the 
idea of asking retired judges to reflect upon how their religious beliefs influenced 
their judicial approach to the law was explored. However, this line of enquiry was 
quickly rejected on the basis that an application for permission to approach retired 
judges was unlikely to prove fruitful for the same reasons as that encountered in 
relation to current members of the judiciary.  
Second, the possibility of conducting a content-analysis of some of the seminal 
cases on the freedom of religion heard in the UK courts (including issues such as 
religious dress in the workplace and opting out of work duties) was considered. 
However this approach was rejected on three grounds: (1) there is no reliable data 
about judges’ religious convictions so connecting judges’ faith with actual 
judgments would be impossible, (2) in any case, written judgments are unlikely to 
contain overt references to the decision-maker’s own religious beliefs, even if 
such factors were at play, and (3) the researcher was keen to focus on the 
influence of faith on decision-making process, not solely on case outcomes. That 
said, in the light of interesting work carried out by scholars such as Cahill-
O’Callaghan and Hanretty (discussed further in Chapter 3),91 it is acknowledged 
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that adopting values-based approaches to look for evidence of the impact of 
religious values may be a viable approach in future.  
Third, the idea of inviting senior barristers, effectively serving as a proxy for 
current judges, to respond to vignettes constructed on hypothetical legal cases 
involving religiously sensitive issues was explored. However, this option was 
dismissed because it would have been too time-prohibitive for participants.  
Fourth, the possibility of an approach akin to that in the Feminist Judging Project 
was considered whereby individuals from different religious backgrounds would 
have been invited to provide alternative judgments to actual cases involving 
religious issues already determined in the English courts.
92
 It was decided that 
successfully attracting a sufficient range of individuals from different religious 
backgrounds who would be prepared to commit time to writing alternative 
judgments was not viable.  
Finally, consideration was given as to the feasibility of asking the general public 
for their views on whether judges’ religious beliefs affect the process of judging. 
This approach was rejected on two grounds: (1) many members of the public have 
little or no first-hand experience of appearing in the courts; and, (2) even if the 
target population could be narrowed to a subset of the general public who had 
appeared at court, trying to further identify those involved in cases with a 
religiously sensitive dimension would prove problematic given the lack of time 
and resources available to the researcher. 
 
1.5 Researcher perspective 
 
The researcher’s perspective with respect to this study is best described as that of an 
‘outsider’, in the sense that the researcher is not a legal practitioner and has little 
courtroom experience. For the purpose of openness and transparency, given that the 
focus of this study is on how religion is perceived to affect judicial decision-making 
behaviour, the researcher declares their own religious identity as Agnostic. 
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1.6 Summary and structure of thesis 
 
This introductory chapter has explained the background to, and the motivation for, 
conducting this study. It argues that coincident changes in the legal and religious 
landscapes of Britain have precipitated a climate in which the law and religion 
increasingly converge. It has also set out the backdrop against which the current 
study has evolved and stated the research aims and design of this thesis.   
 
The remainder of the thesis is organised into 6 chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the key concepts underpinning this thesis including religion, 
theories of adjudication and impartiality. Chapter 3 provides a critical review of the 
existing literature on non-legal factors that affect judicial decision-making, both in 
relation to the courts in the UK and other jurisdictions. The feasibility of conducting 
research similar to that conducted extensively in other legal jurisdictions is 
discussed.  
Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology for the study as a whole. It describes 
the mixed methods design and justifies the reasons for its use. The focus then shifts 
to the methods used for, and the issues relating to, data collection, data management 
and data analysis in each of the qualitative (interviews) and predominantly 
quantitative (SPQ) phases of the research.  
Chapters 5 and 6 present and discuss the empirical data that was generated from 
parts one and two of this study.  In Chapter 5, lawyers’ responses to the central 
research question are addressed by looking at how they perceive the nature, 
frequency and impact of judges’ religion on judging. Chapter 6 considers lawyers’ 
views about calls for specialist courts to hear religious liberty claims, the 
depersonalisation of justice and religious diversity in the judiciary.  The thesis 
concludes in Chapter 7 with a summary of the main findings, limitations and 
implications of the study, along with suggestions for future research.  
In the next chapter, the focus turns to the theoretical frameworks upon which this 
study is based.
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CHAPTER 2 
RELIGION AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 CHAPTER 2  RELIGION AND JUDICIAL CHAPTER 2
DECISION-MAKING: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In the introductory chapter it was argued that given the increasing significance of the 
judiciary, a changing religiously pluralistic society, and an evolving legal landscape, 
an investigation as to whether a judge’s religion is perceived to affect judicial 
behaviour in the English courts is both relevant and timely. This chapter sets out the 
definitional and conceptual frameworks which serve as the backdrop to and guide the 
empirical part of this study. More specifically, it explores four key components 
which are integral to understanding the relationship between judges’ religion and 
judging in this study: (1) definitions of religion, (2) theories and models of 
adjudication, (3) judging from a judicial perspective, and (4) impartiality in an 
adjudicative context. 
 
2.2 Defining religion 
 
The starting point is to consider how religion is defined, both in a research and legal 
context, the purpose of which is three-fold. First, it provides evidence of the 
‘juridification’ of religion (discussed in Chapter 1.2).1 Second, it illustrates the sorts 
of cases in which judges’ religious beliefs may influence judging. Third, it is helpful 
in so far as the lawyers who participated in this study may have had a legal 
understanding of religion in mind when responding to survey questions in the 
interviews or the Solicitor Perceptions Questionnaire (SPQ). Indeed, the researcher’s 
use of ‘religion’ and associated terms was intended to broadly align with legal 
definitions of these terms as understood in human rights and discrimination law. 
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2.2.1 Religion as a research concept 
 
Religion is a hugely complex social phenomenon; it covers a variety of meanings 
and is multidimensional in construct, being cultural, organisational, personal and 
behavioural.
2
 It therefore comes as no surprise to find that no universal definition of 
religion exists. Furthermore, as Greil states, ‘It seems safe to assert that…that no 
consensus is likely to be reached in the foreseeable future’.3 
In recent years it has become conventional to focus on three facets of religious 
involvement when conducting research into religion: belief, practice and affiliation.
4
 
Religion as belief relates to the convictions that people have in respect of matters 
such as God or Gods, a transcendent order, codes of religious morality and doctrines 
of faith. This aspect of religion typically denotes a basic religious commitment, 
either as an individual or as part of a group, which emphasises the truth claims of the 
religion in question.
5
  Religion as practice concerns the way that religious beliefs are 
actively expressed by a religious adherent, for example, through behaviour such as 
attendance at religious services, the wearing of religious clothing or observance of 
dietary restrictions or religious holidays. These customs and rituals often distinguish 
the religious adherent from followers of other religions.
6
 Religion as practice varies 
considerably, often according to the strength of an individual’s religious convictions. 
For example, those with strongly held religious beliefs may assiduously observe the 
rituals and practices of their faith, whilst those with less strong religious commitment 
may choose to engage in limited activities or none at all. As will be shown below, 
these two facets of religious involvement loosely align with the two aspects of 
religious freedom protected under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). 
The third facet, ‘affiliation’, is typically used to denote an individual’s identity (as 
distinct from members of other faith groups).
7
 In this regard, McAndrew and Voas 
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suggest that religious affiliation is more like ethnicity because it is often linked to 
factors such as family, language, and cultural heritage, rather than, or as well as, 
shared theological beliefs.
8
 This is problematic because, for example, someone who 
self-identifies (or is identified by others) as, say, ‘Jewish’ or ‘Christian’ may use 
what facially appears to be a religious descriptor to denote either: (1) an adherence to 
the tenets of Judaism or Christianity, ie a religious identity, or (2) an ethnic, cultural 
or national identifier, in which case it may be that an individual who describes 
themselves as Jewish or Christian may nevertheless have different religious beliefs 
(e.g. they may be an Atheist Jew or Christian), ie a cultural identity, or (3) a 
combination of both.  Indeed this overlap between ethnicity and religion has proved 
problematic in the legal sphere. For example, prior to the introduction of laws 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief in 2003, the principal 
means of domestic legal redress for those suffering religious discrimination was 
found under the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA) based on grounds of race or 
ethnicity, rather than religion.
9
 Importantly, however, this avenue was available only 
to those falling within a particular racial or ethnic group; faith was effectively 
rendered irrelevant other than as a shared religion being indicative of ethnicity.
10
 
This approach led to the unsatisfactory situation where unequal treatment existed as 
between different ‘religious’ groups so, for example, Sikhs and Jews could rely on 
the race provisions,
11
 whilst no protection was afforded to Muslims unable to 
identify with a recognised racial or ethnic group.
12
  
More recently, the close relationship between religion and ethnicity was considered 
by the UKSC in the case of R(E) v Governing Body of JFS,
13
 in which the court had 
to determine whether a faith school’s (JFS) admission policy constituted direct racial 
discrimination under the RRA. The admission policy gave preference to children 
whose Jewish status was recognised by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR); that is, 
to children whose mothers satisfied the matrilineal test or were Jews by conversion 
to Orthodox standards. However, the child seeking entry to JFS did not meet the 
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OCR status requirements. The majority of the UKSC (5:4) held that JFS had 
unlawfully discriminated against the child on ground of ethnic origin. In contrast, the 
minority considered that the admission requirement was exclusively a religious 
requirement which did not depend on ethnic origins and so was not discriminatory 
under the RRA. 
Understanding religion as identity is further complicated by the fact that, unlike 
other fixed characteristics such as ethnicity, an individual can convert from one set 
of religious beliefs to another. In fact the right to change one’s religion or belief is 
itself recognised as a fundamental human right under ECHR, Article 9. In addition, 
of course, unlike many other characteristics, religious identity is often a latent 
characteristic. Therefore, unless the religious (or non-religious) adherent discloses 
his or her religion, the researcher must look to other (arguably less reliable) sources 
to obtain such information.  
Given the difficulty in trying to distil the influence of religious identity from other 
ethnic or cultural factors, it is helpful to articulate in what sense a religious identifier 
is intended to be applied. Here, it is suggested that the lawyers’ views about judges’ 
religious beliefs are predominantly based on perceptions of judicial religious or 
ethno-religious practice and affiliation, as opposed to judges’ cultural (non- 
religious) identities. 
A further distinction:  Religious or moral values? 
In addition to the definitional matters discussed above it should be borne in mind 
that when discussing religion it is difficult to ignore the complex philosophical 
enquiries about the relationship between religion and morality, particularly  the 
question of whether moral values are independent from what are often religious 
values or religion provides the foundation from which moral values are developed. 
If, as argued in Section 2.5 below, judges cannot approach cases in a moral value-
free vacuum, the way that an individual perceives the relationship between a judge’s 
religious convictions and decision-making is likely to depend on how they 
understand the association between religion and morality. Where religious beliefs are 
not deemed to be qualitatively different from other beliefs such as moral convictions, 
it follows that, in some cases, a judge’s religious views, being inextricably linked to 
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one’s moral outlook,  have the potential to influence  legal reasoning.14 In addition, it 
should be noted that, like moral values, many religious values cut across different 
religions. In a general research context then, trying to define ‘religion’ presents a 
challenge because religion, by its very nature, means different things to different 
people in different contexts and cultures.  
 
Having considered how religion is defined in a research environment, the discussion 
now turns to the legal approach to matters of faith and definitions of ‘religion’.  
2.2.2 ‘Religion’ in the UK courts 
 
Approach towards religion 
As a general principle, the courts have been reluctant to adjudicate upon legal 
disputes involving religious doctrine and practice, these matters being generally 
regarded as outside the competence and authority of the secular courts. The basic 
principle is summarised by Munby LJ in R (Johns) v Derby City Council: 
Religion – whatever the particular believer’s faith – is not the business of 
government or of the secular courts, though the courts will, of course, pay 
every respect to the individual’s or family’s religious principles… The court 
recognises no religious distinctions and generally speaking passes no judgment 
on religious beliefs or on the tenets, doctrines or rules of any particular section 
of society. All are entitled to equal respect. And the civil courts are not 
concerned to adjudicate on purely religious issues, whether religious 
controversies within a religious community or between different religious 
communities.
15
 
McCrudden argues that this conventional non-interventionist approach is 
increasingly being supplanted with a more self-confident judiciary who are 
willing to intervene in cases touching upon religiously sensitive issues.
16
 He 
attributes this change in approach to two factors. First, judges may feel more 
qualified to decide cases involving issues with which they are familiar through 
their own experiences. Second, judges may be more religiously agnostic than in 
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the past.  What McCrudden means here is not clear - are judges more familiar 
with religious issues by reason of their own experiences as religious (or non-
religious) adherents or as judges having to deal with such issues? Furthermore, 
why would a religiously agnostic judge be more willing to intervene in religiously 
sensitive cases compared to a judge with different beliefs when adjudicating a 
similar case? Putting such questions aside, it is nonetheless agreed that the courts 
appear more willing to intervene on matters of religious doctrine than in the past. 
Here it is suggested that the adoption of a more interventionist approach is in 
response to three related factors: (1) multiculturalism (in this context being 
associated with cultural diversity), (2) the consequent rise of religious-ethnic 
plurality in the UK, and (3) the juridification of religion.
17
 Evidence can be found 
in Shergill v Khaira,
18
 a case concerning a dispute between Sikh groups and the 
trusteeship of two Gurdwaras. The Court of Appeal held that the issues were non-
justiciable because the court was being asked to pronounce on matters of religious 
doctrine and practice. On appeal to the UKSC, a key consideration for the court 
was to what extent a court can refuse to determine issues of religion or religious 
beliefs in legal proceedings. In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, the 
UKSC said: 
The courts do not adjudicate on the truth of religious beliefs or on the validity 
of particular rites. But where a claimant asks the court to enforce private rights 
and obligations which depend on religious issues, the judge may have to 
determine such religious issues as are capable of objective ascertainment. The 
court addresses questions of religious belief and practice where its jurisdiction 
is invoked either to enforce the contractual rights of members of a community 
against other members or its governing body or to ensure that property held on 
trust is used for the purposes of the trust.
19
 
Put simply, unless the litigants could resolve their differences, it would be 
necessary for the court to adjudicate on matters of religious doctrine and practice 
in order to determine who were the trustees entitled to administer the trusts. 
Clearly this judgment does not give judges the green light to intervene in all cases 
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with a religious aspect. It does, however, mean that, in some instances, the courts 
will have to adjudicate religious claims which, hitherto, have been considered to 
be outside of their jurisdiction. Particularly in cases where the law is unclear or is 
under-developed, it may be necessary for judicial intervention in disputes 
involving difficult religious issues in order for the law to operate effectively. As 
judges become increasingly involved in resolving such disputes, it is argued, so 
might the chances of a judge’s personal religious views, consciously or 
unconsciously, entering the decision-making process.  
However, in the next section it will be shown that the increased involvement of 
the courts in religiously sensitive cases is not matched by a willingness to define 
religion. 
Legal definitions of religion 
Gunn explains that, although international and regional human rights guarantees 
protect freedom of religion, none of the instruments actually define ‘religion’.20 
Similarly, there is no single definition of what constitutes ‘religion’ in the British 
legal system, variations of the term being applied according to legal context.
21
 
Rather, it is left to the courts to determine what constitutes ‘religion’ for the purposes 
of the relevant legislation using guiding principles developed in case law. This 
approach takes account of the many different areas and ways in which the law 
interacts with religion; as Edge explains, there is no reason why a law which aims to 
protect an individual’s religious freedom should be interpreted in the same way as a 
statute intended to provide financial benefits from the State for religious 
organisations engaged in charitable work.
22
 Moreover, it acknowledges the difficulty 
in applying a single definition which adequately captures the diversity of world 
religions (including the emergence of new religions), changes to existing religious 
practices, and developments in the common understanding of ‘religion’ in response 
to cultural changes and shifts in societal attitudes.
23
 The problems with definitions of 
religion in legal fora are clear. Too restrictive and newly established religious groups 
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and their adherents and other minority groups might be excluded; in Ahdar and 
Leigh words, there is ‘a temptation to cling to the familiar, conventional, or popular 
concepts of religion’.24 However, too wide a definition and the available protection 
becomes meaningless. Nonetheless, definitions are important because they determine 
the legal protection that is, or is not, afforded to religious individuals or 
organisations. 
So how do the courts define religion?  
 
Ahdar and Leigh suggest that, methodologically, judicial efforts to define religion 
fall into two categories: the subjective-functional approach and the substantive-
content approach.
25
 The first, the subjective-functional approach, considers religion 
from the subjective view of the individual. More specifically, it considers the 
sincerity with which an individual holds their beliefs and the function of these beliefs 
in their life. The authors identify three weaknesses in this approach. First, it is 
difficult to prove or disprove the sincerity of an individual’s religious belief. Second, 
there is a risk that defining religion in this way is too inclusive; after all, almost any 
set of beliefs that are sincerely held and are central in an individual’s life may 
qualify. Finally, the approach is tautological because in order to know whether 
religion plays a central role in an individual’s life, it is necessary to know what 
religion is. Whilst understanding religion from this internal perspective is favoured 
by some critics,
26
 this approach is not that typically adopted by the domestic courts.  
  
Instead, the English courts tend to follow a substantive-content approach which 
attempts to identify the core characteristics of religion, rather than to assess the 
sincerity with which an individual holds their religious beliefs. Lady Hale has 
acknowledged extra-judicially that the courts are generally reluctant to assess the 
importance of a belief which a believer holds or the extent to which it is in fact 
required by the religion to which he or she belongs:
27
 ‘We [the courts] take as a 
given that religious (and other beliefs) are genuinely held (at least if they reach a 
                                                 
24
 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (OUP 2013) 141. 
25
 ibid145. 
26
 McCrudden (n16)31. 
27
 Lady Hale, Religion and Sexual Orientation, Comparative and Administrative Law Conference 
Yale Law School 7 March 2014. 
 46 
 
certain threshold of seriousness and coherence)...’28 This approach avoids the secular 
courts having to get involved in questions of religious doctrine which may be non-
justiciable or beyond the courts competence. There are numerous examples of cases 
in which the courts state that the sincerity of the claimant is not in question. In 
relation to religious dress for instance, in R (Begum) v Denbigh High School,
29
 a case 
in which the court had to consider whether the refusal by a school to allow a pupil to 
wear a jilbab interfered with her right to manifest her religious beliefs under Article 
9 of the ECHR,
30
 the court said that it was generally accepted that the Muslim 
student sincerely held the religious belief which she professed to hold, ie, that her 
Muslim beliefs required her to wear the jilbab. Lord Bingham stated:  
 
The House is not, and could not be, invited to rule whether Islamic dress, or 
any feature of Islamic dress, should or should not be permitted in the schools 
of this country. That would be a most inappropriate question for the House in 
its judicial capacity…31 
Similarly, in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte 
Williamson,
32
 in which teachers at Christian schools claimed that a blanket ban on 
corporal punishment contravened their right to religious freedom under Article 9 of 
the ECHR because their fundamental Christian beliefs included a belief that part of 
the duty of education was to physically punish children guilty of indiscipline, Lord 
Nicholls explained that: 
  
The court is concerned to ensure an assertion of religious belief is made in 
good faith: 'neither fictitious, nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice'… 
But, emphatically, it is not for the court to embark on an inquiry into the 
asserted belief and judge its ‘validity’ by some objective standard such as the 
source material upon which the claimant founds his belief or the orthodox 
teaching of the religion in question or the extent to which the claimant's belief 
conforms to or differs from the views of others professing the same religion. 
Freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual….Each 
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individual is at liberty to hold his own religious beliefs, however irrational or 
inconsistent they may seem to some, however surprising. 
 
And in R (Swami Surayanda) v The Welsh Ministers,
33
 in which the issue in 
question was whether the slaughtering of a sacred bullock cared for by a Hindu 
community contravened the community’s right to manifest their religion as 
protected under Article 9(2), it was accepted by the court that the community’s 
beliefs in relation to the religious significance of the temple bullock were 
‘patently sincere and most deeply held’.34  
 
Applying the substantive-content approach, it has been suggested that, when looking 
at the core contents of a religion, the aim is to identify criteria analogous to those 
found in established world religions.
35
 This approach can be seen in R v Registrar 
General, ex parte  Segerdal,
36
 in which the Court of Appeal had to determine 
whether a building used by the Church of Scientology could be recorded as a place 
of religious worship under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 (PWRA). In 
finding that Scientology did not involve religious worship, Lord Denning MR 
explained that ‘Religious worship means reverence or veneration of God or of a 
Supreme Being.’37 Scientology was not a religion but ‘more a philosophy of the 
existence of man or life’.38 Similarly, in Re South Place Ethical Society,39 in denying 
the humanist organisation charitable status, Dillon J stated: ‘It seems to me that two 
of the essential attributes of religion are faith and worship; faith in a god and worship 
of that god’.40  A more recent example of this essentialist approach to defining 
religion is found in the UKSC’s high profile decision in R (Hodkin) v Registrar 
General of Births, Deaths and Marriages.
41
 Again, the issue for the UKSC was 
whether or not Scientology is a ‘religion’ for the purposes of the PWRA. However, 
overruling the decision in Segerdal, the UKSC departed from the traditional theistic 
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definition of religious worship in ruling that scientology could be classified as a 
religion. Significantly, Lord Toulson stated:   
 
There has never been a universal legal definition of religion in English law, 
and experience across the common law world over many years has shown the 
pitfalls of attempting to attach a narrowly circumscribed meaning to the 
word.
42
  
 
However, having considered the reasoning applied by the Australian High Court in 
The Church of the New Faith v The Commission of Pay-roll Tax (Victoria),
43
 he 
went on to offer a useful description (as opposed to a definitive formula) of what 
constituted religion for the purposes of the PWRA: 
 
I would describe religion in summary as a spiritual or non-secular belief 
system, held by a group of adherents, which claims to explain mankind’s place 
in the universe and relationship with the infinite, and to teach its adherents how 
they are to live their lives in conformity with the spiritual understanding 
associated with the Belief system. By spiritual or non-secular I mean a belief 
system which goes beyond that which can be perceived by the senses or 
ascertained by the application of science. ..Such a belief system may or may 
not involve belief in a supreme being, but it does involve a belief that there is 
more to be understood about mankind’s nature and relationship to the universe 
than can be gained from the senses or from science.
44
 
 
Again, it is important to bear in mind that Lord Toulson’s statement is context-
specific. Notably, his description of religion (particularly the ‘spiritual or non-secular 
belief system’ element) is inconsistent with the partial, more expansive definitions of 
‘religion or belief’ found in human rights and equality legislation which extend to 
include secular belief systems. This was not an issue in relation to the PWRA 
because separate provisions exist in relation to secular premises for marriages and 
formation of civil partnerships. However, it is relevant to this discussion because the 
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judgment in Hodkin has since been referred to in other legal contexts.
45
 In fact 
Sandberg suggests that a growing tendency for laws which affect religion to cross-
refer to one another, together with the increasing use of language derived from 
human rights jurisprudence relating to freedom of religion and discrimination law 
means that the legal definitions of religion are becoming increasingly similar.
46
  
Approach in human rights and discrimination cases 
Most relevant to the present study is how the courts define religion in cases in two 
key areas, religious rights under human rights law and in discrimination law. These 
areas often interact with those in which the lawyers who took part in this research 
practice (employment and/or family law) and may have possibly informed their 
understanding of the terms ‘religion’ and ‘religious beliefs’ as used in this study.47 
They also illustrate the sorts of cases in which a judge’s own religious beliefs may 
potentially affect judicial approach.   
 
Definition under Article 9 
 
Prior to the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law, with limited exceptions,
48
 an 
individual’s religious rights in the UK largely existed as a negative set of freedoms. 
Individuals were free to do as they wished in relation to religious matters unless 
prohibited by law; the approach was that of ‘passive toleration’ rather than 
‘prescriptive regulation’.49 The HRA marked a turning point in the relationship 
between the law and religion in the UK. Following the coming into effect of the 
HRA, the fundamental rights set out in the ECHR, including the positive right to 
freedom of religion under Article 9, are directly enforceable in the national courts. 
Moreover, so far as is possible, domestic legislation must now be read and given 
effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.
50
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Article 9 of the ECHR provides: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
(2)  Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
It can be seen that Article 9 contains two strands of protection. Article 9(1) provides 
an absolute right to hold a particular religion or belief (the forum internum); any 
State interference with an individual’s ‘psychic freedom’ is prohibited.51 Consistent 
with other international human rights instruments, there is no legal definition of what 
constitutes ‘religion or belief’ under Article 9(1).52 The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has adopted a broad approach to what constitutes religion and offers 
little by way of case-law on this subject other than that a religion must have a ‘clear 
structure and belief system’.53 Religious beliefs founded in a religion, but which go 
further than a belief about adherence to a religion or its central articles of faith, will 
be protected if they ‘denote a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance’.54 
 
Article 9 has been acknowledged to apply to a range of ‘major’ or ‘ancient’ world 
religions including Judaism, Islam, various forms of Christianity and Hinduism, 
Sikhism, and Buddhism to newer religions such as Mormonism,
55
 Scientology ,
56
 
and Neo-Paganism.
57
 Non-religious beliefs are also protected under Article 9 
provided that the belief in question has attains a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance, and relates to a weighty and substantial aspect 
of human life and behaviour, be worthy of respect in a democratic society and be 
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compatible with human dignity and the fundamental rights of others.
58
 Examples 
falling under the protection of Article 9 include pacifism,
59
 druidism
60
 and atheism.
61
 
That said, a sincerely held ‘belief’ does not guarantee protection. Thus, in Pretty v 
UK,
62
 a belief in assisted suicide was held not to have the sufficient degree of 
coherence to constitute a belief under Article 9.  
 
Rather than use the definition of religion or belief to filter out claims alleging 
interference with Article 9, the preferred approach of the Strasbourg court has been 
to rely on other Convention rights or use the limitations under Article 9(2). The 
British courts have adopted a similar approach, wherein it is essentially taken as a 
given that, from a definitional perspective, so long as a religion or belief system 
reaches sufficient degree of seriousness and coherence, it will qualify for protection 
under Article 9(1).Thus, in Williamson, Lord Walker asserted: 
 
I doubt whether it is right for the court, except in extreme cases … to impose 
an evaluative [definitional] filter at the first stage, especially where religious 
beliefs are involved … Only in clear and extreme cases can a claim to religious 
belief be disregarded entirely, as in X v UK, App No 7921/75, Admissibility 
decision 4 Oct 1977 (no evidence of the existence of the “Wicca” religion).63   
 
Sandberg argues that the ECtHR and UK courts reluctance to use definitions of 
religion as a filtering device can be attributed to four factors.
64
 First, the religion in 
question and the litigant’s adherence to it will rarely be in dispute, particularly where 
a well-established faith is concerned.
65
 This can be seen in cases such as Begum, 
Williamson and Surayanda. Second, as discussed above, the courts are keen to avoid 
engaging into enquiries about religious doctrine so as to not become embroiled in 
difficult theological questions outside of the court’s competence. Third, the 
protection afforded under Article 9 extends beyond religion to also cover other (non-
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religious, secular) beliefs.
66
 Accordingly, minority religious beliefs are likely to be 
protected as ‘beliefs’ if not ‘religion’. Finally, there are other means by which claims 
of interference with freedom of religion can be filtered, most obviously by recourse 
to analysis based on manifestation of religion or belief under ECHR, Article 9(2). 
This last point is made clear by Baroness Hale in Williamson: 
 
Convention jurisprudence suggests that beliefs must have certain qualities 
before they qualify for protection. I suspect that this only arises when the belief 
begins to have an impact upon other people, in article 9 terms, when it is 
manifested or put into practice. Otherwise people are free to believe what they 
like.
67
 
 
The right to manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance 
(the ‘forum externum’), is a qualified right subject to the limitations as set out in 
Article 9(2). It occurs where the forum internum transforms from beliefs which are 
essentially private, and perhaps impalpable in nature to all but the believer, to the 
actual external expression of those beliefs. Obviously, by the time the courts have to 
consider if there has been interference with the right to manifest religion or belief 
under the HRA and, if so, whether it is justifiable, it is already accepted that the 
claimant’s religion or belief meets the requisite definitional criteria under Article 9.  
Discrimination because of religion or belief 
Laws prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief were introduced 
into UK law in 2003
68
. Specifically, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003 (EERBR) made it unlawful to discriminate against someone 
directly or indirectly, or to harass or victimise someone on grounds of religion or 
belief in the workplace. The Equality Act 2006 prohibited discrimination and 
victimisation on grounds of religion or belief in the provision of goods, facilities and 
services. These provisions, along with existing laws relating to other discrimination 
strands, were consolidated under the Equality Act 2010 which protects against 
discrimination because of religion or belief, in addition to the following ‘protected 
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characteristics’: age; disability; gender re-assignment; marriage or civil partnership 
(employment only); pregnancy and maternity; race, sex and sexual orientation. 
Under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010, ‘religion’ is partially defined as follows: 
(1) Religion means any religion and a reference to religion includes a reference 
to a lack of religion; 
(2) Belief means any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief 
includes a reference to a lack of belief.  
The explanatory notes to the Act explain that this broad definition corresponds with 
Article 9.
69
 Accordingly, the threshold on qualifying as a religion is low; it must 
have a clear structure and belief system.
70
 Denominations or sects within a religion 
may themselves be a ‘religion’ for the purposes of the Equality Act.  Clearly, 
‘religion’ and ‘belief’ are defined broadly to expressly include a lack of religion or 
religious belief. Thus, Atheists, Agnostics and Humanists are afforded the same 
protection as adherents of theistic religions under the Act. Generally, defining 
‘religion’ for the purpose of protection under the Equality Act 2010 has proved 
uncontroversial. ‘Religious belief’ has also been interpreted broadly. Consistent with 
case-law under Article 9,  it extends beyond belief about adherence to a religion or 
its central articles of faith to include beliefs founded in a religion provided they 
attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, are worthy 
of respect in a democratic society and are compatible with human dignity and the 
fundamental rights of others.
71
  Such belief is subjective and need not be shared by 
others so, as Simler J asserts: ‘beliefs can be individualised and highly subjective’.72 
That said, discrimination based on a collective religious belief are likely to be easier 
to prove than a personally held religious belief in indirect discrimination claims.  In 
contrast, the interpretative boundaries of “philosophical belief” are less certain. 
Whilst a discussion of what constitutes philosophical belief is not of direct relevance 
to the present research, the case-law indicates a wide application. Based on the 
qualifying criteria listed in Grainger plc v Nicholson,
73
, and in line with the 
substantive-content approach, the following have been afforded protected on the 
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basis of being ‘philosophical beliefs’ under religion or belief discrimination 
legislation: a belief in anti-fox hunting;
74
 spiritualism;
75
 and a belief in the ‘higher 
purpose of public service broadcasting.
76
 In contrast, a conspiracy theory about a 
global elite seeking to form a New World Order,
77
 and homophobic beliefs and 
Holocaust denial have failed to meet the criteria under Grainger.
78
 The position as 
regards political beliefs is less clear. The ET has indicated that political views based 
on Marxism/Trotskyism may not qualify,
79
 whilst ‘left wing democratic socialist 
beliefs’ may be protected.80  
 
It is clear that religion is defined broadly under the human rights and discrimination 
frameworks. On this basis it is reasonable to suppose that the lawyers who took part 
in the present study are likely to have similarly interpreted references to judges’ 
religious beliefs expansively so as to encompass major world religions, minority 
religions and non-religious religious beliefs (as distinct from other philosophical 
beliefs). However, there is a risk that some lawyers may have mistakenly assumed an 
individual judge’s cultural identity (e.g. Jewish) to be an indicator of their religious 
beliefs.  
 
The above discussion demonstrates that, generally, definitional issues as to what 
constitutes ‘religion’ have not proved problematic in a judicial context. It is 
suggested that where matters relating to religion become more challenging for the 
secular courts is when they involve issues such as whether there has been an 
interference with a claimant’s right to manifest their religion or belief and, if so, 
whether it can be objectively justified or, in the context of discrimination law, 
questions such as who is an appropriate comparator,
81
 or whether a particular policy, 
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criterion or practice (PCP) which indirectly discriminates because of religion or 
belief can be objectively justified. It is in such cases that judges are most likely to 
encounter difficult questions about religion and, it is suggested, are those cases in 
which judges’ own views could potentially have a bearing on how judicial decisions 
are reached.  
 
The next section provides an overview of some of the recent high profile cases in 
which religiously sensitive issues have been spotlighted. An exploration of these 
cases furthers the investigation of the research questions at the heart of this thesis in 
three main ways by illustrating: (1) the kinds of case where a judge with strong 
religious beliefs may find it difficult to adopt a position which runs counter to his or 
her own, (2) cases which are particularly controversial to, or resonate with the 
public, and (2) the sorts of cases that lawyers may have had in mind when 
responding to interview questions or the SPQ as to whether, and if so how, judges’ 
faith affects judging.  
 
Some examples from case law 
As the lawyers who participated in the empirical part of this study predominantly 
work in employment and family law, it is religion-sensitive cases in these areas that 
are considered. 
 
Employment 
 
The first two employment cases involve so-called clash of equality rights cases, 
specifically those in which the right to religious freedom locks horns with the right 
not to be discriminated against because of sexual orientation. The next two cases 
look at the difficult issue of religious dress in the workplace. This quartet of 
employment cases is particularly interesting because each religious discrimination 
claim failed in the domestic courts and was subsequently heard by the ECtHR.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
unsatisfactorily, comparison was drawn with someone wearing a balaclava or whose face was covered 
with bandages due to injury.  
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In Ladele v. London Borough of Islington,
82
  Ladele, a Christian registrar, refused to 
undertake civil partnership ceremonies between same-sex couples because to do so 
was contrary to her Christian faith. Her employer, London Borough of Islington 
Council, tried to accommodate her religious beliefs by confining her involvement to 
the signing process only, but Ladele still refused to officiate at civil partnership 
ceremonies. For a time, she managed to avoid such duties by changing rosters with 
other registrars. However, two colleagues complained that her refusal to register civil 
partnerships was a breach of the Council’s Dignity for All equal opportunities policy 
and constituted discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation under the Equality 
Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007.
83
 The council subsequently instigated 
disciplinary proceedings whereby it was decided that Ladele’s religious beliefs 
would no longer be accommodated at work. In response, Ladele brought a claim 
against her employer alleging religious discrimination and harassment under the 
EERBR, s.3.  
 
The ET found that Ladele had been discriminated against, directly and indirectly, on 
grounds her religious beliefs. However, on appeal, the EAT found that the ET had 
erred in law.
84
 As regards the claim for direct discrimination, the ET had confused 
the council’s reasons for treating Ladele as it did (her refusal to officiate at civil 
partnerships - the correct approach), with Ladele’s reasons for acting as she did (that 
is, because of her religious beliefs - the incorrect approach).   In respect of her claim 
for indirect discrimination, the EAT acknowledged that a refusal to accommodate 
Ladele’s religious beliefs could amount to indirect discrimination.85 However, the 
Council’s aim of providing a service based on non-discrimination principles was 
held to serve a legitimate aim. Moreover, the employer was a public authority wholly 
committed to equal opportunities; it was a proportionate response to require staff to 
act in a way which complied with that aim. Accordingly, the Council’s refusal to 
accommodate Ladele’s religious beliefs was justified. On appeal, the CA upheld the 
EAT’s decision. It was Ladele’s refusal to officiate at civil partnership ceremonies 
and not her religious beliefs which were the cause of the Council’s conduct. To have 
allowed Ladele to be exempted from performing these duties in contravention of the 
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Dignity for All policy would have amounted to discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation. 
 
The next case is that of McFarlane v. Relate Avon Limited.
86
 It will be recalled from 
Chapter 1.3 that McFarlane brought a claim against his employer, Relate, for direct 
and indirect discrimination contrary to the EERBR based on his employer’s refusal 
to exempt him from working with same-sex couples where sexual issues were 
involved. On joining the organisation, McFarlane had expressly agreed to adhere to 
Relate’s equal opportunities policy in his contract of employment and had counselled 
same-sex couples where no sexual issues arose. However, on completion of a 
psycho-sexual therapy course, McFarlane sought exemption from any obligation to 
do work involving psycho-sexual issues with same-sex couples. When it became 
clear that he had no intention of doing such work, he was dismissed for gross 
misconduct based on his failure to comply with the equal opportunities policy and a 
professional ethics policy.  
On bringing a claim to the ET, McFarlane’s claim for direct religious discrimination 
was rejected on the ground that his dismissal was due to his refusal to comply with 
the equal opportunities policy and not by reason of his faith. This echoes the decision 
in Ladele.
87
 With regard to the indirect discrimination claim, the ET accepted 
Relate’s PCP requiring counsellors’ to comply with the equal opportunities policy 
would put persons of the same religious belief as McFarlane at a disadvantage 
compared to others who did not hold similar beliefs as part of their religious faith. 
88
 
However, the ET accepted the employer’s submission that McFarlane’s dismissal 
was objectively justified; the provision of the non-discriminatory counselling service 
for all was a legitimate aim and it was proportionate to require employees to comply 
with it.
89
 On appeal, the EAT upheld the ET’s decision citing the reasoning in 
Ladele. There was no direct discrimination because Relate would have treated an 
employee who refused to provide psycho-sexual therapy to gay couples for reasons 
other than his or her faith, in the same way. In refusing McFarlane leave to appeal 
the EAT decision, the Court of Appeal flatly rejected the submission that Ladele had 
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been decided per incuriam and was ‘unconstitutional and contrary to the rule of 
law’.90  
The next two cases involve the wearing of religious jewellery in the workplace. In 
Eweida v. British Airways plc,
91
 the claimant bought unsuccessful claims alleging 
religious discrimination under the EERBR, after her employer, BA, introduced a new 
uniform policy which only permitted the wearing of visible jewellery and other items 
if it was a mandatory requirement of the employee's faith and prior authorisation had 
been given by management. In breach of this policy, Eweida, a Coptic Christian, 
wore a small visible cross to work. She accepted this was not a requirement of her 
Christian faith but refused to conceal or remove the necklace. Her employer sent her 
home on unpaid leave. BA subsequently changed its uniform policy so as to allow 
staff to wear such jewellery. Having returned to work, Eweida brought unsuccessful 
claims alleging discrimination on grounds of her religion or belief. Her direct 
discrimination claim failed as she could not show that she had suffered less 
favourable treatment compared to the comparator (identified as a Sikh employee 
who wore a kara bangle which was visible when a short sleeve shirt was worn). 
Whilst the wearing of the kara was said to be mandatory for Sikhs, the wearing of a 
cross was not a mandatory requirement for Christians. The indirect discrimination 
claim failed because there was no evidence that the BA uniform policy put 
Christians as a group, or Eweida herself, at a particular disadvantage. Had this 
criterion been met, BA’s justification would have failed because although the aim of 
the policy was found to be legitimate (band and corporate consistency), a blanket ban 
on jewellery was not deemed to be proportionate since it failed to find the right 
balance between corporate consistency, individual need and the accommodation of 
diversity. 
 
In a similar case, Chaplin v Royal Devon & Exeter Hospital Foundation Trust,
92
 
Chaplin, a nurse working in an NHS hospital, was asked by her employer to remove 
her crucifix necklace because it contravened the employer’s new uniform policy 
which forbade the wearing of jewellery on the grounds of health and safety. Chaplin 
argued that the wearing of the crucifix (which she had done since her confirmation) 
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was a manifestation of her religious beliefs. Having been unable to reach a 
compromise as to how she could wear the crucifix without falling foul of the uniform 
policy, Chaplin was removed from her nursing duties and re-deployed to a new post 
where the uniform policy was not applicable. On bringing her claim to the ET, the 
ET found no evidence that Chaplin had been treated less favourably than an 
appropriate comparator – an employee who wished to wear a necklace or chain with 
a pendant, whether or not for religious, cultural or decorative purposes. In relation to 
the indirect discrimination claim, the majority held that the uniform policy did not 
put persons of the same Christian faith at a disadvantage. However, distinguishing 
this case from Eweida, it was said that even if the PCP had put such persons at a 
disadvantage, there was no indirect discrimination because the policy had a 
legitimate aim – the most important of which was the maintenance and provision of 
health and safety. 
 
It is noteworthy that having failed in domestic proceedings, these cases were taken to 
the ECtHR.
93
 The ECtHR upheld Eweida’s claim ruling that the domestic court had 
given too much weight to the aim of BA’s uniform policy. In particular, the ECtHR 
compared Eweida’s situation to other religious employees who were permitted to 
wear religious dress or jewellery and also took into account the fact that BA had 
subsequently amended its uniform policy to allow religious jewellery to be worn 
visibly.   In comparison, Chaplin’s treatment was found not to violate Article 9 (or 
Article 14) because removing her cross was not a disproportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim, and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In Ladele 
and McFarlane, the employers’ policies (to promote equal opportunities and prevent 
discrimination) were held to have the legitimate aim of securing the rights of others. 
The ECtHR found that the domestic courts had struck the right balance between the 
rights of the claimants to manifest their religion and the employers’ rights to secure 
the rights of others. 
 
Family 
 
Turning to a family law context, judges have had to grapple with a variety of 
complex issues involving religion, many of which focus on judicial determinations 
                                                 
93
 Eweida and Ors v UK [2013] ECHR 37. 
 60 
 
of what is in the best interests of a child. Under the Children Act 1989, Section 1(1), 
when a court determines a question relating to the upbringing of a child, or the 
administration of a child’s property or an application concerning income arising 
from it, the court’s paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. This was the 
issue in Re G,
94
 which concerned a dispute between parents who, because of their 
religious differences, disagreed about where their children should be educated. The 
parents were part of the Chassidic community of ultra-Orthodox Jews. After their 
marriage broke up, the mother remained part of the Orthodox Jewish community but 
no longer adhered to the strict observances of the Chareidi community. Contrary to 
the father’s wishes, the mother wanted her children to attend an Orthodox, rather 
than ultra-Orthodox, school where she argued their education and career 
opportunities would be greater. The court had to conduct a balancing exercise to 
determine what was in the best interests of the children. The court found that the 
children should live with their mother and attend schools of her choosing. The 
reasoning of the judge at first instance was based on four main strands: (1)  the 
narrower educational opportunities available under the Chareidi system, particularly 
for girls, (2) concerns about the emotional impact on the children, both in adjusting 
to the father’s choice of school and the effect that this may have on the relationship 
that they had with their mother, (3) concerns about the children being able to 
embrace their mother’s lifestyle when they were older as opposed to them being able 
to change their religious beliefs and practices later on, and (4) that the interests of the 
children were best served by what the mother was proposing.  
 
On dismissing an appeal, Munby LJ described the issues in this case as being ‘of 
transcendental importance’ to the parents, the children, the Chareidi community and 
to society at large.
95
 As the following extract indicates, the court clearly had a sound 
understanding of the religious sensitivities involved in this case: 
For the nominal Anglican, whose sporadic attendances at church may be as 
much a matter of social convention as religious belief, religion may in large 
part be something left behind at the church door. Even for the devout Christian 
attempting to live their life in accordance with Christ's teaching there is likely 
to be some degree of distinction between the secular and the divine, between 
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matters quotidian and matters religious. But there are other communities, and 
we are here concerned with such a community, for whom the distinction is, at 
root, meaningless, for whom every aspect of their lives, every aspect of their 
being, of who and what they are, is governed by a body of what the outsider 
might characterise as purely religious law. That is so of the devout Muslim, 
every aspect of whose being and existence is governed by the Quran and the 
Sharia. It is so also of the ultra-Orthodox Jew, every aspect of whose being and 
existence is governed by the Torah and the Talmud.
96
 
Significantly, the court made it very clear that where religious practices were 
contrary to what was in the best interests of a child, it would have no compunction in 
prioritising the welfare of the child, although the child’s religious welfare was a 
consideration.
97
 
 
A more recent example is the difficult case of J v B (Ultra-Orthodox Judaism: 
Transgender)
98
 which also involved a dispute amongst an ultra-Orthodox Charedi 
Jewish family relating to contact between a father and her five children. Again, this 
case touches upon issues where competing rights are at play. The father, a 
transgender woman, had not seen her children since she had left the Charedi 
community to become a transgender woman. She did not object to the continued 
religious upbringing of the children within the Charedi community, although the 
traditional view of the ultra-Orthodox community was that transgenderism is a sin. 
The mother argued that if the father was allowed direct contact with the children, 
there was a danger that she and her children would be ostracised by the Charedi 
community. This, she argued, would cause considerable harm to the children. In 
determining the key issue, ie, what was in the best interests of the children, Jackson J 
ruled that the possibility that the mother and children would be rejected by their 
community outweighed the benefits to the children of direct contact with their father. 
As such, the direct contact application was refused. Instead, Jackson J made an order 
for indirect contact, four times a year for each child. As an aside, it is also worth 
noting that the judge declined to intervene on the issue of the get (under Jewish law, 
governed by the Beth Din, a Jewish marriage contract can only be terminated by the 
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issue of a get, a divorce document, that must be granted by the husband and formally 
accepted by the wife). 
 
In another recent case, L & B (Children: Specific Issues: temporary leave to remove 
from the jurisdictional circumcision),
99
 Roberts J had to consider whether it was in 
the best interests of two children to be circumcised in accordance with their father’s 
Muslim faith.
100
 The issue not only touches upon religious and cultural sensitivities 
but also concerns questions as to a child’s right to autonomy and physical 
integrity.
101
 After the parents of the children separated, the father, a practising 
Muslim, sought the court’s permission to allow the children to be circumcised. The 
mother of the children, who had since abandoned her Muslim faith, opposed the 
father’s wishes stating that it would impose a medically unnecessary procedure upon 
the children. Expert evidence was provided as to the Islamic religious basis for 
circumcision and the medical risks associated with the procedure. Finding in the 
mother’s favour, Roberts J accepted that the father’s motives were ‘driven by his 
deep seated religious convictions and his perceptions of his obligations as a devout 
Muslim father’. Interestingly, the father’s freedom to practice his religion was said to 
be protected under Article 8 of the ECHR (right to private and family life), Article 9 
was not referred to. However, the judge decided that as there was a possibility that 
(1) the children may not wish to continue to observe the Muslim faith when they 
were older and (2) there were risks, albeit small, associated with surgery, it was not 
in the best interests of the children to be circumcised until such a time as they could 
make the decision for themselves.  
 
It is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which a judge or tribunal panel member 
with similar devout religious beliefs to the employees in Ladele, McFarlane and 
Chaplin might feel sympathetic towards the claimants’ claims, particularly if a judge 
held similar entrenched views about homosexuality by reason of his or her own faith, 
or similarly chose, or felt obliged, to express their own religious beliefs through the 
wearing of a religious symbol, for example. Similarly, it is not difficult to see how 
an individual’s personal religious outlook might, at least unconsciously, affect the 
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weight that was accorded to the religious welfare of the children in each family case. 
For example, it is conceivable that a male Jewish or Muslim judge who deems 
circumcision to be compulsory for religious reasons may be more sympathetic to the 
father’s arguments in L & B than, say, a Catholic judge who is morally and 
religiously opposed to this practice. The key question is whether, in such 
circumstances, the judge’s own views impinge upon, or are perceived to impinge 
upon, the decisional process so as to give rise to allegations of religious bias. 
 
This section has looked at definitions of religion within a research and legal context, 
the principal aim of which has been to determine how the lawyers who took part in 
this study may have understood and discussed ‘religion’ during the interviews and 
when responding to the SPQ. Furthermore it has showcased the types of cases in 
which judges’ religious beliefs potentially play a role in the decisional process.  
The following section will discuss the second key elements which are vital to 
understanding the relationship between judges’ religion and judging: conceptions of 
judicial decision-making within the context of the English judiciary, and theories and 
models that seek to explain how judges decide cases.  
 
2.3 Theories and models of adjudication 
2.3.1 Conceptions of the judicial role in the English Courts 
 
The traditional conception of the judicial role is that judges decide cases by applying 
the law, understood as a body of rules and principles promulgated by the legislature, 
to the facts of a given case.
102
 For a long time, this classical understanding denied the 
law-making nature of the judicial role and the so-called ‘declaratory theory’ of 
common law prevailed. Thus, as Lord Esher MR stated in Willis & Co v Baddeley:
103
  
 
There is, in fact, no such thing as judge-made law, for the judges do not make 
the law, though they frequently have to apply existing law to circumstances as 
to which it has not authoritatively laid down that such law is applicable. 
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This conventional conception of how judges decide cases has plenty of appeal.
104
 As 
Rackley contends, based on a ‘separation of powers’ argument, confining the judicial 
role to that of declaring law, rather than to law-making, means that judges as non-
elected officials avoid undermining the theory of democratic accountability which 
applies to those tasked with law-making.
105
 Moreover, for the purposes of 
consistency, what is here described as the ‘certainty’ argument, it is argued that if the 
judicial role is confined to the seemingly neutral interpretation and application of 
pre-existing legal rules and principles, litigants are more likely to have confidence in 
judicial decisions as a judgment should not turn on who the judge is.
106
 At the same 
time, it has been argued that laying the responsibility for a judicial decision at the 
door of the law rather than the judge serves to shield the decision-maker from 
criticism.
107
 This might be labelled the ‘protection’ argument.  
 
Whilst the declaratory theory may have served as a useful protective device in the 
past,
108
 it is recognised that the boundaries of the judicial role are not so easy to 
delimit in practice. By producing authoritative determinations of common law rules, 
particularly in cases where the law is uncertain, it is correctly said that the courts 
‘operate as mini-legislators’, which shape and develop the law  in response to novel 
situations and the changing needs of society.
109
 Of course, this is not to say that 
judges have carte blanche authority to decide cases as they wish; the judicial 
function remains subject to significant institutional and individual factors that restrict 
the nature and scope of the judicial role – factors such as the principle of stare decisis 
and judicial self-restraint. However, given the oft-blurred boundary in the judicial 
role, it is unsurprising that the idea that judges do not make the common law is now 
widely rejected.
110
 Most famously, in the 1970s Lord Reid dismissed the declaratory 
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theory as a ‘fairy tale’.111 More recently, Lord Goff described the traditional theory 
of judicial decision-making as a ‘fiction’ and acknowledged that judicial 
involvement in the development of the common law, which he described as ‘a living 
system of law’, was inevitable.112 Lord Bingham has also explained why the 
declaratory theory no longer garners judicial support: ‘[It] is radically inconsistent 
with the subjective experience of Judges, particularly appellate Judges, of the role 
which they fulfil day by day’.113 Lord Bingham suggests that judges know from 
experience that, in many instances, the cases they deal with do not turn on clear and 
unambiguous legal rules. Rather, cases often raise points which have not previously 
been the considered, or are the subject of conflicting decisions, or raise issues of 
statutory interpretation which may involve genuine lacunae or ambiguities.
114
 It is 
suggested that it is in these ‘hard cases’ in particular, defined by Dworkin as those 
‘in which the result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent’,115 and in other 
cases requiring judicial discretion, that judges can be said to develop and change the 
law.  
 
It is also where  it is entirely possible that there is more than one conclusion to a 
legal problem, and where an individual judge must make a choice between two or 
more legally valid alternatives, that a judge’s individual personal factors (such as 
religious views) may have some bearing on the reasoning process. However, as 
previously indicated, it is important to acknowledge that the influence of such factors 
is subject to significant constraints such as those outlined below. 
2.3.2 Constraints on judging 
 
All judges are constrained by the judicial oath by which they undertake to decide 
cases ‘without fear or favour, affection or ill will’ (discussed further in Section 2.5). 
However, whilst the Oath creates a presumption of impartiality and is identified as a 
powerful constraint on judges, Lord Mance explains in Helow v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, that it is no guarantor of impartiality: 
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The judicial oath appears to me more a symbol than of itself a 
guarantee of the impartiality that any professional judge is by training and 
experience expected to practise and display.
116
 
Of course, the law also acts as a fundamental limit on the judicial function. Decisions 
must be reasoned in accordance with legal rules, principles, and procedures, many of 
which are laid down in statutes, regulations and by precedent, others of which are not 
formalistic as such but are nevertheless well-established.
117
 Clearly judges should 
not go on a frolic of their own by making arbitrary decisions based on personal 
preferences; even where judicial discretion is exercised, the law limits the choice of 
outcome available to the courts. Relatedly, the court structure constrains judging. 
Most notably, that appellate courts can reverse decisions of the lower courts 
‘provides an important enforcement mechanism’ to ensure that judges sitting in the 
lower courts follow the existing legal rules and principles.
118
 The composition of the 
court can also play a role in curtailing the influence of an individual judge’s personal 
factors on judging. For example, where a judge sits on a panel, the collegiate 
environment may act as a check on an individual’s judgment because, as Edwards 
states, the judge is ‘quite literally constrained by the consensus imperative’.119  
Alternatively, Pickerell and Brough base the understanding of law as a constraint on 
judging as a theory of socialisation wherein it is suggested that judicial behaviour is 
limited because judges are socialised to believe their role is to follow the law, and 
the expectation from others that they will do so.
120
 In this sense, reflecting Lord 
Mance’s comment above, judicial training and professionalism, including 
compliance with ethical standards and codes of conduct play a vital role in limiting 
the influence of personal factors in judging. Guidance suggests the way that judges 
can demonstrate professionalism include: freedom from bias or prejudice, objective 
reasoning (based solely on the evidence and law),  independence of mind, 
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recognising and dealing with potential conflicts of interest, and treating people 
sensitively, non-discriminatorily and fairly.
121
 Other powerful constraints that serve 
to limit the effects of non-doctrinal factors such as a judge’s religious beliefs in the 
process of adjudication include, but are not limited to, the law on bias which is 
considered in detail in Section 2.5, public opinion, media influences and political 
factors. 
Having provided an overview of how the English courts understand the judicial role 
and some of the ways in which judges’ decision-making is constrained, the main 
theories of adjudication upon which empirical studies of judicial decision-making 
have traditionally been based are now considered. 
2.3.3 Theories of adjudication 
 
The contrasting views of the judicial role outlined above broadly chime with the two 
dominant theories of adjudication which have historically provided the framework 
on which judicial decision-making studies have been understood - legal formalism 
and legal realism. A classical formalist conception of adjudication is underpinned by 
two central claims. Firstly, the law is rationally determinate;
122
 in other words, every 
legal question has a correct legal answer which can be deduced by correctly and 
consistently applying legal rules and principles to the facts of a case. Secondly, 
judging is autonomous insofar as the adjudicator has to look no further than the law 
to find the right answer; ergo, non-legal considerations play no role in the process of 
judging.
123
 At its most extreme, the formalist conception of judging understands 
judicial decision-making as an exercise in mechanical jurisprudence in which judges 
simply declare rather than make law, or what Leiter calls ‘vulgar formalism’.124 
However, contemporary formalists, now generally accept that (a) judging is not 
wholly syllogistic or mechanical in the way that the pure formalists of yore 
envisioned, and (b) a degree of judicial discretion in decision-making is unavoidable.  
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Seen as the antipode to legal formalism, a realist conception of adjudication 
considers what judges actually do when deciding cases rather than what the judges 
claim they do; in other words the realist focus is on the law in action. Whilst there is 
no ‘one size fits all’ version of legal realism, Leiter suggests that the core claim of 
early legal realists was that judges are primarily facts- rather than rule-responsive.
125
 
The most sceptical realists such as Frank,
126
 denied the formalist claim that judging 
was mechanical and that legal rules and principles were the prime determinants in 
how judges decide cases.
127
 Instead, it was argued that judges, particularly those in 
the appellate courts, principally base their decisions on subjective preferences before 
reasoning backwards and ‘manipulating legal rules to support these predetermined 
ends’.128 However, contemporary realists accept that there is a rational element to 
law and that, in addition to the role played by non-legal factors, legal rules and 
principles are key in the process of judicial decision-making. 
Because the more moderate versions of legal formalism and realism are barely 
indistinguishable, some critics argue that it is not appropriate to conceptualise 
judicial decision-making within a formalist-realist narrative.
129
 In particular, 
Tamanaha advances the notion of ‘balanced realism’ or equally ‘balanced 
formalism’.130 This theory posits that the differences that are said to divide formalists 
and realists are exaggerated, and are neither as clear-cut nor profound as portrayed. 
He suggests that the loose contrast that can be made between the two views of the 
judicial role is that formalists tend to emphasize the reasons why and ways in which 
legal rules, texts, and precedents can and should control; whilst realists tend to 
emphasise the limitations of those rules.
131
 It is this balanced realist/formalist view 
of judging upon which this study most closely aligns and which, it is suggested, 
marks a positive departure from the out-dated, and arguably flawed grand theories of 
judging outlined above. 
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2.3.4 Models of judicial behaviour 
 
A number of models of judicial behaviour have been developed in order to explain 
how judges reach their decisions. The three most common models discussed in the 
literature are the ‘legal’, ‘attitudinal’ and ‘strategic’ models of judicial decision-
making.
132
 These models build on pioneering quantitative work by US political 
scientists such as Pritchett and Schubert, whose primary interest was the relationship 
between judges’ ideological and, to a lesser extent, other personal preferences and 
judicial decision-making.
133
 That the main focus of the US studies originally centred 
on how judges’ ideology affects judging, particularly in relation to decisions of the 
Justices of the US Supreme Court , is unsurprising given the politicised nature of the 
judicial appointments process in the US in which confirmation hearings and 
elections are used (see Chapter 3). However, these models have been further  
developed so as to provide the conceptual base from which a range of other models 
have emerged, including those which consider how a range of non-legal factors 
affect adjudication. An overview of the main models of judicial behaviour upon 
which empirical studies of judicial decision-making are traditionally based is now 
provided. 
Legal model 
Synonymous with a formalist theory of adjudication, in its simplest form the ‘legal’ 
model holds that judges’ decisions are principally determined according to, and 
constrained by, legal doctrine and the facts of the case. Representing the traditional 
theory of how judges judge, the legal model is aligned with the concept of 
mechanical jurisprudence in which legalist judges act as automatons and apply the 
law ‘uninfluenced by emotion, unperturbed by personal preferences and unaffected 
by consequentionalist anxieties’.134 In this way, the judge is seen as a neutral and 
impartial arbiter whose primary concern is to interpret the law as well as possible 
rather than to create the law (for a distinction between these two similar concepts see 
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Section 2.5).
135
  With little room for discretion, the risk of judicial subjectivity is 
effectively expunged from the decision-making process.  
 
It is easy to see how a strict legalist explanation of how judges decide cases serves to 
promote and maintain public confidence in, and the legitimacy of the judiciary and 
the rule of law. Moreover, it is unsurprising to find that the legal model provides the 
broad principled framework for judicial decision-making, as the following extract 
taken from the Judiciary’s official website indicates: 
 
It is vital that each judge is able to decide cases solely on the evidence 
presented in court by the parties and in accordance with the law. Only relevant 
facts and law should form the basis of a judge’s decision. Only in this way can 
judges discharge their constitutional responsibility to provide fair and impartial 
justice…136 
 
However, as already suggested, there are few contemporary scholars who would 
agree that legal factors are the sole determinants of the majority of legal judgments 
in the courts today, particularly in cases where judges exercise their discretion.
137
   
 
Attitudinal model 
The attitudinal model is the antithetical paradigm to the legal model. The leading 
proponents of this model argue that legal disputes are decided ‘in light of the facts of 
the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the judges’.138 In other 
words, judicial decisions are explained by reference to a judge’s personal policy 
preferences rather than the law.
139
 Given that a purely attitudinal model envisages 
the judge as being unconstrained by legal rules and precedent and uninterested in 
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strategic or institutional factors means that attitudinalists assume that ‘judges’ 
political attitudes are the exclusive determinants of judicial behaviour’.140  
Insofar as the attitudinal model looks to explain judicial behaviour by reference to 
judges’ personal factors, it might be assumed to be the model to which the present 
study is most closely orientated. However, according to Heise, there is a slight but 
critical difference in the way that judges’ ideological preferences influence judicial 
decisions compared to the role played by judicial personal background 
characteristics and attributes. He states that ‘attitudinal models generally ascribe the 
consequences of a judge’s background as formative on his or her political ideology 
(which he suggests is typically reflected in a judge’s political party affiliation)’. 
According to Heise a judge’s ideology (which is not dictated by socio-economic 
background) can be distinguished from judicial background and characteristics 
because it involves the deliberate adoption of values or attitudes.
141
  
Moreover, whilst the attitudinal model serves as a useful theoretical backdrop to 
studies involving the role of political ideology, it is not consistent with the rationale 
underpinning this research. The argument advanced in this thesis is not that judges’ 
religious beliefs are a major determinant in judicial decisions. Rather, the contention 
is that judges’ religious beliefs are one of many non-legal factors that 
(unconsciously) inform how judges approach cases, but fall short of threatening 
judicial impartiality (Section 2.5 below). 
Strategic model 
Like the attitudinal model, the strategic theory posits that judges are influenced by 
their own policy preferences. However, it is distinct from the attitudinal model in 
that in choosing the course that does most to advance their long term aims and secure 
the best outcome generally, strategic judges will take into consideration the reaction 
of others and, where necessary, will depart from their preferred position.
142
 As 
Epstein and Knight suggest, the strategic model envisages judges not as 
‘unsophisticated characters who make choices based merely on their own political 
preferences’, but as ‘strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their 
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goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of others, of the choices they 
expect others to make, and of the institutional context in which they act.’143  
Development of the predominant models 
The models above are by no means the only models of judicial behaviour. US 
scholars have proposed an array of new or adapted models by which to assess how 
judges judge. For example, Cross identifies a fourth model – the litigant-driven 
model. As the name indicates, this model suggests that it is the litigants rather than 
the judges who drive case outcomes.
144
 Alternatively, Guthrie et al. have developed 
what they call the ‘Intuitive Override model of judging’.145 Drawing upon 
contemporary psychological research, particularly the work of Kahneman and 
Frederick on heuristics and biases, this model recognises that all decision-making is 
the result of a dual-process in which individuals first make intuitive judgments 
(System 1) which may or may not then be overridden by ‘complex, deliberative 
thoughts’ (System 2) (which essentially serve as a self-imposed check on decision-
making). This model is described as ‘less idealistic than the deductive model 
embraced by the formalists, but also less cynical than the intuitive model embraced 
by the realists’.146  
Posner identifies a further six models in addition to those outlined above: the 
sociological, the psychological, the economic, the organizational, the pragmatic and 
the phenomenological theories of judicial behaviour.
147
 These models are indicative 
of how the study of judicial decision-making has become of interest to scholars from 
a variety of disciplines outside of political science  - psychologists, sociologists and 
economists to name but a few. Whilst variants of these different models abound, 
Posner argues that they all share one thing in common – they each fail to present a 
complete account of what judges do.
148
 In response, Epstein, Landes and Posner 
advance a further alternative - the ‘labor-market model of judicial behaviour’.149 
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Drawing on existing models and concepts from labour economic concepts such as 
cost-benefit analysis, this model situates judges as participants in a judicial labour 
market in which they, like other workers, are motivated and constrained by 
predominantly non-pecuniary costs and benefits.
150
 It is noteworthy that judicial 
‘personal-identity’ characteristics are also recognised as influencing how judges 
decide cases.
151
 Findings from the empirical testing of the ‘labor-market model’ 
supports the authors claim that judges are influenced by a combination of legal and 
non-legal considerations.
152
  
In the section above, it is clear that contemporary theories of judicial decision-
making suppose that judges’ personal factors do, at least occasionally, play a role in 
the process of judging. The next section moves on from theories about adjudication 
to explore judging from a judicial perspective. 
 
2.4 Judging through a judicial lens 
 
Significantly, evidence that judges’ personal factors play a role in judicial decision-
making can be gleaned from numerous comments made by former and current 
judges themselves, both in the UK and other jurisdictions, in judicial speeches, cases 
and interviews. To illustrate, Lord Radcliffe once said: ‘More and more I am 
impressed by the inescapable personal element in the judicial decision’.153  Similarly, 
in Piglowska v Piglowski,
154
 Lord Hoffman asserted: ‘Since judges are also people, 
this means that some degree of diversity in their application of values is inevitable’. 
More recently, Lord Justice Etherton has talked about the critical role that a judge’s 
‘personal outlook and judicial philosophy’ can play in the outcome of hard cases and 
the defining of society’s values, even if the judge is unaware of the way in which 
their ‘worldview’ influences their decision-making.155 Likewise, talking about the 
role of the judge in a representative democracy, Lord Mance has stated that ‘Loyal 
though we are by inclination and training to the law, we are each of us different in 
our make-up and individual personalities, and in difficult cases this may evidence 
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itself’.156 This view is also echoed in the following comment by Lady Hale who 
recently opined: 
We like to think that the outcome of any particular case is determined by the 
law and the evidence and not by the predilection of the individual judge. We 
like to think that we are not predictable in the way in which we will decide the 
hard cases where the outcome is not clear. But we cannot have it both ways – 
we have already accepted that it matters who the judge is.
157
 
Specifically in relation to family law and mental capacity cases, Hedley J, a retired 
High court judge and former President of the Lawyers’ Christian Fellowship, asserts 
that: ‘The areas under consideration are value-laden and every outcome will involve 
a value-judgment made by the decision-maker…’ 158 It is perhaps significant then 
that Hedley also opines that ‘…judges tend to have quite strong personal values 
systems’.159 It might tenably be argued that the stronger an individual’s value 
system, the more difficult it will be to make decisions that are not, at the very least, 
unconsciously influenced by those deeply entrenched values, of which religious 
beliefs may be part. On the other hand, talking about the recent Brexit ruling, whilst 
recognising the personal dimension to judging, Lord Kerr emphasises the rule-bound 
nature of judicial decision-making:  
We are not involved in reaching decisions based on anything other than the 
legal principles as they are presented to us and the legal analysis which we 
conduct as to these extremely difficult and complicated questions…That's not 
to say that we don't have personal views but we are all extremely conscious of 
the need to set aside our personal views and to apply the law as we conceive it 
to be.
160
 
 
                                                 
156
 Lord Mance, ‘The Role of  Judges in a Representative Democracy’ Lecture given during the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s Fourth Sitting in The Bahamas (24 February 2017) 
<www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170224.pdf> accessed 18 June 2017. 
157
 Lady Hale, ‘Constitutional Implications of Judicial Selection’ (Constitutional Law Summer 
School, Belfast 11 August 2017) < https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170811.pdf > accessed 
31 October 2017. 
158
 Mark Hedley, The Modern Judge: Power, Responsibility and Society’s Expectations (LexisNexis 
2016). 
159
 ibid 6. 
160
 Andrew Hosken, ‘UK’s Supreme Court faces Brexit limelight’ (BBC Radio 4, 15 November 2016) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37979406> accessed 25 June 2017. 
 75 
 
More recently, in a speech about judicial ethics, Lord Neuberger recalled a case that 
he had been involved in which clearly demonstrates how easy it can be for personal 
factors to enter the judicial decision-making process. Of course, there is no 
suggestion that the actual judgment was inappropriately influenced by such factors: 
 
Early on in my judicial career, I was listening to an oldish man who was giving 
evidence which was inherently unconvincing, and I noticed I was trying to 
justify or explain away his inconsistencies and evasions to myself. I pulled 
myself up and tried to examine why I was doing this, and then I realised that, 
through his physical and vocal mannerisms, he reminded me of my own father 
who had recently died, and that caused me to want to believe him.
161
 
 
Looking to religion more specifically,  Cooke J has commented that his Christian 
values would not influence his professional judgements ‘to a very significant 
extent’, from which we might reasonably infer his religious beliefs nevertheless 
exert some influence on decision-making, particularly given he admits that human 
rights cases may be approached from ‘a slightly Christian perspective’.162 
Similarly, Hedley J has said that in family cases in which the life or death of a 
child is at stake, whilst the best interests of the child is the principal consideration, 
faith will inevitably influence decisions ‘as it will influence any other 
discretionary decision that you might make’.163 On the other hand, when asked 
whether her Christian beliefs had any effect on work as a judge, former Lord 
Justice of Appeal, Dame Butler-Sloss acknowledged the indirect role played by 
personal factors but did not consider her religious beliefs to be a factor in her 
decision-making: 
 
The place of God in one’s daily life is obviously personal, and for most people 
a private matter. I cannot speak for other judges but I do not consider that I am 
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directly affected in my judicial role by my beliefs. It is obvious however, that 
my standards and views, like everyone else’s, are conditioned by my 
background and experience.
164
 
On this view, it might well be questioned what are an individual’s standards and 
views, if not a reflection, at least in part, of their beliefs. 
 
Looking outside of the UK, Richard Chisholm, a former justice of the Family court 
in Australia, acknowledges that there is a risk that judicial decisions may be affected 
by the personal values of individual judges where open-ended principles are applied 
(although not specifically in relation to religious values). He describes this as the 
‘values problem’.165 Arguing that the influence of values are largely neutralised by 
legal constraints, agreed case-specific values and judicial professionalism,
166
 he 
accepts that a judge’s underlying values can often play an unconscious role in 
judicial decision-making. Former justice of the High Court of Australia, Michael 
Kirby, similarly agrees that judges draw on their personal values in legal reasoning, 
whether consciously or unconsciously. He suggests that it is a given that judges’ 
personal values affect judicial reasoning, not least because of ambiguities in the 
English language which mean ‘almost always there are at least two or maybe more 
answers’ to a constitutional case.167 And former Australian Federal Court judge Ray 
Finkelstein QC has painted a similar picture of the factors that affect how judges 
judge: 
 
Every human being is the product of their social experience, background, 
education and heritage. A judge is no different. Judges (sic) views of morality 
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as well as their background and beliefs, sympathies and antipathies cannot help 
but underline at least some aspects of the decision-making process and, in 
some cases, all aspects. This is so whether or not the particular judge 
acknowledges it. There are some self-proclaimed formalists who believe it is 
possible to divorce their personal views and values from their decisions. 
Although they may genuinely believe this, I doubt its truth.
168
 
 
In considering the arguments relating to the appropriateness of personal convictions 
in judging as part of a wider debate regarding the doctrine of church and state, 
Hammond J, a serving judge in the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and President of 
the Law Commission goes so far as to advocate allowing judges to rely on their own 
religious beliefs in hard cases, on the basis that such beliefs help provide ‘a vital and 
inexhaustible source of the energy we need for human renewal and spirit’.169  
What is clear from the discussion above is that many judges make no secret about 
the fact that personal factors colour their personal outlook and that such factors may 
play a part in their judicial decision-making in some way. Crucially however, it will 
be seen in the next section that proponents of this view defend claims that this 
doesn’t threaten impartiality by arguing that judges’ decisions remain ‘subordinate to 
judicial norms’.170  
 
2.5 Impartiality in an adjudicative context 
 
In the foregoing sections, contemporary theories and models of adjudication, 
together with recent comments from judges suggest that judicial decision-making 
cannot be understood without considering the impact of non-legal factors. This 
clearly presents a dilemma – how can the presence of a personal dimension to 
judging be squared with the requirement for judges to administer the law 
impartially? To address this question, this section considers how impartiality can be 
understood within an adjudicative context. 
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Judicial impartiality is widely recognised as a fundamental requirement for 
procedural fairness and natural justice. Moreover, it is essential in maintaining public 
confidence in, and the legitimacy of, the legal process. As Lord Denning MR stated: 
‘Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-
minded people go away thinking: ‘The Judge was biased’’.171 Judicial impartiality 
can be defined as the absence of personal prejudice or bias in a case so as to ensure 
that litigants are treated fairly by the court. Thus, to be impartial, a judge must absent 
any personal interest or bias from the decision-making process so as to ensure that 
his or her reasoning is based only on the evidence presented and the relevant guiding 
legal principles and precedent.  
Together with the closely related concept of judicial independence, the principle of 
judicial impartiality is embodied in the judicial oath which requires a judge to act 
‘without fear or favour, affection or ill will’. Shetreet and Turenne explain that ‘fear 
or favour’ undermines the collective aspect of judicial independence, whilst affection 
or ill will threatens the independence of the individual judge – the latter being that 
about which this thesis is concerned.
172
 Sedley LJ makes a further distinction; he 
links ‘fear or favour’ to independence (both collective and personal) which he 
described as a ‘state of being’, whilst ‘affection or ill will’ is said to be related to 
impartiality which he describes as the ‘state of mind’ of a judge or tribunal towards a 
case and the parties to it.
173
 In any case, the collective and individual dimensions of 
independence are underpinned by the notion of impartiality. In turn, impartiality is 
rooted in the notion of equality, specifically equality before the law, widely 
recognised as a fundamental right protected under international, regional and 
national human rights law. For example, Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provides that: ‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to equal protection of the law’,174 whilst Article 20 of the EU 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights simply states: ‘Everyone is equal before the law’.175  
In so far as it provides a level playing field for all parties, Geyh opines that 
impartiality is therefore ‘a feel good term, like “puppies” and “pie” that no decent 
soul would denigrate’.176  
Despite its importance in a judicial context, the concept of impartiality has received 
little attention among legal scholars. Lucy argues that this is particularly surprising 
because whilst impartiality is recognised as central to understanding the judicial role, 
at the same time, the concept is frequently criticised for being incoherent or 
impossible to attain.
177
 One possible explanation for this is that judicial impartiality 
is often conflated with the notion of judicial neutrality. Notably, in defending the 
possibility of impartiality in a juridical context, Lucy himself chooses not distinguish 
between these two terms reasoning that, as ordinarily conceived, impartiality and 
neutrality are more or less synonyms.
178
 Lucy is not alone; Ipp states that many 
judges regard these two concepts as synonymous.
179
 Nonetheless, in understanding 
judicial impartiality, it is helpful to distinguish these two closely related, but distinct, 
terms.  
Impartial or neutral? 
According to Montefiore, ‘to be neutral is always to be neutral between two or more 
actual policies or parties’.180 In a judicial setting, neutrality requires that judges are 
politically neutral; they are neutral in their stance to the law and their decisions must 
be untainted by bias. However, here it is posited that the idea of the wholly detached, 
value-neutral judge is a fiction. All individuals, professional judges or otherwise, 
have preconceptions, opinions and prejudices that shape their understanding of 
society. These views are likely to be informed by, amongst other things, an 
individual’s moral, religious, ethical and/or political values.  The process of judging, 
by its very nature, necessarily involves a judge having to identify the limits of, and 
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interpret the applicable rules, contrast behaviours and make determinations; these are 
tasks which necessarily involve an element of value-judgment which is often (if not 
always) contingent on the way in which the judge understands and responds to the 
current social context in a given a case, particularly when judicial discretion is 
exercised; accordingly, as Hedley J states: ‘The value-free judge does not and should 
not exist’.181  
For the above reasons, the argument herein advanced is that whilst judges strive to 
be and be seen to be impartial (and, as will be seen in later chapters, often succeed), 
judicial neutrality is impossible to achieve, nor is it desirable.
182
  As Lucy contends, 
to expect judges to adjudicate having divorced themselves from their personal 
commitments and experiences  (to which can be added other factors such as their  
prior understanding of prevailing societal value) is ‘to expect them to live debased 
lives’.183 Surely, it is preferable that those making decisions about matters that often 
affect society at large draw upon their knowledge, experiences and understanding of 
the world when passing judgment. On this view it is easy to see why Lucy says that 
impartiality (and, on Lucy’s argument, neutrality) can only be understood against a 
backdrop of partiality.
184
 On the other hand, the claim that judicial neutrality is 
illusory clearly threatens what Lucy describes as ‘attitudinal impartiality’, 
particularly if a judge’s life experiences are so limited or of such a nature that the 
judge fails to attain what Lucy identifies as the basic requirement of impartiality, 
namely, ‘an attitude of openness to and lack of pre-judgment upon the claims of the 
disputants’. However, this argument fails to take into account the ways in which 
judging is constrained. For example, judges have a duty to comply with legal rules, 
values of the law and standards of judicial behaviour (whether by convention or 
codified). Evidence of the limiting effect of the law can be found in cases where a 
judge says that the law compels him or her to reach a particular decision, even 
though it is not an outcome with which the judge personally agrees.
185
 Of course, 
such constraints do not prevent a judge from entering the courtroom without 
preconceptions but they can play an important role in alleviating the effects that 
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judicial personal factors have on the decisional process. In any case, as Lucy argues, 
a requirement to be impartial does not require a judge ‘to do the impossible’ and set 
aside all of their commitments, experiences and values, only those that are relevant 
to the parties and the dispute.
186
 As such, it is perfectly plausible to argue that a 
judge may lack neutrality but may nevertheless be impartial or, at least it is 
suggested, impartial enough to ensure justice is done and seen to be done. 
The law 
In English law, judicial impartiality is an enduring precept at common law, and is 
also enshrined into statute under the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporates 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 6(1) provides that: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial [emphasis added] tribunal 
established by law…. 
 
Lord Neuberger asserts that the law on bias creates a form of judicial self-
scrutiny, in other words it acts as a constraint on judging.
187
 In addition to the law, 
the Guide to Judicial Conduct (revised in 2018) (‘the Guide’) sets out the 
standards expected of judges in relation to impartiality.
188
 Together with guidance 
on the five other core ‘values’ found in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct (judicial independence, integrity, propriety, equality and competence and 
diligence), the Guide sets out a written code for regulating judicial behaviour. As 
regards the principle of impartiality, the Guide makes clear that it is essential to 
the proper discharge of the judicial office and, significantly, that the requirement 
for a judge to be impartial applies not only to the case outcome but also to the 
decisional process. Although the Guide is not binding per se (for example, it 
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states that deference is to be given to the overall interests of justice), it has been 
convincingly argued that, to the extent that much of the Guide simply reiterates 
already obligatory standards of conduct such as a commitment to impartiality 
under the judicial oath, the Guide is more than simply persuasive.
189
  
 
Common law rule against bias 
 
As indicated above, judicial impartiality requires that a judge is free from bias. At 
common law, the courts recognise two forms of bias which potentially threaten 
judicial impartiality: actual and apparent. As the name suggests, actual bias occurs 
where it is established that a judge is biased against one of the parties. Successful 
claims will automatically disqualify the judge.  In practice, challenges on this ground 
are rare and, unsurprisingly, are not encouraged by the courts.
190
 A key justification 
for the judiciary’s reluctance to readily entertain claims of actual bias is that they 
erode public confidence and trust in the judiciary, and damage the reputation of the 
legal profession and justice system.
191
 A recent example of an unsuccessful claim on 
grounds of actual bias is Red River UK Ltd v Sheikh.
192
 In this case, the judge was 
accused of incompetence and of being consciously and deliberately racially biased 
against the defendant, Miss Sheikh. Having said that these were ‘very serious 
allegations to level against any serving judge…’, the judge said that he had done his 
best to deal with the matters relating to the case in accordance with the law and his 
judicial affirmation and that therefore he would not recuse himself.
193
Of course, 
given that applications for recusal are often decided by the judge against whom an 
allegation of bias is made means it is hardly surprising that a litigant may be 
reluctant to pursue a claim of bias.  In Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties 
Ltd,
194
 the Court of Appeal advance several other reasons why claims under this head 
are uncommon. Firstly, instances of actual judicial bias are unlikely. Returning to the 
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neutrality/impartiality distinction, it is accepted that a judge, like anyone else, may 
have a personal view about an aspect of a case, the law or indeed the parties 
involved. But wherever his or her personal sympathies lay, the judicial oath (which 
creates an assumption of impartiality), along with a judge’s professional training, 
experience and commitment to the judicial role enables him or her to set aside those 
views and decide the case solely on the facts and in accordance with the law. 
Secondly, actual bias is very difficult to prove because ‘the law does not 
countenance the questioning of a judge about extraneous influences affecting his 
mind’.195 As Lord Woolf suggests in R v Gough,196 such an approach is undesirable 
because of the confidential nature of the judicial decision-making process and 
unhelpful ‘because the person alleged to be biased may be quite unconscious of its 
effect’.197 Critically, on this argument, it seems that enforcing the rule against actual 
bias will only ever be successful where conscious bias is suspected. Thirdly, the 
burden of proof is very high; there must be clear evidence of judicial partiality. 
Therefore, from a practical perspective, as the Court of Appeal indicate, those who 
allege judicial bias will find it easier to discharge the lesser burden of showing that 
there is a real possibility of bias under the test for apparent bias.
198
 What constitutes 
apparent bias is now considered. 
 
The concept of apparent bias is encapsulated in Lord Hewart CJ’s extempore 
judgment in R v Sussex Justices, Ex p McCarthy,
199
 in which he states: ‘…it is not 
merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not 
only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’. This 
important principle was reiterated in In Pinochet in which Lord Nolan makes it clear 
that it is not enough for a judge to actually be free from bias in favour of, or against, 
a party to a case; he or she must also appear to act without partiality or prejudice.
200
  
The modern rule relating to apparent bias is that laid down in Porter v Magill
201
 in 
which Lord Hope explained that the ‘question is whether the fair-minded and 
informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real 
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possibility that the tribunal was biased’.202 The original test was formulated in R v 
Gough,
203
 in which the House of Lords held that a judge (or juror) should be 
automatically disqualified for hearing a case where he or she had a proprietary or 
pecuniary interest in subject matter of the proceedings. In all other cases, the test to 
be applied was whether the court, having regard to those circumstances, considered 
that there was a real danger of bias. Of particular note, Lord Goff explained that it 
was unnecessary to require the court ‘to look at the matter through the eyes of a 
reasonable man’, because in such cases the court personified the reasonable man. In 
any event, Lord Goff explained, the court has first to ascertain the relevant 
circumstances from the available evidence, ‘knowledge of which would not 
necessarily be available to an observer in court at the relevant time’. The approach in 
R v Gough was criticised on the basis that it failed to give due regard to the need to 
promote public confidence in the justice system. Thus, in In re Medicaments and 
Related Classes of Goods (No.2),
204
 the test for apparent bias was modified so that 
the appearance of bias was to be considered from the perspective of the ‘fair-minded 
and informed observer’ (rather than that of the court) and the test was whether there 
was ‘a real possibility, or a real danger’ that the tribunal was biased. The effect of 
this change was to bring the common law test into line with the approach in 
Scotland, Commonwealth countries including Australia, New Zealand and Canada 
and the requirement for objective impartiality contained in ECHR Article 6(1).
205
  
 
The test for apparent bias was subject to a further ‘modest adjustment’ in Porter v 
Magill,
206
 in which the ‘real danger’ element was dropped. It is suggested that the 
current test slightly lowers the threshold insofar as a ‘real possibility’ may be 
construed as being less difficult to prove than a ‘real danger’.  
 
The question of who constitutes a ‘fair-minded and informed observer’ was 
addressed in Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
207
 In this case, the 
appellant, a Palestinian asylum seeker, alleged that there was a real possibility that 
the Court of Session judge who had dismissed the appellants appeal, Lady Cosgrove, 
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would be deemed biased by a ‘fair-minded and informed observer’ because of her 
membership with the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists 
(IAJLJ) – an organisation which had published pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian 
articles. Setting out the ideal characteristics of the observer, Lord Hope conceded 
that expectations were rather unrealistic.
208
 A fair-minded observer was ‘the sort of 
person who always reserves judgment on every point until she has seen and fully 
understood both sides of the argument’ and was neither complacent nor unduly 
sensitive or suspicious’.209 Furthermore, he opined that whilst the fair-minded 
observer was cognisant of the requirement for a judge to be impartial, they would 
also know ‘that judges, like anybody else, have their weaknesses’. To be ‘informed’, 
Lord Hope explained that the observer took a balanced approach to any information 
given, read beyond the headlines and appreciated the importance of context.
210
 In 
dismissing the appeal, the House of Lords held that a fair-minded and informed 
observer would not conclude that there was a real possibility of unconscious bias on 
the part of the judge by reason of her mere membership with the IAJLJ. The 
suggestion that Lady Cosgrove may have been unconsciously influenced by reading 
the IAJLJ material, including that with anti-Palestinian sentiments, was rejected on 
the basis that it was ‘a blanket proposition’, the scope of which was too wide.  On 
the other hand, if Lady Cosgrove had expressed, or was President of an association 
which had expressed a view, or endorsed a Pro-Israeli/anti-Palestinian stance, she 
would not have been allowed to sit because, as Mance LJ opined, ‘A fair-minded 
observer would regard such a judge as too closely and overtly committed to 
supporting the cause of Israel generally and of Mr Sharon in relation to the 
Sabra/Shatila massacre’. 211 
 
What is clear is that a claim of bias must be decided on the facts and circumstances 
of the individual case. Case-law and the Guide to Judicial Conduct give a further an 
indication of the sorts of factors that are acknowledged as potentially giving rise to a 
real possibility of bias. Examples include: if a judge or members of the judge’s 
family has a significant pecuniary interest in the case outcome;
212
 if the judge has a 
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personal or business relationship with a party,
213
 or animosity exists between the 
judge and one of the parties in a case the judge is hearing;
214
 if a judge is known to 
have strong views on topics relevant to issues in the case, and/or has commented 
extra-judicially on such topics;
215
 or, if a judge is an active member of a pressure 
group.
216
  
Most significantly, the court has made it clear that there is very little prospect that a 
claim of apparent bias based on the religious beliefs of a professional judge will be 
successful. Specifically, in Locabail,
217
 the Court of Appeal provides a non-
exhaustive list of factors that are unlikely to give rise to a successful claim of 
apparent bias. Of particular relevance to the current discussion is the following 
statement:  
We cannot, however, conceive of circumstances in which an objection could 
be soundly based on the religion [emphasis added], ethnic or national origin, 
gender, age, class, means or sexual orientation of the judge.
218
 
The mere reference to religion, then, is not sufficient to constitute bias. However, in 
some cases, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for those with strongly held 
religious convictions to put aside those beliefs (at least unconsciously) in a way that 
allows them to approach the case with the requisite attitude of openness and lack of 
pre-judgment. Imagine a case such as R (Nicklinson) v. Ministry of Justice,
219
 in 
which the UKSC considered the compatibility of the present law on assisted suicide 
with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the lawfulness of 
the DPP’s policy on assisted suicide. As has been argued elsewhere,220 it is surely 
within the realm of possibility that say, a Catholic judge with strong religious views 
against euthanasia would, at least unconsciously, be influenced by those same beliefs 
when considering such a case, even if his or her final decision was reasoned in 
accordance with the law.
221
 Indeed, in arguing why Nicklinson was a matter for the 
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legislature and not for the courts to determine, Lord Sumption said that such a 
decision was one that could not fail ‘to be strongly influenced by the decision-
makers’ personal opinions about the moral case for assisted suicide’ (discussed 
further in Chapter 5).
222
  
 
Malleson argues that the assertion that there is no possibility of bias on grounds of, 
inter alia, a judge’s religion is inconsistent with one of the factors which the Court 
later suggests might give rise to a danger of bias - that is if, ‘for any other reason, 
there were real ground for doubting the ability of the judge to ignore extraneous 
considerations, prejudices and predilections and bring an objective judgment to bear 
on the issues before him’.223 In agreement with Malleson, the position taken here is 
that it is reasonable to suppose that ‘extraneous considerations, prejudices and 
predilections’ may be partly or wholly shaped by personal factors relating to the 
decision-maker. For all of that, there is a straightforward and sound policy-based 
justification for saying that a judge’s religion  in itself cannot conceivably give rise 
to a possibility of bias. If such challenges were seen as anything other than 
exceptional (for example where there was indisputable evidence as to an element of 
conscious or unconscious religious bias) the floodgates could be opened to claims of 
bias, the judicial process would be frustrated and public confidence in the judiciary 
undermined. This is because, in theory at least, every litigant would have a ground 
on which to question the impartiality of the judge – man against woman, young 
against old and so on. 
What is clear is that based on the court’s reasoning in Locabail considered above, it 
is very unlikely that a judge would countenance recusing himself or herself grounds 
of actual or apparent religious bias, save for in very rare circumstances.  
 
Addressing allegations of bias 
Where concerns are expressed about a judge’s ability to disengage subjective beliefs 
or preferences from the decision-making process (such concerns being raised by the 
judge him- or herself, or by the parties involved in a case) judicial recusal or 
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disqualification may be required.
224
 If a judge is shown to have an interest in the 
outcome of a case which he or she has determined so that he or she has acted, or will 
otherwise act improperly as a judge in his or her own cause, automatic 
disqualification is required.
225
 That said, a party may waive the right to object to the 
judge hearing the case if any such waiver is made with full knowledge of the 
relevant facts. In other cases of alleged actual or apparent bias, often it is the judge 
who determines whether they are sufficiently impartial to sit. This procedure is in 
itself controversial given that it, as Mummery LJ points out, it essentially means that 
a judge sits in judgment on his or her own behaviour.
226
 Indeed, it raises a number of 
legitimate questions, for example: Can a judge properly assess their own propensity 
for conscious or unconscious bias? Should there be greater disclosure requirements 
before proceedings commence? Does the fact that a judge is the adjudicator of his or 
her own conduct deter litigants from alleging bias for fear that the judge’s failure to 
recuse may itself be perceived to adversely affect the way the litigant is treated? 
Whilst a discussion of arguments for and against judicial recusal reform is outside 
the scope of this thesis, a number of alternatives may be considered. For example, 
Mummery LJ cautions against judges yielding too readily to allegations of bias, but 
clearly thinks there may be occasions where it would be appropriate for a judge to 
informally arrange for the case to be re-allocated to a colleague
227
. His argument is 
underpinned by the need for a judge to be seen to be impartial. Another controversial 
option is to have the allegation considered by an independent adjudicator although 
this would be undoubtedly delay proceedings and potentially be resource-
prohibitive.
228
 It has further been proposed that practice directions would be useful to 
direct judges as to the points they should take into consideration when deciding 
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whether to recuse.
229
 This more conservative approach has the benefit of not being so 
administratively burdensome but does not address the problem of whether litigants 
who have made an application for recusal will have trust and confidence in a judge 
who has refused to stand down.  On balance, it is suggested that should allegations of 
judicial bias on grounds of religion or any other factor be made, it would be 
appropriate to combine the first and third of these options –practice directions being 
the first port of call with an option to informally pass the case to a colleague if the 
judge has any doubts about their ability to decide the case in an impartial manner.  
Of course, if a case has already been decided and a judge is found to be biased, the 
case must be set aside.
230
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The overarching research question considers whether lawyers perceive judges’ 
religious beliefs affect judicial decision-making. In unpicking this question, four 
main concepts have been identified: (1) definitions of religion (2) judicial decision-
making (3) judicial reflections and (4) judicial impartiality.  
This chapter began by describing what religion means, both in a research and legal 
context, for the purpose of understanding how the lawyers who took part in this 
study may have understood the researcher’s references to religion and related terms 
in the interviews and SPQ that form the empirical part of this research. In looking at 
examples of cases from employment and family contexts, the sorts of complex 
religious issues the courts are increasingly required to adjudicate were highlighted.  
Next, it went on to consider traditional and modern conceptions of judicial decision-
making in the English courts and the different theories and models of adjudication to 
situate the present thesis within its theoretical foundations. Against this backdrop, it 
was argued that the present study most closely aligns with Tamanaha’s ‘balanced 
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realist’ (or ‘balanced formalist’) conception of judging,233 and loosely with an 
attitudinal model of judicial behaviour. Although, of course, as Posner suggests, 
whether any of the theoretical models can ever wholly capture the full extent to 
which legal and non-legal factors shape judicial behaviour is subject to debate.
234
  
Shifting from the theoretical to the practical, judicial perspectives on the judicial role 
where then explored, wherein it was shown that, contrary to the traditional view of 
how judges judge based on a formalist conception of adjudication, the judges 
themselves readily acknowledge that who they are, their backgrounds and 
experience, inevitably affects their judicial decision-making. Notwithstanding that 
the presence of a personal dimension in judging is, prima facie, discordant with the 
concept of judicial impartiality, it was explained that it is possible for judicial 
personal factors such as religion to be reconciled with the requirement for impartial 
decision-making in both theory and in practice. 
The next chapter explains why there is a paucity of research that considers the 
relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judging in the UK, and presents a 
review of existing judicial studies literature (in relation to the UK and further afield) 
that explores the nexus between judges’ personal factors and judging and, more 
specifically, the relationship between judges’ religion and judicial decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 3 
UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING:  
RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL CHAPTER 3
DECISION-MAKING: RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
The preceding chapter set out the conceptual framework upon which this thesis is 
based. Chapter 3 situates the present study within the existing empirical research that 
explores how judges reach decisions in practice. Having identified a gap in the 
understanding of the non-legal factors that influence judicial decision-making in the 
English courts, the first part of this chapter examines the reasons for the scarcity of 
research in this area. The bulk of the chapter explores evidence emanating from other 
jurisdictions, particularly the US, which indicates that judges’ religion (and other 
personal factors) can influence the legal decisional process in certain cases. Mindful 
of the pitfalls in extrapolating the findings from the US studies to judicial behaviour 
in the English courts (some of which are considered in Section 3.3.1) , it might be 
expected that if the religious convictions and other personal factors relating to judges 
in other jurisdictions (where judges are similarly bound by Oath or Affirmation to 
administer justice fairly and impartially) are found to play a role in judging, a similar 
phenomenon may be expected to be found in relation to the way judges judge in the 
domestic courts. In light of the dearth of empirical literature in relation to how 
judges make decisions in the domestic courts, Chapter 3 concludes by considering 
whether the conceptual and methodological studies of judicial behaviour conducted 
in the US could be replicated in a UK context.  
 
3.1 Current research landscape in the UK 
 
Deciding cases constitutes the core business of judges today.
1
 However, over the last 
seventy years, there has been a significant expansion in the power and reach of the 
judiciary. As discussed in Chapter 1, factors contributing to this broader judicial 
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remit include, but are not limited to, constitutional reform, the growth of the welfare 
state, the rise of judicial review, increasingly complex issues brought before the 
courts, and the enactment of the Human rights Act 1998.
2
 One consequence of what 
Genn has described as the ‘increasing legalization of the social world’3 is that, in 
contemporary Britain, judges are increasingly required to adjudicate a gamut of cases 
engaging novel, often divisive, issues of profound political, social, moral, ethical 
and/or religious importance.
4
 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the opinions and 
decisions of the judiciary are now subject to unprecedented levels of media and 
public scrutiny.
5
 Given the rise in the significance of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other 
arms of government,
6
 and greater scrutiny of the judicial role, the practice of judging 
might reasonably be expected to have captured the interest of the academic 
community in the UK. However, whilst there have been a few notable studies of how 
and what judges do,
7
 it is only recently that judicial decision-making (as a sub-
discipline of judicial studies) has begun to attract the critical attention of legal 
scholars in the UK who, as Thomas observes, have traditionally confined research of 
the judiciary to a more legalistic analysis of cases rather than exploring judicial 
decisions in terms of judges’ own preferences.8  
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Of the few studies that have explored the influence of non-legal factors on judging in 
the UK to date, the focus has been on a narrow range of judicial characteristics – 
social class, political ideology and, more recently, gender and personal values. 
Following the US tradition, the early research into judicial decision-making was 
conducted by political scientists interested in the relationship between ideological 
preferences and case outcomes. For example, in his seminal text on the UK judiciary 
first published in 1977, Griffith controversially argued that, by virtue of their similar 
privileged backgrounds (white, male, Oxbridge educated and upper-middle class), 
judges had ‘a unifying attitude of mind, a political position…primarily concerned to 
protect and conserve certain values and institutions’.9 For Griffith, this meant that 
particularly when deciding ‘political cases’ (defined as those that arise out of 
‘controversial legislation or controversial action initiated by public authorities, or 
which touch upon moral or social issues’ and therefore call for judicial discretion),10 
judges as a group were incapable of political neutrality. Instead, he argued that 
judicial interpretations of what constituted the public interest were informed by a 
corporate view. Whilst absolving judges ‘of a conscious and deliberate intention to 
pursue their own interests or interests of their class’,11 the corporate view (itself the 
product of an elite class) was principally concerned with: (a) upholding the interests 
of the state; (b) maintaining the status quo; and, (c) unconsciously favouring 
conservatism.
12
 Because of this inherent bias towards the ‘established authority’, 
Griffith argued that judges were ineffective as custodians of individual rights against 
the state,
13
 particularly in relation to the claims of minority groups or those who 
might threaten the established order.  
 
Forty years after Griffith’s original work, it is therefore striking that there has been 
relatively little change in the social make-up of the judiciary, particularly in the 
higher ranks. As displayed below (Tables 3.1 and 3.2), judges remain 
overwhelmingly male, white, and typically educated at private school and 
                                                 
9
 Griffith (n5)7. In his original work, Griffith argued that the judges political values were those 
normally associated with the Conservative party. However, later he suggested that judicial 
conservatism did not necessarily follow partisan lines but was nonetheless a political philosophy. 
Griffith (n5)341. 
10
 ibid 7. 
11
 ibid 334. 
12
 ibid 341 
13
 Griffith argued that human rights were no more and no less than political claims made by 
individuals on those in authority’, JAG Griffith, The Political Constitution (1979) 42 MLR 1. 
 94 
 
Oxbridge.
14
 On Griffith’s thesis, it would follow that the decisions of judges today 
are likely to reflect similar personal and corporate biases as their forebears.  
 
    Public School Oxbridge 
  
1987         1994        2015 1987         1994         2015 
    % % 
All senior 
judiciary 70             80           74      80                87             74 
        
Table 3.1 Senior judiciary by education
15
 
 
   Women 
 
Ethnicity 
  
Total 
number 1994          2017 
 
1994      2017 
Law Lords or Supreme 
Court 12 0                    1 
0              - 
Heads of Division 5 0                    0 0              - 
Lord Justices of Appeal 38 1                    9 0              - 
High Court judges 97 6                  21  0              5 
Table 3.2 Senior judiciary by gender and ethnicity
16
 
 
That said, there are several reasons why Griffith’s thesis does not stand up to 
scrutiny today.
17
 First, it rests on a rather simplistic assumption that, because of their 
shared backgrounds, all judges think in the same way. However, now, as when 
Griffith’s work was published, a common social background does not mean that 
judges share a common judicial philosophy or follow the same class interests when 
deciding cases.
18
 Second, treating the judiciary as a homogenous group overlooks the 
important role played by individual judges in the decision-making process, 
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particularly in split decision cases.
19
 Third, it is important to note that Griffith’s work 
pre-dates the coming into effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) into UK law. 
The HRA has provided a more systematic basis on which existing procedural values 
and substantive values such as equality, dignity and fairness are protected. 
Furthermore, the courts now play a greater role in protecting the fundamental rights 
of individuals against violations by the state. This and other constitutional changes 
have fuelled debate as to whether the balance is shifting from a ‘political 
constitution’, specifically the idea that those who exercise political power should be 
held to account through political rather than legal processes and institutions, to a 
‘legal constitution’ in which the courts have greater authority to hold the Executive 
to account.
20
 In criticising the judiciary, Griffith was defending the political 
constitution, no doubt having been heavily influenced by his own left wing bias and 
the political and economic malaise of the time. Fourth, from a methodological 
perspective, Lee has questioned whether the cases that Griffith used to support his 
thesis actually show a definitive association between judges’ backgrounds and the 
politics of their decision-making. As Lee correctly argues, it is not always obvious as 
to which side of the political spectrum a decision falls.
21
 Finally, it is also worth 
noting that Griffith’s research predates the transfer of the judicial appointments 
process to the new independent Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) created in 
2006 under the terms of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  
 
That said, Griffith’s thesis has some resonance today. As discussed in the preceding 
chapters, it is now widely accepted that judges’ personal factors play a role in the 
decision-making process. What Griffith failed to highlight is that such influence is 
limited by the imposition of legal and non-legal checks and balances. There is also 
support for Griffith’s claim as to the impossibility of judicial neutrality, at both an 
individual judge and institutional level. As discussed in Chapter 2, by its very nature, 
judging requires the decision-maker to exercise his or her value-judgment, 
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particularly in hard cases.
22
  Moreover, the value-judgments that judges make are 
shaped by legal values such as fairness and equality. Ergo, neutrality is neither 
necessary, nor desirable.
23
 But what is vital is that when deciding a case, the 
decision-maker adopts an open-mind and complies with his or her constitutional 
responsibility to be impartial; that is, to ensure that any preconceptions and 
predilections are abstracted from the decision-making process so as to ensure that 
judicial reasoning is based on the evidence and relevant guiding legal principles and 
precedent, rather than on personal preferences and prejudices. 
 
In the 1980’s, although not focused specifically on judicial attitudes or values,  
Paterson also departed from the traditional doctrinal approach to explore decision-
making in the House of Lords through the prism of the Law Lords and the Bar.
24
 To 
support his thesis that judicial decision-making in the House of Lords should be 
viewed as a social process, Paterson first observed the interaction between the Law 
Lords and counsel in a range of appeals heard between 1972 and 1973 and conducted 
interviews with a variety of individuals within the legal sphere with knowledge 
about the Law Lords and their role. In the main phase of his fieldwork, he conducted 
in-depth interviews with Law Lords and the advocates who most frequently appeared 
before them, in an effort to shed light on how judges perceived their role inside the 
final court of appeal. Paterson’s early empirical work using role analysis found that 
that the process of judging was an interactive process. Judicial personalities could 
not be ignored, nor could the impact of judges’ dialogue with counsel, particularly in 
acting as a powerful constraint on adjudication. Almost forty years after his first 
study, Paterson has recently returned to explore decision-making in the highest 
court.
25
 Once again he predominantly uses elite interviews to support his view that 
the nature and content of dialogue amongst and between judges and others (Counsel, 
Academics, courts in other jurisdictions, judicial assistants, and other branches of 
government) is pivotal to a better understanding of judicial decision-making. 
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In one of the first quantitative analyses of judicial decision-making conducted in 
respect of the UK judiciary, and emulating studies conducted in the US, Robertson 
used multidimensional scaling to test his premise that an individual judge’s personal 
beliefs and attitudes, notably those ‘inside a legal and ‘professional’ ideology’ 
influenced judicial decisions.
26
 Analysing decisions of judges in nonunanimous 
cases decided in the House of Lords between 1965 and 1978, he concluded that, in 
criminal and public law dimensions at least, a discernible ‘judicial ideology’ (defined 
by Robertson as ‘reflexive positions on issues of a politico-legal nature – echoing or 
leading to a (perhaps only marginal) preference for supporting a particular type of 
cause or litigant’)27 could be detected.  In a later study, Robertson used a 
combination of logistic regression, factor analysis and multi discriminant analysis 
methodologies to analyse both unanimous and nonunanimous decisions of the law 
lords between 1986 and 1995 across a variety of legal areas, for evidence to support 
his central thesis that ‘the law in almost any case that comes before the Lords turns 
out to be whatever their Lordships feel it ought to be’.28 Having shown that case 
outcomes were strongly correlated with which Law Lord decided an appeal, he 
concluded that judges’ decisions were highly predictable in certain types of cases.  
A decade later, in an empirical study of 1,592 nonunanimous opinions in 318 cases 
heard by the law lords between 1969 and 2009, Hanretty used a hierarchical item 
response model to determine whether dissent by judges could be attributed to 
ideological preferences.
29
 He concluded that political affiliation did not have a 
statistically significant effect on case outcomes, although he did not preclude the 
possibility that judges’ decisions reflected other personal characteristics. 
The representation of women in the judiciary and the question of whether gender has 
any effect on judging is increasingly subject to investigation in the UK.
30
 Research 
has been precipitated by a combination of factors including: the common perception 
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of the judiciary as largely ‘pale, male and stale’; the appointment of Lady Hale as the 
first woman law lord and only woman justice of the UK Supreme court and the 
appointments of Lady Justice Arden and Lady Justice Hallett to the Court of 
Appeal;
31
 and the wider drive to increase judicial diversity. The theoretical basis for 
the proposition that a judge’s gender affects judicial decisions is found in one of two 
constructs.
32
 Emanating from the US, Gilligan’s ‘different voice’ theory suggests 
there is a distinction between the nature of moral reasoning employed by women and 
men; women reason from an ‘ethic of care’, whilst men reason from an ‘ethic of 
justice’.33 Applied to the courtroom context, this theory posits that female judges 
display a greater depth of understanding and compassion and are less adversarial 
than their more combative male colleagues. Contrastingly, Boyd, Epstein and 
Martin’s ‘informational theory’ contends that it is the different experiences and 
perspectives of female judges that inform judicial decisions and, in some instances, 
may do so in a way that impacts upon their judging.
34
 This second theory is favoured 
by Lady Hale who remarks:  
I think that we can play the game as well as and in the same way as any man, 
but that we bring a different set of life experiences to the game which in a 
particular sort of case can colour what we think about it. This is not the same 
as having an “agenda” about what the outcome of any given case should be.35  
Moreover, this is a view with which at least one of Lady Hale’s male colleagues 
would appear to agree.
36
  
Whilst remaining sceptical about whether being a man or woman affects judicial 
decision-making, some feminist scholars argue that feminist judges are more 
likely to judge differently to non-feminist judges because they have a more 
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clearly defined set of values and beliefs which will inform their decision 
making.
37
 One of the most interesting works in this field to date has been that of 
the Feminist Judging Project. In this study, feminist scholars were asked to write 
alternative judgments from 23 significant legal cases heard in appellate courts to 
determine whether, in addition to the law, a ‘feminist consciousness or 
philosophy’ could be detected in the alternative judgments.38 In some cases, the 
feminist scholars reversed the original judgments. In others, the feminist ‘judges’ 
reached the same legal outcomes, albeit using different legal reasoning. The 
results suggest that a feminist perspective can make a difference to judicial 
reasoning. Might an individual’s religious outlook similarly affect how judges 
think in cases involving religiously sensitive issues? In any case, empirical 
research that examines the impact of gender on judicial decision-making in the 
UK courts remains limited. This is largely attributed to a lack of gender diversity 
within the senior judiciary.
39
  
More recently, Cahill-O’Callaghan has conducted some interesting work using 
Schwartz’s theory of basic values to explore whether the personal values of 
individual UKSC justices affect their judicial decision-making in cases heard in the 
apex Court.
40
 Schwartz’s theory identifies ten culturally universal, but motivationally 
distinct values which inform an individual’s behaviour and attitudes: self-direction; 
stimulation; hedonism; achievement; power; security; conformity; tradition; 
benevolence and universalism.
41
 Religion is not included as a standalone value in the 
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model.
42
 However, Schwartz and others have recognised that values such as 
tradition, conformity and benevolence are partly shaped by an individual’s religious 
beliefs.
43
  
Cahill-O’Callaghan applies this model in a content analysis of the UKSC decision in 
R(E) v. Governing Body of JFS.
44
 At issue in this split decision case was whether the 
criterion for admission to JFS (formerly the Jewish Free School) constituted direct 
racial discrimination under section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA). The 
school admissions policy gave preference to children whose Jewish status was 
recognised by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR); that is, to children whose 
mothers satisfied the matrilineal test or were Jews by conversion to Orthodox 
standards. However, the child seeking admission to JFS did not meet the OCR status 
requirements. The majority of the UKSC  (5:4) held that JFS had directly 
discriminated against the child on ground of ethnic origin.  
Cahill-O’Callaghan found the presence of two competing values in her analysis of 
the judges’ written opinions in JFS. Those supporting the majority opinion were 
found to favour ‘universalism’ whilst those who reached the minority decision 
favoured ‘tradition’. A quantitative context analysis was then applied to see whether 
there was a significant difference in the expression of these values within the 
competing judicial opinions. Cahill-O’Callaghan found a clear association between 
the values expressed and the decisions reached by judges in the JFS case. The values 
‘Universalism’ and ‘self-direction’ were most evident in the majority opinions. 
‘Tradition’ and ‘self-direction’ dominated in the opinions of the minority. A further 
analysis revealed that whilst ‘self-direction’ was evident in majority and minority 
legal opinions, the majority espoused values focused on individual freedom 
compared to the minority who espoused values focused on judicial freedom.  A small 
experimental study was also conducted in which legal academics were asked to rate 
the factors that influenced how they decided a vignette based on JFS. Consistent 
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with the main study, the findings demonstrated an association between personal 
values and the legal decisions. Cahill-O’Callaghan’s findings support her claim that, 
in cases which divide judicial opinion, the personal values of an individual judge can 
subconsciously influence their judicial decision-making.
45
 She goes on to argue that 
the presence of a ‘value: decision paradigm’ highlights the need for a greater 
diversity of tacit personal values to be represented in the UKSC.   
Cahill-O’Callaghan has also conducted a value-based agreement analysis of other 
cases heard in the UKSC.
46
 Specifically, she conducted a content analysis of 18 
cases that divided judicial opinion in the final court of appeal between 2009 and 
2011 to determine whether value related statements could be identified within 
judgments. She identified eight of Schwartz’s values in these judgments, the 
exceptions being hedonism and stimulation which is unsurprising given the judicial 
setting. Applying the same value profiles for UKSC justices as used in her analysis 
of judicial opinions in  JFS, Cahill-O’Callaghan again found evidence of ‘value 
diversity’ in the decisions of judges sitting in the final court of appeal. In addition, 
her analysis revealed that judges with similar value profiles were more likely to 
demonstrate high levels of agreement in their judicial decision-making, whilst the 
decisions of those espousing conflicting values (such as tradition v. universalism) 
reflected a lower degree of overall agreement which decreased significantly in 
nonunanimous cases.  Cahill-O’Callaghan uses her empirical findings to argue that 
current judicial diversity debates focus too narrowly on explicit diversity (on overt 
characteristics such as gender and ethnicity), and advances the case for the inclusion 
of innate tacit influences such as  personal values in studies of judicial decision-
making behaviour. Notwithstanding the potential for coding errors and researcher 
subjectivity in using a content analysis based approach, Cahill-O’Callaghan’s work 
is of particular relevance to the current study in so far as an individual’s religious 
beliefs are part of a wider gamut of personal values. 
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Inspired by this work, and drawing upon moral foundations theory,
47
 Hanretty has 
conducted statistical analysis for the purposes of determining whether the language 
used in judicial opinions provides an insight into judges’ different moral foundations 
and policy preferences.
48
 Hanretty analysed all opinions of all judges in 310 cases 
heard in the UKSC between 2009 and 2014 to look for words relating to specific 
moral foundations such as harm, fairness, in-group, authority and purity. Using 
logistic and multilevel linear regression, Hanretty found that differences in judicial 
‘value-talk’ could be linked to judicial disagreement over case outcomes.  
Despite such studies, the paucity of research about judicial decision-making in the 
UK becomes all the more evident when looking at studies conducted in other 
jurisdictions, particularly the US, which has a rich history of empirical legal 
scholarship examining the influence of a wide range of non-legal factors upon 
judicial decisions. The impact of political ideology on decision-making has been 
central to the US studies, but other variables including social, educational and 
professional background, the effects of panel composition and demographic factors, 
such as gender and age, have also been subject to extensive analysis.  Of relevance to 
the present study, a rich body of US literature also explores key themes relating to 
the judiciary and religious beliefs: Can a religiously devout judge really make a 
religiously-neutral judgment?
49
 Do particular faith groups fare better in court than 
other religious groups?
50
 Are there some legal areas in which a judge’s own religious 
beliefs may exert a greater influence in case outcomes than in other areas?
51
 Should a 
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judge’s religious beliefs be allowed to influence his or her decision-making?52 The 
findings from some of the studies exploring these issues are discussed further in 
Section 3.3. 
As indicated above, the academic community in the UK is becoming increasingly 
interested in the practice of judicial decision-making, and the part played by both 
legal and non-legal factors in this process.
53
 However, judges’ religious beliefs have 
not yet been subject to comprehensive analysis. To the researcher’s knowledge, only 
one study has considered the influence of judges’ religious beliefs on judicial 
decision-making in the UK to date.
54
 Specifically, Genn and Thomas have used case 
simulation to look at Disability Living Allowance tribunal decision-making appeals 
in the Social Entitlement Chamber. No correlation was found between the religion of 
the decision-maker and the outcome of the case although this is perhaps unsurprising 
given the nature of the decisions being made.
55
  
It is contended that a lack of knowledge about how judges’ faith intersects with 
judicial decision-making in the UK can be attributed to a number of general and 
variable-specific reasons which are explored in the next section. 
 
3.2 Explaining the paucity of empirical research  
 
Thomas suggests that a reluctance to deviate from the conventional doctrinal 
approach to law when looking at judicial decision-making in the UK derives from 
academics believing that empirical studies which explore judicial roles are ‘illegal or 
practically impossible’.56 This stems from the view that judges are unwilling to co-
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operate in research that sheds light on how they judge for fear that their 
shortcomings will be exposed or their views misrepresented in a way that threatens 
public confidence in the judiciary. The counter view, and that underpinning this 
thesis, is that developing an understanding of the factors that affect how judges reach 
decisions serves to enhance, rather than undermine, public trust in the judiciary and 
the justice system. Despite the judicial refusal to participate in this research, there is 
evidence that the judiciary recognise that in order to maintain their reputation as ‘one 
of the best and most independent in the world’, greater openness and transparency 
(including involvement in research) is vital.
57
 Malleson suggests that a further reason 
for the lack of research in relation to judging in the UK courts is that there is deeply 
entrenched reluctance in Britain to acknowledge the political significance of the 
judiciary.
58
 As a result, there has been little call for legal scholars to acquire the 
requisite skills to conduct empirical legal research or for any meaningful engagement 
between academics and judges with a view to better understand the way judges 
work.
59
 However, as previously discussed, in the twenty years following Malleson’s 
useful work on the modernisation of the judiciary, a number of drivers including a 
series of important constitutional changes and the bedding down of the HRA have 
precipitated a sea-change. The rising significance of the judiciary (particularly the 
UKSC) has spawned a burgeoning interest in the functioning of the judiciary, both 
within the legal sphere and in relation to its role as an arm of government. In spite of 
this, studies that explore the impact of extraneous factors on judicial decision-
making in the UK remain conspicuous by their absence.
60
 
Looking at the reasons why the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and 
judging have been overlooked to date, it is contended that similar obstacles to those 
preventing more comprehensive studies of gender and ethnic diversity within the 
judiciary arise. Thomas identifies three major structural and policy reasons for the 
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lack of more substantive inquiries in relation to these characteristics in the UK: a 
scarcity of women and minority judges; the ‘culture of secrecy’ in the judicial 
appointments process; and the fact that judicial diversity has only recently become a 
matter of policy debate in the UK.
61
 Applied to the current context, it is suggested 
that, in the same way that a lack of gender and ethnic diversity within the judiciary 
has made it difficult to assess the impact of these characteristics on judicial 
behaviour, a perceived lack of religious diversity on the bench may yield insufficient 
data from which any meaningful conclusions can be made.
62
 Indeed, Bornstein and 
Miller suggest it is only because of the diverse range of religious beliefs held by 
members of the US judiciary that research in this field remains largely Americo-
centric.
63
  
Whilst changes introduced under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (such as the 
traditional ‘secret soundings’ and tap on the shoulder’ method of appointment being 
scrapped and the establishment of an independent Judicial Appointments 
Commission) have encouraged greater transparency in relation to the judicial 
appointments process, it is argued that a lack of understanding about how judges 
judge in British courts reinforces the public’s perception of the judiciary as an ‘old 
boys’ network’ operating within a culture of secrecy.64 Posner argues that the 
‘professional mystification’ of the judicial role has, for centuries, been deliberately 
promulgated by judges in the US to help them maintain a privileged status, and to 
exaggerate their professional skills and their disinterest.
65
  Other commentators have 
suggested that a similar artifice has traditionally been adopted by the judiciary here. 
For example, Atiyah observes that the judiciary’s obfuscation of the craft of judging 
is an old tradition dating from at least the eighteenth century, the purpose of which 
has been to ‘keep the lower orders in their place’.66 Pannick has gone so far as to 
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liken judges ‘eager to protect the mysteries of their craft’ with ‘members of the 
Magic Circle who face expulsion if they explain how their tricks are done’.67 That 
said, it is worth noting that these criticisms pre-date significant changes such as the 
abandonment of the Kilmuir Rules and the reforms introduced under the CRA 2005 
(such as the removal of judges from the legislature through the establishment of the 
UKSC and the establishment of the JAC).
68
 More recently, there has been a marked 
shift towards greater openness in the judiciary, a consequence of which is that 
judges, particularly those at the top of the judicial hierarchy, appear more willing to 
talk about what they do and how they do it.
69
    Evidence of this can be found in the 
extra-curial speeches of judges (although some areas, such as judicial engagement 
with politics, rightly remain subject to tight controls). However, this change has not 
necessarily come about because judges are eager to lift the veil of secrecy that has 
surrounded their role; rather, it is suggested, this is a positive response to the 
judiciary’s increasingly significant constitutional role and the need for public 
engagement to maintain and enhance public trust and confidence in the courts. 
Another reason for the paucity of research is simply that even if religion is 
acknowledged to be  one of several non-legal factors to affect judgments, it may be 
impossible to untangle ‘religious’ influence from other judicial characteristics or to 
delineate the degree of influence, if any, that each of several independent variables 
has on a judge’s decision making. Similarly, and most typically within a collegiate 
environment, whilst a judge’s faith may have informed their approach,  the 
likelihood is that in the majority of cases, the same outcome will be reached by the 
bench regardless of religious composition because of (1) judges being constrained by 
legal norms and (2) panel effects. In addition to these reasons, it has been suggested 
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that an individual’s religious beliefs are quintessentially ‘a private matter’ and ‘a 
taboo subject in legal analysis’, which is irrelevant and inappropriate for academic 
study.
70
 
From a practical perspective, the unavailability of data is problematical. There is no 
requirement for the disclosure of judges’ religious convictions and where 
information is collected, it is classified as ‘sensitive personal data’.71 The collection 
of statistics regarding a judge’s ‘religion or belief’ is only a recent addition in 
diversity monitoring in relation to judicial appointments and is therefore of limited 
use.
72
 Thus, except where judges are open about their religious affiliation (which is 
not that often),
73
 or where reliable data can be gathered from alternative sources, 
attempts to discern the religious background of specific judges are likely to prove 
unproductive or inaccurate. It is further contended that, even where such information 
can be obtained, empirical studies that examine whether judges’ religious beliefs (or 
indeed other personal factors) affect decision-making may be met with judicial 
resistance. This lack of cooperation may arise because of an innate fear that research 
findings may be used to challenge the impartiality of the judiciary or as evidence that 
the judiciary had overstepped constitutional boundaries. However, it is argued that a 
failure to explore how judicial decisions are reached presents no lesser threat to the 
reputation of the judiciary than does lifting the lid on how and why judges judge as 
they do. Indeed, critics might argue that it is more damaging for judges to conceal 
their personal views on matters about which they are required to adjudicate. 
In light of these problems, the lack of academic interest in the relationship between 
judges’ faith and judicial decision-making in the UK is understandable. However, 
this does not mean that the relationship between judges’ faith and judging should 
continue to remain off-limits.   
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3.3 Empirical findings from other jurisdictions 
3.3.1 Evidence from the US 
 
The US literature is acknowledged as offering the most developed conceptual and 
methodological models upon which to base studies of judicial behaviour.
74
 This is 
attributable to the fact that most of these studies have been conducted by political 
scientists interested in how ideological preferences of Justices influence judicial 
decision-making in the US courts, particularly the US Supreme Court. However, 
whilst the review of US literature below serves as a useful reference point for the 
current thesis, it is important to add some caveats at this point due to significant 
differences between the UK and US constitutional and judicial structures, 
philosophical approaches and attitudes to religion. 
 
The first point concerns differences in the constitutional role of the judiciary. Unlike 
the UK, the US has a written constitution in which the Constitution itself and the law 
are entrenched. Adopted after the founding of the American Republic, the codified 
US constitution is regarded as the ‘the supreme law’ of the US.75 It sets out the 
powers of government (including a system of checks and balances between the three 
government branches), it adopts a federal government system, and provides 
protection for basic individual rights.  Crucially, the US courts interpret ‘the higher 
law’ under the written Constitution and have strong powers of judicial review which 
allows the US Supreme Court to strike down Legislative or Executive actions that 
violate the Constitution.
76
 Inevitably this means that the courts become mired in 
political controversies.
77
 Given that judges have a wide discretion in interpreting the 
Constitution means that there is more opportunity for judicial activism; in other 
words, judges may incorporate their own partisan views into judicial decision-
making. The idea that the US Supreme Court has the final say in constitutional 
matters,  the notion of ‘judicial supremacy’ (also referred to as ‘legal 
constitutionalism’), stands in stark contrast to the UK model where the courts have 
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wide statutory interpretative powers, but Parliament remains sovereign. This is 
evidenced most clearly in relation to the HRA; where the UKSC considers that 
legislation is incompatible with human rights protected under the Act, the court can 
make a declaration of incompatibility but, unlike the US Supreme Court, it cannot 
strike the law down. 
 
The second point is that, compared to the UK, the judicial appointments process in 
the US is highly political. For instance, all federal judges are nominated by the 
President, and confirmed by the Senate, whilst most State judges are elected (either 
in non-partisan or partisan elections),
78
 or are appointed following evaluation by a 
nominating Committee (also known as ‘merit selection’) or through direct 
appointment by the Governor (also known as a Gubernatorial appointment). When 
considered in conjunction with the first point, the way that a judicial nominee’s faith 
shapes their views on policy issues with a possible religious dimension such as 
abortion, gay rights or the death penalty, often generates much interest. A search of 
media reports relating to the most recent judicial appointments to the US Supreme 
Court (i.e. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch) and the religious make-up of the 
court are illustrative. 
This contrasts to the UK system in which judges are appointed strictly on merit, with 
very little political involvement in the appointments process.
79
 That said, the 
changing constitutional role of the judiciary in the UK and the ‘judicialisation of 
politics’, described by Hirschl as ‘the reliance on courts and judicial means for 
addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and political 
controversies’,80 has sparked debate as to whether an element of political 
involvement in senior judicial appointments should be introduced in the UK for the 
purpose of democratic accountability. Somewhat controversially, Lady Hale has 
recently suggested that one senior Government and one senior Opposition party 
politician could sit on the appointments commission for senior judicial posts for the 
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purpose of ‘introducing an element of democratic involvement while preserving 
party political neutrality’.81 Others are not so enamoured with this idea; for example, 
Lord Neuberger has opined: “I think intruding into somebody’s political views, 
religious views, social views is not going to help and will end up, I fear, politicising 
the judiciary in a way which, mercifully, has not happened at all in this country”. 82 
Whether or not this would enhance public trust and confidence in the judiciary is a 
moot point but it would clearly blur the boundaries between the law and politics. 
Finally, attitudes toward religion are markedly different in the UK and the US.
83
 To 
illustrate, a recent global survey shows that 30% of UK citizens regard themselves to 
be religious. This compares to 56% of Americans.
84
  In addition, it is generally said 
that faith has a much lower public profile in the UK than in the US; as Voas and 
Ling put it: ‘God seems more at home in the United States’85 and, as such, religion is 
often at the centre of both political and public debates in the US. Therefore, whilst 
the presence of religion in the UK has been described as subdued,
86
 in the US there 
is a widespread expectation that public figures will be religious.
87
 Evidence of this 
can be seen in the judicial context; in stark contrast to what is known about members 
of the UK Supreme Court, as noted above, the religious backgrounds of the US 
Supreme Court Justices are often discussed following their nomination for 
appointment or when a judgment which touches upon religiously sensitive issues is 
given.
88
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Empirical evidence 
 
Due to the politicalised judicial appointments process in the US, it is unsurprising to 
find that the effect of political ideology has traditionally formed the backbone of 
studies investigating influences on judicial decision-making,
89
 the primary purpose 
being to determine whether a judge’s party political affiliation serves as a predictor 
of judicial decisions. A myriad of other factors such as gender, race, age, social and 
educational background, prior employment and, significantly religion, have also 
been comprehensively analysed. Whilst findings suggest some correlation between 
judges’ political ideology and judicial determinations, the results in relation to other 
background factors are inconsistent, raising doubts as to their general value in 
explaining judgments. 
The US studies conducted to date have predominantly used empirical research 
methods to explore judging and draw on data from a broad range of legal areas. On 
the basis that dissenting judgments enable comparisons between judges’ reasoning to 
be made, the majority of studies conducted look to nonunanimous decisions of the 
higher appellate courts, usually the US Supreme Court, for evidence as to whether 
judicial determinations are influenced by non-legal factors. 
Early Empirical Studies in the US 
Early US empirical studies exploring the relationship between justices’ 
characteristics and judging focused on a number of different personal characteristic 
variables, across a number of different legal areas, so that religion was generally 
considered as an adjunct to, rather than the primary focus of, the research. 
Nevertheless, these early analyses yielded interesting results often supporting a 
hypothesis that judicial behaviour can be influenced by, inter alia, judges’ personal 
religious beliefs. 
Using a quantitative behavioural methodology and determining justices’ religious 
affiliations from sources such as the Directory of American Judges and Who’s Who 
in America?, Nagel analysed decisions in nonunanimous cases decided by 313 State 
and federal Supreme Court justices within 15 fields of law heard in 1955,  to test the 
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relationship between ethnicity and case decisions.
90
 Religious affiliation was 
considered as a distinct component of ethnic identity. Using the term ‘liberal’ to 
mean a stance sympathetic to ‘the interests of the lower or less privileged economic 
or social groups in society and to a lesser extent with the acceptance of long run 
social change’,91 Nagel discovered Catholic justices were more likely to adopt a 
liberal approach compared to their Protestant colleagues. They were significantly 
more likely to do so in criminal cases,
92
 business regulation cases, divorce 
settlements and employee injury cases.
93
 It is suggested that the fact that Nagel 
speculated that this phenomenon was indicative of class differences between the two 
faiths leads to some uncertainty as to whether it was social class or religious 
affiliation which better explained the differences in judging in the cases considered. 
Interestingly, Nagel also compared decisions of judges from different Protestant 
denominations hypothesising that judges of high economic status denominations 
(such as Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian and Unitarian, for example) 
would most likely be more conservative than judges of lower status denominations 
(such as Baptist, Lutheran and Methodist). He found in 9 types of case, judges of a 
lower status denomination voted more liberally than their colleagues affiliated to 
higher status denominations. Notably, there were too few Jewish judges for any 
useful comparison to be drawn.
94
   
 
Consistent with Nagel’s findings, Goldman’s quantitative analysis of nonunanimous 
appellate court decisions between 1965 and 1971, in which religious affiliation was 
again one of several variables,
95
 also found Catholic judges voting more liberally 
than Protestants, specifically in cases involving injured persons or economic 
liberalism. 
96
 It is suggested that ‘liberal’, although not expressly defined, has the 
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same meaning as in Nagel’s study to refer to a viewpoint which favours the social or 
economic underdog.
97
 Whilst Goldman observed that the effects of religious 
affiliation on case outcomes became noticeably diluted when political affiliation was 
introduced as a control (which he suggested was indicative of an association between 
religion with other issues), it was shown minority faith judges (identified as Catholic 
and Jewish) adopted a more liberal approach, contrary to the hypothesis that 
religious difference would not affect judicial decisions in any case. 
In a very different qualitative exploration into the role of personal values in judicial 
ethics, Newman observed and interviewed four state district trial judges over a 
period of weeks to gauge whether personal values, including religious affiliation, had 
any connection with the exercise of judicial discretion.
98
 Newman chose judges with 
a reputation for self-reflection, a strong sense of fairness and who had shown a 
previous interest in judicial ethics. Furthermore, he deliberately sought those with 
sufficiently diverse backgrounds from one another to draw some tentative 
conclusions about the way their personal lives impacted upon their judicial decisions. 
From the findings, the judges generally acknowledged morality as forming the 
bedrock of perceptions and judgments, both in a private and professional dimension. 
However, the majority were reluctant to link their religious beliefs with judicial 
conduct. As Newman rightly observes, this is hardly surprising given the ‘cultural 
taboo against subjectivity in judicial decisions’.99 However, given that moral 
convictions may be enmeshed with religious values, it is not fanciful to surmise that 
judicial decisions may be religiously influenced in some way, even if filtered 
through a guise of moral value-judgments. Notwithstanding this study’s obvious 
limitations i.e. the narrow scope and risk of overtly subjective interpretation, the 
findings are insightful,
100
 albeit not conclusive. 
Focusing on a much narrower field of case types in which to explore the specific 
interrelation between religious affiliation and judicial decision-making, Songer and 
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Tabrizi have found further evidence indicating religion is an influencing factor.
101
 
Looking specifically at the judicial attitudes of Evangelical Protestant bench 
members, the authors reviewed all published obscenity and gender discrimination 
cases decided by State Supreme Court judges between 1970 and 1993, and a random 
sample of 30 death penalty cases selected from the same period. The findings 
revealed Evangelical judges to be significantly more conservative than judges of 
different religious affiliations across all three case types. Whilst the authors did not 
define ‘conservative’, the term would appear to have strong connections with 
political ideology; the approach of Evangelical justices is readily identified with the 
Religious Right.  
More specifically, in the three areas examined, ‘conservative’ judges were those 
more likely to: support the death penalty; reject claims of discrimination; and adopt a 
more restrictive approach to obscenity than their liberal colleagues. Reflecting 
Goldman’s findings, Jewish judges were found to be most liberal.102 Protestant 
judges were found to be more liberal than their Evangelical colleagues but less so 
than their Jewish counterparts. Catholic judges’ behaviour was most variant upon the 
case type, with a strong conservative stance in obscenity issues, less so in death 
penalty cases, and a liberal approach to cases involving gender discrimination. The 
authors concluded that, even taking all other variables into consideration, the data 
supported the proposition that religious affiliation influences judicial decisions in 
gender discrimination, obscenity and death penalty cases. In contrast to earlier 
studies, the authors did not limit their study to nonunanimous cases. However, when 
nonunanimous cases were examined separately, the correlation between religious 
affiliation and judging was even stronger. Whilst this may suggest the significance of 
religious background has been exaggerated in earlier studies (in which only 
nonunanimous cases were examined), the authors suggest their analysis probably 
underestimates the effects of religion on judges’ decisions because of the difficulties 
in determining the denominational affiliation of justices.  
Further evidence to support the theory on the relationship between religion and 
decision-making is found in Pinello’s examination of published appellate court 
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decisions where gay rights issues are raised.
103
 Testing the impact of a number of 
variables in 468 cases between 1981 and 2000, Pinello again found Jewish judges to 
be more liberal than Protestant judges whilst, perhaps unsurprisingly given the 
context of case analysed, Catholic judges were more conservative in approach, being 
less likely to vote positively on cases advancing gay rights. 
More recently, Blake has sought to show the effect of religion on US Supreme Court 
decisions with a particular emphasis on Catholic judges’ preferences.104 Applying 
logistic regression analysis and semi-parametric matching to verify results, Blake 
drew upon formally decided and orally argued cases decided between 1953 and 2007 
across legal areas in which religious issues were thought to be relevant. These areas 
included abortion, racial and gender discrimination, crime, the death penalty, 
religious liberty and Establishment clauses, immigration, obscenity, poverty law and 
federalism. Where the law is clear, Blake hypothesised that judges were unlikely to 
adopt anything other than a legalist approach. It was the extent to which decisions 
are motivated by religious affiliation in cases involving legal uncertainty that formed 
the primary focus of his analysis and explains why he looked at nonunanimous cases 
only.  
Using Catholic affiliation as the key independent variable to discern the influence 
religious affiliation may have independent of judicial ideology,
105
 Blake tested 12 
hypotheses to predict the voting behaviour of Catholic justices (as more liberal or 
more conservative than other judges across the chosen legal areas). The results from 
his analysis support the theory regarding the role of religion in judicial decision-
making and  reflect some previous findings. For example, like Nagel and Ulmer, 
Blake found Catholic judges more likely to vote liberally in criminal cases and, as in 
Songer and Tabrizi’s study, Catholic judges were found to be more likely to vote 
liberally on gender discrimination cases, conservatively in obscenity cases. There 
was no statistical significance in voting behaviour of Catholic judges compared to 
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other judges in death penalty cases. Blake concluded that, whilst religion is not 
necessarily considered consciously by judges when deciding cases, it has a 
transformative power capable of shaping the adherent’s world view. This means it 
cannot be excluded as a factor in explaining judicial behaviour. If a judge’s ideology 
is in part linked to his or her religious values, then it follows that those same values 
will influence judicial decision-making. 
Impact of Judges’ Faith on Cases Involving Religious Freedom  
An area of increasing interest in the US is that which specifically focuses on the 
influence of judges’ religious affiliation in religious freedom cases. In the first major 
on-going empirical study of federal and circuit judges deciding religious liberty 
cases,
106
 Sisk, Heise and Morriss’s findings corroborate earlier academic research in 
which religious affiliation is found to be significant as an influencing factor in 
judicial decisions. The authors consider religious liberties cases derived from the 
lower federal courts, as opposed those in the higher appellate courts which have 
traditionally been investigated. Because the lower federal courts are ‘not shackled by 
the chains of determinate precedent from the high court’,107 Sisk and his colleagues 
contend there is more scope for exercising judicial discretion and correspondingly, 
there is greater likelihood of discovering a correlation between judges’ religious 
beliefs and adjudication.  
In their analysis of all published decisions involving religious freedom cases 
between 1986 and 1995,
108
 the authors use religious affiliation as a key variable with 
other judge specific variables including: religious demographics of the judge’s 
community; sex and race; educational background; political ideology; seniority; and 
prior employment. Judges’ religious affiliations were determined using a variety of 
different online databases, standard biographies and earlier surveys. Using four 
theoretical models of religious freedom,
109
 and applying logistic regression analysis, 
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the authors concluded ‘the single most prominent salient, and consistent influence on 
judicial decision-making was religion’.110  
Reflecting earlier studies, Sisk, Heise and Morriss found Jewish judges and those of 
non-mainstream Christian denominations significantly more likely to decide in 
favour of claimants seeking religious accommodation, independent of other 
variables. Jewish judges were significantly more likely than all other judges to 
uphold Establishment clause challenges to government action. The authors speculate 
that the minority status and societal discrimination of Jews in the US accounts for a 
more sympathetic approach by Jewish and other religious minority judges to claims 
for religious exemptions. Catholic judges’ decision-making was less consistent, 
except within the context of education. When religious exemptions were sought by 
parents or pupils, Catholic judges were significantly more likely to favour the 
religious claimant. In contrast, in claims challenging government funding to private 
religious schools, or challenging the acknowledgement of religion in an educational 
setting, Catholic judges were significantly less likely to uphold the challenges.  
Interestingly, the authors included an additional ‘religious correlation’ variable, the 
religious affiliation of the claimant, to see if there was any evidence to suggest 
religious partisanship, in which judges might favour claims by those claimants who 
shared the same religious affiliation.
111
 Whilst the authors found no evidence of 
religious nepotism (that is, where a judge sharing the same religious beliefs as that of 
a claimant treats the claim more favourably than they would treat the claim from 
someone with a different religious background or with no faith), it prompts the 
question as to whether judges may, wittingly or unwittingly, decide cases differently 
where claimants with the same religious background as the presiding judge are 
involved.  
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Inconsistent Findings in Recent Empirical Studies  
Whilst the studies above suggest an incontrovertible link between religion and 
judicial behaviour, other research indicates the relationship is less clear. In Tate’s 
study of nonunanimous Supreme court decisions between 1946 and 1978, in which 
civil rights and liberties cases and economics cases were considered, religion as a 
constituent of an independent attribute variable of ‘birth, upbringing and education’ 
was found not to be of significance in explaining judicial decisions.
112
 Prior to the 
study Tate had marked religion as the variable most likely to have the greatest 
impact on civil liberties cases, this stance being founded upon the earlier findings of 
Nagel, Ulmer and Goldman. A later study by Tate and Handberg, replicating Tate’s 
previous study but over a longer period (1916-1988), produced similar results.
113
 
Whilst Ashenfelter, Eisenberg and Schwab’s examination of 2258 published civil 
rights case decisions arising in the federal trial courts filed between 1980 and 1981 
led the authors to conclude that religion (along with gender) affected judicial 
outcomes more than the political party preference of a judge, the effect was 
described as ‘modest’.114 In a later critical review of existing evidence on the 
importance of individual factors on judges including religion, George similarly 
concluded: ‘In the end, religion is not a meaningful explanation for judicial 
behaviour…’115 However, it is the most recent empirical research by Sisk and Heise 
which casts doubt on the nature of the relationship between judges’ religious 
affiliations and judicial decision-making.  
In a more recent study by Sisk and Heise, in which the influence of extra-judicial 
factors on judicial outcomes are analysed in 1631 judicial participations decided by 
the lower federal courts between 1996 to 2005, the authors found no discernible 
evidence to indicate religious affiliation played a significant role in influencing 
judicial decisions contrary to their previous study.
116
  Extending the scope of the 
research to include all digested Free Exercise Clause and accommodation decisions 
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by the federal court of appeals and district judges brought by religious individuals or 
organisations, but otherwise using the same variables and logistic regression 
methodology, a swing from religious affiliation being  the most consistent influence 
on  judicial decision-making in the preceding decade to having reached no 
significance in the follow up study is surprising and raises a number of further 
questions: Are there discrepancies between the studies which distort the findings? 
Have judges’ attitudes changed or do the findings reflect more general shifts in 
societal attitudes toward religion for example? The inconsistent findings also extend 
to the issue of religious nepotism.  In the latest study, Sisk found the religious 
correlation variable to be negatively statistically significant. As such, it was found a 
claimant of the same faith as the presiding judge may be less likely to win their case 
than a claimant of different religious background. The authors surmise this may be 
evidence of judges consciously trying to avoid favouritism toward claimants sharing 
the same religious beliefs as themselves. Alternatively, it has been speculated that 
judges’ sharing the same faith may be more willing to make inquiries as to the 
claimant’s understanding of their religious obligations than they might otherwise do 
for claimants of a different faith or no religion.
117
  
That the findings in this recent study are at odds with those in Sisk, Heise and 
Morriss’s previous research does not render the earlier results invalid. Rather, it 
emphasises the need for further empirical research from which it may be possible to 
draw inferences as to the influence or otherwise that a judges’ religious affiliation 
may have on judicial decision-making in cases involving religious freedom. 
3.3.2 Evidence from Commonwealth countries 
 
This wealth of empirical data emanating from the US has inevitably prompted 
scholars to initiate similar research in other common law jurisdictions, most notably 
Canada. For example, in Canadian studies which have included religious affiliation 
as a variable, evidence reflects that from the US which indicates religion cannot be 
excluded as one of several factors impacting upon judicial outcomes. To illustrate, in 
Tate and Sittiwong’s quantitative analysis of 804 nonunanimous decisions made in 
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the Canadian Supreme Court from 1949 to 1985,
118
 it was hypothesised that 
Canadian Catholic judges would vote more liberally than fellow non-Catholic 
justices.
119
 Looking at civil rights and liberties cases and those raising economic 
issues and using a variable of Non-Quebec/Catholic (reflecting regional 
idiosyncrasies), in a regression analysis, the authors concluded religious affiliation 
was an influencing factor in judicial decisions. In a later study, Songer and Johnson 
replicated the earlier study of Tate and Sittiwong and found Catholic judges were 
more liberal than Protestants in civil liberties cases whilst in economic cases, the 
influence of religion was statistically insignificant.
120
 In the latest empirical study by 
Songer, Johnson, Ostberg and Wetstein, in which mixed qualitative and quantitative 
methods were used, Canadian Supreme Court justices were interviewed and their 
decisions for the period 1970 to 2005 were analysed.
121
 Whilst the judicial 
perception was that religious affiliation no longer exerted any influence on decision-
making, the findings revealed otherwise; non-Catholic justices were found more 
likely to support criminal defendants and those seeking to exercise their civil 
liberties than their Catholic counterparts. 
In contrast, studies investigating judicial decision-making in countries such as 
Australia and New Zealand have not considered religion to any significant extent and 
where religious denomination has been included in a dataset, the results have proved 
negligible. To illustrate, in Smyth’s 2005 study which considers the role of 
attitudinal, institutional and environmental factors in explaining the dissent rate in 
the High Court of Australia between 1904-2001, there was found to be no support 
for the hypothesis that Catholic judges would have a higher dissent rate than 
Protestant judges nor that there was a positive relationship between a judge’s 
Catholic faith and voting patterns in relation to divorce cases.
122
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3.4 Using US studies to conduct similar research in the UK 
 
Whilst non-exhaustive, the review of literature above suggests that empirical legal 
research, particularly of a quantitative nature such as much of that discussed in 3.3, 
is currently at the vanguard of studies that explore the impact of non-legal factors 
such as religious beliefs on judicial decision-making; arguably, the US models offer 
the most sophisticated research designs for such inquiries, largely because it is in the 
context of the US judiciary that most studies have been conducted.
123
 This has led 
Sisk to describe the current state of scholarship in relation to studies of the US 
judiciary as the ‘quantitative moment’.124 Importantly, such a view does not 
undermine the value of existing or further theoretical work in this area which Sisk 
acknowledges continues to provide a vital frame of reference for empirical research, 
both in terms of determining what to study and interpreting what has been 
observed.
125
 Given the empirical methodology used by US scholars has been 
described as reaching ‘healthy maturity’, it would seem reasonable to suggest a 
similar research template could be used for analogous studies in the UK.
126
 However, 
there are a number of conceptual, methodological and contextual concerns that cast 
doubt as to the appropriateness of applying US models to studies that aim to explore 
the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judicial determinations in the 
UK courts (in addition to the difficulties and dangers of comparing jurisdictions with 
different judicial structures, legal philosophies and religious landscapes). 
Conceptual issues 
As discussed above, existing studies that explore the impact of non-legal factors on 
judicial decision-making are chiefly predicated on a theoretical framework in which 
the attitudinal and legal models of judicial behaviour are diametrically opposed. This 
gives rise to the basic question: Is it the doctrine of precedent or judges’ personal 
factors that motivate judicial decisions?
127
 Whilst this has provided a useful platform 
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from which to examine how judges judge in the US, some commentators argue that 
the conceptual foundation upon which the US studies are based is fundamentally 
flawed.
128
 In particular, it is argued that attempts to identify a correlation between 
judges’ personal preferences and case outcomes are pointless because judges already 
acknowledge that, on occasions where the law is obscure, judicial reasoning may be 
consciously or unconsciously informed by factors outside of the legal framework. 
Thus, empirical research that has the primary objective of showing a causal 
relationship between non-legal factors and judicial determinations fails to add 
anything new to existing knowledge about the practice of judging.  Given that a 
number of judges in the UK similarly acknowledge the presence of a personal 
dimension to judging means that studies based on the same theoretical construct is 
likely to be subject to similar criticism. As such, a more fruitful investigation is to 
explore whether, and if so, the extent to which a judge’s religious beliefs affect how 
he or she decides a case? Of course, the problem here shifts to whether it is possible 
to discern, and if so, how best to measure, the extent of such influence. 
It has further been opined that empiricists’ specific use of the attitudinal model, 
which it is suggested essentially functions as the ‘default position’ from which to 
analyse judicial decision-making, is problematic. For example, Tamanaha suggests 
that because the prime purpose of scholars’ research is to prove that judges’ personal 
preferences affect judging to the exclusion of legal factors, quantitative assessments 
inevitably have a ‘distorting slant’.129 This distortion potentially renders research 
findings unreliable and misrepresentative of judging. Tamanaha goes so far as to 
describe scholars’ assumptions about the impact that non-legal factors have on 
decisions as ‘corrosive’.130 Only by giving weight to all the factors that might 
influence judicial decision-making can a more accurate assessment of the impact of 
non-legal factors on judicial decisions be made.
131
 Moran has identified a similar 
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issue in relation to his studies regarding sexual diversity in the judiciary.
132
 In the 
same way that the attitudinal model of judicial behaviour encourages scholars to 
focus on non-legal factors (rather than using a more holistic approach in which the 
impact of legal factors on case outcomes are also considered), Moran suggests the 
focus on specific judicial characteristics such as sexuality inevitably places an 
emphasis on the ‘different judge’. Consequently, decision-making by judges falling 
into what Moran refers to as the ‘norm’ are ignored, resulting in a ‘distorting slant’ 
akin to that identified by Tamanaha. 
It is perhaps inevitable that investigations that explore the relationship between 
judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision-making in the UK courts will be 
subject to similar criticisms as those directed at the US studies. However, it is 
contended that the potential for a distorting bias in an approach which focuses on one 
aspect of judicial decision-making such as religion is problematical only if the study 
is conducted without acknowledging the role played by other factors. Moreover, it is 
argued that the simple attitudinal-legal binary provides a useful conceptual starting 
point from which to base initial observations about faith and the influence religious 
beliefs have on judicial decision-making. Likewise, that the spotlight may be on the 
‘different judge’ does not negate the value of the research.133 
Methodological issues  
Despite being recognised by Thomas as the most advanced research on judicial 
decision-making processes,
134
 the quantitative work in the US can be criticised for 
being methodologically weak. For example, these studies have been subject to 
accusations of selection bias because they only include published decisions in 
assessments.
135
 That the bulk of research has been conducted in higher appellate 
courts has also attracted criticism on the basis that decision making in these courts, 
particularly in the Supreme Court, is very different to the nature of work conducted 
in the lower courts. Indeed, it will be recalled from Chapter 1 that Cowan et al. 
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questioned the ‘radiating effects of law’ through the court hierarchy.136 As such, 
making generalizations about whether judicial decision-making is affected by non-
legal factors such as religion is inappropriate or misleading.
137
  
A further concern relates to the effectiveness of translating rich textual data in the 
form of judgments into mathematical data suitable for statistical analysis. As seen in 
the studies considered above, in assessing whether religious beliefs affect judicial 
decisions, the quantitative approach typically requires the researcher to review 
judges’ decisions within a selected data sample and code judgments usually 
according to whether outcomes are ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’. However, the coding 
process is itself problematic. For example, it has been suggested that coding 
decisions simply into binary outcomes fails to represent an accurate reflection of 
judgments because the range of issues contained in a case will rarely represent a 
uniform ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ position. In any case, it may be unclear which 
positions represent a ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ outcome; for example, in a clash of 
rights case in which an individual’s right to manifest their religious beliefs conflicts 
with an individual’s right not to be discriminated against because of sexual 
orientation, should a decision in favour of the religious claimant be deemed liberal or 
conservative? Moreover, that the focus is on case outcomes means the substance of 
judgments is ignored.
138
 Likewise, knowledge of other factors such as which judges 
held majority or dissenting positions in a given judgment may lead to biased 
coding.
139
   
Furthermore, where quantitative studies reveal a statistically significant correlation 
between judges’ faith and judicial decisions, it has been suggested that non-
empiricists and others unfamiliar with statistics terminology, may mistakenly 
conclude that judges’ religious beliefs exert a strong influence on judicial decision-
making.
140
 However, as Ziliak and McCloskey state, ‘a finding of “statistical 
significance”, or the lack of it, statistical insignificance, is on its own valueless, a 
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meaningless parlor game’,141  in so far as it only shows no more than a 5% 
probability that the correlation is coincidental – it reveals nothing substantive about 
the relationship itself.  
Thus, whilst suggesting the study of judicial decision-making in the US is in the 
‘quantitative moment’, the conceptual and methodological difficulties considered 
above lead Sisk to conclude that statistical analysis cannot capture the full dimension 
of the ‘unique and important human enterprise known as judging’.142 Rather, he 
contends that the shortcomings of such quantitative methods gives rise to a 
‘qualitative opportunity’,143 in which theoretical, doctrinal and empirical research are 
all vital components in furthering the understanding of how judges decide cases. The 
position taken in this study follows that of Sisk. Understanding the factors that 
influence judicial decision-making cannot be solely determined by quantitative 
studies that are limited to finding a connection between a given variable and case 
outcome. Such findings may be indicative of the legal areas in which religion is or is 
not a salient factor. However, the value of a qualitative and/or mixed method 
analysis is that it allows the researcher to gain insight into the decisional process 
(rather than outcome only) so as to explore decision-making from a more holistic 
perspective; the qualitative ‘meat’ to the quantitative ‘bones’. In conclusion, it is a 
meld of methods that is likely to yield the most useful results. 
Contextual issues  
In any case, it is apparent that in the present context, an attempt to replicate US 
studies using the same highly developed conceptual and methodological models is 
immediately beset with difficulty. A major hurdle concerns how to ascertain the 
religious beliefs of current members of the judiciary. In the studies conducted by 
Sisk et al. discussed in section 3.3, the author advises that judges’ religious 
background data was obtained by reference to existing work by judicial biographers 
and other researchers. As explained above, in contrast to the US, judges in the UK 
are rarely asked about or discuss such matters publicly and therefore such 
information is rarely available. If a judge was asked about their faith and its 
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influence on judging, it is questionable whether such information would be 
disclosed; remember Lord Neuberger’s response to the suggestion that judges could 
be vetted by MPs.
144
 Evidence of judges’ reticence to talk candidly about sensitive 
issues is also reflected in Darbyshire’s experience of dealing with members of the 
judiciary (discussed in Chapter 1).
145
 In the same way that a judge’s political beliefs 
are considered to be especially sensitive, the same can be said of an individual’s 
religious beliefs; ergo, there would appear to be little prospect of a researcher being 
granted permission to speak to judges about their faith. Indeed, this was found to be 
the case when judicial participation was sought in relation to this study. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the judicial decision-making literature in 
relation to the judiciary in the UK and beyond. In doing so, it finds that very little 
attention has been paid to whether non-legal factors influence how judges judge in 
the UK, particularly religion. There is, to use Genn’s words, an ‘information black 
hole’.146 Studies of judicial decision-making from other jurisdictions, particularly the 
US, provide mixed evidence that judges’ religious beliefs influence case outcomes in 
certain cases. This lends weight to the hypothesis that judges’ religious beliefs may 
influence judicial decision making in cases involving religious issues in the UK.  
However, what the North American studies fail to consider is how judges mitigate 
for the effects of the personal dimension to their judging.  
Having highlighted the difficulties of replicating the advanced methods used to 
examine judicial decision-making in the US, it is clear that the methodological 
options available to the researcher in exploring judging in the UK courts are limited. 
However, it is argued that insight into the relationship between judges’ religious 
beliefs (and indeed other personal factors) and judging may be gleaned from 
adopting a mixed method approach which extends beyond a cause-effect/variable-
outcome relationship so as to encompass the process of judging.   
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In the next chapter, the methodology and mixed methods used to explore lawyers’ 
perceptions of the nexus between judges’ faith and judging in relation to the UK 
courts are articulated. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER 4
METHODS 
This chapter examines the methodology and methods used in this study. Section 4.1 
presents an overview of the use of empirical methods in legal research. Sections 4.2 
to 4.4 explain the methodological aspects of the study: the research design, paradigm 
and strategy. Section 4.5 outlines the application procedure for judicial participation 
in this research, the outcome of which redefined the research approach taken in the 
present study. The focus then turns to the procedures used to generate, manage and 
analyse the data used in this study. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 provide an overview of the 
research methods used in relation to part one involving the qualitative interviews 
with barristers and part two relating to the Solicitor Perceptions Questionnaire (SPQ) 
respectively. A discussion of the limitations of the methods chosen is provided in 
section 4.8. Ethical considerations relevant to all aspects of the research design are 
acknowledged in section 4.9.  
 
4.1 Using empirical legal research 
 
Legal scholarship is traditionally dominated by a doctrinal approach in which the 
focus is on legal theory and expository research.
1
 However, this study uses empirical 
legal research methods to investigate the relationship between judges’ personal 
factors and judging. Empirical legal research is broadly defined as ‘the study, 
through direct methods rather than secondary sources, of the institutions, rules, 
procedures, and personnel of the law, with a view to understanding how they operate 
and what effects they have’.2 In other words, it examines how the law works in 
practice.  
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An empirical legal approach was considered most appropriate for this study on two 
grounds. Firstly, it is consistent with the social-legal dimension of the study in which 
the focus is on legal actors’ perceptions of judging in action rather than ‘textbook 
accounts’ of how judges ought to judge.3  Secondly, as seen in the review of existing 
literature in Chapter 3, an empirical approach is commonly used in studies of judicial 
decision-making. 
 
4.2 Research design 
 
A research design provides the framework that guides the choice of research method 
and analysis in a study.
4
 According to Creswell, an overall research design consists 
of three synergistic components:  
 the researcher’s philosophical worldview (also known as the research 
paradigm); 
 the strategy of inquiry related to that worldview; and, 
 the specific research methods used in carrying out the research.5  
This study used an exploratory sequential mixed methods research (MMR) design 
underpinned by a pragmatic worldview. Research methods involved qualitative 
interviews with barristers and the use of a questionnaire for completion by solicitors 
(SPQ) for the purpose of eliciting lawyers’ views about the relationship between 
judges’ personal factors, particularly religious beliefs and judging. 
 
4.3 Research paradigm: pragmatic worldview 
 
Articulating the researcher’s philosophical orientation is important because it 
provides the theoretical framework in which the intent, motivation and expectations 
for research are set.
6
 There are a number of competing philosophical worldviews that 
a researcher can bring to a research study which are shaped by various factors such 
as discipline orientations, researcher inclinations and previous research experiences. 
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Traditionally, the philosophical research paradigms that have dominated 
methodological debates in social research are positivism and interpretivism 
(summarised in Appendix 2).
7  However, a pragmatic worldview is generally held to 
be a philosophical bedfellow for MMR and is the direction to which this study is 
oriented.  
For pragmatists, the primary focus is on how best to answer research questions rather 
than on theoretical and methodological concerns.
8
 In Feilzer’s words, pragmatism 
‘sidesteps the contentious issues of truth and reality…and orients itself toward 
solving practical problems in the ‘“real world”’.9 To illustrate, a pragmatic 
worldview accepts the existence of both singular and multiple realities of the social 
world. This means that the pragmatic researcher is not committed to any one system 
of philosophy and reality.
10
 Whilst this freedom of choice means that pragmatists are 
not confined to a philosophical straightjacket, Denscombe cautions that a pragmatic 
worldview is not an approach in which ‘anything goes’;11 mixed methodologists 
guided by pragmatism must still explicate their motivations for combining 
quantitative and qualitative data.
12
 
 
4.4 Research strategy: exploratory sequential design 
 
There are a number of MMR design strategies that can be used to address a research 
problem. Creswell advances three major types: convergent parallel; explanatory 
sequential and exploratory sequential.
13
 As the interplay between judges’ religious 
beliefs and decision-making in the UK courts has not been the topic of a focused 
                                                 
7
 These philosophical worldviews are distinct from the legal philosophies of legal positivism and legal 
interpretivism. 
8
 John Creswell and Vicki Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research (2
nd
 edn, 
SAGE 2011). 
9
 Martina Feilzer, ‘Doing mixed methods research paradigmatically: Implications for the rediscovery 
of pragmatism as a research paradigm’ (2010) 4 J Mix Methods Res 1. 
10
 Creswell (n5). 
11
 Martyn Denscombe, ‘A Research Paradigm for the Mixed Methods Approach’ (2008) 2 J Mix 
Methods Res 270, 274. 
12
 Creswell (n5). 
13
 ibid 16. These designs can be used for more advanced research strategies eg transformative mixed 
methods, embedded mixed methods and multiphase mixed methods. 
 
 
131 
 
enquiry before, this study is guided by an exploratory sequential mixed methods 
design.
14
 
Usually when using this two-phase exploratory design, a researcher first conducts a 
qualitative inquiry relating to the topic of interest before moving to a second, 
quantitative phase using a larger sample.
15
 Part one of the fieldwork involved 
qualitative interviews with barristers, the data from which captured interviewee 
perceptions of the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judging. 
Themes identified in part one informed the second part of the study which involved 
the administering of an online survey – the SPQ. This yielded a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative data which expanded on, rather than took precedence over, the 
qualitative study in the first phase. 
 
The results from the two studies were brought together with the aim of gaining an 
insight into lawyers’ perceptions of the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs 
and judicial decision-making. Figure 4.1 provides an outline of the overall research 
design.  
 
PART   
ONE 
 
 
PART  
TWO 
 
Figure 4.1 Overview of the exploratory sequential design used in this study 
 
Rationale for mixed methods research in this study 
The decision to use different methods in relation to each of the respective sample 
groups (barristers and solicitors) rather than a mono-method design was principally 
driven by practical considerations. 
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Part one of the research involving barristers was fixed at the start of this enquiry. 
Qualitative interviews are widely regarded as an effective means by which to gain an 
initial insight into a research topic about which little or no research has been 
conducted as was the case here. Thereafter, a pragmatic approach allowed for 
considerable flexibility as to how the research design evolved in response to the data. 
For example, during the interviews phase, the researcher considered whether it 
would be useful to also conduct an online questionnaire with a larger sample of 
barristers for the purpose of triangulation. In light of the rich and varied data 
generated in the interviews, and given practical considerations (especially time 
constraints), it was concluded that acquiring additional data from a wider sample of 
barristers at this stage would be of limited value. However, this would be a useful 
additional source of data in the event of this foundational study being scaled up.  
In Part two, consideration was given as to the appropriateness of using the same 
qualitative approach to elicit solicitors’ thoughts on, and experiences of, the factors 
that were perceived to influence judging. However, based on the experience of 
conducting interviews in part one, there were concerns that it might be difficult to 
attract a sufficient number of participants with the requisite courtroom experience 
and expertise in the legal areas of interest in the time available. With the qualitative 
data allowing for the development of a quantitative research tool, it was decided that 
an online survey, designed to acquire both quantitative and qualitative data, would 
provide the most efficient means by which to capture solicitors’ perceptions about 
how judges’ religious beliefs influence judging. The responses from solicitors were 
used to reinforce the qualitative findings from the interviews with barristers. 
Applying Bryman’s scheme listing different rationales for mixing methods in 
research, the main reasons for combining methods in this study include: diversity of 
views; instrument development (that is, the designing and revising of the SPQ), and 
enhancement.
16
 
The research methods used in relation to each sample group are outlined in the 
sections 4.6 and 4.7. 
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4.5 The missing dimension: perspectives from the bench 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, the researcher originally intended to explore the 
relationship between religion and judicial decision-making through the lens of judges 
and barristers using a mixed methods approach similar to that adopted in the present 
study. It was hoped that this dual perspective would provide a more rounded 
understanding of how judges judge. After having successfully recruited barristers to 
participate in the study, attention turned to members of the judiciary. 
 
To gain access to members of the judiciary, the Judicial Office advises that 
researchers must first obtain approval for judicial participation in research projects 
from the relevant Head of Division or the relevant Senior President of the tribunals’ 
judiciary.
17
 The procedure to be followed is outlined in the Judicial Office’s 
guidance for researchers relating to requests for judicial participation in research.
18
 
In particular, researchers who want to conduct research involving any member of the 
judiciary must submit a formal application which must satisfy the criteria stipulated 
in the guidance. Accordingly, a formal application for judicial participation in this 
research was submitted to the Ministry of Justice in April 2014 (Appendix 11). 
Permission was sought to interview senior members of the judiciary about how their 
faith affects their work, and invite judges from both the higher and lower courts to 
take part in a survey about the same. However, at the end of June 2014, the 
researcher received notification that the application for judicial participation had 
been rejected (Appendix 1).  
 
The unsuccessful application for judicial assistance prompted a revision of the 
original research plan. As explained in Chapter 1.4, solicitors were immediately 
identified as an alternative source from which to address the research questions. 
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4.6 Research Method Study I: Qualitative Interviews with Barristers 
 
This section explains the methods used to gather and analyse data in relation to Part 
one of this mixed methods study. 
4.6.1 Barristers: a purposive sample 
 
A purposive sampling method was adopted to recruit the participants, barristers in 
practice in England and Wales, to this part of the study.
19
 Purposive sampling 
involves choosing participants or data on the basis that they have particular features, 
characteristics or knowledge which allow for an in-depth exploration and 
understanding of the topic of interest.
20
 This approach is particularly useful for 
conducting exploratory studies in which the researcher seeks to determine whether 
the topic at issue warrants further investigation as is the case here. It is important to 
note that because potential participants are not randomly selected, the sample cannot 
be said to be representative of the population and findings are not generalizable.
21
 
Rather, the strength of this sampling technique lies in the selection of ‘information-
rich cases’ for analysis.22 
As specialist legal advisers and courtroom advocates, barristers appear before and 
interact with judges on a regular, often daily, basis. Significantly, Paterson has 
identified the dialogue between judges and counsel as a key factor in understanding 
judicial decision-making in the UK Supreme Court.
23
 Accordingly, the researcher 
considered barristers to be well-placed to offer a perspective as to what factors, if 
any, appear to play a role in judges’ decision-making. Moreover, that most judges in 
the higher courts have practiced at the Bar prior to their appointment to the bench 
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suggests that the barristers who participated in this study can offer an interesting 
insight into how today’s judges might perceive the business of judging.24 
Barristers: professional ‘elites’ 
It should be noted that barristers are classed as professional ‘elites’. This term has 
been variously defined by social scientists.
25
 Odendahl and Shaw suggest that this is 
because deciding who is classed as ‘elite’ varies according to the area of 
inquiry…’.26  Typically, elites are those in powerful political or social positions by 
virtue of their professional background, social status and/or economic wealth.
27
 Pirie 
and Rogers define elites as being part of a relatively small but exclusive group within 
society that ‘claims and/or is accorded power, prestige, or command over others on 
the basis of a number of publicly recognised criteria, and aims to preserve and 
entrench its status thus preserved’.28 A hierarchical structure may also exist within an 
elite group, in which the highest stratum consists of an ‘ultra-elite’ represented by a 
‘thin layer of people who exhibit especially greatest influence, authority, or power’.29  
It has been suggested that barristers acquire their elite status on call to the Bar by 
virtue of being in a position to have control over, and expertise in, important aspects 
of legal knowledge and practice and can play an important social role in the system 
of justice.
30
 They are ‘highly skilled, professionally competent, and class-specific’.31 
There is a definite hierarchical structure at the Bar -  Queen’s Counsel (QC’s), senior 
barristers who receive ‘silk’ for excellence in advocacy in the higher courts, have the 
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highest prestige within the profession and it is from this rank that most senior judges 
will have started their judicial careers.  
4.6.2 Sample selection  
 
Barristers who practise primarily in the areas of employment and family law were 
targeted. Arguably, these are areas of law in which religious or religiously sensitive 
issues are most likely to be at play (although it is acknowledged that religion may be 
relevant in a variety of different legal contexts), even if it is not immediately 
apparent at the outset of a case.  
Recruitment of participants took place between October 2013 and February 2014. A 
variety of strategies were employed to recruit participants to the study.  
 
In the first instance, an invitation to take part in the research project was sent to 
participants through contact persons (law school contacts) via email. The email 
included a brief outline of the project aims and objectives and asked those who were 
interested in taking part to register their interest by return email (Appendix 3). The 
first two invitees agreed to participate in a pilot study.
32
  The pilot study was used to: 
 
 reflect upon and improve the sequence, clarity and nature of the 
questions contained in the preliminary interview schedule; 
 assess the feasibility of arranging face-to-face interviews for data 
collection and to trial alternative modes of interview if required; 
 estimate the average duration of the interview; 
 identify and address any practical problems that might arise before, 
during or after  the interview process; and 
 obtain feedback about the interview experience.33 
Following the pilot study, invitations were sent to additional contact persons via 
email. This resulted in a five volunteers. 
                                                 
32
 The pilot study took part in October and November 2013 and ran concurrent to the next two phases 
of participant recruitment. 
33
 Harvey observes there is a lack of guidance on whether pilot interviews with elites should be 
conducted. Here, the pilot interviews that took place were with law school contacts that were happy to 
participate in this capacity. William Harvey, ‘Methodological Approaches for Junior Researchers 
Interviewing Elites: A Multidisciplinary Perspective’ (2009) Economic Geography Research Group 
Working Paper Series No. 01.09 < www.egrg.rgs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/egrg_wp0109-
Harvey.pdf> accessed 4 August 2014. 
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At the same time, advertisements were posted on online social media sites including 
the UK Human Rights blog and the Law and Religion blog. Links to these 
invitations were shared on the social networking site Twitter. An advertisement was 
also included in an edition of the Discrimination Law Association e-news (Appendix 
3). This approach yielded just one response.  
In the main phase of recruitment, the Legal500 website was used to identify leading 
sets in London and the regions undertaking work in the areas of key interest.
34
 The 
website of each set was visited to obtain the contact details of Senior Clerks and to 
review barrister profiles for individuals’ areas of practice should individual barristers 
be interested in taking part. The Senior Clerks were contacted by email to ask if they 
would be prepared to distribute details of the research along with the researcher’s 
contact details to members of chambers. Of the 12 Senior Clerks contacted, six 
replied, all of whom offered to circulate the information to members of chambers as 
requested. The researcher also contacted a number of barristers direct by email. 
Invitees were asked to contact the researcher, either by email or by post, to register 
their interest in taking part in the study.  
Those responding to the invitation were sent a further email containing an 
information sheet and a consent form (Appendix 4). A further 12 volunteers were 
recruited in this way, making a total of 18 barristers with requisite experience in the 
legal areas of interest. Given the small sample size, it is acknowledged that the 
sample was not representative of the Bar (the limitations of this are discussed in 
4.8).
35
 However, the rich and thick data generated from this sample allowed the 
researcher to shed light on barristers’ perceptions of the relationship between judges’ 
religious beliefs (and other factors) and judging and provides sufficient information 
to allow the study to be replicated, this being one useful indicator of when data 
saturation is reached in qualitative enquiries.
36
 
                                                 
34
 The Legal500 is renowned as the authoritative guide to the UK’s leading law firms. It provides a 
comprehensive review of firms and sets throughout the UK across a range of legal practice areas.  
<www.legal500.com>28 May 2014. 
35
 There were approximately 15,899 barristers practising in England and Wales in 2015 < 
www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media-centre/research-and-statistics/statistics/practising-barrister-
statistics/> accessed 14 October 2016. 
36
 Patricia Fusch and Lawrence Ness, ‘Are We There Yet? Data Saturation in Qualitative Research’ 
(2015) 20 The Qualitative Report 1408.   
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4.6.3 Sample characteristics 
 
Of the 18 barristers who were interviewed, thirteen were principally located in 
London whilst the remaining five practiced at the regional Bar. Four of the 
barristers were female. Barristers ranged in experience from less than three years 
since year of call to over 22 years at the Bar (Figure 4.2). Four were QC’s and six 
sat as part-time judges at the time of the interviews.
37
 As Figure 4.3 shows, 
interviewees had a narrow range of religious affiliations.
38
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Barristers by year of call (n=18) 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Barristers by religion (n=18) 
                                                 
37
  To comply with Judicial Office Guidance for Researchers, participants who sit as part-time judges 
were asked for their views based on their work as a barrister only. Judicial Office, Judicial 
participation in research projects Guidance for researchers (August 2013) 
<www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Guidance/judicial-research-guidance-
january-2013.pdf> accessed 10 December 2013. 
38
 Here, religious affiliation is used to refer to whether an individual does or does not identify with a 
religious denomination. See David Voas and Alasdair Crockett, ‘Religion in Britain: Neither 
Believing nor Belonging’ (2005) 39 Sociology 11,15. 
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Whilst it could be argued that the categories ‘Atheist’ and ‘No religion’ should be 
aggregated under a single heading to reflect those with a lack of theistic belief, there 
are two reasons for not doing so in this study. First, the researcher wanted to 
foreground interviewee responses in a way consistent with a qualitative research 
approach.
39
 Second, in the absence of further clarification from individual 
participants, it is suggested that the descriptor ‘No religion’ is ambiguous.  On the 
one hand, it may refer to atheists - individuals who believe there is no God or gods 
(or other supernatural beings).
40
 On the other hand, the descriptor may be used to 
describe individuals who believe in a God or gods but who are not connected to an 
organised religion. Alternatively, ‘No religion’ may reflect an agnostic viewpoint in 
which an individual is unsure as to whether a God or gods exist.
41
 The matter is yet 
further complicated by the fact that a reference to ‘religion’ can include a reference 
to a lack of religion.
42
 Whilst it is possible to discern which category of ‘No religion’ 
that some interviewees fall into from the interview data, it is not apparent in all 
cases. In hindsight, it would have been useful to ask all participants describing 
themselves as having ‘No religion’, to clarify the nature of their non-religious 
beliefs. 
4.6.4 Data collection: semi-structured interviews 
 
A semi-structured interview format was considered to be the most appropriate 
method of data collection.
43
   
Face-to-face interviews are traditionally at the vanguard of qualitative interviewing 
and the original intention of the researcher was to interview barristers face-to-face. 
However, upon commencement of the pilot study, it became clear that arranging 
face-to-face interviews with barristers would be problematic, both in terms of 
logistics and given the unpredictable and often hectic nature of life at the Bar. 
Following feedback from the pilot study, it was decided that face-to-face and virtual 
                                                 
39
 Rosalind Edwards and Janet Holland, What is Qualitative Interviewing? (Bloomsbury 2013). 
40
 Julian Baggini, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2002) 3. 
41
 Robin LePoidevin, Agnosticism: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2010) 9. 
42
 Equality Act 2010, s10(1). 
43
 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research: A practical guide for 
beginners (SAGE Publications 2013) 81. Braun and Clarke observe that these interviews are well-
suited to exploring participant understandings, perceptions and constructions of things that the 
participant has a personal stake in. 
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interview formats using the internet (such as Voice-over IP ‘VoIP’), email or 
telephone should be offered to participants. A summary of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these formats is provided in Appendix 5. An outline of the 
main methodological challenges of conducting elite interviews (gaining access to 
potential participants and managing the power relationship) can be found in 
Appendix 6.  
Of the 18 interviews included in part one of this study, 16 were carried out using 
VoIP (Skype, FaceTime and Google Hangouts). One interview was conducted by 
telephone and one interview took place face-to-face.
44
 The average duration of each 
interview was 37 minutes. All bar one of the interviews were digitally recorded and 
transcribed. The one participant who asked not to be recorded gave permission for 
hand written notes to be made when being interviewed.  
During the interviews, a standard set of questions was used.
45
 The interview schedule 
contained a sequence of nine predominantly open-ended questions that were 
developed around four broad themes: judicial characteristics, client characteristics, 
adjudicating on religious sensitive issues; and diversity on the bench. The use of 
open-ended questions is common in semi-structured interviews and was particularly 
important in this study because, as Aberbach and Rockman observe: ‘Elites 
especially – but other highly educated people as well – do not like being put in the 
straightjacket of close-ended questions. They prefer to articulate their views, 
explaining why they think what they think’.46  
4.6.5 Data Preparation 
Digitally recorded interview data was transcribed verbatim after each interview.
47
 As 
the sole transcriber of the interviews, the researcher was able to become familiar 
with data content and make preliminary notes identifying points of possible interest 
                                                 
44
 Interviews were undertaken between October 2013 and June 2014. 
45
 Bryman (n4) 442. Bryman suggests the interview schedule may be no more than a brief list of 
prompt to jog the memory or may take the form of a more structured list of issues or questions to put 
to the participant. 
46
 Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews’ (2002) 35 PS 673, 
674. 
47
 It was decided that non-semantic sounds such as “um” and “erm” and “er” would not be recorded 
on the transcript. 
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from an early stage.
48
 This marked the beginning of the analytic process.
49
  Data was 
anonymised throughout the transcription process by use of marked generic 
descriptions. The transcripts were saved and encrypted as Microsoft Office Word 
Documents on a USB Flash drive. At the end of the transcription process, each 
participant was provided with a transcript of the interview for review and approval. 
Requests for amendments to the transcripts were acted upon in accordance with 
participants’ instructions. Having an opportunity to review their transcripts enabled 
participants to validate their contributing data. This was useful for ethical and quality 
purposes.
50
 
 The length of time taken to transcribe the interview data ranged between 2 hours for 
the shortest interview (duration: 12 minutes) and 12 hours for the longest interview 
(duration: 1 hour 30 minutes).   
4.6.6 Data management and analysis 
The researcher used a combination of computer assisted data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) and manual methods to analyse the qualitative data. Specifically, 
NVivo10 software was used to facilitate the management of the large amount of 
textual data generated for this project and as a tool for the initial generation of codes 
from which potential themes could be identified across the dataset. Manual methods 
were then used to further explore, arrange and develop themes and complete the 
analysis of the qualitative data. 
The interviews were analysed using a predominantly inductive thematic analysis 
approach (TA) using the six-phase guide for TA outlined by Braun and Clarke 
(Appendix 7).
51
  
It is only recently that Braun and Clarke have ‘named and claimed’ TA as a 
standalone method for qualitative data analysis.
52
 Prior to this, variants of TA were 
                                                 
48
 Marshall and Rossman state: “There is no substitute for intimate engagement with your data. 
Researchers should think of data as something to cuddle up with, embrace and get to know better”. 
Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (5
th
 edn, SAGE 2011) 
210. 
49
 Silverman observes the preparation of transcripts is not simply a technical detail prior to the main 
business of the analysis. David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research (4
th
 edn, SAGE 2013) 254. 
50
 Although it is acknowledge that requests for amendments to the data may compromise the value of 
the data. 
51
 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’ (2006) 3 Qual Res 
Psychol 77. 
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used to analyse qualitative data. However, as a method in its own right, TA was 
criticised for being poorly defined and lacking the kudos of other branded analytic 
approaches.
53
 However, the development of a clearly defined analytic procedure by 
which to identify common themes in data means that TA is now widely accepted as a 
branded method and is widely used for analysing qualitative data in social science 
research.
54
 
TA is defined as a qualitative method for the systematic identification, analysis and 
reporting of patterns – known as ‘themes’ – within a dataset.55 It is used to provide a 
rich, detailed thematic description, or aspect of a research phenomenon or issue, and 
can also be used to interpret aspects of the said phenomenon or issue.
56
 Given that 
the concept of coding as a strategy of data reduction is relatively straightforward, TA 
is seen as a foundational method of qualitative analysis.
57
 Codes and themes can be 
either data-derived using a ‘bottom up’ inductive approach, closely linked to the 
semantic content of the data, or they may be research-driven using a deductive ‘top 
down’ approach, in which implicit meanings are identified.58 Whilst thematic coding 
is used as a step in a number of pattern-based qualitative analytic methods, Braun 
and Clarke distinguish TA from other approaches such as Grounded Theory and 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) on the basis that TA does not fix the 
researcher to specific methods for data collection, theoretical positions, 
epistemological or ontological positions; in this sense, it is ‘just a method’ as 
opposed to an approach to qualitative analysis.
59
 This means TA can be used in a 
variety of ways to answer a range of different research questions. It is this 
accessibility and flexibility that influenced the choice of TA for this study. 
Here, a predominantly inductive approach was taken in which codes were derived 
from the data. However, because a comprehensive review of existing literature that 
                                                                                                                                          
52
 Braun and Clarke claim to have ‘named and claimed’ thematic analysis as a standalone method 
within psychology in 2006. The use of thematic analysis is now used across a variety of disciplines. 
Braun and Clarke (n41) 178. 
53
 This is despite the fact that thematic analysis underpins other pattern-based analysis such as 
Grounded Theory. It is in this sense that Braun and Clarke refer to thematic analysis as a 
‘foundational method’ Braun and Clarke (n43)174. 
54
 ibid.  
55
 ibid. 
56
 ibid 178. 
57
 ibid. 
58
 ibid 207. 
59
 ibid 178. 
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explores the relationship between religion and judicial decision-making had been 
carried out prior to conducting and analysing the interviews, it is inevitable that the 
identification of themes will have partly been informed by the researcher’s own a 
priori theoretical constructs.
60
  
IPA was briefly considered as an alternative to TA. IPA is an inductive approach that 
seeks to examine ‘how people make sense of their major lived experiences’,61 and 
therefore lends itself to experiential research in which participants are asked 
questions about their understandings and perceptions of phenomena.
62
 Like TA, IPA 
is a relatively new qualitative approach which involves a process of coding and the 
development of themes.
63
 However, in contrast with the approach in TA in which 
coding is completed across the entire dataset to identify patterns in the data, in IPA 
‘emergent themes’ are identified within each data item before patterns are developed 
into ‘superordinate themes’. Furthermore, IPA has a strong idiographic focus.64 This 
means sample sizes are usually small; in fact some IPA research may comprise no 
more than a single case.
65
  
After consideration, it was decided an IPA approach was not appropriate. The 
emphasis in this study is not on an understanding of participants’ own ‘lived 
experiences’, beliefs and values but is on their understanding and perceptions of the 
influence of others’  experiences, beliefs and values. Furthermore, the researcher 
decided that the focus should be on identifying patterns across the dataset rather than 
on an analysis with a strong idiographic influence. 
 
                                                 
60
 Braun and Clarke observe that while researchers will often give priority to an inductive or 
deductive approach, in practice, a thematic analysis will be informed by an amalgam of both 
approaches. Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Thematic Analysis’ in Harris Cooper (ed), APA 
Handbook of Research Methods in Psychology Volume 2 Research Designs (APA 2012) 58. 
61
 Jonathan Smith, Paul Flowers and Michael Larkin, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: 
Theory, Method and Research (SAGE 2009) 1. 
62
 Braun and Clarke (n43) 181. 
63
 IPA was developed by psychologist Jonathan Smith in 1990s. Larkin et al. state that the analytical 
process involved in IPA is unremarkable compared to other qualitative methods. Therefore, they 
suggest that it may be more appropriate to define IPA in terms of a perspective rather than as a 
distinct method. See Michael Larkin, Simon Watts and Elizabeth Clifton, ‘Giving Voice and making 
sense in interpretative phenomenological analysis (2006) 3 Qual Res Psychol 104. 
64
 Smith (n61) 51. 
65
 ibid. 
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4.7 Research Method Study II: Solicitor Perceptions Questionnaire 
 
This section explains the methods used to gather and analyse data in relation to Part 
two of this mixed methods study. 
4.7.1 Identifying the sample: Solicitors 
 
A purposive sampling method was used to identify and recruit solicitors for this part 
of the research project. As discussed in Chapter 1.4, like barristers, solicitors are 
expert legal advisers. Working directly with clients, solicitors often negotiate on 
behalf of their clients and, if necessary, represent them in the lower courts. Solicitors 
with higher rights of audience can also represent clients in the higher courts (Crown 
Court, High Court and Court of Appeal).
66
 If they do not carry out their own 
advocacy and there is a need to instruct counsel, a solicitor may still attend court and 
provide assistance to the barrister as required. Based on their observations in court, 
and more generally from their interaction with members of the judiciary within the 
wider legal environment, it is therefore argued that solicitors, like barristers, can 
provide an interesting insight into the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs 
and judicial decision-making. 
Justifying the use of a purposive sampling method 
The sample was selected using a purposive, non-probability sampling strategy. As 
discussed in section 4.6.1, this method means that the sample is not chosen randomly 
but is selected ‘based on a specific purpose’.67 A major criticism of the use of non-
probability sampling in social survey research is that because the researcher chooses 
who to select into the sample, some members of the population are more likely to be 
selected than others. This gives rise to sampling bias. Moreover, a non-probability 
sampling strategy prevents findings from being generalizable because it is not 
possible to ascertain of what population the sample is representative.
68
 Nevertheless, 
                                                 
66
 Solicitors are granted rights of audience in all courts when they are admitted to the roll. However 
rights of audience in the higher courts cannot be exercised until a solicitor has passed an advocacy 
assessment based on the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s higher rights of audience competence 
standards. See <www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/accreditation/higher-rights-of-audience.page >accessed 3 
July 2015. 
67
 Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori, ‘Major issues and controversies in the use of mixed 
methods in the social and behavioral sciences’ in Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddle (eds), 
Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research (SAGE 2003) 713. 
68
 Bryman (n4) 183. 
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there are three main reasons why the use of non-probability sampling was justified in 
the second part of this study: 
 
 The researcher had insufficient information to be able to identify the entire 
target population;  
 The sample was initially limited to solicitors working in particular areas of 
law; and  
 It is acknowledged as an effective method by which to select an exploratory 
sample in relation to a new or under-explored research area such as that in 
this research project.
69
 In particular, here it was the range of responses that 
the researcher was interested in rather than the proportion of the population 
that gives a given response.
70
  
4.7.2 Sample criteria 
 
Solicitors practicing in the areas of employment and family law were identified as 
being the main targets for recruitment. As explained in 4.6.2, the rationale for this 
narrow focus is that these areas of law are those in which religious or religiously-
sensitive issues are most likely to arise.  
4.7.3 Data Collection: Solicitor Perceptions Questionnaire  
 
Self-completion questionnaires are acknowledged as a common means by which to 
investigate individuals’ perceptions and attitudes in social survey research (a copy of 
the Solicitor Perceptions Questionnaire (SPQ) can be found at Appendix 8).
71
 This 
was considered to be the most appropriate instrument for data collection in this part 
of the study, the reasons for which are outlined below.  
 
Firstly, the SPQ allowed the researcher to collect data from a large sample of 
solicitors. This contrasts with part one of the study in which the focus was on 
obtaining rich data from a comparatively small sample. Secondly, given both the size 
of the target population and the large sample size sought in this part of the study, the 
use of the SPQ was considered to be the most efficient and cost effective method of 
                                                 
69
 ibid.  
70
 David de Vaus, Surveys in Social Research (6
th
 edn, Routledge 2013) 88. 
71
 ibid 216. 
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data collection vis-à-vis other methods.
72
 Whilst the use of virtual interviews was 
considered as a means of data collection, it was decided that the number of 
interviews that would have to be conducted would be time-prohibitive. Thirdly, the 
use of an online questionnaire format allowed the researcher to incorporate question 
skip logic into the questionnaire design. This can help to speed up respondent 
completion times and avoid respondent fatigue. Fourthly, this format meant that 
response times were quick – for the most part, the responses to invitations to take 
part in the research were received within 48 hours of the email invitations being sent 
by the researcher.  
 
From an administration perspective, using the SPQ provided the researcher with 
instant, basic survey data which was useful for the management and analysis of the 
data.
73
 In addition, once the researcher had completed the time-consuming task of 
identifying and compiling a list of contact details for individuals meeting the sample 
criteria and had created the questionnaire online, delivering the invitation to 
complete the web-based questionnaire was reasonably quick.  
 
Of course, the use of a web-based self-completion questionnaire is not without 
limitations. One of the major issues in a web-based survey relates to response rates. 
Where the response rate is low, data quality may be compromised. Specifically, 
questions about the representativeness of the sample may be asked which in turn 
prevents the findings from being generalizable. Factors that have been shown to 
affect response rates include the content and presentation of a web questionnaire, the 
sample and the mode of delivery, the degree of survey fatigue amongst the sample 
population and the nature of the sample.
74
 In this study, the following strategies were 
employed in an effort to maximise response rates: 
 
                                                 
72
 At the time of writing, the cost of a monthly ‘Select’ plan subscription to the SurveyMonkey 
website was £26 <www.surveymonkey.com/pricing/> accessed 7 March 2015. Had the researcher 
sent out the same number of email invitations to potential respondents by post in this study, the cost 
for postage alone would have been £3407.64. This is based on sending 2334 speculative 
questionnaires by second class post, at the lowest large letter rate (at the time of writing being £0.73) 
and including a self-addressed, pre-paid envelope at the same cost. Additional costs for paper, 
envelopes and printing have not been included in this estimate. 
73
 This included data such as trend information and number of collected responses. 
74
 Fan and Zheng group the factors affecting response rates in survey completion into three categories: 
society-related, respondent-related and design-related factors. Weimiao Fan and Yan Zheng, ‘Factors 
affecting response rates of the web survey: A systematic review’ (2010) 26 Computers in Human 
Behavior 132, 133. 
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 The length of the questionnaire was kept as short as possible. Based on the 
pilot study, the estimated questionnaire completion time was 15 minutes,
75
, 
although a number of respondents were recorded as taking in excess of 30 
minutes to complete the questionnaire (n=59).
76
  
 The design of the survey instrument was kept simple. The SPQ questions 
were organised into ten categories according to theme: Preliminary matters; 
About You; Relationship between judges’ personal factors and judicial 
decision-making; Knowing about judicial personal factors; The effect of 
judicial personal factors on judicial decision-making; Relationship between 
judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision-making; Accommodating 
religious beliefs; How your religious beliefs affect your own approach; 
Specialist panel to hear religious or religiously sensitive cases; and Judicial 
diversity. A screen-by-screen design was used and a progress bar was added 
so that respondents were able to track their progress.  
 All emails were addressed directly to the intended recipients. Whilst this was 
a time-consuming process, addressing potential respondents in this way has 
been shown to have a positive influence on response rates in web-based 
surveys.
77
  
 The researcher ensured that all research queries received from potential 
respondents about the research were answered promptly and 
comprehensively.  
 
The researcher did not experience any major technical difficulties when 
administering the SPQ.  
 
Questionnaire Development 
The questionnaire design was principally shaped by the research questions and the 
findings from the interviews with barristers.  
 
                                                 
75
 Solicitors typically charge in 6 minute units based on an hourly rate. The more senior the 
practitioner, the higher the charge will be. 
76
 The length of time for completion should be treated with caution as it reflects the period of time 
taken from starting the questionnaire until the finish, without taking into account any periods of 
interruption.  
77
 Fan and Zheng (n74) 138. 
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A combination of question types was used in order to address the research questions. 
Dichotomous and nominal questions were initially used to elicit personal factual 
information. Open-ended questions were typically included where the nature of 
responses could not be anticipated or where it was predicated that there might be 
considerable variance in respondent answers. However, the majority of questions in 
the questionnaire took the form of Likert-type item questions.
78
 A Likert-type item 
question typically consists of a closed response question in which respondents are 
asked to indicate their level of agreement to statements according to the given scale. 
Here, the interval measure used was a standard 5-point Likert scale in which: 1= 
Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, and 5= 
Strongly agree. Although the use of such attitude scaling does not detect nuanced 
differences between respondent attitudes, it provides a useful means by which to 
classify individual responses with respect to a particular attitude and can be used to 
explore how particular attitudes relate to other variables.
79
 
 
The initial draft of the SPQ was discussed at length with the supervisory team. 
Suggestions for improvement were implemented and the consultation process was 
repeated. Once the questions were finalised, the SPQ was re-created in an online 
format using SurveyMonkey. Transforming the questionnaire to this survey format 
enabled the researcher to customise the questionnaire design and apply question skip 
logic where appropriate to streamline users’ experience and reduce the time needed 
to complete the questionnaire. At this stage, all questions were reviewed for errors 
and the logic was tested by the researcher. A unique web link was created so that the 
questionnaire could be opened for piloting.  
 
De Vaus has emphasised the importance of pilot testing questionnaires prior to 
implementation and warns that skipping this stage is ‘a risk that is not worth 
taking’.80 Here, the pretesting of the questionnaire was considered to be vital in its 
development. When carrying out a pilot study, ideally the respondents should be 
comparable to members of the population from which the sample for the main study 
                                                 
78
 The questionnaire comprised of 28 questions as follows: 9 Likert-type questions, 11 closed 
questions and 8 open questions. 
79
 A Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement (Bloomsbury 2000) 
195. 
80
 De Vaus (n70) 117 
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will be selected.
81
 However, due to time constraints it was not possible to pilot the 
questionnaire on legal professionals outside of the Law School. Instead, the 
questionnaire was pretested amongst PhD students and academics from the Law 
School (n=10), several of whom are or have been in practice as solicitors or 
barristers. Those who agreed to test the survey were asked to comment on their 
understanding of the questions and identify any areas of concern or confusion, 
comment on question sequence and questionnaire design, look for issues relating to 
functionality and indicate the time taken to complete the questionnaire. 
 
The feedback was generally positive. However, some revisions were made to the 
format and phrasing of a small number of questions to address ambiguities in 
meaning. An additional question was also incorporated into the questionnaire, the 
purpose of which was to elicit more specific information relating to the preceding 
question.  
4.7.4 Sample selection 
 
The SPQ was opened for the collection of online responses between March and June 
2015. 
 
Multiple strategies, akin to those used in Part one (Chapter 4.6.2), were used to 
recruit participants to this part of the study.  Initially, existing contact persons 
meeting the inclusion criteria were invited to complete the questionnaire 
anonymously via email invitation. At the same time, a link to the questionnaire was 
advertised on the social media platform Twitter. These modes yielded a combined 
total of 27 SPQ responses.  The main method used to recruit solicitors was also by 
invitation by email.
82
 The Legal500 and Chambers UK websites were used to 
assemble a list of leading firms of solicitors working in the legal areas of interest. 
The researcher visited the websites of each of these firms to identify practitioners 
working in employment and family law and, where possible, to obtain their direct 
email addresses. Personalised email invitations were then sent out to potential 
participants (Appendix 9).  
                                                 
81
 Bryman (n4) 248. 
82
 The use of email is a common method by which to invite potential respondents to participate in web 
surveys. Fan and Zheng (n74). 
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Overall there were 264 logins to the questionnaire - 179 complete responses and 85 
partial responses.
83
 However, on close inspection of the complete SPQ responses, it 
was clear that a number of respondents worked in areas outside of employment and 
family law. Therefore, although leading to a loss of substantial amount of data, all 
responses failing to meet the requisite sample criteria were excluded from analysis. 
These remaining responses were thoroughly checked to look for signs of ‘ballot box 
stuffing’, that is, where the same respondent responds many times. There was no 
evidence of this. After cleaning up the data, the working sample size was reduced to 
158. 
4.7.5 Sample characteristics 
 
Gender 
Of the 158 solicitors who formed the sample in this part of the study, 54% were 
female and 46% were male. The percentage of female solicitors was slightly higher 
than the proportion of women solicitors with Practising Certificates in England and 
Wales at the time of the study (49%).
84
  
Area of legal practice 
Solicitors were asked to state their main area of legal practice (SPQ Q3). Figure 4.4 
shows that three-fifths of respondents (60%) worked in Employment law, the 
remainder practising primarily in family law (40%).  
 
Figure 4.4 Solicitor profiles according to main area of legal practice (n=158)  
                                                 
83
 SurveyMonkey automatically assigns a ‘complete’ or ‘partial’ response status. 
84
 The Law Society, Trends in the solicitors’ profession Annual Statistics Report 2016, June 2017. 
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Post qualification experience (PQE) 
Solicitors were asked how long they had been in practice.
85
 Figure 4.5 shows that 
solicitors were well-represented across each of the PQE bands.  Just under one third 
of the sample comprised very experienced practitioners – those with 21 or more 
years PQE (29%). Four of the solicitors in this band held part-time judicial posts at 
the time of completion of the SPQ. The remaining groups of 16-20 years PQE, 11-15 
years PQE, 6-10 years PQE and 0-5 years PQE represented 23%, 13%, 15% and 
22% of the sample respectively.  
 
Figure 4.5 Solicitor profiles according to PQE (n=158)   
 
There is no exact corresponding data regarding the current percentage of solicitors 
with practising certificates in England and Wales within each of the PQE bands used 
in the SPQ. However, drawing upon recent data from the Law Society, it would 
appear that the distribution of solicitors working in private practice based on years 
since admission is not too dissimilar from the sample in the present study. To 
illustrate, the Law Society figures show that the experience of solicitors in private 
practice based on years since admission is as follows: 0-9 years - 42%, 10-19 years – 
28% and 20 + years – 30%. The data relating to respondents to the SPQ is broadly 
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comparable: 0-10 years PQE – 37%, 11-20 years PQE – 36% and 21+ years PQE – 
29%.
86
 
Attendance at Court or Tribunal 
Solicitors were asked ‘How often do you attend court or a tribunal?’ (SPQ Q9). For 
the statistical analysis, those who attended court on a monthly or more frequent basis 
were assigned the code ‘frequently’. This group comprised 55% of the sample. 
Solicitors who attended court less than monthly were assigned the code 
‘infrequently’. This accounted for the remaining 45% of the group (Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6 Solicitor profiles according to frequency of attendance at court (n=158)  
 
Religious beliefs 
Solicitors were asked how they would describe their religious beliefs (as distinct 
from their cultural background) (SPQ Q8). On initial coding, the largest category of 
responses comprised those who described their religious beliefs as Christian (55%). 
The next largest groups were individuals who described themselves as Atheist (14%) 
or as having ‘No religion’ (13%), followed by those identifying as Agnostic (9%), 
Muslim (2%), Sikh (1%), Jewish (1%), or as ‘any other religion’ (2%). 3% of 
respondents chose not to disclose their religious beliefs. This pattern broadly follows 
the Law Society’s data regarding the religious diversity profile of solicitors.87 To 
illustrate, in the diversity profile data, 49% of respondents described themselves as 
Christian, 35% of respondents said that they had no religion - in the absence of 
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 Law Society Annual Statistics Report 2016. 
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 The Law Society, Diversity profile of the profession 2014: A short synopsis, June 2015 
<www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/research-trends/diversity-in-the-profession/> accessed 19 
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separate categories for no religion, Atheist and Agnostic in the Law Society’s 
diversity survey, it is assumed that those with these beliefs were grouped under the 
‘no religion’ descriptor in the data. This was followed by respondents who were 
Jewish (3%), Muslim (2%), Hindu (2%), Sikh (1%), Buddhist (1%). 5% preferred 
not to disclose their religion in the Law Society’s diversity survey.  
Due to the relatively low frequencies for solicitors who declared their religious 
beliefs as anything other than ‘Christian’ in the SPQ, the ‘religious belief’ categories 
were collapsed under a new variable (‘RBCOL_RC’). The largest group ‘Christian’ 
remained unaltered (55%). The categories Atheist, Agnostic and No religion were 
collapsed under the code of ‘Unaffiliated’ to form the second largest group 
constituting 35% of the sample.
88
 Responses identifying with minority religious 
beliefs –Jewish, Muslim, Sikh and ‘any other religion’ were grouped together under 
the code ‘Non-Christian’ and accounted for just 6%.89  The ‘Prefer not to say’ 
category remained unchanged although this was excluded from all analyses. A 
breakdown of respondent profiles according to religious beliefs is shown in Figure 
4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7 Solicitor profiles according to religious beliefs (n=158) 
 
                                                 
88
 Guidance was taken from the Pew Research Center. In a 2014 US Religious Landscape Study, the 
label ‘Unaffiliated’ was used to describe respondents who were either Atheist, Agnostic or ‘Nothing 
in particular’. <www.pewforum.org/files/2015/05/RLS-05-08-full-report.pdf> accessed 15 July 2015.  
89
 This approach has been used in research in other publications. Peter Brierley, ‘Researching 
Religion’ 1999, Question Bank Topic Commentary on Religion. The Question Bank  is an ESRC 
funded Internet social survey resource based in the Department of Sociology, University of Surrey. 
<www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/media/263001/discover_qbcommentary_religion_brierley.pdf> accessed 
15 July 2015.  
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4.7.6 Data preparation 
 
The researcher used SPSS v.22 (Statistical Package for Social Sciences software) to 
analyse the quantitative data generated from the questionnaires.  A number of 
respondents took the opportunity to augment their answers by making additional 
comments in the open-text comment boxes following each SPQ question. This and 
qualitative data that was not quantized was analysed drawing upon the principles of 
TA as described in section 4.6.6. 
 
When carrying out survey research, it is common to find that some answers to 
questions have been left blank or are incomplete.
90
 Such missing data, known as 
‘missing values’ can lead to reduced sample sizes, a loss of data and bias in the data. 
It is therefore vital to explain how missing values were handled in this study. A 
manual assessment of the extent of missing data was carried out. The most common 
missing data pattern related to variables created in response to open-ended questions. 
The high rate of non-response to these types of question might speculatively be 
attributed to factors such as respondents’ own time constraints,91 response fatigue 
and question design. Every missing value in each of the cases in the SPQ dataset was 
coded, even where there was no response to a question.
92
 The missing data was 
allocated the code “99”. Where bivariate analysis was conducted, a pairwise deletion 
method was used. This method excludes a case only if there is missing data that is 
required for the specific analysis. It contrasts with the listwise exclusion method in 
which a case is only included in the analysis if it has full data on all of the variables 
listed for that case.
93
 The advantage of using a pairwise approach is that fewer cases 
are dropped from the analysis. Other missing data handling options were considered. 
For example, the researcher looked at dropping all the cases with missing values 
from the analysis in order to leave a complete data set. However, this approach 
would have dramatically reduced the sample size. Alternatively, missing values 
could have been imputed. However, it was felt that this would not add value to the 
analysis. 
                                                 
90
  De Vaus (n70); Andy Field, Discovering Statistics using SPSS (3
rd
 edn, SAGE 2009) 77. 
91
 The majority of respondents completed the questionnaire in working hours. 
92
 De Vaus (n70) 155. 
93
 Julie Pallant, SPSS Survival Manual (4
th
 edn, OUP 2010) 127. 
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4.7.7 Data analysis  
 
Descriptive statistics were primarily used to describe the patterns in the responses of 
cases in the sample.
94
 Simple frequency counts were used to describe single 
variables (univariate). Cross-tabulations were used to describe and detect 
relationships between two categorical variables (bivariate). Inferential statistics were 
also used, albeit sparingly. An approach similar to that suggested by Pallant was 
used to determine which statistical procedures were most appropriate for addressing 
the research questions (Appendix 10).
95
  
Most statistical procedures performed are based on a set of specific assumptions 
about the data being analysed. Most parametric tests assume the following 
conditions: (a) that the level of measurement is continuous (b) normality of the 
distribution of scores on the dependent variable and (c) homogeneity of variance in 
relation to scores when comparing groups. If these assumptions are violated, non-
parametric tests should be used. As non-parametric tests do not assume the specific 
parameters of the sample population,
96
 they are criticised for being less sensitive to 
differences in the data. 
97
 On the other hand, they are a useful means by which to 
detect differences between groups when parametric assumptions are not met.  Here, 
normality of distribution was assessed using both the Kolmgorov-Smirnov test in 
SPSS and by visual examination of the data. The widely used Kolmgorov-Smirnov 
test compares the scores in the sample to a set of scores that are normally distributed. 
The p-value is the attained level of significance. Generally, if p<0.05, the data is 
significantly different from a normal distribution and a non-parametric test should be 
used. If p>0.05, the data is normally distributed and a parametric test can be used.  In 
this study, all normality tests indicated that the data was non-normally distributed.
98
 
As such, non-parametric tests were used throughout the quantitative phase of the 
research. 
 
                                                 
94
 De Vaus (n70) 207. 
95
 ibid. 
96
  Field (n90). 
97
 De Vaus (n70). 
98
 This might be expected in relation to Likert scale type questions as the data is ordinal rather than 
continuous. 
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4.8 Limitations of research methods 
 
As discussed above, sampling involving respondent self-selection was used to 
generate the two sample groups used in this empirical study.  
This choice of sampling technique was motivated by practical considerations. It 
provided a quick and efficient means by which to recruit lawyers working in specific 
legal areas who have ample opportunity to observe judicial decision-making 
behaviour. In addition, self-selection was considered to be the most suitable means 
by which to attract volunteers with an interest in the research topic, and a 
commitment to participation which, it was hoped, would result in higher response 
rates. Of all the barristers who registered an interest in participating in this research, 
all but two had relevant experience in the key legal fields of interest. These two units 
were excluded from the analysis. Controlling for the quality of the solicitor sample 
was more time-consuming. To ensure that the sample consisted of solicitors working 
only in employment and family law, all SPQ responses were critically evaluated 
(with specific reference to demographic profiles and legal area of expertise) and 
those which fell outside the sample criteria were systematically excluded from the 
sample.
99
 Whilst this resulted in a large loss of data, this step was deemed essential 
for quality purposes.  
It is important to note that the use of self-selection sampling has implications for the 
analysis of lawyers’ views in this study. As each of the samples comprised only 
those lawyers who responded to the invitations to participate, non-response bias 
cannot be eliminated. This form of bias occurs where there is a difference between 
the views of those who took part in the interviews or completed the SPQ and those 
of eligible non-participants. Consequently, it is impossible to claim that the findings 
of this study are generalizable to the research population. Relatedly, there is a risk 
that self-selection may reflect some inherent bias on the part of participants, for 
example, they may have a specific interest in religion generally, or particularly 
strong opinions about how judges reach decisions. As a result, there is a risk that 
certain views may be over-represented and the interpretation of findings 
exaggerated. Another limitation concerns the choice of research method in each part 
                                                 
99
 This also gave the researcher an opportunity to check for any signs of multiple responses from 
single respondents although it should be noted that the ‘Multiple Responses’ option was disabled in 
SurveyMonkey. 
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of the overall study. For example, the qualitative interviews with the barristers in 
part one and, to a lesser extent the qualitative feedback from part two, produced large 
quantities of textual data. This data was coded and analysed by a single researcher. 
Given the time and resources available in this project it was not feasible to validate 
the coding by peer review. Whilst every effort was made to reduce the potential for 
researcher bias by constantly reviewing the codes and coded data, it is acknowledged 
that coding is itself a subjective exercise and therefore the risk of researcher bias 
cannot be wholly eliminated from the analyses.  
Finally, it is acknowledged that the researcher’s choice to focus on the views of 
employment and family lawyers is itself a source of potential bias. Whilst every 
effort has been made to address these issues, they cannot be overlooked as possible 
limitations of the study.  
 
4.9 Ethical considerations 
 
A number of ethical considerations arise in any research project involving the 
collection of human participants. The ethical issues salient to this research project 
and the procedures that were put in place to deal with them prior to, during and after 
data collection (in respect of both the interviews with barristers and the SPQ) can be 
found in Appendix 12. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 4 has introduced the methodological approach upon which this socio-legal 
investigation is based and explains the reasons for the choice of exploratory 
sequential mixed method research design used for the empirical element of this 
study. The sample selection, data collection, preparation and analysis procedures in 
relation to both parts of this study have been explained in full. The next chapter 
moves on to address lawyers’ perceptions of the relationship between judges’ 
personal factors and judicial decision-making, the main discussion of which focuses 
on the central research issue, the interplay between religion and the process of 
judging.
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CHAPTER 5 
KEEPING AN OPEN MIND 
 CHAPTER 5 KEEPING AN OPEN MIND  CHAPTER 5
5.1 Introduction 
 
This part of the thesis turns to the empirical findings from the qualitative 
interviews with barristers (Part one) and the solicitor responses to the Solicitor 
Perceptions Questionnaire (SPQ) (Part two) relating to the central research 
question: Do lawyers perceive that judges’ religious beliefs influence judicial 
decision-making? The chapter is divided into two main sections. To start, 
lawyers’ perceptions of the role played by judges’ personal factors are explored. 
These are found to be generally consistent with the now widely accepted view 
that there is a personal dimension to judicial decision-making (discussed in 
Chapter 2). This sets the foundation for a more focused look at lawyers’ 
perceptions of the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs (as one 
constituent of an individual’s personal factors) and judicial decision-making. The 
analysis of the empirical data finds that whilst lawyers in this study are generally 
open-minded about whether an individual judge’s faith impinges on the decision-
making process, lawyers are satisfied that constraints on judging, both legal and 
non-legal, provide an effective means by which to limit the influence that such 
factors have on the decisional process.  
 
5.2 Preliminary matters 
5.2.1 Defining terms 
 
Throughout this and the remaining chapters, the term ‘lawyers’ is used to 
collectively refer to the barristers and solicitors who participated in this study. The 
term ‘practitioner’ is used as an alternative to ‘barrister’ or ‘solicitor’. ‘Interviewee’ 
refers solely to the barristers interviewed in part one of this study, whilst 
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‘respondent’ is used only to refer to the solicitors who completed the SPQ in part 
two of the study. 
5.2.2 Respondent unique identifiers 
 
Where extracts from the interviews with barristers are used to support findings from 
the data, they are identified by a ‘B’ followed by a unique identifier number. Quotes 
from solicitors in response to the SPQ are identified by an ‘S’ followed by a number 
and either ‘E’ for employment or ‘F’ for family to  denote the respondent’s area of 
expertise. 
 
5.2.3 Use of data 
 
This chapter brings together the empirical findings from parts one and two of the 
thesis. Due to the different methods used to collect and analyse data, there are some 
instances in which lawyers’ comments about the relationship between judges’ 
personal factors and judging overlap with the discussion about the nexus between 
judges’ religious beliefs and judging and vice-versa. This is made clear in the text. 
  CHAPTER 6
5.3 The nexus between personal factors and judging 
 
As seen in Chapter 2, many judges, including those at the highest echelons of the 
judiciary, readily concede that, in difficult cases, their judicial decision-making is 
sometimes influenced by aspects of their individual personality, personal background 
and/or experience. This section explores whether this view is shared among the 
lawyers who took part in this empirical study, the rationale being that if lawyers 
think that personal factors are relevant to the process of judging, then judges’ 
personal religious convictions, as one constituent of an individual’s personal factors, 
may similarly be perceived to play a part in how judges reach decisions.  
5.3.1 The majority view: the inevitability of subjectivity 
 
A common thread running throughout the majority of interviews and SPQ responses 
was the view that judicial decision-making is inescapably infused with a myriad of 
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legal and non-legal factors. Figure 5.1 shows that all of the interviewees in part one 
(n=18) were adamant that judges’ background factors were salient to the process of 
judging, whilst almost three-quarters (72%) of the solicitors in part two (n=158) 
agreed that judges’ personal factors influence judicial decision-making (specifically 
in cases where there is no settled law or where judicial discretion is exercised).  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Lawyer perceptions of whether judges’ personal factors influence judicial 
decision-making [Base sample: Barristers (n=18), Solicitors (n=158) [Source: Appendix 
14] 
 
Drawing on the interview responses from barristers and the qualitative open-text 
comments from solicitors which supplemented SPQ Q10, three common themes 
emerged as to why judges’ personal factors were thought to be inherent in the 
process of judging: judges are human, unconscious bias and judicial discretion. 
Judges are human 
 
First, the majority of lawyers situated judging within a wider context in which all 
human decision-making, particularly that relating to disputes involving competing 
values, was understood to be innately value-laden. To suggest that personal factors 
play no part in the judicial decision-making process in cases involving the exercise 
of judicial discretion was dismissed by barristers and solicitors alike as idealistic or 
simply naïve:
1
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 Brian Leiter, ‘Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?’ (2010) 16 Legal Theory 111. 
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I think it’s unrealistic to expect a judge to park his or her life experience at the 
door…. mostly we are looking at an objective legal test but it’s inevitable that 
subjective factors come into play. (B2) 
 
Such responses were frequently buttressed by reference to the fact that many senior 
judges recognise that there is a personal dimension to their judging and acknowledge 
that this may sometimes vitally affect their reasoning:  
 
I think it’s nonsense really to suggest that any judge would come to a case 
without bringing various packages or prejudices that they, like any other 
humans, would carry around with them… Judges, right up to the highest level 
without giving names, have admitted to me that the proposition that they leave 
their own personal characteristics, expectations and prejudices at the door is 
nonsense. (B15) 
I am struggling to understand how any right thinking person could in all 
honesty not be influenced by personal factors… If the suggestion is that a 
judge might base his or her judicial decision-making entirely on reason rather 
than personal factors, how can it be proven that such reasoning is not itself 
influenced by personal factors? (S108E) 
Highlighting the differences in judicial roles across the courts and tribunals 
hierarchy, some lawyers pointed to the fact that a degree of subjectivity in judging 
was unavoidable in some courts given that, in some instances, judges were expected 
to draw upon their own experiences to aid them in the adjudication process. For 
example, one solicitor commented that such influence was ‘inevitable and indeed 
encouraged in the family courts’ (S47F). However, this is not to say that it is 
appropriate for judges to solely base judgments upon their own subjective views 
about what, for example, is or is not in the best interests of a child. Any such 
discretion was said to be constrained by the requirement that any determination must 
be based on an objective assessment as to what is in the best interests of the child 
rather than a judge’s personal views. 
Making a similar point, several lawyers said that, in some employment tribunals, the 
very reason that non-legally trained wing members sit with an employment judge is 
because they have specialist knowledge or a specialised view of the facts which can 
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help provide balance and context in a given case. It was suggested that this 
inevitably introduced a personal element to tribunal decision-making, although 
crucially it was said that the lay members’ contribution to the decisional process was 
kept in check by the presiding judge who, as S4E explained, had the effect of 
“reducing the effect that wing members’ personal factors had on judicial decision-
making”. Of course, conversely it might be argued that the presence of wing 
members also can have an ameliorating effect on the approach of the employment 
judge with whom they sit.  
The problem of unconscious bias 
Having acknowledged that judges, like other decision-makers, are influenced by a 
multitude of factors when reaching decisions, lawyers typically constructed the way 
in which judges’ personal factors affect judging as being that permeated through an 
unconscious, rather than conscious, cognitive process.   Thus, in this respect, as in 
other professional decision-making contexts, it was accepted that an element of 
judicial subjectivity was simply unavoidable in adjudication. However, as the 
following extracts show, lawyers were not overly concerned about the effect of such 
unconscious bias on judicial determinations because it was felt that judges were 
sufficiently alert to, and therefore able to override, such bias by virtue of their 
judicial training and commitment to the judicial role:  
 
I think actually in this country there is a very strong tradition…that judges 
don’t allow, so far as they can avoid it, their personal perspectives influencing 
the way that they act and so anything that does happen is almost certainly 
unconscious rather than deliberate. (B5) 
Obviously the judicial oath that we take means that we shouldn’t let our 
backgrounds interfere but, unconsciously, such matters may come in. (B13) 
It is inevitable that it will influence their judicial decision making, especially in 
terms of unconscious bias, but they are trained to recognise this and keep it in 
check. (S19E) 
 
That the manifestation of unconscious bias borne from judges’ personal factors 
was not perceived to be a cause of concern to the majority of lawyers in this study 
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is of particular interest. As the lawyers’ comments above suggest, where judicial 
personal factors affect judicial decision-making, they do so only because the 
decision-maker is not consciously aware of, and therefore has no control over, 
such influence. By conceptualising the nature of influence in this way, any 
negative connotations associated with claims of judicial partiality are essentially 
assuaged by the fact that the judge is unaware of the role that his or her personal 
factors have played in the decision-making process. This view resonates with that 
of Banks and Ford who, in relation to their studies of racial justice and inequality 
in the US, suggest that one of the reasons why unconscious bias discourse is more 
politically palatable than claims of conscious bias is because it does not attract 
accusation or blame.
2
 
 
Discretion 
 
Lawyers were generally united in the view that it was principally in cases where the 
law was unclear or unsettled, rather than in black-letter cases, that judicial personal 
factors were most likely to, at least unconsciously, colour the decisional process. 
This view accords with psychological studies which find that cognitive biases are 
especially likely to influence decision-making when judgments are made under 
uncertainty.
3
 For example, B7, a senior employment law barrister and part-time 
judge explained that: 
 
There are some legal cases which are matters of statutory construction and the 
judges are being effectively asked to decide whether A+ B = C and it is all 
pretty dry and pretty dull. A typical commercial contract case is a classic sort 
of case. But, outside that, where there are any areas of discretion, then 
individual views will inevitably play a part, and that’s in the majority of cases.  
Despite the homogeneity of views as to the subjective element in judging in cases 
involving discretion, many lawyers were again keen to stress that judges’ personal 
factors played no more than a bit part in the process of judging because the effect 
of such influence was mitigated by, inter alia, judges’ focus on doctrinal authority 
                                                 
2
 Ralph Banks and Richard Ford, ‘(How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics and Racial 
Inequality’ (2009) 58 Emory LJ 1058. 
3
 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974) 
185 Science 4157, 1124. 
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and a personal desire to meet the requisite standard of impartiality expected of a 
judge. Thus, for example, a family law practitioner opined: 
There is, in matters that involve their discretion, indications that a judges' 
nature/views impact on a decision that they may reach. I would not go as far to 
say that it is completely dictated by their 'personal factors'. They [the judges], 
in general, are very careful about ensuring that their decisions are reasonable 
and objectively defined. (S136F) 
 
However, others felt that the reach of judges’ personal factors was wider, 
extending to all cases including those where the law was more certain. Of 
particular note, several lawyers felt that the doctrine of precedent potentially 
perpetuated an element of subjectivity in judging, the reason being that judicial 
decisions made today were quite possibly based on past reasoning that was 
subject to influence from the personal idiosyncrasies of former judges. This is 
perhaps somewhat paradoxical given that precedent predominantly serves as a 
constraint on legal decision-making. To illustrate, B6 said: 
…even when judicial values, if we put it like that, aren’t influencing a decision 
in an individual case, the judges are applying the common law. They are 
applying law made by other judges who presumably were exercising their own 
prejudices and values in deciding those cases because, on my premise, we 
can’t make decisions in any other way than by exercising our prejudices and 
values. 
  
These views are particularly interesting when considered in light of comments 
from other senior practitioners about the shift in judicial attitudes over the last 
half-century or so - from a time when prejudiced attitudes (often reflecting 
societal norms) were more evident than is the case today. For example, B19 
recalled: 
I know a time when personal views could form, could really affect, the way a 
judge handled a case. I mean, say thirty years ago, forty years ago… I know 
from the senior members of my first chambers that there were people who 
were appointed to the bench with extreme racist views. People who used to 
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write ‘Mr X does not represent black men’ on the brief and just sent it back, 
you know. It doesn’t happen now – society is a lot better informed, a lot more 
tolerant and a lot less biased. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the judgments of Lord Denning, whose judicial decision-making had 
a reputation for being imbued with his own Christian beliefs and moral values,
4
 were 
frequently identified as representing a bygone era which was no longer 
representative of judging today:
5
  
 
I suppose the last judge who really wore his religious beliefs on his sleeve 
when making his decisions would probably be Lord Denning and he came off 
the bench in 1982. I don’t think you would see a judge now saying, you know, 
“I’m a card carrying Christian or Hindu or Muslim or Jew and therefore I have 
come to the following conclusions”. (B16) 
 
I thought Lord Denning was a terrible example actually of judges allowing 
their own personal biases to interfere with the objectivity of judging. And he 
didn’t realise I think that, quite often, his perspective on cases was informed by 
his own biases and preferences. But that really shouldn’t happen and I think it 
happens far less now than it did 50 years ago. (B5) 
 
In light of these extracts, it would follow from B6’s view that there is a possibility 
that overtly subjective judgments of yesteryear, judgments that would potentially 
give rise to allegations of bias or applications for recusal and would almost certainly 
attract attention from the JCIO today, may at least potentially continue to exert a 
residual influence on judicial decisions by virtue of the doctrine of precedent, 
especially where precedent  is on all fours with the facts of the case in hand. 
                                                 
4
 Lord Denning once wrote “Many people now think that religion and law have nothing in common. 
The law, they say, governs our dealings with our fellows: whereas religion concerns our dealings with 
God. Likewise they hold that law has nothing to do with morality. It lays down rigid rules which must 
be obeyed without questioning whether they are right or wrong.  Its function is to keep order, not to 
do justice. The severance has, I think, gone much too far. Although religion, law and morals can be 
separated, they are nevertheless still very much dependent on one another. Without religion, there can 
be no morality, there can be no law”. Lord Denning, The Influence of Religion (1981) 2 Christian 
Legal Soc’y Q 12. 
5
 Although Forsyth argues that, at least in the field of administrative law, the moral and political 
views of Lord Denning were found to ‘overwhelm’ sound principles in only a tiny number of 
judgments. Christopher Forsyth, ‘Lord Denning and Modern Administrative Law (1999) 14 Denning 
LJ. 
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5.3.2 Solicitors: a dissenting minority 
 
To find that lawyers typically perceived judging to be influenced by personal factors 
was anticipated; it chimes with the modern conception of judging, endorsed by 
judges’ own views about the factors that shape their reasoning discussed in Chapter 
2, and is consistent with much of the existing literature considered in Chapter 3. It is 
interesting then, that a sizeable minority of lawyers, notably all of whom were 
solicitors, said that judicial personal factors have no impact on judicial decision-
making or were undecided or neutral as to whether such factors were at play where 
the law was uncertain (12% and 15% of those who responded to SPQ Q10, Figure 
5.1).  Several explanations can be advanced for why some solicitors did not 
subscribe to the majority view. 
 
Limitation of sample and methods 
 
First, one possible reason which cannot be overlooked relates to the imbalance 
between the barrister and solicitor sample sizes, the former being much smaller and, 
therefore, potentially not capturing the range of diverging views as might be found in 
a larger sample. Relatedly, it may be attributable to the difference in the roles of 
barristers and solicitors; barristers more typically being judge-facing. However, this 
seems unlikely given that there were no stark differences in the views of solicitors 
according to the frequency with which they attended court. It may also reflect the 
different methods used to elicit lawyers’ perceptions about how judges judge. 
Barristers were able to articulate the ways in which they perceived that judges’ 
personal factors interact with judging compared to the solicitors whose responses to 
SPQ Q10 were restricted to stating the degree to which they felt such factors did or 
did not affect judging.  
 
Distinguishing judges from other decision-makers 
Second, these solicitors may genuinely believe that judges are able to set aside their 
personal views, predilections and prejudices from the decisional process; in other 
words, that judges are capable of being both neutral and attitudinally impartial.
6
 It 
will be recalled from Chapter 2 that Lucy contends that attitudinal impartiality does 
not require a judge to do the unrealisable and decide cases within a wholly legal 
                                                 
6
 Willliam Lucy, ‘The Possibility of Impartiality’ (2003) 25 OJLS 13. 
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vacuum; it requires judges to sunder only those subjective views and preconceptions 
that are relevant to the case being adjudicated. That said, whilst it may be possible to 
consciously set aside subjective influences in this way, neutralising the effect of 
unconscious bias is a more difficult proposition as the decision-maker may not be 
aware of how his or her own implicit prejudices affect their judgments.  
Alternatively, denying the existence of a personal dimension to judging might be 
borne from the belief that the decision-making of professional judges is cognitively 
different to other forms of decision-making. Schauer considers this issue from a 
theoretical perspective.
7
 He observes that because the psychological dimensions to 
judging have, hitherto, been typically understood through the prism of cognitive and 
social psychology, empirical studies of judicial behaviour have focused too narrowly 
on a judge’s attributes as a human rather than on his or her specific attributes as a 
judge and lawyer.
8
  In particular, Schauer distinguishes professional judges’ ‘second-
order reasoning’ from that of non-judges. This higher level of reasoning has been 
described as central to the judicial role because it compels judges ‘to abide by a 
hierarchy of reasons, and specifically, to yield to higher order considerations, even if 
this does not lead to what, in other circumstances, would be ordinarily considered to 
be the right outcome in a specific case.
9
 In other words, the ‘best’ legal outcome may 
not be that which is most fitting in a given case but is that which produces the most 
just result in the majority of like cases. It is because judges engage in decision-
making tasks which are largely exclusive to the judicial profession (such as the 
selection and interpretation of laws relevant to a case) that Schauer contends that 
there may be some areas of decision-making in which judges decide differently to 
other non-judicial decision-makers. In addition, he suggests that factors such as legal 
or judicial education, legal acculturation and experience in the juridical sphere may 
potentially result in content- and method-based differences which distinguish judges’ 
reasoning and decision-making from that conducted in non-judicial environments.
10
  
                                                 
7
 Frederick Schauer, ‘Is There a Psychology of Judging?’ in David Klein and Gregory Mitchell (eds), 
The Psychology of Judicial Decision-Making (American Psychology-Law Society Series 2010).  
8
 ibid 104. 
9
 This contrasts with first-order reasoning in which people are principally concerned with reaching the 
right outcome in a given case. Dan Simon, ‘In Praise of Pedantic Eclecticism: Pitfalls and 
Opportunities in the Psychology of Judging’ in David Klein and Gregory Mitchell (eds), The 
Psychology of Judging (OUP 2010). 
10
 Schauer (n7) 105. 
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If, as Schauer hypothesises, there is a psychology of judging, might this also mean 
that judges are more able than other non-judicial decision-makers to expunge their 
personal factors from the adjudicative process? One way in which Schauer proposes 
to test his hypotheses is through the use of experimental psychological testing.
11
 
Whilst these methods could be used in relation studies that examine proceedings in 
the English courts, given the judiciary’s reluctance to participate in research that 
explores whether non-legal factors affect how judges judge, it is highly questionable 
whether members of the judiciary would agree, or be granted permission, to be 
tested. Moreover, there are some concerns as to whether experimental designs that 
are conducted in a laboratory setting (such as case simulations) accurately capture 
the reality of judging.
12
 Nonetheless, if there is something distinctive about how 
judges make decisions compared to others, ie, that there is a psychology of judging 
as Schauer theorises, then this may well explain why some lawyers perceive that 
personal factors play no role in adjudication. 
Constraints on judging  
A third reason is drawn from the supplementary qualitative data from the SPQ. 
Reflecting comments from those who thought that personal factors do affect judging, 
several respondents opined that whilst such factors were an unavoidable feature in 
judicial decision-making, the influence from such was largely nullified by a range of 
legal and non-legal constraints.  
It is inevitable…but they are trained to recognise this and keep it in check. (S242) 
It would be difficult to tell in the absence of a judge choosing to make 
reference to this in a judgment but, in any event, there is a framework and case 
law within which judicial discretion is exercised which limits the ambit of that 
discretion. (S121) 
Similar views can be found in judges’ own accounts of judging. For example, 
recognising that judges, like others, are susceptible to human fallibilities, Lord 
Mance talks about the factors that control what he describes as ‘judicial excess or 
exuberance’ (it is argued that the erroneous influence of personal factors may fall 
                                                 
11
 ibid 104. 
12
 For a comprehensive discussion of this issue see Simon (n9). 
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under this descriptor).
13
  These include, inter alia, loyalty, precedent and 
methodology and internal collegiality. Similarly, having acknowledged that judges’ 
personal values can affect judicial decisions in family cases, in Chapter 3, it was seen 
that Chisholm identifies three key constraints that serve to contain what he calls the 
‘values problem’; legal constraints, non-controversial case-specific values and 
judicial professionalism.
14
  
Respecting the hierarchy  
Fourth, these solicitors may have felt professionally obliged to advance a view 
consistent with the formalist-legalist theory of judicial behaviour in order to shield 
judges from potential accusations of bias; the purpose being to avoid damaging the 
reputation of the judiciary and legal profession more widely.  On a literal 
interpretation of the data, it is easy to see how the counter view may give rise to 
concerns as to judicial fairness and impartiality, not least because, as the law on bias 
makes clear, justice must not only be done, it should ‘manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done’.15 On the other hand, toeing the official judicial line could have the 
opposite effect. If, as the data suggests, the general consensus amongst lawyers is 
that judicial decision-making is suffused with subjective influences (on the basis that 
judges, like all humans, are as vulnerable to different biases), those who advance the 
counter view may be accused of intentionally upholding an image of judging which 
does not reflect the reality of how judges judge, or at least fails to present a realistic 
account of how judges are perceived to judge; in other words, of promulgating an 
illusion of judicial objectivity.  
An alternative explanation may simply be that solicitors are more deferential to the 
judiciary than their colleagues at the Bar in this regard. It would be interesting to 
compare the views of solicitor-advocates with solicitors who do not carry out their 
                                                 
13
 Lord Mance, The Role of Judges in a Representative Democracy Lecture given during the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council’s Sitting in the Bahamas (24 February 2017) < 
www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170224.pdf> accessed 13 July 2017. 
14
 Such restrictions come in a variety forms from legal and institutional rules and principles to 
judicial training and professionalism and panel composition. 
15
 Lord Hewart CJ, R v Sussex Justices, Ex Parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER 22.  
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own advocacy regularly to see if there was any indication that specialist advocates 
are less deferential than those solicitors who do less of their own advocacy.
16
  
A view based on theory or practice?  
Fifth, the deviation from the majority view may reflect the different bases upon 
which the lawyers approached the question about the relationship between judges’ 
personal factors and judging. In other words, are the views of those who do not think 
that the personal attributes and affective commitments of a judge are reflected in 
decisional processes formulated on a conceptual construct of judging (i.e. on how 
they perceive that judges ought to judge), rather than from an experiential 
perspective (i.e. on how they perceive that the judges they actually appear before 
judge)? It is suggested that one way to assess whether this may be the case is to look 
for a divergence of responses to SPQ Q10 (Do judges personal factors influence 
judicial decision-making?) between solicitors who attend court frequently and 
infrequently. As all of the barristers (all of whom regularly attend court) made a 
positive link between personal factors and judging, it was hypothesised that 
solicitors who frequently attend court were also more likely to do so, having based 
their answers on their perceptions of judging in action (how judges do judge) vis-a-
vis infrequent attendees whose responses are more likely to have been based on their 
visions of how judges ought to decide (and so reflect the traditional view of judging 
and how judges ought to judge ). In fact, amongst those sharing the minority view, 
the frequent attendees were only  marginally more likely to say that judges factors do 
not influence judging (17% compared to 7%), suggesting no clear distinction 
amongst this subset of solicitors based on how often they attend court (Appendix 
14a).  
In the dark about personal factors 
 
A final explanation, also drawn from the qualitative feedback from the SPQ, 
relates to the difficulty in being able to confidently conclude that there is a 
positive relationship between judges’ personal factors and judging when so little 
is known about the background of judges. For example, S113F stated: ‘Maybe 
                                                 
16
 Of the 20 solicitors with higher rights of audience who completed the SPQ, 10 agreed that personal 
factors affect judicial decision-making, 5 disagreed and 3 neither agreed nor disagreed. 
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religious and other beliefs are important but as judges are very good at keeping 
their personal side private it is impossible to test your hypothesis’.  
 
5.3.3 What personal factors influence judicial decision-making? 
 
Having found that there is perceived to be a personal dimension to the task of 
judicial decision-making, it is interesting to find that, when initially asked, many 
lawyers were sceptical as to whether it was possible to actually discern the influence 
of specific factors on judging through the direct observation of a judge’s behaviour 
in court or by looking for evidence of such in written judgments and case outcomes. 
This is an important point because much of the existing literature that explores the 
relationship between non-legal factors and judicial decision-making, particularly that 
in relation to the US judiciary, looks for a correlation between specific variables such 
as gender or religion and the judicial decision. However,  this did not prevent 
interviewees or SPQ respondents from going on to identify the sorts of personal 
factors that they thought were most at play in the decisional process in cases where 
there was no settled law and/or judicial discretion was required.  
 
Comparing the barrister and solicitors results, it was found that the personal factors 
identified as being the main contributors to how judges reach decisions were very 
similar between both groups of lawyers. Most typically, a judge’s personal 
background, personal and professional experience, and aspects of moral or other 
beliefs were said to be most influential. In contrast, physical personal characteristics, 
as a distinct subset of personal factors, were said to seldom play a part in the 
adjudicative process, with only a small number of lawyers identifying overt 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity and age as being significant to how judges 
made decisions. The main findings from each sample group are now considered. 
 
Barristers 
Judges’ political values and social class most frequently featured in barristers’ 
conversations about the factors thought to be most evident in judicial reasoning. As 
regards the former, labels such as ‘political values’, ‘political views’ and ‘political 
ideology’ were used by interviewees interchangeably, and in an expansive, non-
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partisan way, to describe judicial behaviour that reflected either a conservative or 
liberal outlook.
17
 In this context, a ‘conservative’ outlook is marked by a more 
permissive approach to the government whilst a ‘liberal’ approach tends to favour 
the interests of the individual. The following comment was typical: 
Certainly in public law and discrimination law, in the areas I work within, it is 
very apparent, very quickly, what persuasion… Is someone likely to be 
empathetic to the little man? Is someone going to be very pro-state? … I mean 
more their political views in a wider… perhaps political with a small ‘p’ as 
well as a capital [P]. (B3) 
However, there was mixed opinion as to the frequency with which political views 
were thought to influence judicial decision-making. For example, one interviewee, a 
senior employment law practitioner (and part-time judge), felt that it did so only 
occasionally. At the same time, highlighting the role that a judge’s prior legal 
practice had on judicial reasoning, they said: 
And the most visible way you tend to see it is if a judge has a background 
when they were an advocate or practitioner of a particular - acting for 
claimants or acting for respondents – then sometimes you suspect that trickles 
into the way they perceive cases. So if they are a little bit pro-claimant then 
that can come across; by no means always and very often not at all. (B5) 
Another interviewee felt that the influence of judges’ political views was all 
pervasive and played a significant role in the decisional outcomes in some of the 
human rights cases that they dealt with: 
Those are inherently political cases and the impact of individual judge’s values 
is just part of my day-to-day work – it is something I am always thinking 
about, and in fact, with a basic… you know, a claim for judicial review, one of 
the things I often find myself telling my instructing solicitors and my clients is 
that what will determine the outcome of this case is which judge we draw in 
the judicial lottery at the High Court. (B6) 
                                                 
17
 For an interesting discussion as to the many conceptions of ‘politics’ used in judicial decision-
making studies see: Bradley Joondeph, ‘The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision 
Making (2008) 77 UMKC L Rev 347. 
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B7, another senior employment barrister (and part-time judge), likewise implied 
that judges’ political views affected actual case outcomes: 
 You know, you sometimes think ‘Oh God, I’m in front of that judge I’ll never 
get this off him. If I was in front of a different judge I would get that off him 
because he is more liberal in that regard. 
Others expressed the view that judicial decision-making was intrinsically political, 
not because of the political idiosyncrasies of individual judges, but because the 
judiciary was itself part of the machinery of government: 
You can really be up on the merits but you know you are not going to win 
because it would cause so much political ruckus if you did. But then they are 
always going to find a way to not let you win, and they will never overtly say it 
is because of these political reasons, or they are not supposed to, but that plays 
very strong. (B14) 
Barristers’ perceptions about the role of ideological preferences in a judicial context 
are of particular interest if, as Cross argues, political beliefs are treated as analogous 
to religious beliefs in relation to the way in which they can impact upon an 
individual’s life.18 The recent EAT judgment in The General Municipal 
Boilermakers Union v Henderson lends some support to this view.
19
 In this case, the 
claimant, Mr Henderson, brought claims for unfair dismissal and discrimination 
because of his democratic socialist political beliefs, having been dismissed by his 
employer for gross misconduct. Reaffirming the Tribunal’s conclusion that left-wing 
democratic socialism qualifies as a protected belief for the purposes of the Equality 
Act 2010, Simler J stated that ‘Philosophical beliefs may be just as fundamental or 
integral to a person’s individuality and daily life as are religious beliefs’.20  If, as 
many of the barristers suggested, judges’ ideological preferences play a role in 
judicial decision-making in certain cases, by analogy it is reasonable to hypothesise 
that decision-making by judges with sufficiently strong religious beliefs may 
similarly be coloured by those same religious beliefs in some cases. The question 
                                                 
18
 Frank Cross, Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals (Stanford University Press 2007) 70. 
19
 [2015] IRLR 451. 
20
 ibid 62. 
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then necessarily focuses on the robustness of the legal and non-legal constraints 
which safeguard judicial impartiality. 
Another factor commonly identified by barristers as having a palpable effect on 
approach was a judge’s ‘socio-economic background’. Talking about a family law 
case in which they had been involved, B14 said: 
I did a case where there was a kid who had a foreign mother and she wanted to 
take him back [to her home country] … and the father wanted [the child] to 
stay here. It was quite clear that the judge, because [the child] was enrolled at 
one of the private London prep schools… It was quite clear that the judge 
placed quite a lot of weight on that and thought, well, you’ve got excellent 
schooling – as if you couldn’t have good schooling in the mother’s home 
country because he was in some top London prep school where the judge 
probably sent [his or her] kids. 
In another illustration as to the perceived impact of socio-economic background, B11 
talked about judges who came from less privileged backgrounds. Having 
acknowledged that judges, as professionals, were clearly capable of dealing with 
cases with intellectual honesty and were well aware of the need to ensure that their 
personal background played no role in how cases were decided, B11 commented: 
…if you’re from a particular class as a judge, who has grown up in a working 
class background…or perhaps in an industrial town, you’ll often find that they 
are more willing to see the credibility or reliability of a witness, if the witness 
is also from the background…if they have a witness who speaks in a similar 
way, and maybe does work or worked in a similar industry that their [the 
judge’s] father did or their grandfather, they are very, very receptible or very 
willing to say “I believe that person”. And you see it, and it’s just sort of that, 
something that judges perhaps try to put out of their minds and they try to 
ignore but it happens too often, and you hear about it too often probably for it 
just to be coincidence. 
Once again, the inference here is that when personal factors enter the decisional 
process it is assumed to be the result of an unconscious force rather than a deliberate 
choice on the part of the judge. Despite being open to criticism for anecdotalism, 
 
 
175 
 
such accounts clearly raise the possibility that, on occasion, judges are naturally 
more inclined to be empathetic to those with whom they have shared experiences or 
background than those with backgrounds which may be far removed from their own 
or about which they have little understanding. There is no reason to think that a 
common religious background, as a part of an individual’s wider personal 
background, may not similarly (at least unconsciously) affect a judge’s view at some 
stage in the proceedings. Whilst this might be thought to raise doubts about 
impartiality, it is significant that none of the barristers felt that judicial bias was a 
matter of concern, or that the presence of a personal dimension to judging gave rise 
to erroneous decisions. Rather, reflecting the views above, the influence of social 
background on judging was seen as inevitable because judges are human and are 
vulnerable to the same sorts of bias as everyone else: ‘…judges who tend to be at the 
very top end of the [class] spectrum… are probably prone to making judgments 
about people on the basis of class. But actually, you know, I think we all do. I think 
everyone does.’ (B6) 
Solicitors 
Solicitors’ responses to the open question ‘What personal factors do you think are 
most likely to influence judicial reasoning where there is no settled law and/or 
judicial discretion is exercised?’ (SPQ Q11) were analysed using a multiple response 
method (the primary purpose of which is for data exploration rather than statistical 
testing). This generated 165 responses. After listing all of the personal factors 
mentioned by respondents, a TA approach was used to determine the maximum 
number of themes (as opposed to specific factors) in any given response to SPQ 
Q11. Separate variables were then assigned the following six codes: 
Code 1 Moral and other beliefs 
Code 2 Personal characteristics  
Code 3 Personal background and experience 
Code 4  Professional background and experience 
Code 5 Attitudes towards others 
Code 6 None 
It should be noted that these categories are not claimed to be mutually exclusive. 
This is not problematic as the intention of this section is to illustrate the wide range 
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of non-legal factors that are perceived to affect the juging process in cases where 
there is no settled law and/or judicial discretion is exercised, rather than to rank 
personal factors according to the number of times they are mentioned. The results of 
the multiple response analysis are shown in Figure 5.2. A full description of the 
responses falling within each of these codes can be found in Appendix 15. 
 
Figure 5.2 Solicitor perceptions of the main judicial personal factors that affect judicial 
decision-making (n=158) *The sample size is the number of respondents who gave at 
least one answer [Source: Appendix 16] 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that 59% of the solicitors considered a judge’s personal 
background and experience to be one of the main personal factors likely to affect 
judicial reasoning in cases where there was no settled law and/or judicial discretion 
was exercised. Whilst many respondents made general references to ‘life 
experience’, ‘personal experiences’  and ‘personal background’, others were more 
specific about which aspects of background and experience affected judging - an 
individual’s upbringing, education, social class and family history were the most oft-
cited factors. Almost half of the respondents (48%) identified personal factors such 
as an individual’s moral, social, political, religious and/or ethical perspectives. These 
were coded as ‘Moral and other beliefs’. There is clearly the potential for overlap 
between the factors grouped under this widely drawn category and other categories. 
For example, an individual’s religious beliefs may be a product of their personal 
background (Code 3). At the same time, drawing upon the definition under the 
Equality Act 2010,
21
 religious beliefs could as easily be captured in the ‘personal 
characteristics’ descriptor. However, for the avoidance of doubt, all references 
relating to religion in this section fall within Code 1.   A snapshot of examples of 
                                                 
21
 Religion or belief is one of the protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, s.10. 
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Attitude towards others
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Professional background and…
Moral and other beliefs
Personal background and…
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responses under this head include: a ‘personal sense of what the judge perceives to 
be morally and/or ethically right’ (S71E), ‘moral outlook’ (R128) and ‘principles of 
fairness and justice’ (S137F). Other examples include: ‘religious/moral/ethical 
beliefs’ (S59F), ‘an understanding of the ‘politically/socially acceptable stance on 
the position’’ (S63E) and ‘ethical or faith aspects of their personalities’ (S100E). 
30% of respondents identified a judge’s ‘Professional background and experience’ as 
most likely to affect judicial reasoning. The following responses were typical: ‘work 
experience’ (S181E), ‘…but I do think that professional experience and political 
views do influence judicial reasoning’ (S144F), and ‘what they did before becoming 
a judge (e.g. if they were a practising barrister)’ and ‘experience of 
business/commerce’ (S157E). Notably fewer respondents identified other factors 
such as judges’ personal characteristics (those mentioned included gender, age, 
race/ethnicity, sexual orientation) (13%) and judicial attitudes towards others (6%) 
as salient to how judges judge. 
5.3.4 A challenge to orthodoxy?  
 
As seen in Chapter 3, there is a wealth of existing literature, albeit mainly from 
other jurisdictions, which links an array of factors (personal and otherwise) with 
judging, particularly in cases involving the exercise of judicial discretion. As 
expected, the current findings strongly support this view; the majority of lawyers 
overwhelmingly perceive that the process of judging is imbued with both legal 
and non-legal factors, (including judges’ personal factors) particularly, but not 
exclusively, in cases where the law is unclear, under-determined and/or judges are 
vested with discretionary powers. For many of the lawyers in this study, views to 
the contrary lack any rational basis because all decision-makers, regardless of 
context, are thought to be open to unconscious bias.  
To find that judges’ personal factors are largely perceived to be an unconscious 
source of influence on judicial decision-making chimes with findings from 
psychological studies in which human understanding, decision-making and 
conduct is shown to be affected by a range of cognitive biases including ‘implicit 
bias’.22 This term refers to the attitudes and stereotypes that affect individuals’ 
                                                 
22
 The idea that an individual’s judgments and/or actions are often subject to influence from an 
implicit cognitive process was first propounded by psychologists Greenwald and Banaji in 1995.  
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understanding, actions and decisions in an unconscious manner.
23
 Revisiting the 
discussion about models of judicial behaviour in Chapter 2, it is suggested that it 
is when a judge engages in ‘System 1’ reasoning (when his or her decision-
making is largely intuitive) that implicit biases are most likely to enter the 
adjudicative process. It is when the decision-maker attempts to override their 
intuitive response with more deliberative and conscious System 2 reasoning, that 
conscious and unconscious biases are more likely to be contained (although it is 
noted that psychologists have found that the strength of the intuitive System 1 
element of decision-making exerts a powerful force over System 2 where a 
decision is uncertain or particularly difficult).  
 Of course the problem here is that to be able to reduce the potential impact that 
unconscious biases may have on judicial decision-making, an individual needs to 
be alert to their own unconscious biases. In fact, a range of experimental tests 
have been developed to measure such bias. The most widely used is the 
computer-based Implicit Association Test (IAT).
24
 Research using the IAT 
indicates that implicit bias is pervasive across a range of settings, examples of 
which include health, education, housing and employment.
25
 Importantly there is 
also evidence to indicate that judges’ decision-making is vulnerable to 
                                                                                                                                          
Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji, ‘Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem and 
Stereotypes’ (1995) 102 Psychol Rev  4.The theoretical construct of the unconscious mind was 
popularised by Sigmund Freud in the early twentieth century. However, Greenwald suggests that it 
was not until the end of the twentieth century that a ‘new science’ of implicit cognition was developed 
which, unlike Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious mind, attracted wide support amongst 
scientists. This is due to the fact that the research is generalizable. Anthony Greenwald and Linda 
Krieger, ‘Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations’ (2006) 94 Cal L Rev 945. 
23
 www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/  accessed 25 November 2014. 
24
 The IAT was pioneered by Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz in 1998. See Anthony Greenwald, 
Debbie McGhee and Jordan Schwartz, ‘Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test’ (`1998) 74 J Pers Soc Psychol 1464. A number of variants of the IAT have 
been developed including the simplified ‘brief IAT’ (BIAT). Sriram and Greenwald designed the 
BIAT with the intention of ‘reducing spontaneous variation in subject strategy’. N Sririam and 
Anthony Greenwald, ‘The Brief Implicit Association Test’ (2009) 56 J Exp Psychol 283. A religion 
specific BIAT is available at <www.implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html> Accessed 1 
October 2014. In the first stages of the IAT, participants are familiarised with concept and attribute 
dimension words. Stages three to five of the IAT are the critical phases of the test. In stage three, the 
initial tasks are combined so that the participant has to sort both concept and evaluation words. At 
stage four, the key assignment is reversed to change the spatial location of the concepts.  In the 
concluding stage five, the categories are combined so that they are opposite to what they were in stage 
three. It is the difference in the time taken to sort out the categories in stages three and five that 
produces an IAT score (slight, moderate or strong) which shows whether an individual has an implicit 
preference for one group over another 
25
 Cheryl Staats and others, State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2013 Kirwan Institute for the 
Study of Race and Ethnicity, The Ohio State University 2013 <www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf> accessed 7 November 2014. 
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unconscious bias. For example, Rachlinski et al. have tested whether trial court 
judges’ implicit racial biases account for racial disparities in a US criminal justice 
context.
26
 The authors found that implicit racial bias was widespread amongst the 
133 judges who participated in the experiment; moreover, this was found to 
influence judges’ decision-making. Interestingly, the authors also concluded that, 
in some cases, judges who were sufficiently motivated appeared to compensate 
for their own implicit racial biases in order to avoid the appearance of bias.  
Whilst this US study does not provide conclusive evidence as to the pervasiveness 
of implicit bias in judicial decision-making, considered in conjunction with 
research findings that explore implicit bias outside of a judicial setting, there is 
compelling evidence to support the view that unconscious bias does affect judicial 
decision-making and may even influence case outcomes. There is nothing to 
suggest that judges in the UK would be any less vulnerable to unconscious bias 
than their US counterparts, a view to which the lawyers in this study would 
appear to subscribe.  
Prima facie, that the lawyers in this study perceive judicial decision-making to be 
influenced by judges’ personal factors is inconsistent with what is here described as 
the ‘orthodox view’ of judicial decision-making, ie, the view that only the relevant 
facts and law should provide the basis of a judge’s decision to meet the demands of 
fairness and impartiality. It is, therefore, significant that most of the lawyers in the 
study qualified their responses by saying that such influence was quelled by the force 
of legal and non-legal constraints. This view is consistent with Rachlinski et al.’s 
research which indicates that an individual’s deliberative reasoning serves as one 
possible constraint on judging by effectively neutralising the impact that 
unconscious bias may have on judicial decision-making.
27
  
 
To find that many of the personal factors perceived by the two categories of 
lawyers as being contributors to how judges reach their decisions (that is, personal 
background and experience and moral and other beliefs) were matching was also 
expected. It is perhaps unsurprising that ideology/political values were considered 
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to be especially salient given that judges are called upon to make what are often 
intrinsically political decisions. Drawing upon the work of Hayek, Drobak and 
North identify similar influences, developed from an individual’s life experiences, 
that they suggest shape an individual’s belief system, and which, they conclude, 
form part of the ‘hidden’ factors that influence judicial decision-making.28 If, as 
argued throughout this thesis, it is axiomatic that religious convictions are a 
constituent of an individual’s wider belief system, then it follows that a judge’s 
religious outlook will inevitably play a part in his or her judicial reasoning in 
cases with a religious dimension. The question becomes to what extent?  
Relatedly, that the lawyers in this study perceive hidden (as opposed to overt) 
judicial personal factors as those most likely to influence judicial decision-making 
is interesting, particularly when considered in light of Cahill-O’Callaghan’s work 
on the influence of judges’ tacit personal values outlined in Chapter 3. It will be 
recalled that Cahill-O’Callaghan finds a positive correlation between variations in 
the judgments of individual UKSC Justices and their inarticulate ‘personal values’ 
which constitute an oft-unconscious dimension of judging.
29
  
Given there is extensive evidence that judges’ personal factors affect judging (both 
in the existing literature and the findings above), it was a surprise to find that a small 
number of solicitors did not subscribe to the majority view. In fact, on closer 
inspection, there appears to be little difference in how the lawyers perceive the 
relationship between judges’ personal factors and judging; the only difference is that 
those who share the minority view focus on how judicial behaviour is constrained, 
whilst the majority tend to concentrate on the presence of judicial subjectivity, 
before going on to consider the limits on judging. 
 
In summary, drawing on Tamamaha’s terminology, it is posited that most of the 
lawyers who took part in this study are essentially balanced realists; they 
acknowledge that judicial decisions are influenced by non-legal factors, whilst 
acknowledging that the legal framework is the dominant force in shaping 
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adjudication. That the lawyers in this study appear generally nonplussed about the 
presence of judges’ personal factors leads to the conclusion that, by and large, the 
constraints on judges serve as an effective means by which to supress any potential 
improper influence (conscious or unconscious) that a judge’s personal factors might 
otherwise have on the process of judging.  
So why are these initial findings important? It is suggested that they are 
significant in at least two main respects. Firstly, and most importantly, to find that 
the majority of lawyers perceive that judges’ personal factors, particularly 
personal background, experience and moral and other beliefs, affect judging lends 
strong support to the conceptual premise underpinning this thesis - that the 
religious beliefs of a judge may influence judicial behaviour. Indeed, it seems 
illogical to suggest that an individual’s religious outlook, particularly a strongly 
held faith-based view, does not affect the decisional process when other beliefs 
(including moral values which shape or may be shaped by faith values) are 
perceived to play a part in how judges decide cases. That said, this point is 
tempered by the finding that, for the most part, lawyers perceive that such 
influence is: (a) unconscious, and (b) generally overridden by other considerations 
such as legal rules, principles and guidelines and judges’ strong sense of duty as 
regards their judicial function. Secondly, as the majority of those who took part in 
the present study perceive the relationship between personal factors and judging 
in the same way as legal professionals outside of this study (including judges 
themselves), their views about religion and judging may also align with those of 
the wider legal community. Whilst this does not allow for the current findings to 
be generalized to the barrister and solicitor populations at large, it does suggest 
that further research would be useful to gain a clearer understanding of how 
personal factors are thought to affect judging and the implications this has on 
internal and external perceptions of justice.  
The next section narrows the focus on how judges judge by exploring the 
relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judging through the lens of the 
lawyers who participated in this study.  
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5.4 Do judges’ religious beliefs affect judicial decision-making? 
 
On the central research question relating to how lawyers perceive the relationship 
between judges’ faith and judging, the findings from both the Bar interviews and 
SPQ present a mixed picture. These findings mirror those observed in previous 
studies (such as those discussed in Chapter 3) in which attempts to discern whether 
judge-specific factors influence judicial behaviour have proved inconclusive, save 
for in specific cases.
30
   
5.4.1 The view from the Bar 
 
In this phase of the enquiry, lawyers were first asked whether or not they perceived 
that judges’ religious beliefs may be an influencing factor in the process of judging 
and, if so, in what sorts of cases. The universal consensus amongst barristers as to 
the presence of personal factors in judicial decision-making described in section 5.3 
was not echoed in their perceptions of the relationship between judges’ religious 
beliefs and judging. Thus, whilst all barristers were prepared to give examples of the 
sorts of case in which they felt that judges’ religious beliefs potentially influenced 
judicial reasoning, the majority were uncertain as to whether judges’ religious values 
actually affected the decisional process. The tendency was to err on the side of 
caution by indicating that this was unlikely in practice (the reasons for which are 
explored below). For example, B19, a senior barrister, said: ‘…do religious views 
colour the decisions of people in the judiciary?  Frank answer: I don’t know. My best 
guess is it probably doesn’t’. Along similar lines, B15 opined: 
… I see no reason in principle why religious factors wouldn’t be part of that 
[the influence of personal factors] although, partly because of the extreme 
sensitivity of the topic, I’ve no doubt that is the sort of personal prejudice as it 
were – whether it’s coming from the standpoint of having a particular religion 
or being predisposed to religious ideas or faith or being against religion or faith 
- that’s the sort of area where judges would be generally much more reluctant 
to, at least consciously, allow their prejudices to influence them. 
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The overwhelming consensus was that if such factors were at play, the impact on 
judging was no more than slight.  Moreover, most barristers said that if religion was 
an actual factor in decision-making, it would be difficult to draw a direct association 
because judges’ religious beliefs were not common knowledge (whether within or 
outside legal circles), except for a few instances where extra-judicial comments or 
activities meant that such information was available. 
That said, a handful of the barristers (notably including three QC’s and a part-time 
judge) were more confident in linking a judge’s religious beliefs with judicial 
decision-making. Mirroring their responses to the more general question about the 
role played by personal factors, these interviewees plainly perceived there to be an 
air of inevitability about a religious dimension to judging in some of the areas of law 
in which they worked. The following comment from B9 is illustrative:  
Now, in some areas that I work in like family law…plainly religious views are 
bound to have an impact on the approach that the judge takes…We know that 
some judges are likely to be influenced by their religious and other views in 
the way they approach the cases.  
Cases perceived to be vulnerable to influence 
As to the sorts of cases in which judges’ religious beliefs were perceived to 
potentially or actually affect judging, barristers were largely united in saying that 
these would be limited to a few specific legal areas; the most oft-cited being disputes 
involving the right to life and end of life issues. This is unsurprising given that the 
key issue in such cases, the sanctity of life, is a central tenet of many faiths.
31
 To 
illustrate, B13, a senior employment barrister (and part-time judge) opined: “…I’ve 
not been in the cases but some of the cases about right to die, particularly if the judge 
is a Catholic or Fundamentalist, although there are not many of those”.32 Likewise, 
talking specifically about the high profile case Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: 
Surgical Separation),
33
 in which the Court of Appeal ruled that, contrary to the 
wishes of the parents (who felt that it was up to God and not the medical 
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professionals to determine their children’s fate) conjoined twins must be separated 
even though this would result in the certain death of the weaker twin, B18 said:
34
  
 The Archbishop of Westminster actually came to court to give evidence on 
what the religious position was in that case, and you sort of ask yourself, well, 
why did they hear that? Because if the religious perspective had no impact on 
that case, then why were they hearing that…So I think in those sorts of cases 
of life or death, so medical cases where you’ve got people in a persistent 
vegetative state or where someone might die…medical cases where it will 
result in the death of someone – then I think probably the judges personal 
[religious] view is highly relevant. 
Such views resonate with the comments of judges in the recent right to die case of R 
(Nicklinson) v. Ministry of Justice.
35
 In Nicklinson, the UKSC was asked to consider, 
inter alia, the compatibility of the present law on assisted suicide with Article 8 of 
the ECHR and the lawfulness of the DPP’s policy on assisted suicide.36 In his 
judgment, Lord Neuberger acknowledged that the question under consideration 
raised ‘a difficult, controversial and sensitive issue, with moral and religious 
dimensions’.37 For this reason, he explained that it: ‘undoubtedly justified a 
relatively cautious approach from the courts’.38 This clearly aligns with the 
traditional non-interventionist approach of the courts in matters of religion 
(discussed in Chapter 2). In arguing why the issue in Nicklinson was a legislative 
issue and not for the courts to determine, Lord Sumption opined that such a decision 
was one that could not fail ‘to be strongly influenced by the decision-makers’ 
personal opinions about the moral case for assisted suicide’,39 personal opinions 
which, it is suggested, may well be informed by an individual’s religious outlook. He 
went on to explain why, in his view, it was not appropriate for professional judges to 
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impose their own views on such matters.
40
 First, the issue at hand involved a choice 
between conflicting moral values, the right to commit suicide and the right of 
vulnerable people to be protected from pressure to commit assisted suicide, upon 
which there was no current consensus in society.
41
 For the courts to make a 
declaration of incompatibility on such an important issue would therefore lack 
constitutional legitimacy.
42
 Second, Parliament had already decided against changes 
to the law in this area.
43
 Third, given the complexity of the issues involved, Lord 
Sumption argued that the Parliamentary process allowed for a more comprehensive 
consideration of this difficult issue than that which would take place in the courts.  
 
On grounds of democratic legitimacy alone, it is agreed that what are socially 
divisive issues should be for Parliament to decide. However, it is argued that the 
courts are already called upon to make determinations on issues about which there is 
conflicting public opinion on a case-by-case basis. As Paterson and Paterson opine,  
the expansion in judicial power is party attributable to the fact that politicians ‘off-
load’ what the authors describe as ‘too hot to handle’ issues such as euthanasia.44 
Additionally, Lord Sumption’s assertion as to a lack of consensus on the issue of 
euthanasia is contestable. For example, the results of a YouGov poll in 2014 found 
that 69% of those surveyed supported legalising assisted dying in certain 
circumstances.
45
 What threshold would have to be reached, if any, for the courts to 
intervene? 
 
Agreeing that Parliament is the best forum in which to decide such a sensitive issue, 
Lady Hale, together with Lord Kerr, dissented from the majority judgment. She 
explained that the existing law was incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR 
because it failed to take into account the particular circumstances of individual cases 
in favouring a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide. At the same time, Lady Hale 
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made clear that, whatever her view of euthanasia, her reasoning in Nicklinson was 
based on her professional judgment and not her personal preferences. Appearing at 
odds with Lord Sumption’s statement above, implicit in the following extract from 
Lady’s Hale written opinion in Nicklinson is the view that a judge’s personal beliefs 
can be divorced from the task at hand: 
 
…my conclusion is not a question of “imposing the personal opinions of 
professional judges”. As already explained, we have no jurisdiction to impose 
anything: that is a matter for Parliament alone. We do have jurisdiction, and in 
some circumstances an obligation, to form a professional opinion, as judges, as 
to the content of the Convention rights and the compatibility of the present law 
with them. Our personal opinions, as human beings, on the morality of suicide 
do not come into it.
46
 
It is perfectly reasonable to argue that a decision-maker’s own stance on such 
emotive issues will be unlikely to consciously influence their reasoning. But can 
the same be said about an individual’s unconscious bias? In the preceding section 
barristers confined any influence from judges’ personal factors to that manifested 
in an unconscious manner only. Suppose Parliament enacted legislation which 
allowed judges to sanction assisted suicide in very specific circumstances on a 
case-by-case basis. Would a judge’s decision be any less influenced by his or her 
unconscious religious bias when deciding a case involving the exercise of judicial 
discretion than it would have been immediately prior to such legislation coming 
into force?  It seems unlikely. Clearly the argument here is not that any judge 
would wittingly substitute their own religious and/or moral values for the law.  
But it does raise doubts as to whether strongly held religious convictions that 
shape a judge’s views about, say, the rightness or wrongness of assisted suicide, 
can be wholly extracted from a judge’s decision-making in a case where there is a 
choice as to most appropriate outcome.   
Having similarly identified right to life and end-of-life cases as those in which a 
relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision-making is 
most likely, other barristers expressed doubt as to whether or not the impact of 
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such beliefs could be distinguished from the tangle of other personal factors that 
were thought to affect judicial reasoning. Thus, whilst the influence of judges’ 
religious beliefs on judging could not be wholly ruled out, it could not be ruled in 
either. Thus, commenting on a case they had been involved in, B6 reflected: 
One of the judges declared to us his membership of a [religious] organisation 
in advance, and there was some kind of thinking about that and,  at the end of 
the day, the case went ahead and he remained a judge. Do I think it influenced 
him? I have absolutely no basis for saying that but this is a case where [x] 
judges in the High Court found against us, [x] of the judges in the Court of 
Appeal found in favour of us and [x] found against us… How you explain 
those differences… You know, it has got to be because each of those judges is 
a different person. 
 
Another area in which barristers felt that a judge’s religious beliefs could 
potentially colour judicial decision-making was in cases concerning religious 
discrimination. Referring to the case of R(E) v Governing Body of the Jewish Free 
School ,
47
 in which it will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the Supreme Court had 
to consider whether a school admissions policy that gave preference to applicants 
recognised as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi was racially discriminatory, 
employment barrister B5 said: 
And there was a very heavy Supreme Court case where some of the judges 
were Jewish, and I know most of the barristers were Jewish actually. But that’s 
a case where you can see if there was going to be an impact from your own 
personal stand point it would be a case such as that. 
That the religious composition of the judiciary was of interest in this case is seen in 
the remarks of one commentator, a senior QC, who has speculated that the panel of 
judges in JFS was convened ‘in part having regard to the religious/cultural 
backgrounds of the justices hearing the case because of the particular religious and 
cultural sensitivities involved…’.48 In fact, when discussing this with interviewees, 
the common view was that it was unlikely that any regard would have been given to 
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the religious backgrounds of the Supreme Court Justices when convening the panel 
in JFS or, indeed, that this would happen in any other case.  For example, B9 
commented: ‘I don’t know whether there was any thought went into that. I doubt it 
to be perfectly honest in the JFS case’. In a more general context, B17 opined that, 
whilst cases involving particular issues of legal complexity ‘may well be steered 
your way’ (that is, to a particular judge with expertise in dealing with the difficult 
legal issues concerned), the suggestion that this would stretch to consideration of 
judges’ religious beliefs was to “read in a degree of complexity to the listings 
process that is not there’. 
Given that nine of the eleven UKSC Justices sat in R v JFS, it might be argued that 
there was little choice in deciding who should sit on the panel once considerations 
such as a judge’s availability and workload allocation were taken into account. That 
said, this was a close-call case where the majority and minority opinion was divided 
by a single Supreme Court Justice. As such, it is wholly conceivable that a slightly 
differently constituted panel might have reached a different result. Whether it would 
actually be possible to discern whether a difference in outcome could be attributed to 
a different religiously constituted panel (particularly when so little is known about 
judges’ religious identities and the literature shows that judicial decision-making is 
subject to wide range of legal and non-legal influences) is a more difficult question. 
This is further complicated by the fact that very little is known about the selection 
process for judicial panels, particularly in relation to the higher appellate courts in 
which such panels are convened.
49
 Clearly, if there was evidence that the panel in 
JFS had been chosen with regard to the religious backgrounds of the judges, this 
would be a matter of serious constitutional concern because it would call into doubt 
one of the fundamental principles of law - the right to a fair trial. At the same time, if 
the court was selected in part based on the religious backgrounds of the judges, 
evidence suggests that the collegial nature of decision-making in the highest court is 
likely to serve as a forceful constraint upon the individual Justices.
50
   
In JFS, it is speculated that even if the UKSC had sat en banc (the purpose of which 
would have been to make sure no one could claim that the judgment would have 
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been different with a different panel), the religious backgrounds of the judges would 
have still given rise to interest due to the religiously sensitive nature of the dispute 
and the fact that it was the first case heard by nine Justices in the newly formed 
UKSC. In any case, it is interesting to find that the religious make-up of the bench in 
JFS attracted comment outside the courtroom.  
It is unsurprising to find that controversial clash of rights cases, particularly those 
between the right to religious freedom and protection against sexual orientation 
discrimination were also frequently identified by interviewees as a potential source 
of tension for judges, although again, as B19 indicated, such cases were said to be 
relatively uncommon: 
I mean the areas where religion may be an influence are policy areas. In your 
bog standard road traffic accident case, or your bog standard unfair dismissal 
case, religion is not an issue. But, if you’ve got a case say, where if you recall, 
there was this couple who effectively banned gay couples from living in the 
same room in their B and B… Now, in a case like that it may be, or in the 
Eweida case…51  
The controversial ‘B & B’ case which B19 refers to is Bull v Hall.52 It will be 
recalled that in this case the UKSC had to consider whether  Christian hotel 
owners (the Appellants) had discriminated against same-sex civil partners (the 
Respondents) contrary to the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 2007 (EASOR). 
As devout Christians, the hotel owners had a room booking policy that reserved 
double rooms for married couples only. On arriving at their hotel, the 
Respondents were refused a double room on the basis that it was contrary to the 
hoteliers’ religious belief in the sanctity of marriage between heterosexuals only. 
The Respondents brought a claim for discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation. The Appellants argued that it was the Respondents marital status and 
not their sexual orientation that led to their treatment. However, in this close-call 
case (3:2), the majority of the UKSC held that the Respondents had suffered 
direct discrimination on the basis that a homosexual couple could not comply 
with the requirement to be married (which was linked to heterosexual 
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orientation). As regards indirect discrimination, the Appellants accepted that they 
had indirectly discriminated against the Respondents, but argued that this was 
justified on grounds of their religious belief. Ruling to the contrary, the UKSC 
said that it was difficult to see how a belief that sexual intercourse between civil 
partners was sinful could be justified by any matters other than the Respondents’ 
views on sexual orientation. At the same time, the UKSC stressed that the purpose 
of the EASOR was to ensure equal treatment of those of heterosexual and 
homosexual orientation in the provision of goods, facilities and services and that 
it was in the public interest to encourage committed, long-term relationships 
regardless of sexual orientation. If there were meant to be religious exemptions 
under the EASOR which permitted lawful discrimination, this would have been 
catered for under the 2007 Regulations. Whilst the court accepted that the 
Appellants’ right to manifest their religious beliefs was engaged under ECHR, 
Article 9(1), interference with this right was considered to be a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim; the right of the Respondents not to be 
unlawfully discriminated against because of their sexual orientation.  
Clearly, in a case such as this, it is not difficult to see how a judge with strong 
religious convictions might, at the very least, be susceptible to unconscious 
religious bias. Of course, in a clash of rights case between religion and sexual 
orientation (and indeed in cases where other human rights lock horns), it is also 
entirely plausible to speculate that a judge’s views on sexuality (whether or not 
driven by religious dogma) might similarly be a source of positive or negative 
bias. 
The minority view: experiential evidence 
Returning to those barristers who positively linked judges’ faith with judicial 
decision-making, it is interesting to see the evidence upon which their responses 
were based.  
Having said that the interplay between judges’ religion and judging was evident 
in the employment and healthcare cases they were involved in, B2 talked about a 
case in which it was felt that the judge, known to share the same religious 
background as the claimant, had appeared more sensitive to the religious issues 
 
 
191 
 
raised in the case than might have been the case if the judge had not shared the 
same religious background. Acting for the respondent, B2 said: 
We were quite concerned by some of the comments and thought that [the 
judge] was automatically very sympathetic to the claimant’s plight… I think 
the judge’s take on what was a reasonable manifestation of reasonable practice 
in the workplace was very strongly influenced by their own views and previous 
religious background. 
 
However, B2 went on to say that the respondent won this case. Therefore, the only 
definite conclusion that can be drawn here is that there was no evidence of religious 
nepotism. It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that this term is used by Sisk et al. to 
describe where a judge sharing the same religious beliefs as that of a claimant treats 
the claim more favourably than they would treat the claim from someone with a 
different religious background or with no faith.
53
 On the other hand, this does not 
preclude the possibility that the judge, in trying to be and be seen to adjudicate in a 
fair and impartial manner, may have, at least unconsciously, avoided positively 
favouring the respondent by leaning too far the other way.
54
 Indeed, one of the 
interviewees who also sat as part-time judge alluded to this dilemma in relation to 
their own judging. B13 said: ‘I’m sure it’s unconscious but sometimes you’re almost 
looking over shoulder to think of whether people will criticise you for identifying 
with what is your own beliefs’. Of course, the difficulty in such cases is how to 
prove such bias. 
Evidence of a positive relationship between judges’ religion and judging was also 
identified by interviewees who talked about cases where they felt that there was a 
visible tension between the perceived religious identity of a judge and the constraints 
of the judicial role. For example, when asked whether judges’ faith influenced the 
how judges reach decisions, B17, a part-time judge, said: 
 
                                                 
53
 Gregory Sisk, Michael Heise and Andrew Morriss, ‘Searching for the Soul of Judicial 
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions (2004) 65 Ohio St LJ 491. 
54
 Heise and Sisk suggested that this phenomena may be at play when they found a negative 
correlation with case outcomes in their study of Free Exercise and religious accommodation claims 
decision by US federal court of appeals and district judges from 1996 to 2005.Michael Heise and 
Gregory Sisk, ‘Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical Evidence from the Federal 
Courts’ (2013) Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 915, 1371. 
 
 
192 
 
I think they absolutely shouldn’t but I think on occasion they do… When 
you’re looking at things like end of life decisions in which, for the individual 
concerned, one of the key factors for them is their religious beliefs, you do get 
situations where judges obviously grapple with the decision which they 
themselves find quite challenging because intellectually they’re meant to wear 
their judges wig [inaudible segment] set aside what are obviously quite 
[inaudible segment] religious beliefs of their own. 
Another barrister similarly described having been involved in cases where a potential 
conflict between the religious outlook of a judge, the facts of a case and the need to 
be impartial appeared to create a perceptible source of anguish for the decision-
maker: 
 
I suppose their religious instinct makes them want to really probe certain issues 
and be satisfied about certain things…On the other hand, they are probably 
aware of their own religious persuasion and try so hard not to let it influence 
them that I can almost sometimes see the struggle. 
 
That said, overall there was a strong sense in which interviewees felt that, even if 
religious beliefs were to impinge on the adjudicative process, this would not give 
cause for concern because judges, by virtue of their judicial training, were adept 
at taking swift action to prevent or alleviate the impact of any such influence so as 
to prevent potential claims of judicial bias.  
5.4.2 Solicitor views 
 
Figure 5.3 shows that, like the barristers in part one, solicitors were also less certain 
about the part played by judges’ religious beliefs in judicial decision-making 
compared to the role of personal factors more generally. At the same time, the 
findings indicate that they were also more likely to positively associate judges’ 
religious beliefs and judging compared to the barristers. When asked to what extent 
they agreed or disagreed with the view that judges’ religious beliefs influence 
judicial decision-making in cases where the law is unsettled or judicial discretion is 
exercised (SPQ Q16), just over two-fifths of the solicitors agreed or strongly agreed 
that the religious beliefs of a judge may be a contributing factor (44%), just under a 
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quarter of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this view (22%), and 
approximately one-third of respondents recorded a neutral response (34%).  
 
Figure 5.3 Solicitor perceptions as to the influence of judges’ personal factors and 
religious beliefs on judicial decision-making (n=158) [Source: Appendix 14 and 17]  
 
The qualitative comments attached to SPQ Q16 show that solicitors who agreed that 
judges’ religious beliefs influence judicial decision-making typically justified their 
answers using the same reasoning as that on which assessments of the relationship 
between judges’ personal factors and judging were based. The following are typical 
of the comments made by solicitors in response to SPQ Q16: 
A judge is as human as anybody else. Their moral compass will have been 
set/conditioned by their upbringing and education. (S200F) 
I think unconscious prejudices always affect our reasoning and judgements as 
human beings and a judge is no different to anyone else in this regard. (S104E) 
In other words, these solicitors understood the influence of a judge’s religious 
beliefs, along with that from the other homologous judicial personal factors 
identified in section 5.3 above, as operating within a wider frame of reference in 
which an individual’s personal factors (consciously motivated or otherwise) were 
considered to be an intrinsic facet of human decision-making.  
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A common pattern to emerge in the comments of those who recorded a ‘Neither 
agree nor disagree’ response was that their views tended to be skewed towards an 
‘agree’ rather than ‘disagree’ response. This is inferred from comments in which 
these respondents said that felt that they had been involved in cases where they 
had perceived that a judge’s faith had be a salient factor (for example: ‘I have had 
only occasional experience of a judghe (sic) who is very obviously influence (sic) 
by his faith’ (S227E)), or said that a judge’s religious beliefs would only be likely 
to influence a limited number of cases in specific legal areas (for example: ‘It 
would only really affect cases such as illegal abortion, the withdrawal of 
sustenance from a terminal ill person, assisted suicide’(S96F)). 
Similarly, the supplementary qualitative responses of those who recorded a 
negative response to SPQ showed that these solicitors’ perceptions of the 
interplay between religion and judging are perhaps not as clear-cut as the 
quantitative responses initially suggest. Several of these respondents qualified 
their ‘disagree’ response by reference to the distinction between the impact of an 
individual’s moral outlook and religious values, for example, S91E stated ‘Basic 
moral grounding must influence decision making, but this is not specific to 
religion’. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, just because an individual’s moral 
values are not always shaped by a religious perspective does not preclude the 
possibility that, in many instances, faith will colour an individual’s moral values 
and wider personal outlook. Of course, this is not to suggest that the views of 
those who recorded a negative response to SPQ Q16 think that judges’ faith 
definitely play a role in judging. Rather, the extracts suggest that the SPQ results 
may not be as cut and dried as the quantitative responses initially suggest. Clearly 
this is useful in evaluating which research methods may be most appropriate for 
future research in this area.  
At this point, it is of interest to note that when asked about how much was known 
about the personal factors of the judges they appeared before (SPQ Q12), an 
overwhelming majority of solicitors who attended court on a regular basis 
reported that judges’ specific religious beliefs  were rarely, if ever, known (87%) 
and was the least known of several personal factors listed (which ranked in order 
of awareness from always to never known included: age, prior employment, 
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educational background, disability, political beliefs, family status, sexual 
orientation and religious beliefs). 
5.4.2.1 Judges religion and judging based on solicitors’ professional and personal 
factors 
 
Solicitor responses to SPQ Q16 were further explored to see whether perceptions of 
the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judging varied according to 
respondents’ specific professional and personal factors. The statistical analysis 
revealed considerable consistency in responses among solicitors based on their area 
of practice, PQE, frequency of attendance at court and religious beliefs. 
Area of Practice  
Studies conducted in other jurisdictions suggest that whether or not there is a 
relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision-making can vary 
according  to the types of case being adjudicated.
55
  Having identified employment 
and family law cases as those in which religiously sensitive issues are likely to arise, 
it was hypothesised that the responses between the employment and family groups 
would be broadly similar. Indeed, Table 5.1 shows there was considerable 
homogeneity in responses between these two sub-groups. Employment solicitors 
were marginally more likely than family law practitioners to agree that judges’ 
religious beliefs are a factor in judicial decision-making (41% compared to 35%), 
this difference being reflected in the 5% difference between the groups in the 
‘Disagree’ responses.  
 
What was more interesting was to find that there was no real consensus within 
groups as to whether religion plays a part in judging. Again, this may be attributed to 
the sorts of factors discussed previously. For example, those who perceive there to 
be a positive association between judges’ faith and judging may see religion as part 
of the gamut of personal factors that inevitably have a subtle, often imperceptible 
influence on judges’ reasoning.  
 
                                                 
55
 For example, as seen in Chapter 3, judicial studies literature from the US has shown that the 
religious background of a judge can have a modest effect on civil rights decisions, particularly in 
relation to gay and religious liberty rights, see Frank Cross, Decision Making in the US Courts of 
Appeals (Stanford University Press 2007) 73; Daniel Pinello, Gay Rights and American Law (CUP 
2003). 
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On the other hand, those who disagree or are uncertain about this relationship may 
subscribe to a view that chimes with the idea of a psychology of judicial decision-
making (that is that judges judge differently to other decision-makers), or may feel 
that effective constraints dampen the effects of religious (and other beliefs) on 
judicial reasoning. 
 
Judges’ religious beliefs influence 
Judging SPQ Q16 
Employment Family Total 
Agree 41% 35% 39% 
Neither agree nor disagree 35% 35% 35% 
Disagree  24% 29% 26% 
N 
 
83 
100% 
51 
99% 
134 
100% 
 
Table 5.1 Religion and judging by area of practice (n134) [Source: Appendix 18a]  
 
PQE 
Insights drawn from the interviews with barristers in part one of this study indicate 
that more experienced barristers are likely to know more about the personal 
backgrounds of judges than their less experienced colleagues.  On this basis, it might 
be speculated that the more experienced solicitors will take a definite position on 
whether judges’ religious beliefs affect judicial determinations because they are 
more likely to know the religious identities of the judges they appear before than 
their less experienced colleagues. No prediction was made as to the direction of their 
responses.  
 
Table 5.2 shows that there were no obvious patterns or linearity in the data. In fact 
the data presents a rather confused picture. For example, respondents in the 11-15 
years and 21+ years  PQE groups were those most likely to record a positive 
response to SPQ Q16 (both 44%),  whilst those in the 16-20 years group were the 
group most likely to disagree that judges’ religious beliefs influence judging (36%). 
Practitioners in the 0-5 years PQE band were the least likely to disagree with the 
view that judges’ religious beliefs influence judicial decision-making (18%). The 
least experienced solicitors (those with less than 10 years PQE) were more likely to 
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record a neither agree nor disagree response than their more experienced colleagues. 
Again, as with the findings in relation to area of practice above, what is clear is that 
there was considerable variance in solicitors’ perceptions of this relationship, 
regardless of PQE. 
 
   PQE    
Judges’ religious beliefs influence 
Judging 
0-5 
years 
6-10 
years 
11-15 
years 
16-20 
years 
21+ 
years 
Total 
Agree  39% 33% 44% 32% 44% 39% 
Neither agree nor disagree 43% 39% 33% 32% 31% 35% 
Disagree 18% 28% 22% 36% 26% 26% 
N 
 
28 
100% 
18 
100% 
18 
100% 
31 
100% 
39 
100% 
134 
100% 
 
Table 5.2 Religion and judging by PQE [Source Appendix 18b]  
 
Frequency of attendance 
 It was hypothesised that solicitors’ perceptions about whether judges’ faith affects 
judging would differ according to the regularity with which they attend court; and, 
more specifically, that the answers of solicitors who attended court most frequently 
would mirror the views of the barristers in part one because these two groups appear 
in court most and have greater opportunity to observe how judges reach decisions. A 
cross-tab of responses to SPQ Q16 and frequency of respondents’ attendance at court 
revealed a moderate relationship between these variables (Table 5.3). Interestingly, 
approximately half of the respondents who attended court infrequently agreed that a 
judge’s religion might play a role in ‘hard cases’ – 17% more than those in the 
frequently group (48% and 31% respectively). This suggests that those appearing in 
court the most are those who are most confident in judges’ ability to decide cases 
free from extraneous influences such as religion. Once again, there was a relatively 
even distribution of respondent answers within each of sub-groups. 
 
Judges’ religious beliefs influence  
judging 
Frequently 
attend 
Infrequent 
attend 
Total 
Agree  31% 48% 26% 
Neither agree nor disagree 39% 30% 35% 
Disagree 30% 22% 39% 
N 
 
74 
100% 
60 
100% 
134 
100% 
Table 5.3 Religion and judging by frequency of court attendance [Source: 
Appendix 18c] 
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Religious beliefs  
A final point of interest was whether perceptions of the relationship between judges’ 
religious beliefs and judicial decision-making differed according to respondents’ 
own religious beliefs. As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, in light of a growing 
number of high profile cases in which Christians have alleged discrimination 
because of their religion such as Eweida,
56
 Ladele
57
 and Hall,
58
 concerns have been 
raised by a number of religious organisations that Christians have become 
increasingly marginalised in the courts, and in public life more generally. The 
findings from a Parliamentary Report on the freedom of Christians in the UK, 
‘Clearing the Ground’ lends some support to this view:                         
We are convinced that there is a problem facing Christians in Britain today… 
We consider that this problem arises through high levels of religious illiteracy 
and through legal and cultural restrictions on actions and words that are normal 
in Christian belief.
59
 
 
This gives rise to the question of whether solicitors’ perceptions of the relationship 
between judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision-making varied according to 
solicitors’ own religious beliefs. The empirical data indicted a weak relationship 
(Table 5.4). It is interesting that Christian and non-Christian respondents were more 
likely than those in the ‘Unaffiliated’ group to believe that a judge’s faith was a 
factor in the process of judging - 47% and 38% compared to 27% respectively. One 
possible explanation for this may be that responses of those in either of these 
religious groups (Christian and non-Christian) perceived the relationship between 
judges’ faith and judging by reference to their own relationship with religion.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56
 Eweida (n51). 
57
Ladele v London Borough of Islington and Liberty [2010] IRLR 211 CA.  
58
 Bull (n52). 
59
 Christians in Parliament, Clearing the Ground Inquiry Preliminary Report into the freedom of 
Christians in the UK, February 2012 < www.eauk.org/current-affairs/publications/clearing-the-
ground.cfm> accessed 12 March 2016. 
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In hindsight, it would have been useful to include a follow up question in which 
respondents were asked if, in cases where religious beliefs were perceived to 
influence judicial decision-making, they perceived the impact of such beliefs to 
favour or disfavour the claimant.  
 
Judges’ religious beliefs influence  
Judging 
 
Christian 
Non-
Christian 
 
Unaffiliated 
 
Total 
Agree  47% 38% 27% 39% 
Neither agree nor disagree 28% 50% 43% 35% 
Disagree 24% 13% 31% 26% 
N 
 
74 
 
8 49 131 
Table 5.4 Religion and judging according to respondents’ religious beliefs 
[Source: Appendix 18d] 
Following the descriptive statistics analysis, non-parametric tests were run. These 
showed that there were no statistically significant differences between solicitors as 
regards to their perceptions of the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and 
judicial decision-making based on their own area of practice, PQE, frequency of 
attendance at court nor their religious beliefs (Appendix 18e). 
5.4.2.2 Cases in which judges’ religious beliefs may affect judging 
 
As to the sorts of cases in which judges’ religious beliefs may influence judicial 
decision-making, like the barristers, solicitors typically identified those cases with 
strong moral, ethical and/or religious content, particularly in relation to family law 
cases (incorporating child law) and discrimination cases (SPQ Q19). This was 
expected given that each of the samples consisted of practitioners specialising in 
these areas. Various examples of the ways in which a judge’s religious beliefs may 
potentially be at play in family cases were provided: 
 
Children living with/spending time with same-sex parents; judgments over 
parents’ lifestyles e.g. if promiscuous, being involved in the adult entertainment 
industries etc. (S125F) 
 
Money in terms of quantum and arrangements for children in terms of making 
moral judgments. (S158F) 
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Catholic and other faiths that do not find divorce or marriage easy concepts, or 
find co-habitation without marriage as unacceptable, may dictate that a judge 
will treat future needs or contribution in family cases differently. (S209F) 
‘Clash of rights’ discrimination cases involving disputes between equality rights 
(typically, but not solely, between religion and sexual orientation) in the provision of 
employment and goods and services were also frequently identified as being 
vulnerable to influence from a judge’s religious beliefs. Examples of responses 
included: ‘Cases involving religion not only on grounds of religion but on other 
protected characteristics’ (S248E); ‘… as is much in the news at the moment, the 
battle between conflicting rights/protections – see the ‘gay cake’ case in Northern 
Ireland’60 (S47E); ‘Where different areas of discrimination law conflict, eg, 
religion/belief and sexual orientation and also dress codes’ (S184E). 
A much smaller number of respondents mentioned criminal cases. A snapshot of 
examples of specific offences identified by respondents included, but was not 
limited to cases of ‘theft or dishonesty’, ‘involving drink and drugs, assault, 
murder and domestic abuse’, ‘sexual offences’ and ‘religiously aggravated 
offences’.61 Similarly small numbers of respondents explicitly identified right to 
life and/or right to die cases and human rights cases as the sorts of case in which 
the decision-maker’s religious beliefs was most likely to affect judicial reasoning.  
5.4.3 Drilling down deeper: frequency, nature of influence and extent of impact 
 
If a judge’s religious beliefs are perceived to potentially affect judicial decision-
making as the findings above suggest, it is important to try and understand how 
religion is thought to potentially or actually affect judging. This section examines the 
three key aspects of this relationship: the prevalence, nature and extent of judges’ 
religious beliefs in the process of judging. 
                                                 
60
 The “gay cake case” refers to the Northern Irish case of Lee v Ashers Bakery Co. Ltd & Anor [2015] 
NICty 2. Mr Lee claimed for discrimination against on grounds of his sexual orientation, contrary to 
the provisions of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 and/or 
the Fair Employment and Treatment Order 1998, after Ashers Bakery refused to supply a cake 
decorated with the caption “Support Gay Marriage”, Sesame Street characters Bert and Ernie and a 
logo for Queerspace (a LGBT organization) to Mr Lee. The defendants argued that they were entitled 
to refuse to supply the cake based on the protection afforded to them under ECHR Article 9.The 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal have since rejected the defendants appeal - Lee v McArthur & Ors 
[2016] NICA 29. 
61
 Of course this list is not exhaustive.  
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5.4.3.1 Perceptions of frequency 
There were divergent views between the two groups of lawyers on the question of 
how often judges’ religious beliefs were perceived to affect judicial decision-
making. Implicit in the interviews with barristers was the view that judges’ religion 
would only rarely affect cases, if at all. This is evidenced by the fact that the majority 
of those interviewed said that they had not been involved in such cases, or if they 
had, stressed that this was by no means a regular occurrence.   
In comparison, the SPQ findings show that the majority of solicitors who positively 
correlated judges’ religion with judging (SPQ Q16) felt that religiously sensitive 
issues were occasionally relevant in judicial decision-making. When asked how 
often judges’ religious beliefs might be at play in cases where the law was unsettled 
or discretion was exercised (SPQ Q17), approximately three-fifths of the solicitors 
(61%) believed that they would occasionally be a relevant factor. Interestingly, 
almost one-fifth of respondents felt that religious beliefs often affected how judges 
judge (18%). As expected, none of the respondents recorded an ‘Always’ response. 
In contrast, one-fifth of respondents (20%) thought that judges’ religious beliefs 
would rarely be an influencing factor (Figure 5.4).  
 
Figure 5.4 Perception of the frequency with which judges' religious beliefs 
influence judicial decision-making (n=121) [Source: Appendix 19] No respondents 
recorded an ‘Always’ response. * SPQ Q17 made clear that it was to be completed only by those who felt that 
judges’ religious beliefs might affect judicial reasoning. The ‘Never’ option was included so that supplementary 
data from respondents who felt that judges’ religious beliefs would not affect judging was excluded from any 
qualitative analysis. 
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Q17. How often judges' religious beliefs affect judicial 
decision-making? 
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Cross-tabs and non-parametric tests were used to see if there were any relationships 
between perceptions of frequency and respondents’ area of legal practice, PQE, 
frequency of attendance at court or religious beliefs.  
Area of Practice  
Again, as Table 5.5 shows, there was consistency in the majority views in each sub-
group. 59% and 64% of employment and family solicitors recorded that judges’ 
religious beliefs occasionally affected judicial decision-making.
62
 Employment law 
specialists were more likely to say that judges’ religious beliefs often affected 
judicial decision-making, although the difference was not that great (21% of 
employment compared to 13% of family law solicitors). In short, the views of both 
sets of practitioners were similar.  
 
Judges’ religion affects 
judging: frequency 
Employment Family Total 
Never 1% 0% 1% 
Rarely 19% 22% 20% 
Occasionally 59% 64% 61% 
Often 21% 13% 18% 
N 
 
76 
100% 
45 
99% 
121 
100% 
Table 5.5 Frequency with which judges’ religious beliefs influences judging by area of 
practice [Source: Appendix 20a] 
PQE   
The cross-tabulated data regarding perceptions of frequency with which judges’ 
religious beliefs influenced judicial decision-making according to respondents PQE 
presented a very mixed picture, with non-linear relationships across the PQE bands 
in respect of the ‘Occasionally’ and ‘Rarely’ response options (Table 5.6). To 
illustrate, one-third of respondents (39%) with 11-15 years PQE said that a judge’s 
religious beliefs may occasionally affect judicial reasoning. Respondents with 16 or 
more years PQE were notably more likely to share this view – 66% of those with 16-
20 and 66% of the most experienced respondents (those with 21+ years PQE) 
respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, the least experienced respondents 
were noticeably more likely than those in the 11-15 years PQE group to think that 
                                                 
62
 The results of a Pearson’s chi-square goodness-of-fit test are not reported because the assumption 
that there are at least 5 expected frequencies in each group of categorical variable was not met, even 
when the ‘Often’ and ‘Always’ categories were collapsed (after which 33% of cells still had an 
expected count of less than 5). This test is used to determine whether or not the instances of a number 
of categories occur equally frequently. 
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religion was occasionally an influencing factor – 54% of those with 0-5 years PQE 
and 53% of those with 6-10 years PQE respectively.  
 
A similarly confusing relationship was seen in relation to the ‘Rarely’ responses. 
Respondents with 11-15 years PQE were most likely to think that judges’ religious 
beliefs would rarely affect judicial decision-making (31%), followed by the least 
experienced solicitors (0-5 years 25% and 6-10 years 21%). There was no marked 
difference between respondents with the least experience and the most experience.  
   PQE    
Judges’ religion affects judging: 
frequency 
0-5 
years 
6-10 
years 
11-15 
years 
16-20 
years 
21+ 
years 
Total 
Never 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Rarely 25% 21% 31% 11% 18% 20% 
Occasionally 54% 53% 39% 66% 66% 61% 
Often 18% 26% 31% 11% 15% 18% 
N 
 
28 
100% 
19 
100% 
13 
100% 
27 
100% 
34 
100% 
121 
100% 
Table 5.6 Frequency with which judges’ religious beliefs influence judging by PQE 
[Source: Appendix 20b] 
Frequency of attendance 
Interestingly, akin to the barristers in part one of the study, respondents who attended 
court regularly were those most likely to say that religious beliefs were rarely a 
factor in judges’ decision-making – 24% compared to just 15% of those who 
attended less frequently. On the other hand, the proportion of the respondents in each 
of the two sub-groups who said that religious beliefs occasionally affected judging 
was almost identical (61% compared to 62% respectively) (Table 5.7). 
 
Judges’ religion affects judging: 
frequency  
Frequently 
attend 
Infrequently 
Attend 
Total 
Never 0% 2% 1% 
Rarely 24% 15% 24% 
Occasionally 61% 62% 59% 
Often 15% 22% 17% 
N 
 
66 
100% 
55 
100% 
121 
100% 
Table 5.7 Frequency with which judges’ religious beliefs influence judging by 
frequency of attendance at court [Source: Appendix 20c] 
 
Religious beliefs  
An analysis of cross-tabulated data indicated the existence of weak to moderate 
relationships between the frequency with which judges’ religious beliefs were 
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perceived to influence decision-making and respondents’ own religious beliefs 
(Table 5.8).  Those in the group ‘Christian’ and ‘Non-Christian’ groups were 15% 
more likely to think that judges were often influenced by their personal religious 
beliefs than those in the ‘Unaffiliated’ group (25%, 25% and 5% respectively). On 
the other hand, those in the ‘Non-Christian’ group were more likely to think religion 
was occasionally a factor affecting how judges reach decisions (75%) compared to 
those under the ‘Christian’ group who were least likely to say this (58%). However, 
it is important to bear in mind that the ‘Non-Christian’ group was disproportionately 
small in number. 
 
Judges’ religion affects judging: 
frequency 
 
Christian 
Non-
Christian 
 
Unaffiliated 
 
Total 
Never 1% 0% 0% 1% 
Rarely 15% 0% 27% 22% 
Occasionally 58% 75% 68% 60% 
Often 25% 25% 5% 18% 
N 
 
72 
100% 
8 
100% 
37 
100% 
117 
100
% 
Table 5.8 Frequency with which judges’ religious beliefs influence judging by religious 
beliefs [Source: Appendix 20d] 
 
The results of a Kruskal-Wallis H test indicated that there was a statistically 
significant difference between respondents’ perceptions as to the frequency with 
which judges’ religious beliefs affect judicial decision-making based on their 
religious beliefs: Christian (Mean rank = 62.89), Non-Christian (mean rank = 70.88) 
and Unaffiliated ( mean rank = 48.86), X
2
(2) =7.023,  p =.030. Subsequently, 
pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. This post hoc analysis revealed no 
statistically significant difference between the groups. The inference is that 
perceptions of the frequency with which judges’ religion affects judging vary 
according to respondents’ own faith, although there is no clear pattern as to how.  
Thus, as regards perceptions of the frequency with which judges’ religious beliefs 
influence judging, the study finds that most barristers felt that if, or for a minority 
when, a judge’s faith impinged on his or her adjudication, this was limited so as to 
rarely affect only a narrow range of cases, typically those directly or indirectly 
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raising issues of moral, ethical and/or religious significance. Conversely, the findings 
from the SPQ indicate that the solicitors who positively correlated a judge’s religion 
with judging perceived the impact of religious beliefs to be more frequent; 
approximately four-fifths of solicitors recorded an ‘occasionally’ or ‘often’ response 
to the question of how often judges’ religious beliefs might influence judicial 
reasoning in cases where the law was unsettled or discretion was exercised. There 
are no immediately obvious reasons as to why there is such polarity in perceptions of 
frequency amongst two groups of lawyers who work in the same legal areas, 
particularly given that there were no discernible differences in the views of lawyers 
detected based on how often they appeared in court. 
It is interesting to find that neither the qualitative data from part one nor the 
statistical analysis of SPQ responses in part two revealed any noteworthy differences 
in lawyers’ perceptions of the frequency with which judges’ faith was thought to 
affect judicial decision-making based on their area of practice, years of experience or 
the frequency of their attendance at court. The most likely explanation for this 
homogeneity of views amongst (as opposed to between) the two lawyer groups is 
related to their common legal training and work environment. On the other hand, 
there was a statistically significant difference based on solicitors’ own religious 
beliefs. Given the uneven group sizes amongst the group and the results of the post 
hoc test, the only inference that can safely be drawn here is that solicitors’ views 
about the frequency with which judges’ religion plays a role in judging vary 
according to their own religious beliefs. 
Overall, it is concluded that there is no clear consensus amongst the lawyers in 
relation to this first aspect of how judges’ faith affects judging,  
5.4.3.2 Nature of influence 
 
The differences between the two lawyer groups above are further demonstrated in 
their differing interpretations of the way in which judges’ religion was felt to 
impinge upon the process of judging. 
Barristers 
As discussed in 5.3 above, in conversations about the interplay between judges’ 
personal factors and judging, a common theme to emerge was that interviewees felt 
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that any influence on judicial decision-making was typically manifested in an 
unconscious manner. Whilst the interviewees were not asked expressly asked about 
the way in which they felt that a judge’s faith would impact on judging, it was clear 
from the conversations with barristers that the nature of influence that judges’ 
religious beliefs was perceived to have on adjudication was similarly confined to that 
which was unconscious only, if at all.  
Solicitors 
Solicitors who agreed with the view that judges’ religious beliefs affect judicial 
reasoning (in response to SPQ Q16) were asked directly how they thought they did 
so (SPQ Q18). As shown in Figure 5.5, it is interesting to find that just over half of 
the respondents (54%) thought that judicial decision-making was subject to both 
conscious and unconscious influences from judges’ religious beliefs. Just over a 
third of respondents (36%) perceived the nature of influence more restrictively to 
that which was unconscious only. A small number of respondents (10%) said that 
they did not know the way in which judges’ religious beliefs affected such cases. 
 
Figure 5.5  Solicitor perceptions of how judges' religious beliefs influence judicial 
decision-making (n=129) [Source: Appendix 21] 
 
Once again, the SPQ data was interrogated to see whether there were any significant 
differences between solicitors’ responses according to their area of practice, PQE, 
frequency of attendance at court and religious beliefs. Tables 5.9 to 5.12 show there 
was considerable homogeneity between respondents regardless of their demographic 
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characteristics. However, two observations are of note. First, employment 
practitioners were 15% more likely than family lawyers to report that judges’ 
religious beliefs both consciously and unconsciously affect judging – 59% compared 
to 44% (Table 5.9) - although the difference was not found to be statistically 
significant. Second, it is worth noting the variance between respondents who were 
coded as Christian, non-Christian or Unaffiliated. Specifically, those in the non-
Christian group were more likely to report that judges’ religious beliefs influence 
judicial decision-making consciously and unconsciously than those in the other two 
groups (71% compared to 57% (Christian) and 48% (unaffiliated) (Table 5.12). 
However, once again this difference was not statistically significant. Given the small 
sample size for the non-Christian group, caution must be exercised when interpreting 
these results.  What is clear, however, is that the solicitors who were coded under the 
two religious categories (Christian and non-Christian) were more likely than those in 
the non-religious group (Unaffiliated) to positively associate judges’ religious beliefs 
with conscious and unconscious influence. 
Judges’ religion affects judging: nature  Employment Family Total 
Consciously only 0% 0% 0% 
Unconsciously only 33% 42% 36% 
Consciously & unconsciously 59% 44% 54% 
Don’t know 7% 15% 10% 
N 
 
81 
100% 
48 
99% 
129 
100% 
Table 5.9 Ways in which judges’ religious beliefs influence judging by area of 
practice [Source: Appendix 22a] 
 
Judges’ religion affects judging: 
nature 
0-5 
years 
6-10 
years 
11-15 
years 
16-20 
years 
21+ 
years 
Total 
Consciously only 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Unconsciously only 25% 32% 21% 47% 44% 36% 
Consciously & unconsciously 64% 63% 64% 38% 50% 54% 
Don’t know 11% 5% 14% 16% 6% 10% 
N 
 
28 
100
% 
19 
100
% 
14 
100
% 
32 
100
% 
36 
100
% 
100
% 
Table 5.10 Ways in which judges’ religious beliefs influence judging by PQE [Source: 
Appendix 22b] 
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Judges’ religion affects judging: nature Frequently 
attend 
Infrequently 
Attend 
Total 
Consciously only 0% 0% 0% 
Unconsciously only 36% 38% 36% 
Consciously & unconsciously 51% 57% 54% 
Don’t know 14% 5% 10% 
N 
 
73 
100% 
56 
100% 
129 
100% 
Table 5.11 Ways in which judges’ religious beliefs influence judging by frequency of 
attendance [Source: Appendix 22c] 
Judges’ religion affects judging: nature  
Christian 
Non-
Christian 
 
Unaffiliated 
 
Total 
Consciously only 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Unconsciously only 37% 29% 34% 35% 
Consciously & unconsciously 57% 71% 48% 54% 
Don’t know 7% 0% 18% 10% 
N 74 7 44 125 
Table 5.12 Ways in which judges’ religious beliefs influence judging by religion 
[Source: Appendix 22d] 
 
Reconciling conscious and unconscious influences with the requirement for 
impartiality 
In section 5.3 it was argued that framing the nature of influence as 
unconscious/implicit as opposed to conscious/explicit provides a means by which 
those lawyers who think judges’ personal factors are a salient factor in judging can 
reconcile two seemingly incompatible claims: (1) non-legal actors play a role in 
judging, and (2) judges are impartial and objective arbiters of law.  The argument is 
that judges who are oblivious to how their faith influences judging cannot be 
criticised for something about which they are unaware. The same argument can be 
advanced in relation to unconscious religious bias. Thus, to find that lawyers were 
broadly in agreement as regards the presence of unconscious religious influences in a 
judicial context is unexpected, both  for the reason outlined above, and in light of 
previous research which highlights the role played by implicit bias in professional 
and personal decision-making, discussed in 5.3. 
In fact the judiciary in the UK already recognise that judges can be susceptible to 
unconscious bias during the process of adjudication. The Judicial College’s Equal 
Treatment Bench Book alerts judges to the dangers of unconscious prejudice.
63
 
Moreover, the meaning and effects of unconscious bias are explored in the 
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College’s national Business of Judging seminars,64 during which judges are 
informed about IATs and are invited to take an IAT online (although they are not 
compelled to do so).
65
 And in a recent lecture, Lord Neuberger voiced his 
concerns about the presence of unconscious bias in the courts:  
…I worry about unconscious bias. And I worry about it in myself as much as 
in anyone else; because it is extremely hard to know if you suffer from it, and 
if so, in what way and what you can do about it.
66
  
Like those who took part in this study, Lord Neuberger does not think that 
unconscious bias in judging is surprising nor gives rise to alarm. However, amidst 
the growing body of literature regarding the effects of implicit bias on decision-
making behaviour, Lord Neuberger has called for the topic of ‘sub-conscious 
bias’ to take a more prominent position on the judicial training agenda.67 The 
findings from this study, together with the work of other scholars (such as Cahill-
O’Callaghan on tacit personal values)68 lends strong support to the call for further 
training in this area; after all, it is only by being trained to identify such bias that 
attempts can be made to mitigate against it, regardless of context.
69
  
Perhaps more significant in the present study is to find that a majority of solicitors 
felt that the religious beliefs of a judge may also consciously enter the decisional 
process. One possible explanation may relate to the differences in the role of the two 
different sets of lawyers who took part in this study. It is well known that judges 
typically come from a barrister background, especially those in the higher courts.
70
 
Therefore, as argued elsewhere in this thesis, barristers’ might not wish to do or say 
anything to undermine the authority and prestige of an institution to which they 
aspire. 
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Again, the different methods and questions used to elicit lawyers’ responses to the 
question of how judges’ faith is perceived to influence judging cannot be dismissed 
as a cause of discrepant views between lawyer groups. In particular, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, evidence shows that the respondents to online self-administered 
questionnaires (such as the SPQ) are more likely to give open and honest responses 
to sensitive questions compared to methods involving the presence of an 
interviewer.
71
 In addition, such questionnaires have also been found to be less 
susceptible to social desirability bias.
72
 As Tourangeau explains, this form of bias 
occurs when individuals ‘distort their answers to avoid presenting themselves in an 
unfavourable light’.73 This may explain why it is only the anonymous respondents to 
the SPQ who said that judges’ religious beliefs consciously influence judicial 
decision-making. In hindsight, it would have been useful to conduct a barrister 
perceptions questionnaire (using similar questions to those in the SPQ) to (1) gain 
views from a wider section of the Bar community about the relationship between 
religious beliefs and judging and (2) compare in-group responses by reference to the 
data collection method used. 
What is clear is that rhetoric in which the influence of judges’ personal factors 
(including religious beliefs) is described as unconsciously, rather than consciously, 
manifested is ostensibly easier to square with notions of judicial impartiality and 
objectivity. This raises the question of whether the solicitor responses about the 
presence of conscious religious influences should give cause for concern in the 
judicial context.  The argument is that if judges consciously allow their religious 
beliefs to affect how a case is decided in some cases, this surely introduces an 
unwelcome element of subjectivity into a process which demands that only the 
relevant facts and the law form the basis of a judge’s decision. However, reflecting 
the argument advanced by Lucy as to the possibility of impartiality in an 
adjudicative context (discussed in Chapter 2), here it is suggested that the presence 
of conscious religious influence in judicial decision-making is reconcilable with the 
requirement for a judge to adjudicate free from bias, albeit in a limited sense.  
                                                 
71
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Take the following example. Judge X is a devout Christian. She subscribes to the 
core doctrines of Christianity which she manifests through various practices in her 
daily life. She is allocated to an employment case involving the issue of indirect 
religious discrimination. The claimant, also a devout Christian, sincerely believes 
that Sabbatarianism is a core tenet of her Christian faith. Her employer, having 
previously been able to accommodate her requirement not to work on Sundays now 
requires the claimant to do so. The claimant refuses to do so because of her Christian 
beliefs. She resigns and brings a claim for indirect religious discrimination.
74
 
Clearly, in a case like this, regardless of whether or not Judge X shares the 
claimant’s views about Sunday working, it is entirely reasonable to expect that Judge 
X will consciously draw upon her religious knowledge to understand and be duly 
sensitive to the arguments advanced by the claimant. At the same time, Judge X must 
be mindful of the need to be, and be seen to be impartial and not allow her own 
beliefs to affect the way she decides the case.  
 
In this scenario, Judge X’s own faith may be seen to consciously influence the 
decisional process in two ways. First, as alluded to above, it provides one means by 
which she can better understand the relevant religious issues. Indeed, it would seem 
odd not to draw upon such personal knowledge and experience. In Lucy’s words, to 
do so would mean that “The beings judging us would know nothing at all of what 
standard human lives look and feel like or, knowing something, would completely 
ignore it”.75  Second, having formed an opinion, Judge X engages in the conscious, 
reasoned and deliberative ‘System 2’ phase of decision-making (discussed in section 
2.3.4) and enters into a process of self-reflection and, if necessary, self-correction. 
This provides the means by which non-legal considerations are prevented from 
surreptitiously affecting the judgment. However, a note of caution is due here. As 
previously mentioned, there is a risk that by making a concerted effort to ensure that 
she does not, or is not seen to favour her fellow religious adherent, Judge X may lean 
too far in the other direction. It will be recalled that Heise and Sisk offer this as one 
explanation for why they found judges’ faith to be negatively correlated with case 
outcomes in their study of the influence of various factors on the Free Exercise and 
religious accommodation claim decisions by the federal court of appeals and district 
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court judges in the US.
76
 Indeed, that self-conscious efforts to guard against partiality 
could potentially result in reverse ‘religious nepotism’ is implicit in the following 
comments from two of the senior barristers who participated in this study:
77
 
 
…not just in the jury’s perspective but in other areas of law, I think the 
suspicion is that judges who share the characteristic of the claimant or the 
victim are potentially less sympathetic than those who do not. (B5) 
 I’ve come in front of a Jewish judge, in fact two Jewish judges, and, in a way, 
I think both of them bent over backwards to be perhaps fairer to the right wing 
parties than if they hadn’t been Jewish. So, in a way you are almost going the 
other way from what your actual beliefs are. Do you see what I mean? (B13) 
Thus, what serves as an important constraint on judging - judicial self-reflection 
and, where necessary, moderation – may, in and of itself, be a potential source of 
bias. There is no easy solution here. However, as suggested above, highlighting 
how conscious and unconscious biases affect judges’ judgment, and providing 
judges with effective strategies to alleviate the influence of such biases delivered 
under the judicial education and training programme is a good starting point.  
That said, the argument above raises the question of whether it is actually 
meaningful (or indeed possible) to distinguish between conscious and unconscious 
influences that affect judicial decision-making. Drawing upon insights from 
psychology, particularly the dual process theory by Kahneman discussed in Chapter 
2,
78
 there is strong support for the view that the use of conscious-unconscious 
paradigm presents a false dichotomy because all human behaviour emanates from a 
combination of both these processes.
79
 More specifically, it could be argued that the 
division of the nature of influence of judges’ religious beliefs (and other personal 
factors) into conscious and unconscious is artificial in a judicial context because, as 
seen in Chapter 2, the law on judicial bias makes no distinction between judicial 
reasoning which is consciously or unconsciously biased; what matters is whether 
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there is actual or apparent judicial bias.
80
 Whilst there is a natural alignment between 
apparent bias and conduct that is manifested subliminally, there is no reason to 
suppose that actual bias is the product of conscious forces only. Of course, the 
problem is the evidential burden in proving that unconscious influences have 
actually tainted an aspect of the decisional process.  
5.4.3.3 Extent of impact 
 
Barristers 
Irrespective of whether they felt that there was a definite or potential relationship 
between a judge’s faith and judging, a constant feature in the interviews with 
barristers was that the extent of influence of religious beliefs was narrowly 
confined to that affecting judicial approach rather than case outcomes. The 
analysis of the interview data revealed three main ways in which interviewees 
perceived judicial approach to be influenced by judges’ religious beliefs: the 
nature of judicial interventions, the degree of sensitivity afforded to litigants, and, 
indirectly, how judges reacted to advocates. 
Judicial interventions 
One of the principal ways in which it was felt that judges’ religious beliefs could 
affect judicial approach related to the nature of their questions and judicial 
interventions during proceedings. Judicial questions were sometimes more 
challenging, particularly   if a judge’s religious persuasion was the same as that of a 
litigant, although this was not thought to have a bearing on the final judgment: 
 
I don’t think… the ultimate outcome has been influenced by the religious 
views of the judge, but I do think that they course that the trial has taken, and 
the types of question and the areas where I’ve been pushed harder to explain 
something might have been. 
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Where there was no such commonality, judicial questioning could be rather 
different. It is suggested that, particularly in cases in which judges are perceived 
to lack knowledge about minority faiths or new religious movements, it might 
reasonably be expected that a judge would be keen to seek clarification on 
specific matters about which he or she was unfamiliar or lacked sufficient 
understanding, so long as to do so was relevant and within the jurisdiction of the 
courts.
81
 In fact, the Judicial College gives guidance as to how judges can best 
demonstrate an understanding of difference and the problems faced by those from 
disadvantaged groups including adherents of minority faith groups; this includes 
the use of timely and sensitive judicial intervention as a means by which to ensure 
that parties from such groups can fully participate in proceedings.
82
 However, 
some barristers reported that a lack of judicial knowledge and understanding, 
particularly in cases involving minority religious beliefs, occasionally meant that 
judges were less inclined to ask faith-related questions during a trial, even though 
they thought it might be pertinent for judges to make such enquiries.
83
 Thus, for 
example, B16 remarked:  
So where you have clients who have religious beliefs that the judge just 
doesn’t understand – whether it’s because they are Scientologists or serious 
Muslims or committed Christians or whatever – it is as if the judge’s don’t 
understand the beliefs, they’ll not bother to take the time to dispel that 
understanding… 
Here, the perception is that some judges appear apathetic when issues of a religious 
nature, particularly those with which a judge is not generally conversant, arise. Of 
course, it could  be argued that a lack of interest results from the fact that a judge 
feels confident that he or she has already been presented with sufficient information 
upon which to make a decision or that the issues are not relevant to the case in 
                                                 
81
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question. However, an alternative interpretation is that in some cases, judges are 
reluctant to ask questions about religious matters which may or may not be relevant, 
in order to avoid the risk of becoming engaged in religiously sensitive matters which 
may or may not be justiciable. In other words, it may be more convenient for 
difficult or particularly sensitive issues which are not pivotal in a case to be brushed 
to one side or, as the extract from B8 suggests below, to simply assign them to a 
generic category of ‘cultural differences’: 
  
Things like religion play a part… because you could have your archetypal 
stuffy, white, middle class judge who just doesn’t understand, doesn’t want to 
understand, and just says: “Oh fine. Okay. Well, its cultural differences. Okay. 
Is that how you do it wherever you’re from? That’s fine. 
 
What is particularly interesting to note is that the above accounts are based on the 
interviewee having had, or assuming, prior knowledge of a judge’s religious 
background in such cases.  
Judicial sensitivity  
In the extracts above it was suggested that occasionally some judges appear apathetic 
about, or are insensitive to, cases involving less familiar religious issues. Other 
barristers felt that religious difference had a more positive effect on judicial 
approach. Specifically, in cases where minority religions were involved, it was said 
that judges often appeared more sensitive to the parties than might otherwise be the 
case. This view is very clearly captured in the following extract from B5, who also 
sat as part-time judge at the time of being interviewed: 
I think that judges who don’t share for example a religious background with 
the witness or the individual are particularly keen to be sensitive to them and 
are therefore prepared to take additional steps to make that person comfortable, 
which a judge from their own background may not feel is necessary. 
Illustrating this point, another senior barrister (and part-time judge) described how a 
panel of judges who they had appeared before had ‘bent over backwards’ to allow a 
Rastafarian client to wear religious dress in court. The willingness of today’s judges 
to accommodate such religious differences was said to be in stark contrast with the 
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approach taken by judges in the past: “I mean things have changed quite a bit. In the 
old days, a Rastafarian, particularly if he wouldn’t take his hat off in a hearing, 
would have got the judges into real hysterics”. For B19, another senior employment 
barrister, such sensitivity stretched beyond the courtroom and was said to be 
symptomatic of, and a response to a wider ‘culture of taking offence’ and an ‘age of 
hypersensitivity’, particularly post 9/11. Thus, referring to an employment 
discrimination case to which they had been instructed, again related to the issue of 
religious dress, B19 opined: 
 
I am going to do a headscarf case, a Muslim woman headscarf case. Now 
everybody is walking on eggshells in that case, even though they may not have 
to…the employer is bending over backwards to ensure that no offence is given 
or can be taken to be given. So we are living in a very hyper-sensitive time and 
I think that cuts across the board [to] men and women in the judiciary. 
Interestingly, B2 was similarly sceptical as to whether all religious minority 
groups were treated with the same level of sensitivity: 
I don’t find it translates across the board. To put it bluntly, I don’t think that if 
they find themselves with a Buddhist witness in front of them they are as 
concerned as with certain other religions which they get very concerned about 
offending. I’ll give you an example of a female Muslim witness who is 
wearing the full hijab or niqaab or whatever – they almost seem very stressed 
out by that and do try very hard to… yeah… tread on eggshells. 
The views of B19 and B2 were supported by anecdotal evidence from B5. 
Following a high profile case in which Murphy J had to consider whether a 
female Muslim defendant was entitled to wear the niqaab during Crown Court 
proceedings,
84
 B5 recounted: 
I was talking to a [senior colleague] who said there had been some Egyptian 
judges visiting while this [case] was going on and they were really surprised 
that this was a problem because in Egypt the woman would have just been told 
to take it [the niqaab] off. Their perception was that the judges in this country 
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were being ultra-sensitive because they weren’t themselves Muslim and 
therefore didn’t put in context that wearing the niqab was not a tenet of the 
religion so much as a cultural decision that certain people in Muslim countries 
choose to do. 
Whilst there has been a shift in judicial attitudes as regards religion over the last 
fifty years or so, judges may still be seen to have difficulty dealing with cases 
involving religiously sensitive issues. Thus, as the above extracts demonstrate,  
although the religious beliefs that give rise to a dispute may evolve, the sorts of 
religiously sensitive issues which judges have to grapple with remain the same 
regardless of the faith in question.  
 Advocacy strategy 
Perhaps a less direct avenue by which judges’ religious beliefs were perceived to 
have an effect on judicial approach was drawn from barristers’ conversations about 
how much or little was known about individual judges’ personal and professional 
backgrounds. Generally, interviewees said that their own approach in court varied 
according to which judge or tribunal was hearing a case. For example, B3 said: 
Barristers talk to each other very openly about judges and the likelihood of 
them finding for them in a certain case once you know you are listed before 
somebody – it will obviously affect your negotiation strategy, your entire 
advocacy strategy … 
This raised the question of whether having prior knowledge about judges’ 
religious beliefs influenced the approach taken by the advocate when representing 
their clients in court. Where barristers adapt their submissions and skeleton 
arguments with the intention of trying to appeal to, inter alia, the known religious 
sensitivities of a judge, the implication would appear to be that such judicial 
personal factors impact upon judicial approach, albeit perhaps in an oblique way. 
The data shows that barristers’ responses were mixed. For example, B5 said that 
foreknowledge about a judge’s religious background had no bearing on how they 
presented cases in court: 
In my [22+] years of practice or so, I’ve never felt in a position where you 
should alter the way in which you present a  case because of the gender or the 
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religion or the sexual orientation of the judge concerned… I was in front of a [  
] judge recently [ ] who wears a turban… I don’t know indeed if he is Sikh or 
Hindu, an Indian sub-continent background. But it wouldn’t have occurred to 
me in a million years for that to have had any impact at all in the way I 
presented the case or, indeed, have any impact in the way he dealt with the 
case’ 
Clearly B5 was confident that, as skilled professional decision-makers, judges are 
not likely to be swayed by subtle attempts by advocates to curry their favour by 
exploiting known judicial personal factors. Having typically come from a 
background at the Bar, judges are fully alert to the possibility that advocates will 
occasionally employ such tactics in an effort to win a case. Of course, it could be 
argued that this view is unsurprising given that B5 sits as a part-time judge and 
may be keen to ensure that the reputation of, and the public’s confidence in, the 
judiciary is protected. B15 took a slightly different approach: 
It has to be part of your approach as an advocate to try and play on and 
emphasise those points that you think will carry the tribunal. And you’re never 
going to do it, or shouldn’t do it, being any good at it, in a crude way. You’re 
not going to say ‘Your Lordship, as a good Christian you will appreciate blah, 
blah, blah…’… But you are going to be acutely aware of that because there are 
ways in which you can shape and order and present evidence and submissions. 
Initially, this extract appears to suggest that there may be some merit in attempts 
to appeal to a judge’s known religious preferences. However, B15 went on to say 
that playing to such religious sensitivities would not have that great an impact on 
their argument: 
If you gave me a sheet with the information about all the judges’ protected 
characteristics, plus all the other things we’ve been talking about, of course I 
would look at it and think would it affect the way in which I did things? There 
would probably be fewer cases in which, as an advocate, it would make a 
material change to the way in which I presented the case but I would always 
want to know because you do don’t you. 
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The findings suggest that having foreknowledge of judges’ religious beliefs will 
not play a significant part in influencing advocacy strategy. From this it might 
reasonably be concluded that it is unlikely that judges will react or take kindly to 
attempts to appeal to factors outside of those directly relevant to a case. Indeed, 
the position is summed up neatly by B4, a part-time judge, who plainly stated, 
“I’m not impressed by it”.  
Plainly, most barristers felt that the nature of influence from judges’ religious 
beliefs would be limited to that which affected judicial approach only. However, 
it should be noted that one interviewee, a senior barrister, appeared to think that 
the extent of impact was greater in scope than perceived by the majority, so as to 
affect case outcomes as well. Whilst the following represents a single viewpoint, 
it is no less significant or valid than those of the majority of interviewees. B9, a 
senior QC, opined that: 
Your basic thesis, I think, is absolutely right, [judges’] religious views do 
colour judgments. They do have an important influence on the outcomes of 
cases but it is an area that is very poorly understood.   
The reasons for why there is a lack of understanding as to the relationship 
between religion and judging were explored in Chapter 3. However if, as B9 
thinks, religion does play a role in the adjudication process, understanding the 
nature of, and how this relationship is managed becomes all the more important. 
Solicitors 
In order to determine how the solicitors who felt that religion was a factor in judging 
perceived the extent to which judges’ personal factors such as religious beliefs 
affected the decisional process, SPQ respondents were asked to rate their levels of 
agreement with three statements as shown in Table 5.13 below (SPQ Q13). Based on 
the barristers responses to the interviews in part one of the study, it was hypothesised 
that solicitors would be much more likely to think that judges’ personal factors affect 
judicial approach compared to case outcomes.  
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STATEMENT N Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
1 I think that a judge’s personal factors 
affect judicial approach 
136 74% 16% 10% 
2 I think that a judge’s personal factors 
affect case outcomes 
136 63% 20% 17% 
Table 5.13  Extent of impact of judges’ personal factors on judging [Source: Appendix 
23 and 24] 
The findings show that solicitors did not confine the scope of influence of personal 
factors (including religion) as narrowly as the barrister in part one. Whilst a large 
majority (74%) felt that judicial approach would be affected, a significant proportion 
of respondents also felt that judges’ personal factors including religion would affect 
case outcomes (63%).  
However, an important note of caution should be made here. In the SPQ solicitors 
were asked about the impact of personal factors on judicial approach and outcome 
rather than that of religious beliefs more specifically. Thus, no direct comparison can 
be drawn between barristers and solicitors using the quantitative findings from the 
SPQ.  Any future survey instrument should explicitly ask about the extent of 
influence that judges’ religious beliefs are perceived to have on judging for 
comparative purposes. 
Instead, the supplementary open-text comments from solicitors are used to gain an 
understanding of their perceptions of how judges’ religious beliefs affect judging. 
The data suggests that, like the barristers in part one, SPQ respondents were less 
convinced that a judge’s religion, as a constituent of his or her personal factors, had 
the same effect on judicial decision-making as other factors.. The following 
examples are illustrative: 
The outcome of a case will be affected by which Judge we get but this is not 
due to religious factors (S252E) 
 
There is very occasional situation where a decision is made in favour of an 
individual which appears to be due to a personal sympathy for the individual 
rather than other "personal factors" such as commonalities of age disability 
religion or belief” (S55) 
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These are marginal calls - they follow the law, and the law does constrain what 
they can and cannot do, but personal factors such as religion influence how 
they think.  
 
A false dichotomy? 
In the previous sections, it was suggested that a consequence of understanding the 
influence of judges’ religious beliefs on judicial decision-making as an infrequent 
and unconscious process was that it helped to dilute any controversy that ensues 
from a view of judging that so much as hints at the possibility that judicial decision-
making rests on anything other than the evidence and the law. Here it is argued that 
understanding the impact of religious beliefs as that affecting judicial approach only 
has a similar effect. Arguably, implicit in the view that judges’ religious beliefs 
affect judicial approach only is that such a narrow construction presents little or no 
threat to judicial impartiality; it is only where a causal relationship is established 
between judges’ religious beliefs and case outcome that judicial impartiality may be 
seen to be compromised.
85
  However, guidance to judicial conduct makes clear that 
impartiality applies not only to decisional outcomes, but also to the process by which 
a decision is made.
86
 Accordingly, confining the perceived nature of influence solely 
to judicial approach should not obviate the possibility of accusations of religious 
bias, nor does it necessarily serve to maintain trust and confidence in the judiciary.  
Moorhead et al.’s review of existing literature as to what factors are related to public 
and participants (hereafter ‘participants’) levels of satisfaction with the courts and 
tribunals in England and Wales is insightful here.
87
 Whilst much of the evidence 
reviewed is based on studies in the criminal sphere, it is interesting to note that the 
authors found participants’ perceptions about both the fairness of court or tribunal 
procedures and outcomes are an important driver in participants’ satisfaction with 
the justice system. If this is found to be the case in other areas of law such as in 
                                                 
85
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employment and family cases, distinguishing between the impact of judges’ religious 
beliefs (and other factors) on judicial approach or outcome is not particularly helpful 
when discussing the role played by non-legal factors in adjudication. An associated 
difficulty with the approach-outcome dichotomy is the difficult question of whether 
the influence of religious beliefs on judicial approach can actually be extracted from 
the judgment stage of the judicial decision-making in the way that many of the 
lawyers in this study suggest. Taking questions from the bench during a trial as an 
example, if it is assumed that a judges’ religious beliefs can affect the number and 
types of questions a judge asks but will not have any bearing on outcome, what is the 
rationale for making such enquiries? It could reasonably be argued that this fact 
finding stage of the decision-making process will have had some affect the way a 
judge interprets the facts and it is this which is perforce key in determining a case 
outcome. Linked to this, the use of the approach-outcome dichotomy is difficult to 
reconcile with the framing of judicial subjectivity within an unconscious paradigm. 
If the view that judicial approach and not outcome is subject to unconscious religious 
bias is applied consistently, at some point during the course of judicial reasoning it 
requires the decision-maker to somehow, consciously or unconsciously, extirpate 
biases including those about which he or she may be unaware.  
5.4.4 Discussion 
 
It is unsurprising that the majority of lawyers who took part in this study perceive 
there to be a melange of judicial personal factors that influence decision-making, 
particularly in cases where the law is unclear, unsettled or where judicial discretion 
is exercised. It accords with the widely acknowledged view that the craft of judging 
is far too complex an activity to be understood by sole reference to the facts of a case 
and the evidence alone.  However, that the findings relating to perceptions of the 
nexus between judges’ religious beliefs and judging are more nebulous is perhaps 
surprising given that in both parts of this study, judicial personal factors were 
considered by many lawyers to encompass an individual’s belief system of which, 
for many people, religious beliefs may form part. It is difficult to explain this result. 
However, several non-mutually exclusive reasons are advanced as to why lawyers 
were more diffident when asked specifically about the relationship between religion 
and judging compared to that of personal factors and judging.  
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The most obvious reason is simply that many lawyers do not know the religious 
backgrounds of members of the judiciary. This raises the question of whether more 
should be known about the personal backgrounds of members of the judiciary, 
particularly those at the top tier of the judicial hierarchy, who have responsibility for 
adjudicating some of the most morally, socially, politically or ethically important 
issues of the day. This important question is considered in more detail in the next 
chapter. A second possible reason is that some lawyers have not considered this issue 
and/or have no experience of such so feel unqualified or are unable to offer any 
insight about if, and how, a judge’s faith influences the judicial reasoning process, 
perhaps other than to conclude that it is not a matter of much concern (if any) in the 
courts. A third reason may be that lawyers are simply reluctant to comment on 
others’ faith in the belief that such matters are sensitive, private and irrelevant for 
discussion in a public forum. Indeed, it is unsurprising to find that those working in 
an environment in which confidentiality and integrity are essential elements, 
acknowledge and respect the importance of judges’ personal autonomy (in the 
present context being a judge’s choice not to share their religious views and/or 
discuss them in public). Fourthly, as previously suggested, such uncertainty may be 
evidence of a more general unwillingness to criticise, or be accused of criticising the 
judiciary so as to avoid controversy. In this sense, lawyers can be said to display the 
‘habitus of a conventional lawyer including a respect for the hierarchy and values of 
legal office.’88 Fifthly, it highlights the difficulty to be had in trying to distinguish 
the impact of an individual’s personal religious values from their general worldview 
(Chapter 2).Thus, whilst some lawyers may be happy to make assumptions about the 
nexus between faith and judging, others appear loathe to draw conclusions when 
they find it difficult, observationally, to disentangle religious values from wider 
personal factors/values.  
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has looked specifically at lawyers’ perceptions of the relationship 
between judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision-making, in order to directly 
                                                 
88
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address the research question: Do lawyers perceive that a judge’s religious beliefs 
influence his or her individual judicial decision-making, and if so how? In doing so, 
it has sought to make a unique and significant contribution to a growing body of 
literature which examines the factors that influence the process of judging.    
 
Conclusions relating to differences between the responses of barristers and solicitors 
are found within the sections of this chapter. As to the broader findings, this part of 
the empirical investigation lends limited support for the first limb of the thesis which 
posits that judges’ religious beliefs inevitably influence judging, particularly in cases 
involving religiously sensitive issues (set out in Chapter 1.1). It is limited in so far as 
most lawyers acknowledge that religion is one of a multitude of judicial background 
factors that potentially affect judicial decision-making in these cases, but are more 
equivocal when it comes to the claim that religious beliefs inevitably inform the 
decisional process. In relation to how judges’ religion influences judging, this 
investigation has shown that there is no overwhelming consensus among lawyers as 
regards the frequency, nature and extent to which judges’ faith affect adjudication. 
However, what is clear from the evidence is that religion, particularly compared to 
the role played by other legal and non-legal factors, is perceived to have a very 
marginal role in the process of judging at most, and is definitely not thought to be a 
consistent factor in judicial decision-making.  
 
When it comes to the second limb of the thesis, the evidence suggests that most 
lawyers are confident that, even if judges’ religious factors are at play, legal and non- 
legal constraints such as the doctrine of precedent, judicial training and 
professionalism act as a strong curb on the influence that they might otherwise have 
on individual judicial decision-making. This partly explains why the lawyers who 
took part in this study seemed unfazed by the claim that, sometimes, there may be a 
religious dimension to the process of judging and why they were adamant that 
judicial decision-making is highly unlikely to be tainted by religious bias. Overall, 
the overwhelming majority of lawyers expressed high praise for judges and the 
quality of their judicial decision-making, particularly, but not exclusively, in relation 
to the higher courts.  
 
 
 
225 
 
In the next chapter, lawyers’ perceptions of whether, and if so how, judges’ religious 
beliefs affect adjudication are explored in a more abstract way. Lawyers’ views as to 
whether judges lack an understanding of, and sensitivity to religious issues are 
examined to see whether there is any evidence of an anti-religious bias in the 
judiciary. It considers whether there is any support for increasing religious diversity 
in the judiciary and asks whether it would be useful to know more about judges’ 
religious backgrounds, particularly in relation to those in the higher courts, so as to 
be better able to examine whether correlations exist between religion and other 
judicial personal factors and adjudication.
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CHAPTER 6 
DEPERSONALISATION AND OPEN JUSTICE 
CHAPTER 6 DEPERSONALISATION AND OPEN JUSTICE 
In the previous chapter it was seen that most lawyers who took part in this study 
perceive judicial decision-making to be potentially vulnerable to unconscious 
influence from a judge’s religious beliefs. Crucially, however, if or when a judge’s 
religious views play a role in the process of judging, the general view of these 
lawyers is that any impact on judicial determinations is or will be minimal at best, 
and, crucially, does not give rise to concerns about religious bias in judicial decision-
making. This chapter builds upon these findings by looking at three further areas 
relating specifically to the nexus between judges’ faith and judging. Drawing on 
Lord Carey’s criticism of the judiciary in McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd,1 section 6.1 
considers whether claims that the judiciary are insensitive to, and lack an 
understanding of matters relating to religion (in other words implying that the courts 
are anti-religious) have any credibility. This discussion is extended in section 6.2 by 
exploring lawyers’ views about having specialist judges to hear cases involving 
religion. The findings show that, for the most part, lawyers do not support calls for 
specialist courts to deal with matters of religion because judges are considered to be 
sufficiently capable of handling such cases within the current legal structure, from an 
informed and impartial perspective. Section 6.3 looks at whether there is support for 
increasing religious diversity in the judiciary. Section 6.4 considers lawyers’ 
attitudes towards, and the case for knowing more about, judges’ personal factors 
such as religion. The reasons for these enquiries, specifically their relevance to the 
overall thesis, are further explained in each of the related sections.  
 
6.1 Criticism of judicial reasoning in religious rights cases 
 
In Chapter 5 it was found that the lawyers in this study are confident that judges 
demonstrate high levels of professionalism, and  are fully aware of the need to 
                                                 
1
 [2010] EWCA Civ 771. 
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ensure that personal religious convictions (and other personal factors) do not cloud 
their judgments, particularly (but not exclusively) in cases involving religiously 
sensitive issues. In Chapter 5.4 it was also found that whilst some lawyers think that 
judges occasionally appear overly sensitive to religious issues, or conversely do not 
enquire about such issues where it would be pertinent to do so, there is little evidence 
in the empirical data that this affects judicial outcomes in a way that gives cause for 
concern. However, others have been more critical of the way judges handle cases 
involving religion, such as in relation to the restrictive approach taken in relation to 
what constitutes a manifestation of religion or belief under Article 9 of the ECHR, or 
in cases where religious rights clash with, and are said to be ‘trumped’ by, other 
protected equality or human rights claims. Critics argue that, in such cases, judicial 
decisions reflect and perpetuate an anti-religious (often anti-Christian) bias in public 
life.
2
  
One proponent of this view is Lord Carey. In Chapter 1.3 it will be recalled that, in 
McFarlane,
3
 Lord Carey directly accused senior members of the judiciary of having 
‘a disparaging attitude towards Christian faith and its values’,4 and of being unaware 
of basic issues relating to Christianity.
5
  He went on to imply that if judges do not 
grasp the key tenets of Christianity, then those from minority faiths have even less 
reason to be confident that judges dealing with disputes involving minority religions 
will have the requisite knowledge and understanding to adjudicate fairly.
6
 In the 
same vein, other Christian commentators warn about what is seen as the increasing 
marginalisation of faith in public life, including the secular courts. Again in response 
to the Court of Appeal judgment in McFarlane, former Archbishop of Rochester, 
Michael Nazir-Ali, accused Laws LJ of having ‘driven a coach and horses through 
the ancient association of the Christian faith with the constitutional and legal basis of 
British society’, and expressed his concerns that such judgments are a sign that ‘we 
are entering an absolutist era where there is no room for believers’.7  Trigg similarly 
maligns judges in the British courts who, he asserts, make ‘questionable assertions 
about the epistemological status of religion, and its place in the constitution’, and 
                                                 
2
 Alice Donald, Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights: Grounds for 
Optimism? (2013) 2 OJLR 50, 52. 
3
 McFarlane (n1). 
4
 ibid.   
5
 ibid 
6
 ibid. 
7
 Michael Nazir-Ali, ‘The legal threat to our legal tradition’ The Telegraph (London 30 April 2010). 
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criticises them for not giving religious freedom due weight in a hierarchy of rights.
8
 
And in what he describes as ‘the new orthodoxy’, Rivers posits that the equality 
agenda means that churches and religious associations now ‘find themselves boxed 
in… benefiting only from narrow exceptions narrowly interpreted by an 
unsympathetic judiciary’.9  
There is also empirical evidence, albeit very limited, that the decisions of the 
domestic courts are perceived by some as indicative of judges’ failure to adjudicate 
such cases with a requisite level of understanding. Take, for example, the ‘Clearing 
the Ground Inquiry’ conducted by the Christians in Parliament which was set up in 
response to high profile judgments involving religious freedom such as Ladele,
10
 
McFarlane
11
 and Eweida.
12
 Having sought evidence from Christian organisations, 
groups and individuals, the inquiry found that there was ‘a deep-seated and 
widespread lack of understanding about the nature and outworking of religious 
belief’, reflected in, inter alia, the judgments that courts issue.13 Whilst the Inquiry 
stressed that this did not mean that Christianity was badly treated, the frequency and 
nature of cases involving Christians was said to indicate ‘a narrowing of the space 
for the articulation, expression and demonstration of Christian belief’.14 However, as 
Donald finds in her research relating to the understanding of religion or belief in 
equality and human rights in a domestic context, because individuals’ perceptions 
are often influenced by a few high profile case-specific legal judgments, claims that 
there is a general trend of anti-religious (particularly anti-Christian) discrimination 
and marginalisation of faith in the public sphere lack an evidential base.
15
  
Nor are such views universal amongst all Christian groups. Like the majority of the 
lawyers in this study, others perceive that judges do apply the law impartially, 
without any hint of religious bias. The contention that judges misunderstand religion 
                                                 
8
 Roger Trigg Equality freedom and religion (OUP 2012) 154.   
9
 Julian Rivers, ‘Law ,religion and gender equality’ (2007) 9 Ecc LJ 24, 52. 
10
 Ladele v London Borough of Islington and Liberty [2009] EWCA Civ 1357. 
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 McFarlane (n1). 
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 Eweida v British Airways plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80. 
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ground.cfm> accessed 12 March 2016. 
14
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15
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is said to rest on two false propositions.
16
 First, the assumption that there is only one 
Christian view; one in which Christianity is traditionally privileged, irrespective of 
the interests and needs of others. Second, a belief that action linked to religion 
should in some way exempt religious adherents from certain legal requirements. So 
who is right? Is there evidence in recent case-law to support the claim that the 
judiciary are insensitive to, or demonstrate a lack of understanding of matters 
involving religion as Lord Carey and other critics assert? 
Looking for evidence of religious illiteracy 
As the examples below will demonstrate, at first blush, the outcomes and reasoning 
in some of the recent high profile cases on religious discrimination may well lead an 
observer to conclude that religious claimants, particularly Christians, are getting a 
raw deal in the British courts. 
A core belief? 
One area of criticism relates to judicial pronouncements as to whether a religious 
belief is or is not a ‘core’ part of an individual’s faith i.e. to the substantive-content 
approach of the courts. Until the recent ECtHR decision in Eweida,
17
 this issue was 
important in deciding whether conduct was a manifestation of religion (or belief) and 
so fell under the protection of Article 9 of the ECHR or merely motivated by a 
religion (or belief), in which case it did not qualify.
18
  If an individual’s 
manifestation of their religious beliefs was not core to their religion, the restriction of 
their manifestation was more likely to be proportionate than a restriction of core 
beliefs.
19
 Accordingly, it was less likely that a claim of religious discrimination 
would succeed than if those beliefs were a core part of the claimant’s faith. To 
illustrate, in Ladele,
20
 the Court of Appeal stated (notably without explanation) that 
Ladele’s view of marriage (the belief in the union of one man and one woman for 
life to the exclusion of all others) ‘was not a core part of her religion’.21 This, it is 
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 Ekklesia, ‘Misleading claims about discrimination against Christians’ (1 March 2011) 
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argued, demonstrates a fundamental misconception about Christian beliefs on 
marriage because for many Christians, a belief in the sanctity of marriage is central 
to their faith.
22
  
The case of Mba v Merton BC raises a similar point.
23
 Mba, a Christian, worked as a 
care assistant at a children’s home. Following a change of rota, Mba was required to 
work on some Sundays. She refused on the basis that it was contrary to her Christian 
beliefs. After resigning, Mba brought an unsuccessful claim alleging, inter alia, 
indirect religious discrimination contrary to EERBR, reg 3. The ET dismissed Mba’s 
claims. Whilst the Council’s requirement for staff to work on Sundays (the PCP) did 
put Mba at a disadvantage, the ET said that this was objectively justified because, 
among other reasons, ‘the belief that Sunday should be a day of rest was not a core 
component of the Christian religion’.24 The EAT acknowledged that the  assertion 
that Mba’s beliefs about Sunday working were not a core part of her faith might 
reasonably be seen by some as offensive if considered in isolation, but explained that 
it was justified in so far as it was important to the question of proportionality under 
EERBR reg 3(1)(b).25 Specifically, the EAT said if there is a PCP which applies to a 
whole group, but only adversely affects a minority within the group, the PCP will 
carry less weight in the proportionality test than it would do if it affected everyone in 
the whole group.26 
On Appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that the Council had not indirectly 
discriminated against Mba; her employer could not provide their services any other 
way than by requiring all staff to work on Sundays. However, the Court did find that 
the ET had erred in its assessment of how Christians as a group would have been 
affected by the PCP, and said it had given too much weight to whether or not Mba’s 
belief in Sabbatarianism was a core component of the Christian faith.27 Based on 
evidence, Kay LJ opined that ‘for some Christians, working on Sundays was 
unacceptable’ and that Mba's religious belief genuinely embraced that injunction.28 
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Moreover, he stated that it was not necessary to establish that all or most Christians, 
or all or most non-conformist Christians, are or would be put at a particular 
disadvantage.29 Elias and Vos LJJ agreed but for different reasons. Whilst the 
question as to whether or not Mba’s refusal to work on a Sunday was a core 
component of the Christian faith would be a legitimate enquiry if the case was 
considered independently of Article 9, when Article 9 was engaged (as it should 
have been in Mba), there was no need to establish group disadvantage and secondly, 
the question of whether her beliefs were core or not was irrelevant.30 
The issue of what is or is not a core belief was also considered in Eweida.
31
 
Controversially, the court commented that there was no evidence that practising 
Christians considered the visible display of the cross to be a requirement of the 
Christian faith, a point on which Eweida herself agreed. However, Lord Carey has 
argued that a judgment which has the effect of compelling a Christian adherent not to 
wear a cross as an expression of religious faith (because it has been held by another 
not to be important) is to force them to deny their faith.
32
 That the ECtHR 
subsequently ruled that Eweida’s right to manifest her religion had been violated on 
the basis that the domestic courts had failed to give sufficient weight to her desire to 
manifest her religious belief appears to add some weight to this view.
33
  
Critics also point out that the courts have been more willing to decide what 
constitutes a core belief in relation to Christianity compared to other religions.
34
 For 
example, in Eweida, Ladele and Mba, the courts determined that each claimant’s 
religious belief was not a core requirement of their Christian faith. However, Vickers 
argues that in the earlier case of Begum for example, the House of Lords accepted 
that the Muslim schoolgirl’s wearing of the jilbab was a sincerely and strong held 
belief   but did not specifically question whether or not it was a core belief. 
Similarly, in R(Watkins-Singh) v The Governing Boy of Aberdare Girls’ High 
School,
35
 in which the issue was whether a school’s refusal to allow a Sikh pupil to 
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wear a kara bangle contravened the Race Relations Act 1976, the High Court upheld 
the claimants right to wear the kara, even though Sikhism did not require her to do 
so. Silber J explained that the threshold for showing the claimant had suffered a 
particular disadvantage was met where that person genuinely believed on reasonable 
grounds that wearing the kara was a matter of exceptional importance to her racial 
identity or religious belief and the wearing of the kara was shown objectively to be 
of exceptional importance to his or her religion or race, even if the wearing of the 
kara was not an actual requirement of that person's religion or race.
36
 It can be seen 
that in part, the reasoning of Vos LJ and Elias LJ in Mba aligns with the approach in 
these earlier cases suggesting that questions as to what is or is not a core belief  
depend on the facts of the case rather than the faith at issue. 
More generally, critics argue that decisions in which judges declare what is or is not 
a core aspect of religion demonstrates that the courts are increasing willing to 
pronounce on theological issues about which they may not understand and are 
outside the competence of the courts.
37
  Of course, this overlooks the fact that, in 
many instances, judges will have received evidence about whether a belief is or is 
not a core belief to enable them to make an informed decision on such matters. 
Importance of religion 
Returning to Ladele, it is suggested that the Court of Appeal’s comment that her 
employer’s requirement to conduct same-sex ceremonies ‘in no way prevented her 
from worshipping as she wished’ elsewhere,38  arguably shows a lack of 
understanding as to the important role that religion plays in some people’s lives. The 
centrality of faith in the lives of many believers is perhaps best captured by 
Archbishop Sentamu who, commenting on what he sees as an intolerance and 
illiberality about faith in the workplace, has said: ‘Asking someone to leave their 
belief in God at the door of the workplace is akin to asking them to remove their skin 
colour before coming into the office. Faith in God is not an add-on or an optional 
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extra…’.39 If an individual is free to hold religious beliefs, but is not permitted to act 
in accordance with those beliefs (other than exercising the right to resign), it could 
be argued that the right to religious freedom is impotent.  
Choice 
The courts have also been said to (mis)conceptualise religion and belief as being a 
matter of individual choice.
40
 In Ladele, for example, Hambler posits that the courts 
cast Ladele as the protagonist, ‘actively choosing to indulge her whims’.41 In 
suggesting that Ladele wanted to cherry-pick which duties she was prepared to carry 
out (based on her religious beliefs), the courts appear guilty of misunderstanding, 
undervaluing, or at worst, trivialising the place of religion in individual’s lives. 
Again, a similar approach is found in Eweida.
42
 In his judgment,  Sedley LJ 
distinguishes age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
race, sex and sexual orientation, all of which he states are ‘objective characteristics 
of individuals’ from religion and belief which he states are solely matters of choice.43 
It is acknowledged that, for many, religion is a matter of choice; this right being 
recognised as a fundamental human right under ECHR, Article 9. Others, however, 
would assert that religion is not a matter of choice (at least not in practice). It is often 
deeply entrenched in cultural traditions. In this sense, Trigg suggests that religion is 
an identity acquired at birth.
44
 Moreover, in some circumstances, changing one’s 
faith could have profound consequences for an individual such as exclusion from 
their community. In these cases, whilst ultimately the individual has choice, 
exercising that choice may be far from straightforward. Furthermore, as Sirjav asks, 
can religion be said to be a matter of choice in cases where children lack capacity to 
have a view about their own religious upbringing (such as in the family cases 
considered in Chapter 2)? 
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Discussion 
The examples above provide some evidence as to why judges are seen by some to 
adjudicate religious rights claims without due respect and sensitivity.  Whilst the 
Christian cases are considered from an essentially external viewpoint, the approach 
in Begum and Watkins-Singh indicates that, in some cases, the law is open to 
consider religious practices from an internal perspective in which the belief system 
and its importance to the religious adherent is considered from the claimant’s own 
point of view.
45
 That some Christians have reason to feel aggrieved is also a point 
acknowledged by Lady Hale.46 She suggests that it is because Christian practice is 
less demanding than other religions (for example, in terms of requirements such as 
dress code and dietary requirements) that followers of other faiths may be perceived 
to be treated more sympathetically by the courts. However, the argument advanced 
here is that criticisms as to how judges adjudicate reflect a misunderstanding of the 
law and the legal reasoning underpinning facts-specific judgments. It is not that 
judges are anti-religious or religion-insensitive; rather, the crux of critics’ complaints 
seems to be that the law does not accommodate (or arguably privilege) religious 
beliefs in the way that the religious rights claimants and critics would like. Whilst a 
discussion about whether religious beliefs should be accommodated in particular 
settings is beyond the scope of this thesis, vitally, if there was a duty of reasonable 
accommodation, it would not obviate the need for judges to enquire into whether an 
act actually constituted a manifestation of religion.47  
In any case, as many judgments relating to cases involving religiously sensitive 
matters demonstrate, judges make a concerted effort to ensure that they have 
understood the salient religious issues, particularly in cases involving minority 
religious rights. This often includes evaluations of expert evidence on theological 
matters (as the family cases discussed in Chapter 2 demonstrate). There is no reason 
to suppose that judges are any less competent in dealing with this evidence as they 
are when assessing expert evidence in relation to other issues. 
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6.2 An alternative approach: Specialist panels for religious issues? 
 
To build on the finding that most lawyers think judges’ religious beliefs do not affect 
judicial decision-making (at least not in a way that gives cause for concern or calls 
into doubt the ability of judges to decide cases in a fair and impartial manner), 
lawyers were asked for their views about the merits or otherwise of convening a 
specialist panel of judges to hear cases involving religious issues. The rationale for 
this enquiry is simple.  It is contended that a lack of endorsement for specialist 
religious tribunals may buttress the main findings in Chapter 5. On the other hand, 
for the minority of lawyers who felt that judges’ religious beliefs have a more 
profound impact on judging, a lack of support may indicate that Lord Carey’s 
proposed solution to this issue was considered inappropriate; that is, that the 
proposed cure is worse than the disease. Conversely, strong support for the 
establishment of ‘religious courts’48 might point to underlying concerns about the 
interplay between religion and decision-making which are not directly evident in 
lawyers’ responses to the question of whether judges’ religious beliefs affect judicial 
decision-making. 
Rejecting the plea for ‘religious judges’ 
Echoing Laws LJ’s response to Lord Carey’s witness statement in McFarlane, the 
analysis of the interviews and SPQ shows that the majority of lawyers in this study 
were against the idea of having specially convened courts to hear cases involving 
religious rights - all of the barristers who were interviewed and just over half of the 
solicitors who responded to the SPQ (55%) said that they were opposed to Lord 
Carey’s plea for specialist courts. A quarter of the solicitors recorded a neutral 
response (26%), whilst one-fifth of the solicitors expressed support for such a panel 
(19%) (Figure 6.1). 
 
                                                 
48
 The term “religious courts” is used in Patrick Elias, ‘Religious discrimination: conflicts and 
compromises’ [2012] EOR 222. 
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Figure 6.1 Lawyer responses as to whether they support or oppose the idea of a 
specialist panel of judges to hear cases involving religious rights SPQ Q23. Base sample 
Barristers n=18, Solicitors (n=136) [Source: Appendix 25] 
 
The interview data and the qualitative comments from the SPQ (Q23) revealed three 
major reasons for why Lord Carey’s proposal was generally dismissed. These 
grounds were also pervasive in the responses of lawyers who recorded a neutral 
response, the views of whom were generally skewed towards a negative response. 
Judges: professionalism 
First, reflecting sentiments consistently expressed throughout the interviews and 
SPQ, the overarching view amongst most lawyers was that specially designated 
panels were wholly unnecessary because judges, especially those in the most senior 
ranks, possessed the requisite judicial intelligence and integrity to understand, be 
sympathetic to, and therefore adjudicate cases involving religious issues. As B5 
pointed out, it would be very unlikely that an individual lacking these virtues would 
be sitting as a judge, particularly in the higher courts because ‘…the sort of 
sensitivity that you need to deal with those sorts of cases is the sort of level of 
sensitivity that people should have in the first place…’.  
Further challenging Lord Carey’s assertion that judges are unaware of basic issues 
relating to Christianity and other faiths, many lawyers also expressed the view that 
religion was no more complex than other difficult issues that the courts had to deal 
with. The following extracts are illustrative: 
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…are religious factors such a specialist area that they require…or do you think 
our panel or our judiciary wouldn’t be able to handle that? I don’t know. I’m 
not sure it is a specialist area that you’d require specialist judges with that sort 
of knowledge. (B12) 
I certainly do not think that you should be seeking out religious judges for 
cases of that sort because I don’t think there is anything that is required that 
any suitably qualified judge should not be able to bring to the case. (B6) 
Judges are perfectly capable of having an understanding of religious issues. 
You do not have to be of a particular faith to deal with a case (S121E) 
On the odd occasion where a judge seemed ignorant of the interests and needs of 
a religious adherent or the religious issues raised in a case, a commonly shared 
view amongst the barristers was that it was the duty of the advocate to ensure that 
any matters about which the judge was uncertain were addressed. For B4, also a 
part-time judge, this meant that in cases where judges were accused of exercising 
poor judgment or demonstrating a lack of knowledge about the salient issues, it 
was the advocate and not the judge who was at fault. That said, as the following 
extract shows, this interviewee thought that this was a problem irrespective of the 
nature of the dispute being heard: 
I think there are times when the judiciary get religion wrong….But that’s not 
them, that’s a failure of representation. It’s one thing for them to say ‘We’ve 
heard evidence and we reject it,’ and I suppose there might be an argument, in 
particular cases, for asking the judiciary to treat evidence of religious practice 
as expert evidence, although they quite frequently do. But, it’s quite another to 
say ‘Well, they misunderstood the evidence because it wasn’t presented to 
them properly’. I mean, that sort of thing can happen in any case. 
Even though judicial understanding of religious matters was not considered to be an 
issue, it is noteworthy that lawyers felt that judicial training on different belief 
systems and associated issues was an important means by which to maintain and 
support judicial professionalism: 
…all judges need that because they [religious issues] arise in all sorts of cases. 
You need to know whether the witness is more or less likely to be telling the 
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truth if he unwraps the Qur’an and takes it out of the bag or leaves it in the 
bag, you need to know whether you need to pack up early on a Friday 
afternoon so the [inaudible segment] Jew can go off and say his Sabbath 
prayers, you need to be aware of adjustments you might need to make to set 
hearing times when you’ve got Muslim witnesses who are on Ramadan. There 
are all sorts of areas that all judges need to be aware. (B16) 
Likewise, B18 opined: 
I see the issue there as being training and knowledge and awareness rather the 
judge’s personal beliefs. … We may even think it is suitable to have all judges 
trained in this way – to have a day-long training course…Maybe, we feel it 
should be part of the judicial training – that they should be made more 
religiously aware in the same way they are in other offences. 
Opening a Pandora’s Box 
Another major reason for why lawyers were largely opposed to Lord Carey’s call 
for religion-sensitive judges was based on the view that if a case could be made 
for the establishment of a specialist tribunal with the sole remit of hearing cases 
with a religious dimension, it would be only a matter of time before other groups 
would demand that their cases be heard by judges considered to have a heightened 
understanding of, and sensitivity towards specific personal circumstances relating 
to an individual claimant. To deny these groups the right to have their cases heard 
in specially constituted courts would be to unfairly privilege religion for no 
justifiable reason. 
 … if you had a specialist of panel of religious judges and, in other 
areas…well, the next thing is you might as well have a panel of gay judges and 
where does it stop? (B7) 
‘If this were to happen then specialist panels would have to be created for all 
protected characteristics… (S246E) 
If one has ‘religious judges’ then you will also have to have ‘sexual orientation 
judges’, ‘disability judges’ and ‘racial judges’ etc. etc. Judges should judge all 
matters equally not just those which they have a sensitivity for. (S120F) 
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Here it is agreed that to create a system in which religious rights claimants are 
conferred an additional right to have their case heard by religious judges if their 
claims are unsuccessful in the lower courts has no place in a society which values 
equality for all; the idea is regressive and, arguably, it encourages the sort of 
inequality which human rights and equality laws aim to address.  
It was not only socially disadvantaged and minority groups currently protected under 
the Equality Act 2010 that were thought to be those who would call for their own 
specialist courts; for some, this was just the thin end of the wedge. One SPQ 
respondent clearly felt that a dedicated court to hear religious rights claims would set 
a dangerous precedent in which the floodgates would be opened to all litigants who 
would essentially be able to judge-shop:  
Should we also be considering having a specialist panel of judges with a 
proven sensitivity and understanding of what it is like to be in your 40s or of 
what it is like to be pregnant? Where should we stop? We are opening a can of 
worms. (S174E)          
For those more amenable to the idea of specialist religious tribunals, such views 
might be seen as scaremongering. Moreover, the proposal for religiously sensitive 
judges to hear cases involving religious liberty, but not to have, say, gay judges 
hearing cases involving discrimination because of sexual orientation, might be 
defended on the basis that religion, by its very nature, deserves special treatment. For 
example, Trigg argues that the protection of religious rights and the nurturing of the 
principles of freedom and equality are ‘explicitly the product of a Christian vision’ in 
the UK.
49
 The shift towards a secular democracy, he argues, is merely an 
‘aberration’, at best a ‘fashion of the moment’; on this view, some elevated level of 
protection against religious discrimination is necessary.
50
 It might also be argued that 
to select a tribunal panel member based on their specialist expertise or knowledge, 
including having a shared characteristic with a litigant, is not without precedent.  
Specifically, in sex and race discrimination in employment cases, selection of the lay 
members of a tribunal panel may be made so that at least one member of each sex (in 
sex discrimination claims), or at least one member with special experience of race 
                                                 
49
 Roger Trigg, Free to Believe? Religious Freedom in a Liberal Society (Theos 2010), 24 < 
www.theosthinktank.co.uk/research/2010/02/01/free-to-believe> last accessed 14 June 2017 
50
 ibid 46. 
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relations (in race discrimination claims) is appointed. 
51
 However, this is not a legal 
requirement and failure to appoint a lay member on these grounds does not affect the 
validity of the panel’s composition.52 The justification for having non-legal members 
on tribunals is not only to draw upon their unique skills and expertise but also to 
ensure the judicial system is representative of those who come before the courts and 
of the wider society.
53
  
Other participants expressed concern that the establishment of a panel of judges 
qualified to hear religiously sensitive issues might also serve as a catalyst for the 
development of a pluralist court system in the UK. In other words, religious legal 
systems such as Sharia councils and the Jewish Beth Din courts could run parallel to 
the English legal system. B9 said: 
If, by that [the suggestion to appoint a specially convened tribunal to hear 
religiously sensitive cases] you mean holding a particular religious view, I’m 
not sure that is the right way forward because you start to get the sense then of 
potentially religious courts. We are in a secular society when all is said and 
done. 
Similarly emphasising that members of the judiciary sit as secular judges in a secular 
court system, B19 voiced concern that judges selected to hear religiously sensitive 
cases on the basis of their religion-sensitive credentials could fracture the current 
legal system: 
The secular law is what it is and it holds primacy over all other belief systems 
so I don’t see why there should be any special treatment… religion should just 
keep out and that’s the end of it. Once you start making… you see, I recall 
people like Rowan Williams suggesting that perhaps Sharia law could play 
some part here… Absolutely no chance! We should not run parallel systems 
because that is the camel’s nose… 
                                                 
51
 This practice stems from an undertaking by the then Labour Government during the passage of 
Race Relations Bill, later to become the Race Relations Act 1976  (House of Lords, Lord Jacques, 15 
October 1976 cc725.   
52
 Habib v Elkington & Co Ltd [1981] ICR 435. 
53
 For an interesting insight as  to the effect of panel composition on litigants perceptions of fairness 
in relation to race and ethnicity see Jane Aston, Darcy Hill and Nii Djan Tackey, ‘The experience of 
claimants in race discrimination Employment Tribunal cases’ (2006) DTI Employment Relations 
Research Series No. 55 .  
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Practical difficulties in convening a specialist panel 
A third area of common concern amongst lawyers was the view that if even Lord 
Carey’s calls for a specialist panel could be supported, the practicalities of 
establishing such a court would prove unduly problematic. Three key areas were 
identified. 
Qualifying criteria 
A frequent thread throughout the data was that it would be imperative for any judge 
seeking appointment to such a specialist panel to demonstrate an understanding of a 
range of religions and an appreciation of the effect that religious beliefs could have 
on an individual’s daily living. This is illustrated in the following comment from 
S131E who, in response to SPQ Q24 which asked respondents to state the qualifying 
criteria they thought would be needed to sit on a specialist panel said: ‘An 
understanding of faith issues and how they can impact the jobs we have to 
undertake’, and ‘Sympathy with the view that a decision based on conscience is not 
taken with a desire to discriminate or to prevent a particular outcome….’ In theory, 
however, this requirement leaves the door open to all judges. Current Judicial Office 
guidance requires that all judicial office-holders must ensure that they are properly 
informed and aware of the cultures, beliefs and disadvantages of others, both in 
general and where the need arises in a specific case.
54
 In other words, it is already 
taken as read that judges have or will acquire the necessary knowledge and 
understanding about different cultures and beliefs (including those of minority faith 
groups) to adjudicate cases in a fair and impartial way. Other concerns related to 
how an individual judge could demonstrate sufficient ‘understanding and sensitivity’ 
of religious issues for the purpose of selection to the panel. Some respondents 
thought that it would be sufficient for an applicant to simply show that they had 
undergone relevant training or already had experience of adjudicating religiously 
sensitive cases as illustrated in the following: 
Appropriate training across the widest possible number of religions (as well, of 
course, as sufficient judicial experience) (S102E)  
                                                 
54
 Judicial College, Equal Treatment Bench Book, 2.31. 
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A background in dealing with sensitive religious cases, ie, possible (sic) sat on 
a Court of Appeal case which resulted in that case becoming a guidance case 
for the remainder of Judges… (S189E) 
Another solicitor, S96E, felt that ‘an ability to understand and acknowledge the way 
in which personal upbringing has influenced an approach to these issues’ would be 
vital, whilst S137F was not alone in proposing ‘that being religious be a qualifying 
criteria’, albeit ‘efforts would need to be taken to ensure that the panel was 
balanced’.  
Other issues that could arise include whether applicants would have to declare their 
own religious beliefs to qualify. If so, would those who exercised their right not to 
do so be barred from selection? Furthermore, would those with non-theistic religious 
beliefs qualify to sit? If the religious panel was limited to judges with theistic beliefs, 
this would undoubtedly lead to more discrimination claims because those having a 
lack of religion or religious beliefs would be subject to less favourable treatment 
than those with religious theistic beliefs. Of course, this would have time and cost 
implications for both the judiciary and the tax payer. It might reasonably be expected 
that religions falling within the legal definitions would be included in the qualifying 
criteria. On this basis, the panel would be pointless - all judges would be eligible 
because such definitions encompass having a lack of religion or religious belief. Of 
course, although ‘religious’ judges sitting on such a panel would still be required to 
adjudicate in a fair and impartial manner, might their decisions be more vulnerable to 
unconscious religious bias than judges with less strong religious convictions? 
Composition   
Even if a specialist ‘religion’ panel could be assembled, many lawyers in this study 
were unsure as to how such a panel should be composed. In his witness statement, 
Lord Carey said that he would support a panel comprised of judges of all faiths and 
denominations. However, this gives rise to a number of important questions. For 
example, who would allocate which ‘religious judges’ would sit on the panel in a 
given case? Would there be set protocols for panel composition in cases involving 
litigants from particular religious backgrounds? For example, could a Muslim 
claimant expect a Muslim judge to hear his or her case alongside panel members 
from other faiths? It is argued that this would be completely unworkable in many 
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instances due to the lack of religious diversity in the judiciary, particularly at the 
senior levels. Accordingly, would it be sufficient that a religious claimant had their 
case heard by a panel of judges which did not necessarily comprise a judge sharing 
the same or similar religious identity?  
Returning to the floodgates argument considered above, there is also the question of 
what form a tribunal hearing a case involving a clash of rights, such as that between 
religious rights and the right not to be discriminated against because of sexual 
orientation, would take?  On Lord Carey’s proposal, the panel would comprise those 
who are sensitive to religious issues. However, there would be an equally strong 
argument for having representation from judges who are sensitive to, and 
understanding of the rights of the LGBT community to sit. Surely, a panel selected 
without reference to judicial religious background serves to minimise potential 
concerns about actual or apparent religious bias. 
 
Identifying cases 
Finally, as B4 commented, there is also the difficult issue of determining which 
cases would be heard by the tribunal because ‘The other thing is you don’t know 
when you are going to encounter it. I mean nobody screens the witnesses’’. Some 
cases obviously engage religiously sensitive issues from the outset – religious 
discrimination cases or child cases involving disputes about religious upbringing 
being obvious examples. But what would happen in cases where religious issues 
came to the fore during proceedings? Would such cases have to be remitted from 
general court to the specialist tribunal? At the very least there would be major 
cost and time implications and, on this ground alone, the system would be 
unfeasible. Moreover, whilst judges sitting on a panel may well be versed in the 
religious issues, they may lack the breadth of legal knowledge to decide cases in 
areas of law in which they had no expertise. Put simply, the quality of decision-
making could be compromised. 
A counter view 
Of the 19% of solicitors who supported the idea of a specialist court, it is perhaps 
significant that the majority (80%) identified as Christian, the remaining 20% being 
from the ‘Unaffiliated’ group (it will be recalled from Chapter 4 that this group 
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comprised those who identified as Atheist, Agnostic or No religion). Of those who 
made supplementary comments, all identified as Christian and were coded as 
infrequent attendees at court. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind the possible 
bias in these responses.  It was clear from the SPQ data that these few respondents 
felt that, in some religiously sensitive cases, judges were failing to meet the grade in 
terms of the requisite level of religious literacy. Because of this, there was felt to be 
some merit in having a specialist court to hear religious rights cases. The following 
remarks clearly reflect a more widespread view, particularly among Christian 
groups, that religious views are being increasingly marginalised in the public square, 
including in the justice system:  
Each religion does require particular understanding into their practices and not 
all judges necessarily have that level of knowledge. (S210E) 
Issues of religious freedom are particularly sensitive in terms of having an 
understanding of the impact of such cases. A lack of understanding can often 
lead to a missing of points of significance in the circumstances of a case. 
(S135E) 
And alluding to some of the recent clash of rights cases in an employment law 
context, S155E, opined: 
I think that the religious discrimination laws have been watered down in 
practice by a series of decisions where religious views have been given 
inadequate weight when balancing factors. There is a strong suspicion that this 
is because the employment judges do not understand the sensitivities. 
Once again, it is interesting to find that of all the lawyers who participated in this 
study, it was only solicitors who expressed support for a specialist panel. There 
was no pattern between groups according to their area of practice. The reason for 
the disparity between barristers and a minority of solicitors is unclear. Again, this 
may be attributable to the fact that a larger solicitor sample presented a greater 
opportunity for a wider range of opinion or be a result of the different methods 
used to collect and analyse data. It is also noteworthy that none of the solicitors 
from non-Christian backgrounds expressed support for a specialist panel. As this 
group only comprised a small number of respondents, the results must be treated 
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with caution. However, it can tentatively be questioned whether a lack of support 
for a specialist panel from those in the non-Christian group might be indicative of 
a view espoused by lawyers in Chapter 5, ie, that judges often appear more 
sensitive to the needs and interests of religious minority litigants than others 
(particularly Christian claimants) bringing religious rights claims. 
Maintaining the status quo 
There is no doubt as to the general tenor in the majority of lawyers’ responses in the 
interviews and SPQ; that lawyers have confidence in, and respect for the quality of 
judicial decision-making in relation to cases involving religiously sensitive issues. 
Arguably, this reason alone renders the idea of a specialist panel to hear religious 
rights cases unnecessary; the message being ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. As seen 
above, there are other compelling reasons why, as Laws LJ opined in McFarlane, 
specialist courts would ‘be deeply inimical to the public interest’.55 
Here it is argued that a panel of judges convened solely to hear religious rights and 
freedoms is difficult to reconcile with the requirement of impartiality (save perhaps 
where an effectively neutral panel is convened). It introduces a form of 
‘personalised’ justice based on claimants’ and judges’ attributes which undermines 
the requirement for objectivity and impartiality in judging. This is not akin to other 
specialist courts and tribunals where, for example, family law magistrates or lay 
wing members on an employment tribunal are selected because they have special 
training and/or are expected to have a specialised perspective of the facts and 
evidence before them. The danger of having a religious panel with judges selected on 
the basis of their being religion-sensitive is that an element of claimant partiality is 
introduced. However, this does not mean that judges should not approach all 
religiously sensitive cases, like other difficult cases, without due regard to the 
religious beliefs and practices of those appearing before them. 
 
6.3 Exploring lawyers’ views about religious diversity in the judiciary 
 
It is suggested that a further way to explore lawyers’ views about the relationship 
between judges’ religion and judicial decision-making is to assess views as to 
                                                 
55
 McFarlane (n1) 26. 
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whether there is a perceived need to promote and encourage greater religious 
diversity in the judiciary. The rationale for this argument is similar to that put 
forward in respect of other diversity strands. In relation to gender, for example, 
Hunter cites six basic reasons as to how and why improving gender diversity makes 
a difference to substantive decision-making.
60
  Symbolic reasons include (1) 
increased democratic legitimacy, (2) the advancement of equality of opportunity, and 
(3) the provision of encouragement and active mentoring for women working in law. 
From a practical perspective, it is argued that (4) women judges may provide what 
Hunter describes as ‘a better courtroom experience’ for female litigants and 
witnesses;
61
 the assumption being that there will be less opportunity for gender bias 
and sexism in judicial decisions. Relatedly, it is argued that (5) the presence of 
women judges can have an ameliorative impact on judging from behind the scenes. 
As well as providing a different perspective, women judges ‘educate and civilise’ 
their male colleagues against gender bias and stereotyping for example.
62
 Finally, by 
virtue of their own life experiences and drawing upon Gilligan’s ‘different voice 
theory’, it is argued that (6) women bring a gendered sensibility to judging which 
can occasionally influence the way cases are decided.  
In respect of religion, today’s judges sit as secular judges. However, a judiciary 
(particularly the senior ranks) that is perceived to largely comprise white male 
individuals brought up in households traditionally underpinned by Christian values 
may be thought to lack democratic legitimacy, particularly by those belonging to 
minority faith groups.
63
 Some would argue that this is reinforced by the judiciary’s 
involvement in religious services such as the ‘Judges Service’ which, it has been 
claimed, at least gives the appearance of support for Christianity (and the Church of 
England in particular).
64
  Whilst judges’ religious beliefs should have no bearing on 
how decisions are reached within a legal framework, a religiously diverse judiciary 
could instil or enhance public confidence in the perception that judges understand 
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 Rosemary Hunter, ‘More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-making’ 
[2015] 68 CLP 119. 
61
 ibid. 
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 Of course the irony here is that much of the criticism levelled at the judiciary is from Christians 
who feel that they are increasingly marginalised in  an increasingly secular society.  
64
 ‘NSS calls for end of Anglican judges’ services’ (National secular society, 28 September 2017) 
http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2017/09/nss-calls-for-end-of-anglican-judges-services> accessed 
29 December 2017. 
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and/or are sensitive to faiths other than their own. So what do lawyers think about 
religious diversity in the judiciary? 
Supporting judicial diversity: overview 
Unsurprisingly, the data shows that both groups of lawyers overwhelming supported 
the need for greater diversity in the judiciary.  
Barristers 
Reflecting the trend in their previous responses, barristers were unanimous in their 
support for judicial diversity. Typical responses included: ‘I think it’s essential’ 
(B16), ‘I do agree with it very much’ (B13) and ‘I can answer that very quickly… a 
very, very strong yes’ (B10). The most common arguments in favour of a more 
diverse judiciary were those found in the diversity debate literature. As such, 
interviewees talked about the need for democratic legitimacy, equality of opportunity 
for those from minority and underrepresented backgrounds, and the effect of having 
judges from a wider range of backgrounds on the quality of judicial decision-making 
and justice.
65
  
As an aside, it is worth noting that the majority of barristers were keen to 
emphasise that diversity should not come at the expense of merit and that using 
positive discrimination to accelerate progress to a more diverse judiciary was 
likely to hinder rather than enhance justice. This is neatly summed up in the 
following extract from B3:  ‘I think the job of a judge is incredibly specialist. I 
think there is a huge difference between a good judge and a bad judge. It’s a 
difficult skill, and I think to just simply start recruiting people because they have 
diverse backgrounds would be an absolute disaster to the system.’ 
Solicitors 
Figure 6.2 shows that, like the barristers in part one of the study,  a significant 
majority of solicitors were in favour of having a judiciary with a more diverse 
background – approximately four-fifths (79%) of respondents, many of whom 
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 Geoffrey Bindman and Karon Monaghan ‘Judicial Diversity: Accelerating Change 
www.jac.judiciary.gov.uk/sites/default/files/sync/news/accelerating_change_finalrev_0.pdf accessed 
27 August 2016. 
 248 
 
expressed strong agreement .  Just 5% of respondents disagreed that there was a need 
for greater diversity in the judiciary, and 16% recorded a neutral response. 
 
Figure 6.2 Solicitors’ views about judicial diversity (n=134) [Source: Appendix 25]  
 
The solicitors who agreed that there should be greater diversity gave similar reasons 
as the barristers above to justify their answers. The need for greater democratic 
legitimacy featured strongly, the following comments being typical: ‘Judicial 
diversity is needed purely to show those accessing justice that all judges are not 
white or heterosexual’ (S251E). S224E simply commented that ‘I think the judiciary 
should reflect the makeup of society’. Making the same point, S64E made clear the 
importance of the role played by diversity in creating an equality of opportunity: 
‘This is primarily to ensure that individuals wishing to join the judiciary are not 
facing unreasonable barriers and also to provide an outward perception of the 
judicial system as not being unrepresentative’. That said, all of these respondents 
went on to say that these reasons were not sufficient to prioritise diversity over other 
basic requirements such as ‘straight ability’ (S245F) and a requirement for judges 
who were ‘sensitive to, and understood the issues faced by litigants on a case-by-
case basis’ (S185E). 
The few solicitors who recorded a neutral or negative response to SPQ Q25 justified 
their responses by suggesting that diversity arguments based on the need for 
democratic legitimacy were misleading because it was impossible to have a judiciary 
that reflected the populace in any meaningful way and that, in any case, the judiciary 
2 3 
16 
49 
31 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neither
agree
nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
P
e
r
c
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
r
e
sp
o
n
d
e
n
ts
 
SPQ Q25. Do you agree or disagree that there should 
be greater judicial diversity? 
 249 
 
operated successfully and in a way that meant that there was no need for it to reflect 
social diversity.  
Again, reflecting the sentiments of the barristers, it is interesting that in many of 
the additional comments of the SPQ respondents, the pervading view was that it 
was essential that judges be appointed on merit and were not promoted as a result 
of positive discrimination based on specific background characteristics.  
Addressing religious diversity in the judiciary 
The widespread enthusiasm that punctuated lawyers’ responses to the question of 
whether they supported greater diversity in the judiciary (in general) was not 
reflected in their responses to questions on the more narrow issue of whether 
specific judicial characteristics such as religious identity should be prioritised in 
diversity debates. The scope of diversity has recently been raised by Lord 
Neuberger who enunciated that diversity should go beyond ‘familiar categories 
such as ethnic origin and gender’ to include other areas such as social, educational 
and professional background.
66
 
Barristers 
When asked about whether judicial diversity initiatives should extend beyond a 
relatively narrow focus on gender and ethnicity to encompass other diversity 
strands such as religion, the overarching view from those at the Bar was that the 
current approach to tackling a lack of diversity in the judiciary was generally 
sufficient and, with one exception discussed below, spotlighting other diversity 
strands was unnecessary for the time being. B16’s view was typical: 
We have not finished sorting out, and we are nowhere near sorting out gender 
equality. Our record on race is even worse…I think there is a great danger that 
if we try and sort out everything at once… I think those [gender and race] are 
serious social inequalities that we need to address. 
That there is often an overlap between ethnic identity and religious identity meant 
that, for many interviewees, the current focus on increasing BAME judges would 
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accessed 19 April 2016. 
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indirectly bring about greater religious diversity in the judiciary. Thus, for 
example, B5 opined: 
I think that the issue of a mix of religious groups will happen automatically 
with greater diversity in terms of ethnic mix. There is certainly, in my lifetime, 
never been a problem with Jewish judges or particular Christian denomination 
judges and, as the younger generation of very able Asian lawyers gets up to the 
stage where they are becoming judges, then the religious mix will expand to 
include judges from religious groups which come from south Asia and areas 
like that. And when you’ve got things like sexual orientation, I think that also 
will just work it out… 
As indicated in B16’s comment above and those below, there was one exception to 
the general view; socio-economic imbalance in the judiciary was identified as being 
an important area that had hitherto been neglected. For example, having said that the 
current narrow focus on gender and race diversity was misguided, and describing the 
current approach to improving judicial diversity as ‘a total dead end’, B9 went on to 
explain: 
It’s not the colour or the gender of the individual that’s important in my view, 
background is, because its background that shapes views and perceptions of 
the individual judge. 
Adopting a similar argument, B17 asserted: 
I think the restriction to those two strands, it’s not really a focus but a 
restriction to those two strands, is pretty short-sighted actually. I think it shows 
that in actual fact the political and wider ruling class are pretty stupid on these 
issues. 
Like B9, B17 felt that diversity of background, particularly socio-economic 
status, was likely to be a more useful starting point by which to tackle the lack of 
judicial diversity than that which spotlighted gender and race.  
It is of interest to this study that during the interviews there was no suggestion 
from the barristers that a more concerted effort to attract judicial candidates from 
minority religious backgrounds was necessary in order to improve judging or 
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justice. In harmony with the general tenor of the interviews, this suggests that the 
interplay between judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision-making is not a 
source of concern to the barristers who took part in this study. 
Solicitors 
Solicitors were not asked specifically asked about whether they felt having a more 
religiously diverse judiciary was important. Instead, a matrix question was used to 
explore respondent views as to which diversity strands, including religion, were 
perceived to be most important in a judicial context.  Specifically, in SPQ Q26 
respondents were asked whether they felt that the narrow focus of judicial diversity 
initiatives (typically the focus is on gender and BAME) should be broader so to 
include any of the following characteristics: age; disability; gender re-assignment; 
sexual orientation; social class; political beliefs; and importantly religious beliefs.
67
 
Responses are presented in Figure 6.3 below. 
 
Figure 6.3 Solicitors’ views about extending the focus of judicial diversity initiatives 
Base sample: Age, Disability and Social class (n=106), Sexual orientation Gender-
reassignment, Political beliefs and Religious beliefs (n=105) [Source: Appendix 27] 
                                                 
67
 An illustration of the limited focus of initiatives to improve judicial diversity is seen in the JAC’s 
equal merit provision policy which provides that were two or more persons are judged to be of equal 
merit and where under-representation of gender or race can be demonstrated, the JAC can consider 
applying the equal merit provision for the purpose of increasing diversity, Crime and Courts Act 
2013. 
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Of the options listed in SPQ Q26, social class attracted the highest number of 
positive responses – 70% of respondents agreed that the focus of diversity initiatives 
should be extended to include social class, presumably in order to encourage those 
from less rather than more socially advantaged backgrounds to the judiciary. 
Disability, age and sexual orientation also ranked highly, each attracting the support 
of more than half of respondents in the sample – 63%, 59% and 55% respectively.  
Notably fewer respondents agreed that the focus of diversity initiatives should be 
extended to the remaining characteristics. 47% of respondents felt that gender-
reassignment should be included.  A similar proportion agreed that religious beliefs 
should be included (44%), whilst significantly fewer respondents thought that the 
focus should extend to political beliefs (31%). Ranking based on levels of 
disagreement were similar to those relating to agreement. Responses in the ‘Neither 
agree nor disagree’ category were not insignificant; anything between one-fifth and 
approximately one-third of respondents recorded a neutral response to each of the 
characteristics listed in SPQ Q26. 
Discussion 
If there are concerns amongst lawyers about judges being insensitive to, or 
lacking an understanding of matters of faith in a way that affects judicial decision-
making, this might be reflected in a desire to promote and encourage greater 
religious diversity in the same way that gender and BAME have been fore fronted 
in judicial diversity initiatives.
68
 However, the findings from this study suggest 
that the majority of lawyers do not consider this to be necessary.  
 
6.4 Remaining blind to judges’ faith 
 
An alternative way to explore lawyers’ perceptions of the nexus between judges’ 
religion and judicial decision-making is to see whether lawyers think that more 
should be known about judges personal backgrounds, including their religion.  
 
                                                 
68
 ibid. 
 253 
 
Barristers 
Most barristers were strongly opposed to the view that a judge should be required to 
disclose his or her religious affiliation upon taking judicial office. For most 
interviewees, judges’ religious beliefs were a personal matter.69 On this construction, 
there is an assumption that because a judge’s religion ought to be an irrelevant factor 
in how judicial duties are discharged there is no legitimate basis upon which judges 
should be required to declare their religious beliefs. The same argument can be 
advanced in relation to other judicial personal factors. Of course, the corollary of this 
is that if judges’ religious beliefs (and other characteristics) are shown to influence 
judicial decision-making, and so can be said to impinge on the public sphere, there is 
a case to be advanced in support of disclosure. Whilst many of the barristers acceded 
to the possibility that judging may be affected by unconscious religious bias, the 
perceptions by many that any influence on judging would, at worst, be so slight as to 
be insignificant, outweighed any argument in support of disclosure. This view is 
implicit in the following comment from B5: 
We shouldn’t, as a matter of routine, be informed of what they [judges’ 
religious beliefs] are because… two reasons. One, they are private but, more 
importantly, I just don’t think there is a problem in this country with religious 
bias or even religious views affecting judges…certainly from my own personal 
experience, it’s just not an issue… 
Interviewees also pointed out that if litigants were able to ascertain the religious 
sensitivities of a judge, it would open the door to claims of judicial bias. This could, 
at the very least, delay or frustrate court proceedings. Thus, cautioning against a 
requirement for judges to declare their religious background B16 said: 
I think the danger, if we start saying that information ought to be all in the 
public domain is that people will start saying ‘Now I’ve got that information I 
ought to be able to do something with it’ and the ‘something to do with it’ is to 
turn around and say to the judge ‘you can’t hear this case because your 
personal beliefs make it entirely appropriate for you to do so. 
                                                 
69
 An individual has an absolute right to hold internal thoughts and beliefs in private, in the ‘forum 
internum’ under the ECHR, art 9(1).  
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And similarly citing the risk of claims of bias as a defence for why it was 
preferable to not to know too much about the backgrounds of individual judges, 
B8 reflected: 
I think it’s better that judges have this slight detachment from opening 
themselves up, not a detachment from reality, but from opening themselves up 
because, if you kind of bare yourself, there is always going to be a proportion 
of people who are going to seek to take advantage of that. These people [the 
judges] are meant to be interpreters of law at low level,and makers of law at a 
higher level, or I suppose benders of law at a higher level, and I think it is 
probably better that they are able to do that without thinking at the back of it: 
‘Well, is someone going to think I’ve only done this because I’m an atheist or 
because I am a Christian or because I am Jew or whatever… 
There is some evidence to support such concerns. For example,  it was seen in 
Chapter 1 that  Cooke J faced strong criticism that his known conservative Christian 
beliefs may have influenced the length of sentence he handed down to the defendant 
in R v Sarah Louise Catt.
70
 Likewise, one interviewee questioned whether former 
High Court Judge Sir Paul Coleridge would have been subject to as much criticism 
when discussing his views on traditional marriage if his own religious (Christian) 
views were not already widely known. Sir Paul Coleridge received a formal warning 
from the JCIO on the basis that his interviews and articles on the decline of marriage 
were ‘incompatible with his judicial responsibilities and therefore amounted to 
judicial misconduct’.71 B16 explained that ‘once he had done it the Judicial 
Complaints Office were just bombarded because every litigant who lost in front of 
him said “I lost because he didn’t like my morality”. So, you see what happens if 
you stick your head above the parapet and make those kinds of judgments known’. 
Another barrister felt that any requirement for a judge to disclose their religion 
upon judicial appointment would also discourage people from applying for 
judicial office for fear of later being accused of bias. 
 
                                                 
70
 [2013] EWCA Crim 1187. 
71
 JCIO, Statement from the Judicial Conduct and Investigations Office (OJC 58/13 2013). 
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Solicitors 
Solicitors were not asked directly whether they felt that individual judges’ religion 
should be a matter of public record. They were asked for their views on the more 
general question of whether it would be useful to know more about the personal 
backgrounds of the judges hearing their clients’ cases. As Figure 6.4 shows, views 
were very mixed. Two-fifths of respondents agreed that it would be useful (40%), 
approximately one quarter neither agreed nor disagreed (23%) and just over one third 
of solicitors disagreed (37%).  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Views about knowing more about judicial personal factors (n=137) [Source: 
Appendix 28] 
The most common explanation for why solicitors said it would useful to know 
more about judicial backgrounds was that it would improve their own case 
presentation and help them manage their client’s expectations more effectively. 
This view is clearly captured by S144F who explained that: ‘It would be better for 
clients to have more certainty and for us as solicitors to be better equipped to 
provide a better level of service’. 
There were several emergent themes in the responses of those who were opposed to 
the idea of knowing more about individual judges. Reflecting the views of some of 
the barristers considered above, the most basic reason was that judicial personal 
factors were irrelevant to, and had an insignificant impact on, judicial outcomes: 
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‘The impact of judges’ personal factors is never sufficiently significant to require 
prior knowledge or more information’ (S136E). This was frequently attributed to 
judges’ professionalism: ‘It should be irrelevant and I consider many judges try very 
hard for justice to be blind and applied equally.’ (S195F)  
Like the barristers, many solicitors said that the personal affairs of a judge were 
simply a private matter. Some expressed concern transparency as to judicial personal 
backgrounds would amount to an infringement of an individual’s right to privacy. 
For example: 
Personal factors are, by definition, personal and likely to be of a sensitive 
nature. It would not necessarily be appropriate for that information to be 
shared. (S54E) 
Others felt that access to background information about judges would be inimical 
to justice; it would threaten the basic principles of judicial independence and 
impartiality and foster a culture of suspicion which in turn could undermine trust 
and confidence in the judiciary: 
Judges are supposed to be neutral and independent. If their personal factors 
were known more than they already are, justice may not only not be done but 
not seen to be done. (S77E) 
Personal factors are part of life and any degree of transparency would be 
oppressive for judges and of no practical value – it would never be right to vet 
judges for each case and so the information would have no added value. 
For S83E, lifting the lid on judicial backgrounds could even ‘jeopardise important 
decisions, current and past’. Along similar lines, S59F argued that knowing more 
about judges could ‘lead to less objectivity from lawyers and, as suggested in the 
following extracts, could weaken an otherwise good case: 
I would probably be interested in the personal factors of the judge but knowing 
them would probably make me over-emphasise that aspect of preparation 
rather than focusing on the strengths of my case overall. (S52E) 
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This would risk the possibility of trying to play to an audience based upon 
stereotypes and prejudices which would be unhelpful in a judicial process. 
(S91E)   
If people knew more the way in which a case is presented would deliberately 
try to work the angle based on that knowledge. Its best we don’t know. 
(S250E) 
As the following extract illustrates, even if judicial background information was 
available, it was felt that it would be of little use when trying to predict case 
outcomes because it was impossible to predict how judicial reasoning would be 
affected: 
It is hard to predict the effect of the knowledge on the Judge’s view. For 
example, if I know my client has the disability as the judge I would ask myself 
– would a judge have more or less sympathy for an individual who claims not 
to be able to attend work because of the same disability when the Judge can 
attend on a daily basis? A similarity might make the Judge less rather than 
more sympathetic. More likely however the Judge would disregard altogether. 
(S55E) 
For S226F, the argument was rather less complicated. Knowing more about judicial 
background was of little use because judges’ behaviour, like that of all humans, was 
inherently unpredictable.  
The easiest to read and best known Judge will behave differently if her dog has 
just been put down and I wouldn't expect her to advertise the fact. 
 
Discussion 
The study findings thus far indicate that lawyers overwhelmingly perceive that 
judges’ personal factors play a part in judicial decision-making when judicial 
discretion exists and when the area of law lends itself to value-judgment. There is 
less certainty about the role played by a judge’s religious convictions, although most 
lawyers acknowledge that religious values may play a part in the decisional process, 
particularly in cases where judicial discretion is exercised and where religiously 
sensitive issues are involved. For this reason, it was anticipated that lawyers would 
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react positively to the suggestion that it would be useful to know more about judges’ 
personal backgrounds and views. In fact, as seen above, the findings suggest that a 
majority of the lawyers in this study were not receptive to this idea for a variety of 
reasons.  As discussed on Chapter 3.2, such attitudes reflect a strong tradition in 
which the anonymity of judges has been considered vital in order to maintain public 
confidence in the proper administration of justice. As Lord Neuberger explains: 
…one of the advantages of the UK justice system has been that individual 
judges have never, or at least very rarely, been well known, let alone 
controversial figures. And this is desirable: justice should not, I believe, be 
personalised. It should be seen to be objective and reasonably detached, as the 
more it is about personalities the greater the risk of it being devalued and 
trivialised.
72
 
Kavanagh is similarly circumspect about knowing too much about individual judges’ 
backgrounds and beliefs.
73
 Whilst she acknowledges that judicial decisions depend 
in part on the judges’ moral and ideological beliefs, Kavanagh advances four key 
reasons for why calls for enhanced transparency about individual judges’ 
backgrounds and views (specifically those of the UKSC Justices) should be treated 
with caution.
74
  There is no reason why similar arguments cannot be advanced in 
relation to judges at other levels within the judiciary.  
As a preliminary point, Kavanagh notes that there has been little public interest in 
knowing more about judicial backgrounds.
75
 However, whilst this may have been 
the case in the immediate period after the establishment of the UKSC (when 
Kavanagh’s article was written), there are clear signs that, fuelled by the media, 
public attitudes may be shifting, at least in relation to judges in the appellate 
courts. Outside the current context, the reaction to the recent Brexit ruling,
76
 and 
media comments about the perceived pro-EU bias of judges in general, and the 
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160303.pdf> accessed 7 July 2016. 
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judges who heard the case in particular, is a case in point.
77
 Moving on to 
challenge the claim that increased transparency may enhance public trust and 
confidence in the judiciary, Kavanagh first argues that knowing more about 
judges may spark concerns about the subjectivity and possible arbitrariness of 
judging.
78
 It is accepted that this is a risk. At the same time, this argument rests on 
a challengeable assumption – that the public believe in the ‘default understanding’ 
of the judge as ‘objective, neutral, and detached from any particular moral or 
political leaning...’79 Do the public really think that judges are able to divorce 
their religious (and other) beliefs from the process of judging?
80
  
Second, Kavanagh suggests that being more transparent about judicial 
backgrounds may be counter intuitive.
81
 This is because judges may feel more 
inclined to conceal the role that their personal factors play in judging for fear of 
criticism and/or claims of bias and request to recuse. This is supported by 
reference to the impact that increased transparency has had on judicial nominees 
to the US Supreme Court; for example, Justice Sonia Sotomayor is said to have 
distanced herself from an earlier view that her Latina upbringing might affect her 
decision-making. This argument is clearly more compelling. However, arguably 
this simply means that the status quo prevails. Judges do not currently explain 
how their own views have influenced how they have arrived at a decision.  
Third, drawing on O’Neill’s work in relation to greater Government transparency 
on how public institutions function,
82
 Kavanagh argues that knowing more about 
judges’ backgrounds raises the problem of ‘undifferentiated information’ whereby 
dubious sources, misinformation and unsorted information can lead to confusion 
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rather than clarity.
83
 To illustrate her argument, Kavanagh again explains how a 
legally uneducated public may easily jump to conclusions about the validity and 
lawfulness of judicial decisions which are in part shaped by judicial background, 
life experience and personal views and values. This, she argues, may be 
exacerbated by inaccurate or hyped media reporting. Again, this is a forceful 
argument. The counter argument here is that if judges were more open and 
transparent, it would bring clarity because the sources being relied upon should be 
more reliable (although, of course, this is not guaranteed).  
Finally, Kavanagh warns that enhancing transparency can create perverse 
incentives;
84
 not only might judges conceal some of the factors that colour their 
reasoning, they may also be more cautious in deciding cases. Again, this is a 
strong argument. However, given the increased scrutiny of the judiciary, both 
individually and collectively, it is reasonable to suppose that judges already adopt 
such an approach in controversial cases; a cautious approach does not 
automatically mean that the quality of judging will be adversely affected as 
implied. 
Given the raised profile and power of the judiciary over recent years (the main 
reasons for which were discussed in Chapter 1), together with the findings of this 
and other studies which suggest a relationship between judges’ personal factors and 
judging, there is a legitimate case to be made for greater judicial transparency in 
relation to the backgrounds of members of the judiciary, particularly those sitting in 
the highest court. This is certainly a view to which former justice of the High Court 
of Australia, Michael Kirby, subscribes, at least in relation to UKSC judges. He 
posits that the public (being those affected by the UKSC’s decisions) has ‘a 
legitimate interest in knowing more about the values of potential appointees’.85 At 
the same time,  it might be argued that greater public awareness of, and 
understanding about how judges at all levels judge (including the factors that 
influence the way they make decisions) could increase public confidence in the 
judiciary and the justice system more generally. The more difficult question is that of 
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how open and transparent should the judiciary be? As regards whether more should 
be known about judges’ religious backgrounds, there are valid arguments on both 
sides. However, based on the current findings, it is tentatively suggested that, on 
balance, because religion is not considered to be a significant issue in how judges 
reach decisions, the case for knowing more about judges’ religious backgrounds is 
weak. That said, that some lawyers do perceive religion to play a role in judicial 
decision-making supports the argument advanced here that by conducting further 
research on the nexus between judges’ religious beliefs and judging it may be 
possible to better understand the judicial role and properly address questions such as 
what constitutes optimal judicial openness and transparency in this regard. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered three areas which, it is contended, serve as an indirect 
barometer of lawyers’ perceptions of the relationship between religion and 
adjudication. It was argued that if there were concerns that judges’ own religious 
views taint individual decision-making, lawyers might be expected to be receptive 
to alternative ways by which to deal with religion-sensitive cases or to support 
increased religious diversity and transparency in the judiciary. There is little 
evidence in the data to indicate lawyers’ support for anything other than the 
current regime. On this basis, and together with the findings in Chapter 5, it is 
concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that lawyers acknowledge that the 
religious beliefs of judges, along with other homologous judicial personal factors, 
may influence individual judicial decision-making in cases involving religion, 
they are confident that judges do not allow religious factors to affect judging in a 
way that compromises judicial impartiality. This is important, both to further the 
understanding of the factors that influence judicial decision-making across the 
court spectrum and to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the judiciary, whether 
individually or as a collective. 
A summary of the main findings of the thesis as a whole, together with limitations 
and implications of the study, along with suggestions for future research are 
presented in the final chapter, Chapter 7. 
 262 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: FAITH IN JUSTICE 
 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION: FAITH IN JUSTICE CHAPTER 7
Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and taking 
the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human, strips himself of all 
predilections and becomes a passionless thinking machine.1 
 
7.1 Revisiting the research issue 
 
Traditionally, judges have been portrayed as dispassionate, objective and neutral 
arbiters of the law who are unaffected by personal predilections, preferences or 
interests when carrying out the judicial role. Moreover, they have been depicted as 
having little choice in the matter’.2 The judicial oath, legal rules and principles and a 
a range of other constraints all serve to ensure that judges do not stray beyond the 
boundaries of legitimate judicial decision-making. As the Judicial Office’s response 
to the request for judicial participation in this study makes clear (stated in Chapter 
1.4), this classic conception of the judicial role continues to provide a principled 
model for how judges reach decisions today. Clearly, that judges are not biased, nor 
are seen to be biased, is of the utmost importance for maintaining public trust and 
confidence in the judiciary and the justice system. At the same time, contrary to the 
default image of the judge as an expert decision-maker imbued with ‘superhuman’ 
qualities,3 it is recognised that, particularly in cases where the law allows for a 
degree of discretion, there are an array of factors (in addition to the facts of a case 
and the relevant law) that can influence adjudication, including personal factors 
relating to individual judges.  
This thesis has partly arisen from the inconsonance that exists between orthodox and 
contemporary discourse on how judges judge.  Using a mixed methods approach 
                                                 
1
 Jerome Frank, Re J A T Lindham, 138 F 2d 650, 651 (2d Cir 1943). 
2
 Dan Simon, ‘A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making’ (1998) 30 Rutgers LJ 1. 
3
 Dworkin famously imagined a judge as Hercules,  ‘a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience 
and acumen’. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury 1997) 132. 
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within a pragmatic paradigm, this exploratory socio-legal study has focused on 
lawyers’ perceptions of how the religious beliefs of professional judges affect 
judging in the English courts, religion being identified as one of many different 
personal factors that potentially influence how judges reach decisions. Looking at the 
religion-judging interface from the perspective of lawyers, specifically barristers and 
solicitors practising predominantly in the fields of employment and family law, has 
provided an opportunity to gain a valuable insight into this relationship. This thesis 
has sought to make a valuable contribution to existing knowledge of what factors 
influence judging and fill one part of the ‘information black hole’ that exists in our 
understanding of what judges do and how they do it. Whilst it represents one of a 
growing number of studies of judging in relation to the UK courts, to the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the first to empirically explore the relationship 
between judges’ religion and their adjudication. 
 
At the start of this thesis it was explained that the judiciary are increasingly tasked 
with deciding cases involving religion. It was suggested that this development can be 
attributed to two main factors: (1) the ‘juridification of religion’,4 and (2) an evolving 
evolving religious landscape in Britain (in which there has been a decline in those 
identifying as Christian and an increase in those having no religion or from minority 
religions).  Moving to the conceptual foundations of this study, consideration was 
given to theories of judicial behaviour derived from political science and the 
fundamental tension that exists between conventional and contemporary models of 
how judges judge. Aspects of psychological research on judgment and decision-
making in general were also touched upon.  Contrary to the traditional view of how 
judges judge, existing empirical evidence from other jurisdictions and disciplines, 
together with extra-judicial comments from senior members of the judiciary in the 
UK, was found to provide unequivocal evidence to support the overarching premise 
underpinning this thesis, that there is a personal dimension to judging in relation to 
judges in the UK courts. It was posited that whilst the presence of personal factors in 
judging is seemingly at odds with the requirement for judicial impartiality, these 
competing concepts are reconcilable when, consistent with Lucy’s contention, 
impartiality is understood in a restricted sense.5 This view acknowledges that judges 
                                                 
4
 Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (CUP 2011). 
5
 Willliam Lucy, ‘The Possibility of Impartiality’ (2003) 25 OJLS 13. 
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judges bring  their own life experiences with them to court; what is important, 
however, is that they put aside any personal views or prejudices which might 
constitute a legitimate ground for a claim of bias and prevents the judge approaching 
the case in hand with an open mind. 
Turning to the empirical dimension of the study, an exploratory sequential mixed 
methods research design was used to gather lawyers’ views about how judges’ faith 
(and other factors) influences judicial decision-making. Part one involved semi-
structured interviews with a sample consisting of 18 barristers predominantly 
working in the fields of employment and family law. Part two involved the 
administering of an online questionnaire, the SPQ, to solicitors. After data cleaning, 
this sample comprised 158 solicitors, again with expertise in employment or family 
law. The interviewees and SPQ respondents were asked about their perceptions of 
the influence of judges’ religion on judicial decision-making, the focus largely being 
on cases involving religiously sensitive issues where there is no settled law and/or 
judicial discretion is exercised. 
 
7.2 Key findings  
 
The overarching research question for this thesis is: Do lawyers perceive that a 
judge’s religious beliefs influence his or her individual judicial decision-making? To 
address this question, it was first situated within a broader context in which lawyers 
were asked for their views on whether and how judicial personal factors in general 
affect adjudication. 
The most basic finding (and that which underpins the subsequent focus on religion) 
was that most lawyers overwhelmingly perceived that aspects of judges’ personal 
backgrounds and experiences affect how judges judge. This is consistent with 
previous studies. For the most part, judicial personal factors (as distinct from the 
more narrow focus on judges’ religious beliefs) were thought to permeate the 
decisional process in an unconscious manner, and usually in cases in which judicial 
discretion is exercised. Whilst judicial approach and outcome were thought to be 
influenced by the identity of the judge, the impact was seen as modest due to the 
constraining force of both formal and informal restrictions. Typically, political 
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and/or moral values and social-economic status were identified as personal elements 
having a discernible impact on how judges judge. In this regard, Griffith’s thesis 
concerning the falsity of judicial neutrality remains persuasive (Chapter 3.1). 
Moreover, where judges’ personal factors are perceived to affect judicial decision-
making, that lawyers think that it is tacit rather than overt characteristics (such as 
gender and ethnicity) that are most likely to be at play lends strong support to Cahill-
O’Callaghan’s argument about the influence of judicial personal values on the 
adjudicative process (Chapter 3.1). Furthermore, it strengthens her critical argument 
that judicial diversity debates which largely focus on visible judicial characteristics 
overlook the important role played by more obscure factors in the judicial decision-
making process.
6
   
It was seen in Chapter 2.4 that many judges readily acknowledge that their 
background and values inevitably play a role in how they judge; in this regard the 
current findings can be said to reveal nothing new and their significance should not 
be overstated.  However, the findings here can be distinguished from much of the 
existing judicial behaviour literature in one interesting respect. 
It has been explained that many of the extant studies have focused on the influence 
of extraneous factors on judging in the appellate courts, usually the apex court, 
because it is here where judges have most discretion and are therefore most 
susceptible to subjective influences. This study has taken a different approach in 
which the spotlight has been on the views of lawyers working in specific areas of 
law rather than on specific courts. Irrespective of the court in which the judgment is 
made, to find that most lawyers felt that it was inevitable that judicial personal 
factors had a bearing upon how judges reach decisions (including outcomes) lends 
empirical backing to a much smaller body of literature which posits that judicial 
discretion is not limited to appeal cases, but is a feature in the majority, if not all, of 
the kinds of case that come before the courts. Ergo, the influence of personal factors 
in judging is potentially more extensive in scope than might be thought, even though 
it remains the case that the extent of impact continues to be significantly constrained 
by the limits of the law and judicial professionalism. 
                                                 
6
 Rachel Cahill-O’Callaghan, ‘Reframing the judicial diversity debate: personal values and tacit 
diversity (2015) 35 LS 1. 
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When the focus narrowed to perceptions of the relationship between judges’ faith 
and judging, the findings show that the lawyers in this study were generally much 
more reticent to positively link judges’ religious identities with judicial decision-
making compared to personal factors per se. This clearly suggests that other 
background factors are more salient than in judging than religion.  In the main, when 
asked directly whether the religious beliefs of judges play a role in individual 
judicial decision-making, religion was identified as no more than a potential 
influencing factor affecting judging in areas of law touching upon or involving 
religiously sensitive issues (for example, discrimination and human rights cases and 
cases involving determinations as to someone’s best interests such as in the right to 
life or a child’s medical treatment), although a minority of lawyers thought that 
judges’ religion did have a discernible impact on judging. Views as to the nature of 
influence varied between the two lawyer groups; barristers typically saying that if 
judges’ religious beliefs were at play, they manifested in an unconscious manner, 
compared with solicitors who were more likely to say that judges’ decision-making 
was subject to both conscious and unconscious religious influences. The empirical 
data did not allow for a definitive conclusion as to lawyers’ perceptions of the extent 
of influence from judges’ faith on judging (save for barristers confining this to 
judicial approach only). In any case, the argument advanced herein was that the 
distinction between judicial approach and outcome is of limited relevance because 
impartiality applies to both decisional process and outcome.    
There was no evidence to indicate that lawyers’ views were contingent on their PQE 
or their own religious identities, although both barristers and solicitors who attended 
court most frequently were those least likely to think that judges’ religious beliefs 
were a relevant consideration in their decision-making. It is particularly reassuring to 
find that those appearing before judges on a regular basis are confident that religious 
bias is not an issue in the courts. Importantly, this exemplifies how understanding the 
relationship between judges’ religion and judging can help increase the perceived 
legitimacy of the judiciary. 
Thus, despite some differences in the views of barristers and solicitors, the general 
consensus was that judges’ faith is not a salient factor in cases involving religiously 
sensitive issues, largely because other factors, notably the law, judges’ training and a 
steadfast commitment to striving towards impartiality, exert much greater force on 
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the adjudicative process.  This is buttressed by the findings discussed in Chapter 6 in 
which the majority of lawyers: (1) opposed the idea of specialist religious courts to 
hear disputes involving religiously sensitive issues, (2) did not identify the 
promoting religious diversity among the judiciary as a priority issue, and (3) were 
uncertain as to the benefits and appropriateness of knowing more about judges’ 
religious identities (and other personal factors), if anything erring on the side of 
knowing less is better than knowing more. 
From a methodological perspective, in so far as lawyers make a distinction between 
the influence of judges’ faith on judicial approach and the decision itself, the thesis 
demonstrates that attempts to understand judicial behaviour by searching for 
correlations between specific variables such as religion and case outcomes (as seen 
in many studies of judicial decision-making, particularly in the US) leaves a void in 
our understanding of the process of judging. Whilst, ultimately, the focus of 
academic enquiries depends on why we want to know about how judges make 
decisions, it is argued that to meaningfully and significantly extend knowledge on 
how judges reach decisions, it is essential to look beyond the result and consider the 
decisional process, as has been done here. Only in this way can such studies fully 
help shape training programmes and enhance the legitimacy of, and public trust and 
confidence in the judiciary. 
 
7.3 Implications of findings 
 
This study has challenged the claim that studies of judicial behaviour, particularly 
those touching upon sensitive issues such as judges’ faith, are ‘illegal or practically 
impossible’ in the context of UK judiciary.8 It demonstrates that addressing difficult 
questions about how judges judge from novel yet informed perspectives (such as that 
of lawyers who appear before judges and are acculturated in the legal system) offers 
one viable avenue by which researchers can gain otherwise inaccessible insights into 
relationships such as that between judicial background and judging. Nonetheless, it 
                                                 
8
 Cheryl Thomas, ‘Lack of Understanding about the Judiciary is Unacceptable and Dangerous’ The 
Guardian (London, 6 July 2012) < www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jul/06/understanding-judiciary-
dangerous> accessed 10 February 2013.  
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is clear that trying to distil the actual influence that specific factors such as religion 
have on judging presents a formidable challenge for researchers. 
The findings of this study also have implications for the judiciary, specifically in 
relation to training and professionalism. Firstly, responses from lawyers who 
participated in the study highlight the important role that training plays in 
maintaining confidence and trust in the decisions judges reach. It is noteworthy, 
therefore, that although detailed guidance on religion can be found in the Equal 
Treatment Bench Book,9 there is currently no dedicated judicial training on matters 
relating to religiously sensitive issues. It is suggested that future training 
programmes could incorporate a seminar that considers some of the complex issues 
that arise in relation to matters of faith. Secondly, it is acknowledged that judicial 
training programmes already consider the meaning and effect of unconscious bias. 
The topic is covered in the Judicial College Business of Judging seminar in which, 
for example, unconscious bias is considered in relation to assessments of credibility 
and reliability of evidence.10 Judges are also informed about the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT) and are invited to take an IAT test online via Project Implicit. This is 
optional and for judges’ own interest outside of the training environment.11 At the 
time of conducting this research, the judiciary have also introduced ‘Rethinking our 
Thinking’ unconscious bias training.12 There is a body of evidence to suggest that 
raising awareness about unconscious bias can motivate individuals to take corrective 
or ‘debiasing’ action.13 It is recommended that the Judicial College continues to 
deliver unconscious bias training for all judges to help develop judges’ knowledge 
and skill as to how best to manage such bias. Raising awareness of this issue at the 
induction stage of judicial training for all judicial office-holders, and as part of 
continuing professional development, should encourage judges to actively engage in 
regular critical self-reflection on how the personal dimension to judging affects their 
decision-making. Whilst compulsory IAT tests may be useful to ensure judges fully 
engage with such training, the publishing of results is not supported for the same 
                                                 
9
 Judicial College, Equal Treatment Bench Book 2013, Section 10.  
10
 Statement by Brian Evans (Judicial College) (Personal Communication 20 November 2014). 
11
 ibid. 
12
 Judicial College, Activities Report 2015-2016 < www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/review-of-activities-2015-2016.pdf> accessed 12 January 2018. 
13
 Cheryl Staats and others, ‘State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2015’ Kirwan Institute for the 
Study of Race and Ethnicity 2015 http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-
kirwan-implicit-bias.pdf accessed 13 October 2016. 
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reasons advanced by Kang et al. who argue that this may foster a ‘feeling of 
resentment and counter the benefits of increased self-knowledge’.14  
 
Finally, to find that lawyers generally perceive the influence of judges’ religion on 
judicial decision-making to be limited at best should instil the public with confidence 
in the quality, and impartiality of judicial decision-making in the UK. Of course, 
critics could argue that it is unlikely that the perceptions of those who are themselves 
part of the machinery of law would indicate anything other than respect for and 
confidence in the judiciary. Whilst the potential for response bias should not be 
ignored, there is no reason to think that the self-reported perceptions of lawyers who 
took part in the interviews or completed the SPQ represent anything other than their 
honest views of how judges judge; in short, their accounts have to be taken at face 
value. Save for a few exceptions, there appears to be a genuine belief amongst 
lawyers that judges, by virtue of their legal and judicial training and experience, are 
very capable of ensuring that judgments are principally based on the evidence and 
the relevant law, with any extraneous factors being manifested unconsciously and 
certainly not in a way that delegitimises the decisional process or case outcomes. 
 
7.4 Study limitations 
 
Exploring the factors that influence judging through the lens of lawyers has provided 
a useful means of addressing the central and associated research questions.  
However, as with any research, this study is not without limitations.  
Whilst data from the Bar interviews and SPQ provided valuable data from which to 
explore the research question, the sample sizes in both parts of the study were small. 
Whilst efforts were made to avoid nonresponse to the invitations to lawyers to 
participate in this research, as discussed in Chapter 4.8, the risk of non-response bias 
cannot be eliminated. On the other hand, as seen in Chapter 4.6.3 and 4.7.5, each 
sample group comprised lawyers with a range of backgrounds. Although the 
response rate was disappointing in respect of both samples, this indicates that 
nonresponse bias is not a cause for major concern in this study.  
                                                 
14
 Jerry Kang and others, ‘Implicit Bias in the Courrtoom’ (2012) 59 UCLA Law Review 1124, 1177. 
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In addition, the sample was restricted to barristers and solicitors working in specific 
areas of law. It was the choice of the researcher to explore the views of lawyers 
working in employment and family law, in part driven by the researcher’s own 
interest in (religious) discrimination in employment and belief that these are areas in 
which religious factors can be of upmost importance to litigants. Together with the 
small sample sizes, this means that the results cannot be claimed to be generalizable 
to areas of law outside of employment and family law, nor are they representative of 
the wider legal community. It is argued that the focus on lawyers’ views about cases 
involving overtly religiously sensitive issues makes sense in a foundational study, 
however it is accepted that, within a broader context, this acts as a limit on the value 
of the empirical data.  
It can also be argued that the present findings reflect lawyers’ self-reported, 
subjective perceptions of the relationship between judging and judges’ perceived 
religious identity. Accordingly, it may be claimed that the views of lawyers in this 
study do not accurately reflect how judges decide cases in practice. Notwithstanding 
such criticism, it is argued that understanding the way in which lawyers perceive 
judicial decision-making matters because lawyers’ perceptions of judges, the courts 
and the justice system more generally can play an important role in shaping the way 
in which the public sees the courts.15  
A further criticism relates to the interview schedule and SPQ design used. There 
were no existing templates from which to base interview questions or the SPQ 
instrument design and, as such, an inductive approach was taken in which the data 
guided the researcher. Accordingly, it is likely that some issues salient to the study 
remain unexplored. An associated issue relates to the researcher’s choice of different 
methods of data collection. As discussed in Chapter 4, the first part of the study 
elicited barristers’ views about the relationship between judges’ religion (and other 
factors) and judging. This data was also used to develop the survey instrument in 
part two of the study. Whilst the use of a sequential mixed methods research design 
based on two sample groups of different legal professionals was straightforward at 
the data gathering and preparation stage, integration of findings for the purpose of 
                                                 
15
 Murray Gleeson, ‘Public Confidence in the Courts’, National Judicial College of Australia o 9 
February 2007 < http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/gleesoncj/cj_9feb07.pdf> accessed 30 August 2016. 
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discussion was more problematic. This is due to the difficulties in bringing together 
asymmetric responses to similar rather than identical questions in each part of the 
study. In repeating the study, it would be useful to conduct interviews and administer 
a perceptions questionnaire to each professional group participating in the study. 
This would allow for more accurate data integration.  
Finally, it would have been useful to have secured access to the judges themselves to 
find out how they perceive the way in which their religious beliefs impact the 
process of judging. Added to the barrister and solicitor data, this would have allowed 
for a more holistic view of the way in which judges’ religious beliefs are perceived 
to affect judging.  It is hoped that the findings from the current study, together with 
those from research conducted in other jurisdictions, may encourage the judiciary to 
consider allowing participation in future studies which aim to gain a deeper 
understanding of how judicial personal factors affect the judicial decision-making 
process. 
Despite these limitations, it is argued that the empirical element of this study has 
provided a useful insight into the role played by judges’ religious beliefs (and other 
personal factors) in the process of judging and makes an interesting and significant 
contribution to the scholarly literature in this area. 
 
7.5 Future directions 
  
It is clear from this exploratory study that many questions about the relationship 
between judges’ faith and judging, theoretical and empirical, remain unanswered. To 
this end, the following roadmap for further research is proposed. 
It would now be useful to target decision-making in specific courts, again with a 
focus on cases in specific legal areas in which religiously sensitive issues may be 
important to litigants. This would determine whether perceptions of the nexus 
between religion and judging are contingent on variables such as (a) the type of 
judge hearing a case, or (b) the level of court in which a trial takes place. In light of 
lawyers’ responses about the sorts of cases in which religion may be an issue, it is 
envisaged that further research opportunities may present in relation to cases such as 
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those involving capacity and best interests issues including children and end of life 
decisions.  
Different research methods to that used here (particularly quantitative studies) have 
commonly been used to explore how non-legal factors affect judging. Whilst useful 
in trying to predict how cases may be decided, the application of these methods is 
limited in the context of judging in the UK courts because of the lack of data about 
judicial backgrounds (particularly religion), and because the focus of the empirical 
studies centres on case outcomes rather than the overall process. It is argued that the 
adoption of a mixed method approach overcomes some of these limitations and, 
from a sociological perspective, helps to develop an understanding of how judges go 
about the business of judging as a process rather than simply allowing for 
conclusions to be drawn based on judicial determinations.  
Other pathways by which to explore the relationship between judges’ faith and 
judging include experiences of other court users, specifically litigants in person, for 
their perceptions of (a) the interplay between judicial personal factors and judging 
and (b) how religiously sensitive issues are handled by the courts in certain types of 
case. Furthermore, whilst mindful of the sensitivities involved, it is in the interests of 
open justice that members of the judiciary have an opportunity to discuss how their 
own faith affects adjudication, the challenges that this presents in a judicial context 
and how this is overcome.  
Another avenue for future research involves experimental testing to explore how 
unconscious bias affects judicial decision-making. Replicating the approach taken by 
Rachlinksi in relation to racial bias (described in 5.3.4),16 it would be interesting to 
analyse the results of judges’ religious IAT’s in order to determine whether 
unconscious religious bias is a live issue. At the very least, from a practical 
perspective, such research could be used by judges to improve their own judging. 
From a theoretical perspective, it may be useful in informing debate as to whether 
judges’ decision-making is substantively different to professional decision-making in 
other contexts. What is clear is that given the interdisciplinary nature of the study of 
                                                 
16
 Jefferey Rachlinski and others, ‘Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?’ (2009) 
Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 786. Psychologists have typically focused on the role of 
implicit bias in juror decision-making.  
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judicial decision-making, collaboration with scholars from other disciplines would 
prove most useful in future.  
Looking further ahead, comparisons between actual judicial reasoning and computer-
based decision-making programs that utilise Artificial Intelligence provide exciting 
opportunities to further explore the impact that specific factors such as a judge’s 
religious beliefs have on judging.17  
It is hoped that adopting an alternative approach to the more typical quantitative 
methods used to examine the influence of non-legal factors on judging (discussed in 
Chapter 3) has provided an illuminating, meaningful and timely exposition of how 
lawyers perceive the relationship between judges’ religious beliefs and adjudication. 
At the same time, the present study exposes the breadth and depth of the 
‘information black hole’ that exists in the understanding of the factors that influence 
judges’ decision-making in the UK courts. Whilst judges’ faith may occasionally 
influence the process of judging in cases involving religiously sensitive matters, 
there is no compelling evidence to suggest that judicial religious bias is a live issue 
in the courts today. However, the evolving religious and legal landscapes mean that 
there is no room for complacency in understanding the interplay between judges’ 
religion and judging in future studies of judicial behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The use of Artificial Intelligence in a judicial context has already been explored. eg, Atkinson 
compared the decisions of 32 cases decided by judges with decisions generated using computer 
programs. She found that there was a 96% success rate when AI decisions were compared with those 
of the judges. Monidipa Fouzder, ‘Artificial intelligence mimics judicial reasoning’ The Law Society 
Gazette (22 June 2016) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/artificial-intelligence-mimics-judicial-
reasoning/5056017.article > accessed 12 September 2016. 
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APPENDIX 1 Rejection letter to request for judicial participation in 
research 
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APPENDIX 2 Research paradigms: positivism and interpretivism  
 
Positivism  
The ‘positivist’ worldview is traditionally characterised by quantitative research.1 
Traditional positivists believe that the social world can be explored in the same way 
as the natural world.
2
 As such, it is assumed that there exists an external, single 
objective reality, the truth of which can be discovered through replicable empirical 
observation and precise measurement.
3
 This ontological position means that a 
researcher remains independent from the phenomenon of interest in order to prevent 
research outcomes being influenced by subjective values and biases.
4
 A positivist 
approach is typically associated with a hypothetico-deductive method in which 
research questions and hypotheses are developed and tested by measuring the 
relationship amongst variables using instruments such as questionnaires or surveys, 
although as Webley observes,
5
 there is nothing to prevent a qualitative researcher 
adopting a positivist worldview. 
Interpretivism 
Seen as the antipode of a positivist worldview, interpretivism is typically associated 
with qualitative research. Having gained prominence as a critique to positivism, 
interpretivists believe that there are socially constructed multiple realities of 
phenomena.
6
 As individuals interpret and give meaning to themselves and their 
environment, reality is a ‘social creation’ which cannot be measured objectively. 
Interpretivism is underpinned by a subjectivist ontology which recognises that a 
researcher’s own values affect how they interpret the phenomenon of interest. In 
contrast to positivism, research guided by an interpretivist philosophy tends to be 
inductive so that theories or patterns of meaning are developed from data that is 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘positivism’ originates from the nineteenth century by positivists such as Comte and 
Durkheim. 
2
 Donna Mertens, Research and Evaluation in Education and Psychology: Integrating diversity with 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed method (2
nd
 edn, SAGE 2005). 
3
 This purist view is challenged by post-positivists who assume that absolute objectivity is 
unattainable. Creswell explains that this is why a hypothesis is not proved or disproved; rather, a null 
hypothesis is accepted or rejected.) John Creswell, Research Design (4
th
 edn, SAGE 2014) 7. 
4
 Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln, ‘Competing paradigms in qualitative research’ in Norman Denzin 
and Yvonna Lincoln (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (SAGE 1994).  
5
 Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010). 
6
 Like positivism, interpretivism originated in the nineteenth century and has its roots in the work of 
German sociologist Max Weber. 
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usually collected by means of interviews, focus groups, visual recordings or images 
or existing documents, for example.  
The Paradigm Wars & the pragmatic worldview 
In the 1980’s, disagreement amongst scholars as to the merits and limitations of 
quantitative vis-a-vis qualitative research and their different philosophical 
foundations led to the so-called ‘paradigm wars’. Purists on either side of the 
quantitative/positivist-qualitative/interpretivist continuum argued that as their 
respective paradigmatic orientations presented the ideal for research, quantitative and 
qualitative methods should not be mixed.
7
 It is largely as a response to these 
paradigmatic debates that proponents of mixed methods research have sought to 
position their research within alternative philosophical perspectives that support both 
quantitative and qualitative research, most typically being the pragmatic worldview.
                                                 
7
 Burke Johnson and Anthony Onwuegbuzie, ‘Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm 
Whose Time Has Come’ 33 Educational Researcher 14. 
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APPENDIX 3: Barristers invitations to participate in research  
  
INVITATION BY DIRECT EMAIL 
Dear [  ], 
PhD Research – Religion and Judicial Decision-making 
 
I am a PhD Law research student at the UEA Law School in Norwich. I am writing to 
ask if you would be interested in taking part in my research project exploring the 
influence of extra-legal factors on judicial reasoning, particularly the nexus between 
judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision making.  
 
The topic has been subject to extensive empirical research in the US where, given 
the highly politicised nature of the judicial appointments process, scholars have 
long been interested in the relationship between judicial values and adjudication, 
particularly in the appellate courts. The US findings indicate that, in certain legal 
areas, a range of variables, including the religious convictions of judges, may 
consciously or unconsciously influence judicial decisions. This raises the question as 
to whether a similar phenomenon be observed in the context of the UK judiciary.  
 
What does participation involve?  A major part of the study involves the use of 
qualitative methods to explore the research topic from a variety of perspectives, 
including that of the bar.  A single semi-structured interview (either by video call or 
face-to-face) is used to seek views as to which extra-legal factors may influence 
judicial decisions, if any. Opinions regarding judicial diversity are also sought. Whilst 
the length of the interview will vary, it is expected to last between 20-40 minutes.  
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for considering this 
request and I very much hope to hear from you. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Amanda Springall-Rogers 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich  
NR4 7TJ    
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DLA eNews No 136 October 2013 
Are you a barrister or solicitor with higher rights of audience? If so, would you be 
interested in participating in a PhD research project on judicial decision making? 
A DLA member (a PhD student at the UEA Law School, Norwich)  is looking for 
barristers or solicitors with higher rights of audience to take part in a research 
project exploring the nexus between judges’ religious beliefs and judicial decision 
making in UK courts.  
The topic has been subject to extensive empirical research in the US where, given 
the highly politicised nature of the judicial appointments process, scholars have 
long been interested in the relationship between judicial values and adjudication, 
particularly in the appellate courts. The US findings indicate that, in certain legal 
areas, a range of variables, including the religious convictions of judges, may 
consciously or unconsciously influence judicial determinations. This raises the 
prospect that a similar phenomenon might be observed in the context of the UK 
judiciary.  
What does participation involve?  A major part of the study involves the use of 
qualitative methods to explore the research topic from a variety of perspectives, 
including that of the bar.  A single semi-structured interview will be used to seek 
views as to which extralegal factors may influence judicial decisions, if any. Your 
opinions regarding judicial diversity will also be sought. Whilst the length of the 
interview will vary, it is expected that an interview will typically last between 20-40 
minutes. 
If you are interested in taking part in this study or if you would like further 
information please email A.Springall-Rogers@uea.ac.uk .  
General comments are also very welcome. 
 
UK HUMAN RIGHTS BLOG 24 November 2013 
Request for help – religion and law 
Courting Faith: Religion as an Extralegal Factor in Judicial Decision-making 
Barristers sought to participate in PhD Research Project exploring the relationship 
between religion and judicial decision making. If you are interested in taking part, 
please contact Amanda Springall-Rogers at A.SPringall-Rogers@uea.ac.uk  
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APPENDIX 4: Barristers’ Participant Information Sheet and 
Consent Form 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Research Project Title:  Courting Faith: Religion as an Extralegal Factor in 
Judicial Decision Making 
Researcher Name:  Amanda Springall-Rogers   
PLEASE RETAIN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
You are being invited to participate in this postgraduate research project. Before 
you decide whether you would like to participate, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with 
others if you wish.  Please contact me if anything is unclear or if you would like more 
information. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your interest. 
What is the aim of the study? 
The central theme of the research project is to explore whether there is evidence to 
support the view that the religious beliefs of a judge may influence his or her 
judgments in hard cases, in UK courts. This area has not yet been subject to analysis 
in empirical studies in the UK. In contrast, the topic has been subject to extensive 
empirical research in the US where scholars have long been interested in exploring 
the relationship between various judicial characteristics and adjudication, 
particularly in relation to the US Supreme Court, where the judicial appointments 
process is subject to intense public scrutiny. Whilst US findings have proved 
inconclusive, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the religious beliefs of a 
judge may inform judicial determinations in the higher courts in specific legal areas. 
This raises the prospect that a similar phenomenon might be observed in the 
context of the UK judiciary.  
The research project considers this theme from both historical and contemporary 
perspectives. Extrajudicial writing and a selection of judgments over the last 
century will be analysed for indicative evidence of the past existence of a nexus 
between judges’ religious affiliations and judicial decision making and to assess the 
courts changing approach to religion. For a contemporary perspective, your views 
are sought as to what extralegal factors are perceived to influence judicial decisions 
today, whether religion may be a relevant factor in judicial decision-making and, 
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more generally, for opinion as to whether religious values should be allowed to 
influence judgments in any way. 
It is important to note that the aim of the research project is not to suggest that a 
judge’s religious beliefs exert a major source of influence on his or her judgments. 
Rather, in the absence of any existing research, the study serves as a launch pad 
from which to determine whether religious beliefs can and should be included in 
future empirical legal studies that seek to understand what factors affect judicial 
decision making and to what extent they do so. 
Why have I been asked to take part in this research project? 
As a barrister or solicitor with higher rights of audience, you are well placed to offer 
insight into this topic, and express your views as to whether religious beliefs may be 
a relevant factor in judicial reasoning. 
The information collected for the research project will be used to produce a PhD 
thesis and may be used in academic publications. Anonymised direct quotes from 
the interview transcript may be used. 
What will participation involve? 
An interview will be conducted at a time and place that is convenient for you. This 
can be face-to-face or by video call (e.g. Skype or FaceTime). The interview will be 
based around a semi-structured format and will typically last between 20-40 
minutes.  
The views expressed by participants will not be ascribed to any particular 
participant.  Please see “How will your privacy and confidentiality be maintained?” 
below for details. 
The points to be discussed include: 
 Have there been any occasions on which participants feel a client’s religious 
or non-religious beliefs may have in some way affected a judge’s decision in 
cases in which religiously sensitive issues are raised? Has a client ever voiced 
such concerns themselves? 
 Do participants think that, in some cases, judges have been influenced in 
their decision making by their religious beliefs?  If so, in what way?  
 Have participants ever been involved in a case/s in which they have felt that 
a judge’s religious beliefs affected how a judge decided the case? If so, in 
what way? 
 When cases are allocated, should regard ever be given to the religious 
background of a judge/s? 
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 Should judges be permitted to employ religious based reasoning (in addition 
to legal reasoning) in hard cases?  
 If participants were judges, do they think they could set aside their own 
religious or non-religious beliefs in cases engaging religiously sensitive 
issues? 
 Views as to the merits of increasing religious diversity within the judiciary. 
Subject to your permission, the interview will be recorded on a digital audio 
recording device. You can decide to stop the interview at any point and, of course, 
you do not have to answer questions that you do not wish to. Following the 
interview, the researcher will manually transcribe the recording into text form.  You 
will have an opportunity to check the transcript.  
The recorded interview will be deleted upon transcription. Please note, if you 
would like to take part in the research project but would prefer not be recorded, 
the researcher is happy to take hand-written notes of the interview. 
You are very welcome to a summary of the findings following the completion of the 
PhD thesis. 
What will happen if I choose to withdraw from the study? 
It is up to you whether to participate or not. If you decide to take part you are still 
free to withdraw during the interview, or at any time thereafter, and without giving 
a reason. If you choose to withdraw from the study all data will be withdrawn and 
destroyed. 
How will your privacy and confidentiality be maintained? 
If you agree to take part in the research project, all efforts will be made to ensure 
any information you provide will be kept confidential. All data collection, storage 
and processing will comply with the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
All efforts will be made to ensure that you cannot be identified as a participant in 
the study and that any information you disclose will not lead to any third party or 
specific case being identifiable in the research. 
The digital audio file of the interview will be transferred from the recording device 
using audio management software to a memory stick that will remain in the 
researcher’s office until the recording is transcribed. Upon transcription, the audio 
file will be erased from the memory stick and the memory stick will be physically 
destroyed.  
The transcript of the interview will be anonymised through use of a pseudonym, 
known only to the researcher, and will be allocated a numerical identifier. A master 
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list identifying you to a pseudonym will be held on a password protected computer 
accessed only by the researcher. Other potentially disclosive text will be replaced 
with more generalized text and third parties and cases will be anonymised and/or 
allocated pseudonyms. 
The transcript will be stored on a password protected computer and a hard copy 
will be stored in a locked filing cabinet to which the researcher has sole access. The 
transcript will not be available to other researchers without your express 
permission. Electronic data will be stored on a computer with password protection, 
at both login and individual file level, accessible only by the researcher. 
At the conclusion of the study, the information or data collected from you may be  
retained and used (in its anonymised form) for future research only where the 
researcher has agreed to preserve the confidentiality of the data and subject to 
approval from the relevant research ethics committee.  
What happens next? 
If you would like to take part in this research project please contact me, Amanda 
Springall-Rogers,  by email at: A.Springall-Rogers@uea.ac.uk, or complete the 
attached response form and return it to: A.Springall-Rogers, UEA Law (PGR), 
University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 7TJ. 
If you do decide to participate I will contact you by return so we can arrange an 
interview, at a time and date that is convenient for you. You will be given this 
information sheet and asked to sign a consent form. 
Further information and complaints procedure 
If you have any questions or require more information about this research project 
or, if you decide you would rather not participate in the study but would like to 
make any comments about the research, please contact me. My contact details are: 
 
Amanda Springall-Rogers 
UEA Law School (PGR) 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich  
NR4 7TJ    
 
Email: A.Springall-Rogers@uea.ac.uk 
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If you wish to make a complaint relating to your participation in this research 
project, please contact the research project supervisor: 
Gareth Thomas 
UEA Law School 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ    
 
Email: G.Thomas@uea.ac.uk 
 
 
Approval to conduct this research has been provided by the UEA General Research 
Ethics Committee in accordance with ethics review and approval procedures. 
 
Thank you for your interest.  
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RESPONSE FORM 
 
Research Project Title:  Courting Faith: Religion as an Extralegal Factor in 
Judicial Decision Making 
 
Having read the attached Information for Participants Sheet I would be interested 
in taking part in the above research project. 
My contact details are as follows: 
 
Name:  
 
Address:  
 
 
Email:  
 
Telephone:  
 
Date:  
 
 
Please complete and return to: 
Amanda Springall-Rogers 
UEA Law School (PGR) 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich  NR4 7TJ    
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CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
 
Research Project Title: Courting Faith: Religion as an Extralegal Factor in 
Judicial Decision Making 
 
Researcher Name:  Amanda Springall-Rogers 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. The researcher must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions, 
please ask the researcher before you agree to participate in the research project. 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened 
to an explanation about the research. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form 
for your records.  
 
Please tick                                                                                                                                                                      
or initial  
Participation 
 
I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet for 
the above research project. I have had the opportunity to consider 
the information and ask questions about the project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary. I can withdraw at 
any stage of the research project without giving any reason. 
Should I decide to withdraw, I understand any records relating to 
my participation will be destroyed unless I agree that the 
researcher may retain and use the information. 
I consent to being interviewed and the interview being recorded 
using a digital audio device. I understand that I am under no 
obligation to answer questions should I choose not to do so. 
I understand that I will be given a transcript of the interview for my 
approval before it is included in the research project. 
Use of information  
I understand and agree to the arrangements relating to privacy and  
Confidentiality set out in the Participant Information Sheet under the  
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heading “How will your privacy and confidentiality be maintained?” 
 
I understand that data will be processed manually and with the 
aid of computer software and  I consent to the processing of my 
personal information for the purpose of this research project and 
that such information will be handled in accordance with the 
provisions in the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
I agree that the researcher may access my contact details and 
interview transcript for the sole purpose of this research project.  
I understand that information gained during the research project 
will be used to produce a PhD thesis and may be used in academic 
publications.  
I would like to receive a summary of the results. 
I agree that information or data collected from me may be used in 
future research only where the researchers agree to preserve the 
confidentiality of the data and subject to approval from the 
relevant research ethics committee. 
 
Signed ………………………………………………………(Research Participant)       
                                                                                                         
Print name…………………………………………………Date…………………….. 
 
Signed…..………………………………………………………………(Researcher)       
                                                                                                         
Print name ………………………………………………...Date………..................... 
Please return to: Amanda Springall-Rogers, UEA Law (PGR), Norwich Research Park, 
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ. If you have any questions or issues relating to your 
participation in this research project, please contact the researcher by email at 
A.Springall-Rogers@uea.ac.uk, or by post to the above address. 
If you wish to make a complaint relating to your involvement in the research, please 
contact the research project supervisor, Gareth Thomas, by email at 
G.Thomas@uea.ac.uk, or by post to Mr. Gareth Thomas, UEA Law, Norwich 
Research Park, Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ. 
Approval to conduct this research has been provided by the UEA General Research 
Ethics Committee in accordance with ethics review and approval procedures. 
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APPENDIX 5: Data Collection: semi-structured interviews 
Advantages and disadvantages of the interview formats used in respect 
of this qualitative research 
Interview Format Advantages Disadvantages 
Face-to-face 
 
 
 
 
Longer duration of interview 
 
Synchronous communication allows 
both parties to observe body language 
and other “social cues” (Opdenakker) 
and to establish a good rapport 
 
Easy to ensure ethical requirements for 
informed consent are met 
 
Better quality of digital recording 
 
Time and cost of travel to 
participant’s work place or 
other neutral venue  
 
Physical access to participants’ 
places of work 
 
Difficulty in pre-arranging 
interviews without 
postponement at short notice 
due to erratic nature of 
barristers’ work  
 
The power asymmetry 
between researcher and elite 
participant may be magnified  
VoIP (USING 
Skype, 
FaceTime and 
Google 
Hangouts) 
 
 
 
Costs are minimal.  
 
Access to participants in different, 
remote geographical areas means 
access to larger sample 
 
Convenient and flexible in terms of 
time i.e. conducted during the day or 
evening, at work or at home.  
 
Reduces participant anxiety about 
location 
 
Rapport can be established 
Network drop outs can disrupt 
the flow of the interview and 
may result in distorted data 
 
Opportunity to observe body 
language and other “social 
cues” can be hindered 
 
Risk of interviews being 
accessed by others, 
compromising participants 
confidentiality and anonymity 
 
 
 
Telephone 
 
 
Access to participants in different, 
remote geographical areas means 
access to larger sample 
 
Difficult to establish rapport 
 
Time and cost effective 
 
Poor connection can disrupt 
the flow of conversation and 
may result in distorted data 
 
Less control of the interview 
situation for the researcher 
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APPENDIX 6: Interviewing legal elites: methodological challenges 
 
The bulk of literature relating to strategies for conducting qualitative interviews 
focuses on standard interviews with non-elites in which a researcher is said to ‘study 
down’ because it is the researcher who identifies and controls the interview space. In 
contrast, there is a small but significant body of work on how to research elites. 
Much of this literature identifies methodological challenges that may arise where a 
researcher, perceived to lack power relative to the elite participant, is said to ‘study 
up’.1  Two of the main methodological challenges relevant to the present study - 
gaining access and managing the power relationship - are considered below. 
Gaining access 
The first potential obstacle identified in the literature is gaining access to elites.
2
  In 
many cases, access has to be negotiated through a gatekeeper; this can be a time-
consuming process and, if unsuccessful, can prove fatal to the research project. On 
the other hand, it has been suggested that far from being a barrier to access, a gate 
keeper who sees the merits in the research, and with whom the researcher can 
establish a rapport, can potentially open doors to elite participants who may not 
otherwise have been accessible to the researcher. 
3
  
Where direct contact can be made with the elite and the research topic is of interest 
to them, a busy schedule may simply prove too time prohibitive to enable their 
participation in the study. Moreover, where the elite invitee has offered their time, 
arranging a convenient interview date and location may prove problematic. Even 
where access can be successfully negotiated and an interview takes place, it does not 
guarantee the researcher will obtain the rich data they hope for because elites are also 
‘in a position to manipulate information and to deny access to it’.4  
In this study, the researcher negotiated access to elite participants via gatekeepers 
and through direct contact by email with potential participants. Gatekeepers, the 
Senior Clerks in Chambers, were initially contacted by email to ask if they may be 
                                                 
1
 Zoe Morris, ‘The Truth about Interviewing Elites (2009) 29 Politics 209, 213.  
2
 Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (ECPR 2006). 
3
 William Harvey, Methodological Approaches for Interviewing Elites’ (2010) 4 Geography Compass 
193, 198. 
4
 Robert Mikecz, ‘Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues’ (2012) 18 Qualitative 
Inquiry 482, 483. 
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willing to circulate details of the research project to members of Chambers. It was 
only when gatekeepers agreed to the researcher’s request that an invitation to 
participate, together with a brief summary of the research, was forwarded. A number 
of gatekeepers were very happy to assist. However, of those contacted, half did not 
respond to the initial email or to a reminder sent 4 weeks after the first 
communication. Of the elite invitees contacted direct by email, approximately one 
third responded. 
Managing the power relationship 
As discussed above, in a qualitative interview, the power relationship between 
researcher and participant is often conceptualised as an asymmetric relationship in 
which power resides with the ‘expert’ researcher.5 However, in an elite interview, it 
is commonly assumed that this power dynamic is reversed in favour of the 
participant.
6
 The elite participant is seen as a ‘professional communicator’,7 used to 
being in charge. As such, there is a danger that the participant will dominate the 
interview and the novice researcher may be left in a position of relative 
disempowerment.
8
 Such an imbalance may also raise reliability issues.
9
 For example, 
research data may be distorted if the participant uses unfamiliar technical language,
10
 
manipulates information or influences the way the researcher understands or 
interprets what was said, or makes it difficult to access, for example.
11
 
By virtue of the nature of work at the Bar, the elite participants in this study were 
highly intellectual, skilled orators. Accordingly, the researcher was very alert to the 
possibility that there may be a power imbalance in favour of the elite participants. 
Several strategies were employed in an attempt to achieve a degree of symmetry in 
the interview relationship. For example, the researcher ensured they were thoroughly 
                                                 
5
 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research: A practical guide for 
beginners (SAGE Publications 2013) 89; ; Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, InterViews: learning 
the craft of qualitative research (2nd edn, SAGE Publications Ltd 2009)  33. 
6
 ibid. 
7
 John Fitz and David Halpin, ‘Brief encounters: Researching education policy-making in elite 
settings’ in Salisbury and Delamont (eds), Qualitative studies in education (Avebury 1995) 65. 
8
 Anna Boucher, Ahmar Maboob and Lydia Dutcher, ‘Power and Solidarity in Elite Interviews’ 
(2013) American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting Paper; American Political 
Science Association 2013 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2301499> accessed 
4 June 2014. 
9
 Dexter (n2) 100. 
10
 Kvale and Brinkmann (n5) 147. 
11
 Mikecz (n4) 482. 
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prepared before each interview. This involved making sure the researcher had a 
sufficiently strong depth of knowledge relating to the subject matter and, to a lesser 
extent, the professional profile of the participant.
12
 Much of the literature on elite 
interviewing suggests such an approach is vital in order to establish trust and rapport 
and to legitimise the request for participants to take time out of their working day.
13
 
It can also serve as a defence against participants’ attempts to patronise the 
researcher.
14
 In addition, the researcher presented as an “informed outsider”. Welch 
et al. suggest this is an effective strategy for tackling power asymmetry because 
elites ‘like to use the interviewer ... as a facilitator of their own thinking and 
sounding board for ideas'.
15
    
Where possible, interviews with more senior barristers were arranged towards the 
end of the interview timetable.
16
 This allowed the researcher time to hone their 
interview skills and enabled the researcher to draw upon previous interviews to 
enhance the credibility of the research. 
 That the majority of interviews were conducted in a virtual environment neutralised 
concerns about the potentially intimidating effect of the interview setting.
17
  
                                                 
12
 Harvey (n3). Harvey identifies this ability to acquire background information about the participant 
as a key advantage of interviewing elites. It also enables the researcher to concentrate on the subject 
matter where time us at a premium. 
13
 Harriet Zuckerman, ‘Interviewing an Ultra-Elite’ [1972] 36 Public Opinion Quarterly 2 164. 
14
 Mikecz (n4) 487. 
15
 Catherine Welch, Rebecca Marshcan-Piekkari, Heli Penttinen and Marja Tahvanainen, ‘Corporate 
elites as informants in qualitative international business research’ (2002) 11 International Business 
Review 611, 625. 
16
 The reference to ‘senior’ barristers refers to barristers with more than 15 years PQE and QCs. 
17
 It has been suggested that participants were more likely to disclose information away from 
workplace Harvey (n3). 
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APPENDIX 7: Braun and Clarke’s Phases of Thematic Analysis 
 
Phase Description of the process 
1. Familiarizing yourself 
with your data 
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading, re-reading the data, 
noting down initial ideas. 
2. Generating initial codes Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion 
across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code. 
3. Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data 
relevant to each theme. 
4. Reviewing themes Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts 
(Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a 
thematic ‘map’ of the analysis. 
5. Defining and naming 
themes 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the 
overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and 
names for each theme. 
6. Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question 
and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis. 
 
Source: Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research: A 
practical guide for beginners (SAGE Publications 2013). 
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APPENDIX 8 Solicitor perceptions questionnaire (SPQ)              
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APPENDIX 9: Invitation to take part in the online SPQ 
 
INVITATION BY DIRECT EMAIL 
Invitation to take part in PhD Research - Religion and Judicial Decision-making 
 
Dear  
I hope you do not mind me contacting you direct. I am a PhD Law student at the 
UEA Law School in Norwich. My research entitled “Courting Faith: Religion and 
Judicial Decision-making” examines the relationship between judges’ decision-
making and religious beliefs from the perspective of barristers and solicitors. 
  
I am writing to ask if you would be so kind as to consider taking part in my research. 
Your participation would involve completing an  online survey which seeks your 
views about the nexus between judges’ religious beliefs (and other personal 
factors) and judging. The questionnaire takes approximately 15 minutes to 
complete. If you would like to take part, please click on the following link: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/RB0515 
If you would like further details about the research project or would like to 
complete the survey in a different format, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
I would like to thank you for your time in considering this request and I very much 
hope that you find this research of interest. 
Yours sincerely, 
Amanda Springall-Rogers
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APPENDIX 10: Choice of statistical procedure 
 
  
STEP CONSIDER 
1 What research questions 
are to be addressed? 
Can the research question be asked in more than one 
way? If so, which question is most suitable given the 
nature of the data collected? 
 
Does the research question explore relationships amongst 
variables or relationships amongst groups? 
2 Identify the questionnaire 
items and scales that will be 
used to answer the research 
questions 
Identify the following: each variable, how each variable 
was measured, how many response options were 
available and the possible range of scores.  
3 Identify the nature of each 
of the variables 
Is the variable a dependent variable or an independent 
variable and how is it measured? Do the variable 
responses need to be collapsed? 
4 Is a parametric or non-
parametric test appropriate? 
What assumptions need to be met? Are these 
assumptions met? 
5 Consider the tests now 
available and choose which is 
most appropriate  
Why is the chosen statistical procedure more appropriate 
than others? 
 
Steps for choosing which statistical technique to use for data analysis (adapted from 
Julie Pallant, SPSS Survival Manual (Allen and Unwin 2005)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 308 
 
APPENDIX 11: Formal Application for Judicial Participation in 
Research 
 
APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Applicant:    Amanda Springall-Rogers (Researcher) 
Position:   PhD Law Research Candidate, University of East 
Anglia, Norwich 
Project Supervisors:  Mr Gareth Thomas 
Professor Owen Warnock 
Ms Gillian Daly 
 
Working Project Title:  Courting Faith: Religion as a Factor in Judicial 
Decision-making 
Date of Application:   30 April 2014 
 
COURTING FAITH: RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Permission is sought from Heads of Divisions and the Senior President of Tribunals 
to invite judges to take part in interviews or to complete a short online survey as 
part of a PhD research project exploring lawyers’ perceptions of the relationship 
between religion and judicial decision-making in British courts. 
It is widely acknowledged that judges’ personal backgrounds and experiences may 
impact upon their judicial decision-making, particularly in hard cases and in cases 
where judicial discretion is required. As such, in so far as religious belief may be a 
constituent part of a judge’s background and integral to his or her personal outlook, 
religion could potentially affect judicial reasoning, consciously or unconsciously. 
There has been a wealth of empirical research exploring the relationship between 
religion and judicial decision-making conducted in other jurisdictions, most notably 
the US, where some findings indicate that religion does affect judicial reasoning in 
certain legal areas. However, there is a paucity of similar research in relation to the 
judiciary in Great Britain. 
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Using interviews and an online survey, this exploratory social-legal empirical study 
considers the relationship between religion and judicial decision-making from the 
unique perspective of judges. No alternative source of data can provide a similar 
insight. The survey will form part of a wider PhD project; the researcher has already 
conducted interviews with barristers to elicit opinion as to whether religious beliefs 
inform judicial reasoning. Whilst findings from those interviews have yet to be 
analysed, it is apparent that some of those questioned thought religion may play a 
role in judicial reasoning, albeit not so as to be determinative of case outcomes.  
Judicial participation in the research project will provide an invaluable and distinct 
insight into how judges perceive the relationship between religion and judicial 
decision-making. The proposed study will make a valuable contribution to a greater 
understanding of how judges judge and help fill the ‘information black hole’ that 
currently exists in the understanding of the judiciary in the UK (Genn 2010). 
 
RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This foundational enquiry explores the nexus between two themes – religion and 
judicial decision-making.  
Aims  
The proposed research adds a new dimension to a burgeoning body of academic 
study that aims to fill the void in the understanding of the judiciary in the UK. It will 
contribute to a wider understanding of the factors that influence judicial decision-
making and will inform the judicial diversity debate through an exploration of the 
relationship between religion and judicial decision-making from the unique 
perspective of members of the judiciary.  
Judicial participation is crucial to the research project. 
Objectives 
The research objectives are: 
 To assess, using qualitative research methods, judges’ views as to whether 
religious beliefs (and other personal characteristics) are perceived by others 
to influence judicial reasoning. 
 To examine, using qualitative interview techniques, the attitudes and 
experiences of senior members of the judiciary in relation to the question of 
what effect, if any, a judge’s personal religious beliefs have on their judicial 
reasoning. There is no requirement for participating judges to disclose their 
own religious affiliation.  
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 To seek judicial opinion as to the merits or otherwise of having specialist 
judges to hear cases in which religiously sensitive issues are identified  i.e. a 
requirement for judges hearing such cases to have what might be described 
as a ‘religious ticket’. 
 To explore views as to whether judges’ religious beliefs should be subject to 
academic enquiry in the UK context. 
 To assess the feasibility of including religious belief as a variable in future 
empirical analyses that explore how judges judge in our national courts. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The project proposes to employ a mixed methods research strategy as follows: 
1. Qualitative research -  Semi-structured interviews with senior members of 
the Judiciary  
Approval is sought to allow the researcher to interview current and retired 
Supreme Court justices and /or Lord and Lady Justices of Appeal, for the purpose of 
gaining an insight into how senior judges view the relationship between religion 
and judicial reasoning. The desired sample size is between 4-8 participants. 
The use of elite interviews (that is to say interviews ‘with persons who are leaders 
or experts in a community, who are usually in powerful positions’ (Kvale 2009)) is 
an established method of enquiry in socio-legal studies of judicial decision-making. 
Over 30 years ago, in his benchmark text ‘The Law Lords’, Paterson interviewed 15 
Law Lords and 46 barristers to explore decision-making in the House of Lords 
(Paterson 1982). In his most recent landmark study of appellate decision-making in 
the House of Lords and Supreme Court, Paterson again uses elite interviews to form 
the backbone of his research examining judicial decision-making as a social process 
(Paterson 2013).  
 
In compliance with the guidelines for researchers seeking approval for judicial 
participation in research: 
 The information provided will be confidential and all data collection, storage 
and processing will comply with the principles of the Data Protection Act 
1998.  
 A transcript of each interview will be made. No participant will be identified 
by name and information disclosed will not lead to any third party or 
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specific case being identifiable. Whilst direct quotations may be used, these 
will be non-attributable (For further details see Annex A, ‘How will your 
privacy and confidentiality be maintained?’). 
 The researcher undertakes to provide relevant judicial Heads of Division and 
the judges interviewed as part of the research with a final draft copy of any 
report for comment prior to publication. 
 Participants will not be asked about the merits of individual cases. 
 To ensure judicial participation does not involve an undue burden on those 
taking part, interviews will typically take no more than 30 minutes (unless 
the participant has expressly agreed otherwise). Interviews will be by video-
call (e.g. Skype), telephone or face-to-face according to the participant’s 
preference. 
A Participant Information Sheet is provided at Annex A. 
A Participant Consent Form is provided at Annex B. 
Questions for discussion are listed at Annex C. 
A copy of the letter giving ethical approval for the research project is provided at 
Annex D. 
 
2. Qualitative research - Questionnaires to members of the Judiciary 
Approval is sought to allow the researcher to send an online questionnaire to the 
following members of the judiciary: 
 Individual Supreme Court Justices as listed on the Supreme Court website 
(http://supremecourt.uk/about/biographies-of-the-justices.html). 
 Members of the senior judiciary as listed under ‘Senior judiciary’ on the 
Judiciary of England and Wales website (http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-
the-judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/list-of-members-of-
the-judiciary/senior-judiciary-list, details being correct as at 13 March 2014). 
Members of the senior judiciary who have agreed to be interviewed will not 
be asked to complete a questionnaire. 
 Circuit judges as listed on the Judiciary of England and Wales website 
(http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-
tribunal-judges/list-of-members-of-the-judiciary/circuit-judge-list, details 
being correct as at 6 December 2013). 
 Tribunal Judges, a list of which should available from the Judicial Office 
internal database (as per information provided in the Judicial Office 
response to Freedom of Information Request 79448, December 2012). 
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The questionnaire will ask judges for their views on factors affecting judicial 
decision-making and on diversity in the judiciary. The survey will be confidential and 
results will be presented in an anonymised form. Data collection, storage and 
processing will comply with the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998.  
The draft questionnaire is provided at Annex E. 
 
WHY EXPLORE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND JUDICIAL DECISION-
MAKING? 
 
 
Changing Judicial and Religious Landscapes 
There has been a significant expansion in the power and reach of the British 
judiciary over the last 70 years (Genn, 2010). One consequence of this wider judicial 
remit is that judges are increasingly required to adjudicate on cases engaging novel, 
often controversial, issues of profound political, social and moral importance. In 
consequence, judges and judicial decision-making might reasonably have been 
expected to have captured the interest of the academic community in the UK. 
However, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Griffith 1977, Paterson 1982, 
Robertson 1982), it is only recently that judicial decision-making has begun to 
attract the wider attention of legal scholars - who have traditionally focused on a 
legalistic analysis of cases rather than exploring decisions from a socio-legal 
perspective. This lack of academic scrutiny has been described as ‘an astonishing 
void in our understanding of the judiciary as a critical social institution…’ (Genn, 
2010). Thomas goes further and suggests the lack of understanding about the 
judiciary is ‘academically unacceptable and socially dangerous’ (Thomas 2012). 
Contemporaneously, the religious landscape of the UK has changed significantly. 
Whilst the cultural monopoly once enjoyed by the institutionalised forms of 
Christianity has waned and much of society has become increasingly secular, a 
growing number of judicial decisions relate to matters in connection with which 
many religions have clear positions or approaches. This, along with the promotion 
and protection of religious freedom under the Human Rights Act 1998 for example, 
means that judges are now more likely to find themselves deciding cases that 
engage religiously sensitive issues. In turn, this potentially gives rise to tension with 
the secular approach of the courts or may be a source of conflict for an individual 
judge if the religious issue in question runs counter to his or her own religious or 
non-religious beliefs. 
Lack of Existing Empirical Research in the UK 
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Paterson observes that research into the work of the judiciary in the UK is currently 
undergoing a new lease of life (Paterson 2013). However, empirical studies that 
explore the influence of personal characteristics and values on judicial decision-
making in the UK courts remain scarce. Of the few studies conducted, the scope has 
historically been limited to the relationship between judicial decisions and political 
values and/or social class and educational background (e.g. Griffith 1977, Robertson 
1982, Arvind and Stirton 2012, Hanretty 2013) with little attention having been paid 
to the role of other demographic factors or values on judicial reasoning. In contrast, 
scholars in the US have long been interested in the link between judicial 
determinations and a myriad of other factors – gender, religion, race, age, prior 
employment and political ideology have been comprehensively analysed. These 
studies typically employ quantitative methods to analyse publicly available data 
often contained in longitudinal databases of US court decisions (Thomas 2013). 
Whilst US findings have proved generally inconclusive, there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that a judge’s religious convictions may inform judicial reasoning in the 
higher courts, consciously or unconsciously, in some legal areas. 
Upswing in studies of judicial decision-making in the UK 
It is only recently that scholars have become interested in investigating the 
influence of a wider range of variables on judicial reasoning to those few already 
examined in the context of the British judiciary i.e. political values, social class and 
educational background. For example, prompted by constitutional reforms and by 
initiatives to improve gender diversity in the judiciary, the role of gender on legal 
judgments is now subject to extensive investigation. Of particular interest has been 
the question of whether having a feminist philosophy makes a difference to judicial 
reasoning (e.g. Malleson 2003, Hunter 2008, Rackley 2009, Hunter, McGlynn and 
Rackley 2010). Significantly, the most recent investigation to explore the 
relationship between personal characteristics and judicial decision-making in the UK 
has broadened the scope of enquiry further. It is significant that, in an empirical 
study of tribunal decision-making in relation to Disability Living Allowance appeals 
using case simulation, Genn and Thomas assess the influence of factors including 
gender, age, household income, ethnicity and, for the first time, the religion of the 
panel members on appeal decisions (Genn and Thomas 2013). In light of these 
developments, this exploratory research project is particularly timely. 
 
BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The key benefits of the research are three-fold: 
 Benefits the judiciary  
 314 
 
It will provide an opportunity for individual judges to reflect upon their own 
experiences of judicial decision-making and to assess how their attitudes compare 
to those of their colleagues and others involved in the judicial process. Such 
awareness can help improve judicial skills across the bench by encouraging ‘greater 
self-conscious objectivity and heightened attention to legal rules and norms’ (Sisk 
2008).  
 Improves and promotes the administration of justice 
Judicial participation demonstrates a tangible commitment to the promotion of 
greater transparency in, and access to, the judiciary, the value of which is to 
enhance public confidence in the judiciary and the administration of justice. 
 In the public interest 
Waldron states judges ‘are not deciding what to do as individuals; they are making 
decisions for and about a whole society’ (Waldron 2008). On this basis, there is a 
legitimate societal interest in knowing more about the factors that inform judicial 
reasoning, particularly in cases in which morally and ethically sensitive issues are 
engaged. 
 
 
 
TIMESCALE 
The anticipated state date and duration is: 
1. Interviews: Subject to approval, estimated start date June 2014 for 
completion October 2014. 
2. Questionnaires: Subject to approval, it is anticipated questionnaires will be 
sent to members of the judiciary between June and July 2014. 
Project due for completion: March 2015 
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ANNEX A 
JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET (Interviews) 
Courting Faith: Religion as a Factor in Judicial Decision-making 
You are being invited to participate in this postgraduate research project. Before 
you decide whether you would like to participate, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully.  Please contact me if 
anything is unclear or if you would like more information. I would like to take this 
opportunity to thank you for your interest. 
 
What is the aim of the study? 
This research project explores the relationship between religion and judicial 
decision-making. 
It is widely acknowledged that judges’ personal backgrounds and experiences may 
impact upon their judicial decision-making, particularly in hard cases and in cases 
where judicial discretion is exercised.  Therefore, in so far as religious beliefs may 
be a constituent part of a judge’s background and personal outlook, a judge’s 
religious beliefs could potentially affect judicial reasoning, consciously or 
unconsciously.  
Forming part of a wider PhD research project, this study uses semi-structured 
interviews to explore the nexus between religion and judicial decision-making from 
the unique perspective of judges. There has been a wealth of empirical research 
exploring this relationship in other jurisdictions, most notably the US, where 
findings indicate that religion does affect judicial reasoning in certain legal areas. In 
contrast, it is only recently that religion has been considered in an empirical study 
of decision-making in the UK.  
The aim of the research project is to explore the relationship between religion and 
judicial decision-making in order to gain a wider understanding of the factors that 
influence judicial decision-making and to help fill the void that currently exists in 
the understanding of how judges judge in British courts.  
 
Why have you been asked to take part in this research project? 
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This project explores the relationship between religion and judicial decision-making 
from the perspective of members of the judiciary.  As a member of the appellate 
judiciary, you are likely to be involved in cases raising unexplored legal issues where 
religion might well be relevant and, as such, you are well placed to offer insight into 
this topic. 
The information collected for the research project will be used to produce a PhD 
thesis and may be used in academic publications. Anonymised direct quotes from 
the interview transcript may be used. 
 
What will participation involve? 
An interview will be conducted at a time and place convenient for you. This can be 
face-to-face, by video call (e.g. Skype) or telephone. The interview will be based 
around a semi-structured format and will typically last between 20 – 30 minutes. 
 
What will happen if you choose to withdraw from the study? 
It is up to you whether to participate or not. If you decide to take part you are still 
free to withdraw during the interview, or at any time thereafter, and without giving 
a reason. If you choose to withdraw from the study every effort will be made to 
ensure all data is withdrawn and destroyed. However, it will not be possible for 
data to be extracted and destroyed following submission of the PhD thesis for 
examination or where data is included in academic articles that have been accepted 
for publication.  
 
How will your privacy and confidentiality be maintained? 
If you agree to take part in the research project, every effort will be made to ensure 
any information you provide will be kept confidential. All data collection, storage 
and processing will comply with the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
All efforts will be made to ensure that you cannot be identified as a participant in 
the study and that any information you disclose will not lead to any third party or 
specific case being identifiable in the research. 
A digital audio file of the interview (if agreed to) will be transferred from the 
recording device using audio management software to a memory stick that will 
remain in the researcher’s office until the recording is transcribed. Upon 
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transcription, the audio file will be erased from the memory stick. On completion of 
the research project, the memory stick will be physically destroyed.  
The transcript of the interview will be anonymised and will be allocated a unique 
identifier. A master list identifying you to the unique identifier will be held on a 
password protected computer accessed only by the researcher. Other potentially 
disclosive text will be replaced with more generalized text and third parties and 
cases will be anonymised and/or allocated pseudonyms. You will be asked to 
approve the transcript. 
The transcript will be stored on a password protected computer and a hard copy 
will be stored in a locked filing cabinet to which the researcher has sole access. The 
transcript will not be available to other researchers without your express 
permission. Electronic data will be stored on a computer with password protection, 
at both login and individual file level, accessible only by the researcher. 
At the conclusion of the study, the information or data collected from you may be  
retained and used (in its anonymised form) for future research provided the 
researcher has agreed to preserve the confidentiality of the data and subject to 
approval from the relevant research ethics committee.  
 
What happens next? 
If you are willing to take part in this research project please contact me, Amanda 
Springall-Rogers,  by email at: A.Springall-Rogers@uea.ac.uk. If you decide to 
participate I will contact you by return so we can arrange an interview, at a time 
and date that is convenient for you. You will be given this information sheet and 
asked to sign a consent form. 
 
Further information and complaints procedure 
If you have any questions or require more information about this research project 
or, if you decide you would rather not participate in the study but would like to 
make any comments about the research, please contact me by email at: A.Springall-
Rogers@uea.ac.uk or by post to: Amanda Springall-Rogers, UEA Law (PGR), 
University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 7TJ. 
 
If you wish to make a complaint relating to your participation in this research 
project, please contact the research project lead supervisor by email at: 
G.Thomas@uea.ac.uk or by post to: Gareth Thomas, UEA Law, University of East 
Anglia,  Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 7TJ. 
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Approval to conduct this research has been provided by the UEA General Research 
Ethics Committee in accordance with ethics review and approval procedures. 
 
 
Thank you for your interest.  
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ANNEX B 
 
 
JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION CONSENT FORM (Interviews) 
Courting Faith: Religion as a Factor in Judicial Decision-making 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. If you have any questions, 
please ask the researcher before you agree to participate in the research project. 
Please complete this form after you have read the Participant Information Sheet 
relating to the research.  
 
 
 
Participation 
I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet for the above 
research project. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
I understand that I can withdraw at any stage of the research 
project without giving any reason. Should I decide to withdraw, I 
understand all data will be withdrawn and destroyed up until 
submission of the PhD thesis for examination or where data has 
been included in academic articles accepted for publication. 
 I consent to being interviewed and the interview being recorded 
using a digital audio device.  
I understand that I will be given a transcript of the interview for my 
approval before it is included in the research project. 
Use of information  
I understand and agree to the arrangements relating to privacy and confidentiality 
set out in the Participant Information Sheet under the heading “How will your 
privacy and confidentiality be maintained?” 
 
I understand that data will be processed manually and with the 
aid of computer software. I consent to the processing of my 
personal information for the purpose of this research project and 
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that such information will be handled in accordance with the 
provisions in the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
I understand that information gained during the research project 
will be used to produce a PhD thesis and may be used in academic 
publications.  
I would like to receive a summary of the results. 
I agree that information or data collected from me may be used in 
future research only where the researchers agree to preserve the 
confidentiality of the data and subject to approval from the 
relevant research ethics committee. 
 
Signed:…………………………………………………………………… (Participant) 
Print name:………………………………………………………………. 
Date: ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Signed:……………………………………………………………………(Researcher) 
Print name:……………………………………………………………….. 
Date:………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Please return to: Amanda Springall-Rogers, UEA Law (PGR), Norwich Research Park, 
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ or by email to A.Springall-Rogers@uea.ac.uk. If you have 
any questions or issues relating to your participation in this research project, please 
contact the researcher by post or email at the addresses stated above. 
 
If you wish to make a complaint relating to your involvement in the research, please 
contact the research project supervisor, Gareth Thomas, by post to Mr. Gareth 
Thomas, UEA Law, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ or by email at 
G.Thomas@uea.ac.uk. 
 
Approval to conduct this research has been provided by the UEA General Research 
Ethics Committee in accordance with ethics review and approval procedures. 
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ANNEX C  
SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS TO PUT TO JUDICIAL PARTICIPANTS  
COURTING FAITH: RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN JUDICIAL DECISION-
MAKING 
Please note: Where questions refer to religious views or beliefs this should be 
taken to include the absence of such views or beliefs 
1. Do you agree or disagree with the view that, in some cases, the decisions of 
judges are influenced by their own backgrounds, experience and personal 
outlook, in addition to the law itself? If so, can you please give examples of how 
this occurs (without referring to specific reported cases)? 
  
2. Do you think religious beliefs can affect judicial reasoning, consciously or 
unconsciously? If so, what impact does this have on judicial decision-making? 
 
3. Do your own religious views ever affect your judicial reasoning? If so, how? 
 
4. How easy or difficult is it to set aside your own religious beliefs in cases 
involving religious issues or religiously sensitive issues where one or more of the 
arguments relied on is in conflict with your own beliefs? 
 
5. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the view that a judge should be 
able to request an exemption from hearing a case involving religious issues or 
religiously sensitive issues on grounds of his or her own religious beliefs? Please 
briefly explain your response in the box below. 
 
6. Have you noticed an increase in cases engaging religiously sensitive issues since 
the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force? 
 
7. In the employment law case of McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 
771, Mr McFarlane appealed against a decision of the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal rejecting his claims of unfair dismissal and religious discrimination 
brought against his employer, Relate Avon Ltd. Mr McFarlane, a relationship 
counsellor, had been dismissed for refusing to counsel same-sex couples on 
sexual matters because to counsel same-sex couples on such issues would be 
contrary to his Christian beliefs. 
  
In support of Mr McFarlane’s application to appeal, Lord Carey, former 
Archbishop of Canterbury, provided a witness statement in which he appealed 
to the Lord Chief Justice to establish “a specialist Panel of Judges designated to 
hear cases engaging religious rights”. Lord Carey said that “Such Judges should 
have a proven sensitivity and understanding of religious issues.”  
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Do you think there is any merit in having a specialist panel of judges with ‘a 
proven sensitivity and understanding of religious issues’ to hear cases engaging 
such issues? If so, how would you suggest panel members be selected? If not, 
why not? 
 
8. How would you feel about having biographical information about you, 
including information about your religion, religious beliefs or absence of 
religious beliefs being widely available? 
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ANNEX D  
ETHICAL APPROVAL FROM UEA 
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ANNEX E   
COURTING FAITH: RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
RELIGION AND JUDICIAL REASONING - JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS SURVEY 
Questionnaire 
 
The aim of this survey is to contribute to a wider understanding of the factors that 
influence judicial reasoning and to inform judicial diversity debate. The survey will 
typically take around 10 minutes to complete and will involve answering questions 
that seek your personal views regarding the relationship between religion and 
adjudication in the British courts. The survey forms part of a wider PhD research 
project in which interviews are also to be used to explore the perceptions of 
members of the judiciary in relation to these matters.  
The information you provide in the survey is completely confidential – individual 
answers will not be published. If you choose to take part, you may withdraw at any 
time without giving a reason. At the end of the questionnaire, there is the option to 
provide your contact details should you also be willing to be interviewed. If you 
provide this information it will be held separately from your responses and will only 
be accessed by the project team.  
The project team is: Amanda Springall-Rogers (PhD Researcher) and Gareth 
Thomas, Professor Owen Warnock and Gillian Daly (Project Supervisors). 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the UEA General Research Ethics 
Committee in accordance with ethics review and approval procedures. 
 
Before starting the survey, please confirm the following: 
 
  I agree to take part in the study. 
 I have read the information about the study. 
 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time 
without giving a reason. 
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 I understand that I may skip any questions I would prefer not to 
answer. 
Please note that if you would like to provide a more detailed response to a 
question you can do so where an additional comment box is found in the space 
below the question. A separate box is also provided at the end of the 
questionnaire should you have any further comments.  
 
 
About you 
 
1. What is your judicial role? Please select one. 
 
 Justice of the Supreme Court 
 Court of Appeal Judge  
 High Court Judge 
 A retired member of the Senior Judiciary under 75 (as listed on the Judicial 
Office website < http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judges-
magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/list-of-members-of-the-judiciary/senior-
judiciary-list > 
 
 Circuit Judge 
 Tribunal Judge or Chairman 
 Other – please specify  
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2. How long have you held judicial office? Please count from the point at 
which you were first appointed as a judge whether on a part-time or full-
time, salaried or fee-paid, basis. 
 
 0 – 5 years 
 6 – 10 years 
 11 – 15 years 
 16 – 20 years 
 21 years + 
 
3. In which jurisdiction do you sit? Please tick all that apply. 
 
 Civil 
 Criminal 
 Family 
 Other - please specify 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. In which geographic region do you consider you are principally based for 
work? 
 
 England  Please specify: 
     London 
     Midlands 
     South East 
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     North 
     North East 
     West 
 Wales and Chester 
 Scotland 
 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
 
 
 
    
 
5. What is your gender? 
 
 Female 
 Male 
 Transgender 
 Prefer not to say 
 
6. Of the options below, what best describes your religious beliefs (as distinct 
from cultural background)? If within one of the following options you 
associate with a particular denomination, please indicate which in the box 
below. 
 
 None (please go to Q. 8) 
 Agnostic  
 Atheist 
 Christian 
 Muslim 
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 Jewish 
 Hindu 
 Buddhist 
 Sikh 
 Any other religion – please specify 
 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. To what extent do you actively practice your religion? For the purposes of 
this question, ‘practice’ includes religious activities that are expected of 
believers ‘such as worship, prayer, participation in special sacraments, and 
adherence to religious dress and dietary laws, for example’ (Purdam, 
Afkhami, Crockett and Olsen 2007).  
 
 Always 
 Often 
 Occasionally 
 Rarely 
 Never 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
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The Relationship between Religion and Judicial Reasoning 
  
8. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the view that the religious 
beliefs of a judge may influence his or her judicial reasoning in cases where 
there is no settled law and/or judicial discretion is exercised? 
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree (please go to Q.12) 
 Disagree (please go to Q.12) 
 Strongly disagree (please go to Q.12) 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
 
 
 
 
9. If you agree with the view that the religious beliefs of a judge may influence 
his or her judicial reasoning in cases where there is no settled law and/or 
judicial discretion is exercised, how often do you think that they may do so? 
 
 Always 
 Often 
 Occasionally 
 Rarely 
 Never 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
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10. If you agree with the view that the religious beliefs of a judge influence his 
or her judicial reasoning, do you think that they do so: 
 
 Consciously 
 Unconsciously 
 Both consciously and unconsciously 
 
11. If you agree with the view that the religious beliefs of a judge influence his 
or her judicial reasoning, in what types of case do you think this will be most 
likely? 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the view that a judge should 
be able to request an exemption from hearing a case involving religious 
issues or religiously sensitive issues on grounds of his or her own religious 
beliefs? Please briefly explain your response in the box below. 
 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree 
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The Relationship between Religion and Your own Judicial Reasoning  
 
13. Please use the space below to list the personal factors that you think will 
most likely influence your judicial reasoning in cases where there is no 
settled law and/or judicial discretion is exercised. Examples include factors 
such as gender, age, family circumstances, educational background, prior 
employment and social class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. To what extent do you think that your own religious beliefs affect your 
judicial reasoning? 
 
 Always 
 Often 
 Occasionally 
 Never 
 Don’t know 
 Not applicable 
 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
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15. How often do you adjudicate cases in which religious issues or religiously 
sensitive issues arise? 
 
 Always 
 Often 
 Occasionally 
 Never 
 Don’t know 
 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
 
 
 
 
16. Please indicate which of the following statements best reflects your own 
approach when dealing with cases in which religious issues or religiously 
sensitive issues arise: 
 
 I find it easy to set aside my own religious views 
 I find it difficult to set aside my own religious views but I am able to do so 
 I find it difficult to set aside my own religious views and I am never able to 
do so 
 I do not think it is appropriate or necessary to set aside my own religious 
views 
 Not applicable 
 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
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17. Have you noticed any change in the number of cases in which religious 
issues or religiously sensitive issues have been raised since the coming into 
force of the Human Rights Act 1998? 
 
 Yes, significant increase 
 Yes, moderate increase 
 No, no change 
 Yes, a significant decrease 
 Yes, moderate decrease 
 Don’t know 
 
 
Additional comments (if desired): 
 
 
 
 
18. In the employment law case of McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA 
Civ 771, Mr McFarlane appealed against a decision of the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal rejecting his claims of unfair dismissal and religious 
discrimination brought against his employer, Relate Avon Ltd.  
 
Mr McFarlane, a relationship counsellor, had been dismissed for refusing to 
counsel same-sex couples on sexual matters because to counsel same-sex 
couples would have been contrary to his religious beliefs. 
  
In support of Mr McFarlane’s application to appeal, Lord Carey, former 
Archbishop of Canterbury, provided a witness statement in which he 
appealed to the Lord Chief Justice to establish “a specialist Panel of Judges 
designated to hear cases engaging religious rights”. Lord Carey said that 
“Such Judges should have a proven sensitivity and understanding of religious 
issues.”  
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Please indicate whether you support or oppose having a specialist panel of 
judges ‘with a proven sensitivity and understanding of religious issues’ to 
hear cases involving such issues as suggested by Lord Carey in McFarlane v. 
Relate Avon Ltd? 
 
 
 I support having such a specialist panel of judges to hear such cases  
 I oppose having such a specialist panel of judges to hear such cases (please 
go to Q.20) 
 I neither support nor oppose having a specialist panel of judges to hear such 
cases (please go to Q. 21) 
 
19. If you support having a specialist panel of judges to hear cases involving 
religious issues as suggested by Lord Carey in McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd, 
please suggest what qualifying criteria you think there should be to sit on 
such a panel and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. If you oppose having a specialist panel of judges to hear cases involving 
religious issues as suggested by Lord Carey in McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd, 
please briefly explain why. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. If you have any further comments on the issues being raised in this 
questionnaire, please use the space below. 
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22. Would you be interested in taking part in an interview so your views on this 
topic can be explored in more detail? If so, please provide your contact 
details in the space below. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
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APPENDIX 12: Ethical considerations 
 
Obtaining ethical approval  
Ethical approval was sought in an application to the University of East Anglia 
General Research Ethics Committee (G-REC) in 2013. In respect of the qualitative 
interviews with barristers, copies of the Participant Information Sheet and Consent 
Form were submitted to G-REC for scrutiny. Ethical approval was granted subject to 
the researcher’s compliance with approval conditions (Appendix 11 Annex D). 
Voluntary participation 
Participation in the research project was on a voluntary basis. In relation to the 
qualitative interviews with barristers, contact with potential participants was made 
only where individuals responded to the initial invitation to take part in, or comment 
on, the research project. These participants were advised of their right to withdraw 
from the study at any time before, during or after the study. Respondents to the SPQ 
were advised that they could withdraw from the study prior to submitting the 
questionnaire response.  
Informed consent 
All individuals who expressed an interest in taking part in the qualitative interviews 
were initially provided with a Participant Information Sheet sent via email. The sheet 
contained comprehensive detail about the study such as the aims of the research, the 
right of the participant to withdraw from the study at any time and the procedures for 
maintaining privacy and confidentiality.  Participants were invited to contact the 
researcher should the information sheet give rise to any questions or concerns about 
the study.  
Given the potentially sensitive nature of the interviews conducted, it was decided 
that the use of a written consent form was the most appropriate means by which to 
obtain consent.  Individuals agreeing to take part in the study were provided with a 
consent form for completion and return, either by post, email or by hand. The 
consent form contained a statement of confirmation which gave participants the 
choice of whether to consent to all or some of the points detailed in the Participant 
Information Sheet. On completion, participants were asked to retain copies of the 
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signed consent form and information sheet and to provide the researcher with a 
signed consent form. The researcher retained all signed consent forms in a secure 
storage cabinet. Due to the time lapse between the completion of the consent form 
and the interview date, the researcher sought verbal confirmation from the 
participant that they had read and understood the Participant Information Sheet and 
asked if there were any points that required clarification at the start of the interview. 
The participant was further reminded that they were free to withdraw from the study 
at any time. 
Respondents to the SPQ were provided with details about the research project on the 
Welcome page of the online questionnaire.  The Welcome page also provided the 
researcher’s contact details so that potential respondents had an opportunity to 
contact the researcher if they had any questions prior to participation. At this point, it 
was also made clear that by giving consent, respondents permitted the researcher to 
include responses, including additional written comments, in the write up of the 
research project.  Respondents were asked to give their consent to take part in the 
study on Page 2 of the online survey, completion of which was necessary in order to 
access the main part of the questionnaire.  
Data Protection 
Participants were advised that data collection, storage and processing complied with 
the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Interviews with barristers 
The Participant Information Sheet contained details about participant anonymity and 
confidentiality in the section headed ‘How will your privacy and confidentiality be 
maintained?’  At the start of the interviews, participants were asked to reaffirm their 
consent to allow the interview to be recorded using an audio digital recorder. If a 
participant advised that they did not consent to the recording of the interview, the 
researcher asked for permission to make hand written notes. 
Interviews were subsequently transcribed by the researcher using computer. 
Throughout this process, transcripts were anonymised through the use of numerical 
identifiers and replacement terms. An anonymisation log was kept which was held 
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separately from the transcripts.  Individual files were encrypted and stored on 
portable storage media (USB stick and CD). Hard copies of transcripts were held in a 
lockable filing cabinet to which the researcher had sole access. Participants were 
given the opportunity to review their transcript and were invited to request 
amendment and/or agree to its use in the research project. 
CAQDAS (NVivo10) was used to assist the management of data. Access to 
NVivo10 was restricted by use of a password known only to the researcher. 
SPQ 
Using a web-based survey tool such as SurveyMonkey to collect and analyse data 
raises specific ethical issues relating to anonymity and confidentiality. Although 
respondents were not asked to provide identifying details such as their name or email 
address, the default position of the survey software is set to collect IP addresses.
1
 To 
avoid IP tracking in this study, the default option was changed so that IP addresses 
were not included in the survey results. Furthermore, access to the SurveyMonkey 
account was restricted by use of a password known only to the researcher. 
A small number of the questionnaire respondents asked to be provided with an 
executive summary of research findings on completion. A written list of these 
respondents and their contact details is held in a lockable filing cabinet, to which the 
researcher has sole access. This list will be destroyed after the Executive summary of 
findings has been distributed to those who have requested a copy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 An IP (Internet Protocol) address is a unique address (numeric) that is assigned to any device 
connected to an IP network by server or router software. 
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APPENDIX 13: The Codebook 
 
Question item Variable Name Values 
2. How long have you been a solicitor? PQE 1= 0 – 5 years 
2 = 6-10 years 
3 = 11-15 years 
4 = 16-20 years 
5 = 21 years + 
99 = Missing 
3. Please state your main areas of legal 
practice in the box below. 
AREAPRAC_RC 1 = Employment 
2 = Family 
3 = Misc. (non-
commercial) 
4 = Other 
99 = Missing 
4. Are you a solicitor with higher rights 
of audience? 
HRA 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
99 = Missing 
5. Do you hold any part-time judicial 
posts?  
PTJUD 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
6. In which geographic region are you 
principally 
based for work? 
LOC 1 = London 
2 = North West 
3 = North 
4 = Yorks and Humber 
5 = West Midlands 
6 = East Anglia 
7 = South East 
8 = South West 
9 = Wales 
99 = Missing 
7. What is your gender? GEN 1 = Female 
2 = Male 
99 = Missing 
8. Of the options below, what best 
describes your religious beliefs (as 
distinct from your cultural background)? 
RBCOL_RC 1 = Christian 
2 = Unaffiliated 
3 = Non-Christian 
4 = Prefer not to say 
9. How often do you attend court or a 
tribunal? 
ATTCT_RC 1 = Frequently 
2 = Infrequently 
3 = Unclear 
4 = Missing 
10. Do you agree or disagree with the 
view that judges' personal factors 
influence judicial decision-making in 
cases where there is no settled law and/or 
judicial discretion is exercised? 
INFL_PF 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
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11. What personal factors do you think 
are most likely to influence judicial 
reasoning in cases where there is no 
settled law and/or judicial discretion is 
exercised? 
MAINPF1_RC 
MAINPF2_RC 
MAINPF3_RC 
MAINPF4_RC 
1 = Personal 
characteristics 
2 = Personal experience 
and background 
3 = Professional 
experience and training 
4 =Personality 
5 = Personal values and 
beliefs 
6 = Attitudes towards 
other court users 
7 = Other 
12. Please indicate how much you know 
about the following judicial 
personal factors in relation to the 
majority of the judges that you appear 
before most regularly in court. 
KNOWAGE 
KNOWDIS 
KNOWEDU 
KNOWFAM 
KNOWPOL 
KNOWPREEMP 
KNOWRB 
KNOWSEX 
1 = I always know 
2 = I often know 
3 = I occasionally know 
4 = I rarely know 
5 = I never know 
13.1 I think that a judge's personal 
factors affect case 
Outcomes 
PFCASEOUT_RC 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
13.2 I think that a judge's personal 
factors affect judicial 
approach (setting aside whether they 
affect case 
outcomes) 
PFJUDAPP_RC 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
13.3 I think that a judge's personal 
factors have no effect on 
judicial approach nor on judicial 
outcomes 
PFNOEFF_RC 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
13.4 I often think that the outcome of a 
case will be 
determined by which judge we draw in 
the judicial lottery 
PFJUDLOTT 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
14. Consideration as to the impact of a 
judge's personal factors 
on his or her judgments is part of my 
day-to-day work as a solicitor'. 
PFDAILY 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
15. I would find it useful to know more 
about the personal factors relating to any 
judge hearing a case relating to a client 
KNOWMORE 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
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of mine'. disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
 
16. Religious beliefs of a judge may 
influence his or her judicial decision-
making in cases where there is no settled 
law and/or judicial discretion is 
required? 
RBAFF 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
17. If you agree with the view that the 
religious beliefs of a judge can influence 
his or her judicial reasoning in cases 
where there is no settled law and/or 
judicial discretion is exercised, how often 
do you think that they may do so? 
FREQRB 1 = Never 
2 = Rarely 
3 = Occasionally 
4 = Often 
5 = Always 
18. If you agree with the view that the 
religious beliefs of a judge influence his 
or her judicial reasoning, do you think 
that they do so: consciously; 
unconsciously; both consciously and 
unconsciously; or don’t know. 
NATRB 1 = Never 
2 = Rarely 
3 = Occasionally 
4 = Often 
5 = Always 
19. If you agree with the view that the 
religious beliefs of a judge influence his 
or her judicial reasoning, in what types 
of case do you think this will be most 
likely? 
CASERB Qualitative 
20. To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the view that a judge 
should be able to request an exemption 
from hearing a case involving religious 
issues or religiously sensitive issues 
because of his or her own religious 
beliefs? 
CONEXM 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
21. How often are you involved in cases 
where religious or religiously sensitive 
issues arise? 
OWNEXPRB 1 = Always 
2 = Often 
3 = Occasionally 
4 = Never 
5 = Don’t know 
22. As a solicitor, please indicate which 
of the following statements best reflects 
your own approach when dealing with 
cases in which religious issues or 
religiously sensitive issues arise. 
SOLAPP 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
23. Do you support or oppose having a 
specialist panel of judges ‘with a proven 
sensitivity and understanding of religious 
issues’ 
RBPANEL 1 = Support 
2 = Oppose 
3 = Neither support nor 
oppose 
25. Do you agree or disagree that there 
should be greater diversity in the 
judiciary? 
JUDDIV 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
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4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
 
26. Do you agree or disagree that the 
judiciary's current focus on increasing 
gender and ethnicity diversity in the 
judiciary should be extended to include 
any of the following characteristics? 
 
 
AGEDIV (Age) 
DISDIV 
(Disability) 
GRDIV (Gender 
Re-assignment) 
PBDIV (Political 
beliefs) 
RBDIV (Religious 
beliefs) 
SODIV (Sexual 
orientation) 
SCDIV (Social 
class) 
OTHERDIV 
(Other) 
 
 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
27. If you agree that the current focus on 
increasing gender and ethnicity diversity 
in the judiciary should be extended to 
include other judicial characteristics 
- - 
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APPENDIX 14: Frequency distribution of response to SPQ Q10 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the view that judges' personal factors influence 
judicial decision-making in cases where there is no settled law and/or judicial 
discretion is exercised? 
 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
3 1.9 1.9 1.9 
 Disagree 17 10.8 10.8 12.7 
 Neither agree 
nor disagree 
24 15.2 15.2 27.8 
 Agree 95 60.1 60.1 88.0 
 Strongly agree 19 12.0 12.0 100.0 
 Total 158 100.0 100.0  
Missing  0 0   
Total  158 100   
 
Appendix 14a Solicitor responses to SPQ Q10 by frequency of attendance at 
court 
 
 
Q9 Attend court  
Total Frequently Infrequently 
Q10 Disagree Count 15 5 20 
% within Q10 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  17.2% 7.0% 12.7% 
% of Total 9.5% 3.2% 12.7% 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Count 11 13 24 
% within Q10 45.8% 54.2% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  12.6% 18.3% 15.2% 
% of Total 7.0% 8.2% 15.2% 
Agree Count 61 53 114 
% within Q10 53.5% 46.5% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  70.1% 74.6% 72.2% 
% of Total 38.6% 33.5% 72.2% 
Total Count 87 71 158 
% within Q10 55.1% 44.9% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 55.1% 44.9% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX 15: Multiple response codes allocated to qualitative 
responses in SPQ 11 
 
Personal Factors Variables PF1, PF2, PF3, PF4: Code 1 Moral & Other 
perspectives; Code 2 Personal characteristics; Code 3 Personal background and 
experience; Code 4 Professional background and experience; Code 5 Attitudes 
towards others; Code 6 None; Code 7 Other 
 
RESPONDENT 
ID 
 
QUALITATIVE RESPONSE TO SPQ 
Q11 
 
PF1 
 
PF2 
 
PF3 
 
PF4 
10 sexism. As a family lawyer I know which 
judges are pro-wife and which are pro-
husband. 
1    
11 Upbringing, ethnicity 3 2   
15 Individual makeup of the Judge 7    
19 Work experience 4    
21 Background for example practice prior to 
becoming a judge 
4    
25 gender  socio-economic background  
education  race 
2 3   
 
29 
The size and resources of the 
Respondent/Defendant; whether both 
parties are represented; the impact upon 
the Claimant of an adverse decision 
5    
31 Experience and their understanding of the 
justice/fairness of the situation, indeed 
even where there is settled case law must 
Judge's, rightly in my view, seek to see 
where the justice lies first before applying 
the law. 
1 4   
35 Possible influencing factors could include 
background (cultural, religious), age, 
gender, experience in the particular area, 
political persuasion. 
3 1 2  
36 Working life; class 4 3   
43 Their moral perspective - what is the 
"right" outcome 
1    
44 I think that an individual's background, life 
experiences and social/political views are 
inevitably bound to have a degree of 
influence over their reasoning and 
decision-making. Some judges are better 
than others at putting their personal views 
to one side. 
3 1   
46 The way in which a party presents 
themselves and their attitude/behaviour in 
5    
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court. 
47 background, education, religion, personal 
experience 
3 2   
48 Experience, social background influence 
views of what is normal or reasonable 
3 4   
49 Experience of similar cases whilst in 
practice as a lawyer (before becoming a 
judge - just because cases do not receive 
judgment and so become case law, it 
doesn't mean that the issue hasn't been 
litigated before) 
4    
50 Previous practice (i.e. whether Claimant or 
Respondent friendly lawyer prior to 
joining the judiciary).   Any personal 
experience of the matters in issue (i.e. a 
case involving the treatment of someone 
with mental health may be more personal 
to a judge who has a family member with a 
similar condition) 
4 3   
51 Not aware of any. 6    
53 background, sympathy with witnesses 3 4 5  
55 General perception of fairness and 
knowledge of how the business 
environment works 
1 7   
57 See above* 3 4   
59 religious/moral/ethical beliefs 1    
60 Political views. 1    
63 A mixture of their own personal views and 
the prevailing politically/socially 
acceptable stance on the position 
3 1   
65 It is very difficult to comment as I seldom 
have knowledge of a Tribunal judge's 
personal beliefs or circumstances.  
However, in my experience their 
background sometimes plays a part (eg 
whether from an employee or employer 
friendly background) 
4    
66 I don't believe personal factors 
significantly influence ET judges decision 
making. I believe, of any of these factors, a 
Judge's commercial experience is most 
likely to be an influencing factor 
4    
67 The judge has to interpret what Parliament 
meant in statutory law, if a new angle/issue 
arises which has not been decided before. 
7    
71 Personal sense of what the judge perceives 
to be morally and/or ethically "right" 
1    
72 What they perceuve to be justice 1    
77 The only factor should be whether their 
decision would be consistent with social 
1 3 4 2 
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mores and what society in general would 
regard as acceptable. However judges will 
inevitably be influenced by their own 
background, experience and characteristics 
in their reasoning. This can lead to 
unexpected and at times strange outcomes. 
When advising a client on their prospects 
of success, a factor will be the identity and 
characteristics of the judge hearing the 
case. 
79 Personal experience or moral views 1 3   
81 I worry that there is institutional racism at 
times within the court system 
3    
82 Life experience  Own position in life 3    
83 Personal experience 3    
84 Upbringing, personal financial 
circumstances (on financial matters), 
general ideas as to what is best for a child 
(in children matters) based on own 
upbringing and experience as a parent. 
3 1   
85 Religious beliefs, their own upbringing, 
moral values 
1 3   
87 Prejudices and biases (even if only sub-
consciously)  How much training the judge 
has received and how good that training 
was  Upbringing  Personality  Number of 
years of experience as a judge 
5 4 3  
88 Religious views of the trial judge  have not 
played a visible  part in any orders made in 
my professional experience. 
6    
89 Cultural background, possibly religious 
and other beliefs 
3 1   
91 personal knowledge and experience (or a 
lack of understanding of something that is 
different) can impact particularly on 
decisions relating to facts, such as whether 
a particular explanation is credible or 
reasonable. 
3    
92 Their background, political views 3 1   
93 I would hope none, but I do think that 
professional experience and political views 
do influence judicial reasoning. 
4 1   
94 upbringing and background 3    
96 whether the Judge is married or in a civil 
partnership , whether they have personal 
experience of looking after children  , 
whether they are judgmental in their 
approach , whether they have experienced 
or can empathise with persons who are in 
personal or financial difficulty , and 
3 1   
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whether their own needs as a child were 
met 
98 Personal experience 3    
100 family history, economic situation and 
ethical or faith aspects of their 
personalities 
1 3   
102 In the field of family law, the judges' 
personal views and experience on (1) the 
best arrangements for children, ie. whether 
with mother or father and the extent to 
which care should be shared (2) their 
views as to whether the primary carer 
should be expected to go out to work 
3 1   
104 The full range - ie social background, 
education (public or private school), 
experience in the work place outside of the 
law (if any), age, sex etc etc. 
3 4 2  
106 Background before judicial appointment, 
social background, conduct or advocate 
4 3   
107 i think judges bring their experience to 
bear on cases so what they have lived 
through may infulence eg if they have 
adopted a child, been widowed etc 
3    
121 see above* 6    
123 [personal life experience and judicial 
experience 
3 4   
124 Again my comments are based upon the 
area that that I practice in but to give a few 
examples I do believe that a judge who has 
been divorced or suffered a marriage 
breakdown is unlikely to ignore that totally 
when making a decision. A judge is also 
likely to have a view about a persons 
reasonable needs based on their own 
expenditure. Another example is when 
should a non earning wife exercise her 
earning capacity . 
3 1   
125 Background - education, class, life 
experience 
3    
128 Moral outlook, social class, education, 
race, gender, sexual orientation 
1 3 2  
131 Their individual world view, which will 
undoubtedly be shaped by their faith if 
they have one; changing societal norms 
1    
132 A Judge's moral/political/social beliefs 
(possibly including strong religious 
convictions if the Judge has these) 
1 2   
135 background in terms of e.g. boarding 
school can be important factors and the 
judge's own experience of being parented 
3    
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coupled with their own experience of 
having been divorced 
137 Own experiences and principles of fairness 
and justice 
3 1   
138 None 6    
140 A desire to act justly by operating 
principles of fairness and equity.  This 
desire may stem from a particular religious 
conviction but equally can be based on 
non-religious moral conviction. 
1    
141 Background 3    
144 Gender, education, own life story 3 2   
146 Their personal experiences, their own 
families. 
3    
147 Experience in the law 4    
155 Political views are important in 
employment cases in the sense of the 
balance between employer and employee 
rights. I have no personal experience of 
religious beliefs having weighed in a 
decision. 
1    
156 background, and experience 3 4   
157 Experience of business/commerce and of 
family life 
4 3   
158 Gender, age 2    
159 Life experience 3    
160 Any of the judge's own personal 
experiences of the issues touched on in the 
case and the judge's political or 
philosophical (by extension, religious) 
views. 
3 1   
161 Personality often dictates level of patience 
/ willingness to adopt a nuanced approach 
(at county court level).  Faith / personal 
ethics also influence. 
1 7   
162 General life experience 3    
163 Class and education 3    
169 too wide to answer 7    
173 Some judges are scrupulously fair and 
clearly seek to apply what they see as a 
just outcome. Others are bad tempered and 
rude and consequently seem to "take 
against" advocates or parties sometimes. 
1 7   
183 I think there is a desire amongst judges to 
ensure that a fair result is obtained.  Their 
view on fairness will be influenced 
primarily by the case but also their general 
experience 
1 3 4 7 
185 Political beliefs, upbringing/background of 1 3 4  
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a Judge, how long they have been a Judge 
and what they did before becoming a 
Judge (for e.g. if they were a practising 
barrister). 
186 personal world views (i.e. faith or no 
faith), personal ethics, social prejudices 
and preconceptions, compassion 
1    
189 Judges appear to be not confident in their 
wide ranging discretion, or are fearful of 
using their discretion when it is clear they 
have the power to do so. Furthermore, 
Judges appear to follow what all the other 
judges may be doing, which at that point in 
time may be the 'fashion' to do so, but then 
this changes over a period of time when a 
new guidance case emerges. 
7    
190 None they are impartial 6    
192 Personal experience 3    
195 Cultural mores and public policy such as 
upholding the rule of aw and confidence in 
the judicial process 
1    
197 common sense, desire to do justice 
between the parties, recognition of public 
interest 
1    
198 Upbringing - i.e. belief systems (not 
necessarily religious) learned from parents, 
school and friends.  Many judges come 
from a fairly narrow spectrum of society in 
terms of their education and the people 
with whom they interact professionally and 
socially.  The same can be said for lawyers 
in general 
3 1 4  
202 It would be personal opinion because its 
human nature for one to express their 
views. From a judicial perspective its even 
more likely because the whole point of the 
judiciary is to dissect and advise on what is 
presented. In those circumstances there 
will always be a basis for opinion. 
7    
206 Their upbringing and personal beliefs 3    
210 An individual's characteristics and their 
background 
2 3   
211 past experience, ability to relate to witness 
ie are they likeable, genuine 
3 5   
212 Family background, education, experience 
as a lawyer in private practice, 
moral/ethical/religious beliefs 
3 4 1  
221 upbringing, political views, age 3 2 1  
224 cultural and religious 3 1   
226 Having a poor advocate on one side 7    
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229 Experience (both personal and 
professional) and subjective views. 
thoughts and beliefs.  
3 4   
230 assumptions regarding commerical or 
economic realities experienced by business 
clients 
4    
231 Their life experience  3    
232 social/ ethnic background including 
religion, own experiences / exposure to 
other social classes / ethnic back grounds 
and where those experiences and exposure 
is lacking the perception of what they think  
other social classes / ethnic backgrounds 
are like.  
3 2 5  
234 The instinct of the judge for what is the 
just outcome. 
1    
236 Personal factors - their background and 
beliefs.  
3 1   
237 Experience of life, generally - most good 
judges try to achieve justice where possible 
and, in doing so, they try to look past 
technicalities to identify the real issues.   
3 1 4  
238 Fairness, experience at the Bar or in 
practice 
1 4   
241 Experience from having been a practitioner 
on eg the meaning of commercial terms 
used in a contract 
4    
244 Career experience, common sense, sense 
of fairness 
4 1 7  
245 The Judge's view of what the man on the 
Clapham omnibus would think - it is the 
Judge's job to be the representative 
reasonable man on the street, and some 
flavour of 'who' the Judge is is bound to 
creep in. 
1    
246 Where a Judge has personal characteristics 
which are the same as those being debated 
such as race, gender, disability, religion, 
sexual orientation etc 
2    
248 Their own experience  3 4   
250 I appear before civil judges where I think 
personal factors have little bearing.  In the 
criminal court I think magistrates are 
heavily influenced by their background 
experience in sentencing, the crown court 
less so. 
3    
253 A sense of fairness/justice 1    
257 class, culture and convictions 3 1   
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APPENDIX 16: Frequency of multiple response factors for 
qualitative responses in SPQ 11  
 
What personal factors do you think are most likely to influence judicial reasoning in 
cases where there is no settled law and/or judicial discretion is exercised? 
 
  RESPONSES  Percent of Cases 
  N Percent  
SPQ 
11 
Moral and other 
Perspectives 
49 29.7% 47.6% 
 Personal characteristics 
(excluding religion) 
13 7.9% 12.6% 
 Personal background and 
experience 
61 37.0% 59.2% 
 Professional background 
and experience 
31 18.8% 30.1% 
 Attitudes towards others 6 3.6% 5.8% 
 None 5 3.0% 4.9% 
 Total 
165 
100.0
% 
160.2% 
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APPENDIX 17: Frequency distributions for response to SPQ Q16 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the view that the religious beliefs of a 
judge may influence his or her judicial decision-making in cases where there is no 
settled law and/or judicial discretion is required? 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
6 3.8 3.8 3.8 
 Disagree 28 17.7 17.7 21.5 
 Neither agree 
nor disagree 
54 34.2 34.2 55.7 
 Agree 65 41.1 41.1 96.8 
 Strongly agree 5 3.2 3.2 100 
 Total 158 100 100  
Missing  0    
Total  158 100   
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APPENDIX 18 Attitudes towards the relationship between religion 
and judging by respondent factors  
 
Appendix 18a: Area of practice 
 
 
 
Q3 Area of Legal Practice  
Total Employment Family 
Q16  Disagree Count 20 15 35 
% within Q16 57.1% 42.9% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac  24.1% 29.4% 26.1% 
% of Total 14.9% 11.2% 26.1% 
NAND Count 29 18 47 
% within Q16 61.7% 38.3% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac  34.9% 35.3% 35.1% 
% of Total 21.6% 13.4% 35.1% 
Agree Count 34 18 52 
% within Q16 65.4% 34.6% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac  41.0% 35.3% 38.8% 
% of Total 25.4% 13.4% 38.8% 
Total Count 83 51 134 
% within Q16 61.9% 38.1% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 61.9% 38.1% 100.0% 
The results of a Mann Whitney U test showed that there were no statistically 
significant differences between respondent views as to whether there is a relationship 
between judges’ religion and judicial decision-making  based on their area of 
practice: Employment (mean rank =69.40), Family (mean rank=64.41), U=1959.00, 
z = -.769, p = .442.
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Q2 PQE How Long have you been a solicitor? 
Total 0 -5 years 6 -10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years 21 years + 
Q16 Disagree Count 5 5 4 11 10 35 
% within Q16  14.3% 14.3% 11.4% 31.4% 28.6% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 17.9% 27.8% 22.2% 35.5% 25.6% 26.1% 
% of Total 3.7% 3.7% 3.0% 8.2% 7.5% 26.1% 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Count 12 7 6 10 12 47 
% within Q16  25.5% 14.9% 12.8% 21.3% 25.5% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 42.9% 38.9% 33.3% 32.3% 30.8% 35.1% 
% of Total 9.0% 5.2% 4.5% 7.5% 9.0% 35.1% 
Agree Count 11 6 8 10 17 52 
% within Q16  21.2% 11.5% 15.4% 19.2% 32.7% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 39.3% 33.3% 44.4% 32.3% 43.6% 38.8% 
% of Total 8.2% 4.5% 6.0% 7.5% 12.7% 38.8% 
Total Count 28 18 18 31 39 134 
% within Q16  20.9% 13.4% 13.4% 23.1% 29.1% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 20.9% 13.4% 13.4% 23.1% 29.1% 100.0% 
Results of a Kruskal-Wallis H test indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between the perceptions of respondents as to 
whether there is a relationship between judges’ religion and judicial decision-making  based on the length of time they had been in practice:  
0-5 years PQE  (Mean rank = 71.13), 6-10 years PQE (mean rank = 64.11), 11-15 years ( mean rank = 71.89), 16-20 years (mean rank = 
60.42) and 21+ years (mean rank = 70.06) X2(4) =2.058,  p =.725.  
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Appendix 18c: Frequency of attendance at court 
 
 
 
Q9 Attend court  
Total Frequently Infrequently 
Q16  Disagree Count 22 13 35 
% within Q16  62.9% 37.1% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  29.7% 21.7% 26.1% 
% of Total 16.4% 9.7% 26.1% 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Count 29 18 47 
% within Q16  61.7% 38.3% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  39.2% 30.0% 35.1% 
% of Total 21.6% 13.4% 35.1% 
Agree Count 23 29 52 
% within Q16  44.2% 55.8% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  31.1% 48.3% 38.8% 
% of Total 17.2% 21.6% 38.8% 
Total Count 74 60 134 
% within Q16  55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
The results of a Mann Whitney U test showed that there were no statistically 
significant differences between respondent views as to whether there is a relationship 
between judges’ religion and judicial decision-making  based on the frequency with 
which they attend court: Frequent attendees (mean rank =62.20), Infrequent 
attendees Family (mean rank=74.04), U=2612.50, z = 1.871, p = .061.
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Appendix 18d: Religion 
 
 
Q8 Religious beliefs 
Total Christian 
Non-
Christian Unaffiliated 
Q16  Disagree Count 18 1 15 34 
% within Q16  52.9% 2.9% 44.1% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB 24.3% 12.5% 30.6% 26.0% 
% of Total 13.7% 0.8% 11.5% 26.0% 
Neither  
agree nor 
disagree 
Count 21 4 21 46 
% within Q16  45.7% 8.7% 45.7% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB 28.4% 50.0% 42.9% 35.1% 
% of Total 16.0% 3.1% 16.0% 35.1% 
Agree Count 35 3 13 51 
% within Q16  68.6% 5.9% 25.5% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB 47.3% 37.5% 26.5% 38.9% 
% of Total 26.7% 2.3% 9.9% 38.9% 
Total Count 74 8 49 131 
% within Q16  56.5% 6.1% 37.4% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 56.5% 6.1% 37.4% 100.0% 
Results of a Kruskal-Wallis H test indicated that there was no statistically significant 
difference between the perceptions of respondents as to whether there is a 
relationship between judges’ religion and judicial decision-making  based on their 
religious beliefs: Christian (Mean rank = 70.71), Non-Christian (mean rank = 70.69) 
sand Unaffiliated ( mean rank = 58.12), X
2
(2) =3.830,  p =.147.  
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APPENDIX 19: Frequency distributions for response to Q17 
 
If you agree with the view that the religious beliefs of a judge can influence his or 
her judicial reasoning in cases where there is no settled law and/or judicial discretion 
is exercised, how often do you think that they may do so? 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Never  1 0.6 1.0 1.0 
 Rarely 24 15.2 19.8 20.7 
 Occasionally 74 46.8 61.2 81..8 
 Often 22 13.9 18.2 100 
 Total 121 76.6 100  
Missing  37 23.4   
Total  158 100   
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APPENDIX 20 Attitudes towards frequency with which religious 
beliefs affect judging by respondent factors 
Appendix 20a 
 
 
Q3 Area of Legal Practice 
Total Employment Family 
Q17  Never Count 1 0 1 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area Prac 1.3% 0.0% 0.8% 
% of Total 0.8% 0.0% 0.8% 
Rarely Count 14 10 24 
% within Q17 Frequency RB 58.3% 41.7% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac 18.4% 22.2% 19.8% 
% of Total 11.6% 8.3% 19.8% 
Occasionally Count 45 29 74 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  60.8% 39.2% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac 59.2% 64.4% 61.2% 
% of Total 37.2% 24.0% 61.2% 
Often Count 16 6 22 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac 21.1% 13.3% 18.2% 
% of Total 13.2% 5.0% 18.2% 
Total Count 76 45 121 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  62.8% 37.2% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 62.8% 37.2% 100.0% 
The results of a Mann Whitney U test showed that there were no statistically 
significant differences between respondent views as to the frequency with which 
judges’ religious beliefs affect judicial decision-making based on their area of 
practice: Employment (mean rank =62.77), Family (mean rank=58.01), U=1575.00, 
z = -.829, p = .407.
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Q2 How Long have you been a solicitor? 
Total 0 -5 years 6 -10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years 21 years + 
Q17  Never Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 
% of Total 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 
Rarely Count 7 4 4 3 6 24 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  29.2% 16.7% 16.7% 12.5% 25.0% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 25.0% 21.1% 30.8% 11.1% 17.6% 19.8% 
% of Total 5.8% 3.3% 3.3% 2.5% 5.0% 19.8% 
Occasionally Count 15 10 5 21 23 74 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  20.3% 13.5% 6.8% 28.4% 31.1% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 53.6% 52.6% 38.5% 77.8% 67.6% 61.2% 
% of Total 12.4% 8.3% 4.1% 17.4% 19.0% 61.2% 
Often Count 5 5 4 3 5 22 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  22.7% 22.7% 18.2% 13.6% 22.7% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 17.9% 26.3% 30.8% 11.1% 14.7% 18.2% 
% of Total 4.1% 4.1% 3.3% 2.5% 4.1% 18.2% 
Total Count 28 19 13 27 34 121 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  23.1% 15.7% 10.7% 22.3% 28.1% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 23.1% 15.7% 10.7% 22.3% 28.1% 100.0% 
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Appendix 20c 
 
Q9 Attend court 
Total Frequently Infrequently 
Q17  Never Count 0 1 1 
% within Q17 Frequency  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  0.0% 1.8% 0.8% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.8% 0.8% 
Rarely Count 16 8 24 
% within Q17 Frequency  66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  24.2% 14.5% 19.8% 
% of Total 13.2% 6.6% 19.8% 
Occasionally Count 40 34 74 
% within Q17 Frequency  54.1% 45.9% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  60.6% 61.8% 61.2% 
% of Total 33.1% 28.1% 61.2% 
Often Count 10 12 22 
% within Q17 Frequency  45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  15.2% 21.8% 18.2% 
% of Total 8.3% 9.9% 18.2% 
Total Count 66 55 121 
% within Q17 Frequency  54.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 54.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
The results of a Mann Whitney U test showed that there were no statistically 
significant differences between respondent views as to the frequency with which 
judges’ religious beliefs affect judicial decision-making based on the frequency with 
which they attend court: Frequent attendees (mean rank =57.89), Infrequent 
attendees Family (mean rank=64.73), U=2020.00, z = 1.226, p = .220.
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Appendix 20d 
 
 
Q8 Religious beliefs  
Total Christian Non-Christian Unaffiliated 
Q17 Never Count 1 0 0 1 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB  1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
% of Total 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
Rarely Count 11 0 10 21 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  52.4% 0.0% 47.6% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB  15.3% 0.0% 27.0% 17.9% 
% of Total 9.4% 0.0% 8.5% 17.9% 
Occasionally Count 42 6 25 73 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  57.5% 8.2% 34.2% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB  58.3% 75.0% 67.6% 62.4% 
% of Total 35.9% 5.1% 21.4% 62.4% 
Often Count 18 2 2 22 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  81.8% 9.1% 9.1% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB  25.0% 25.0% 5.4% 18.8% 
% of Total 15.4% 1.7% 1.7% 18.8% 
Total Count 72 8 37 117 
% within Q17 Frequency RB  61.5% 6.8% 31.6% 100.0% 
 
% within Q8 RB  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 61.5% 6.8% 31.6% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX 21 Frequency distributions for response to Q18 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Unconsciously only 47 29.7 36.4 36.4 
Both consciously and 
unconsciously 
69 43.7 53.5 89.9 
Don't know 13 8.2 10.1 100.0 
Total 129 81.6 100.0  
Missing 99.00 29 18.4   
Total 158 100.0   
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APPENDIX  22 Attitudes towards how judges' religious beliefs 
influence judicial decision-making 
Appendix 22a  
 
The results of a Mann Whitney U test showed that there were no statistically 
significant differences between respondent views  as to how judges’ religious beliefs 
affect judicial decision-making based on their area of practice: Employment (mean 
rank =65.70), Family (mean rank=63.81), U=1887.00, z =-.311, p = .756.
 
Q3 Area of Legal Practice 
Total Employment Family 
Q18 Unconsciously only Count 27 20 47 
% within Q18. Nature of influence RB 57.4% 42.6% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac 33.3% 41.7% 36.4% 
Both consciously 
and unconsciously 
Count 48 21 69 
% within Q18. Nature of influence RB 69.6% 30.4% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac 59.3% 43.8% 53.5% 
Don't know Count 6 7 13 
% within Q18. Nature of influence RB 46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac 7.4% 14.6% 10.1% 
Total Count 81 48 129 
% within Q18. Nature of influence RB 62.8% 37.2% 100.0% 
% within Q3 Area of Prac 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Q2 How Long have you been a solicitor? 
Total 0 -5 years 6 -10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years 21 years + 
Q18.  Unconsciously 
only 
Count 7 6 3 15 16 47 
% within Q18. Nature of influence RB 14.9% 12.8% 6.4% 31.9% 34.0% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 25.0% 31.6% 21.4% 46.9% 44.4% 36.4% 
Both 
consciously and 
unconsciously 
Count 18 12 9 12 18 69 
% within Q18. Nature of influence RB 26.1% 17.4% 13.0% 17.4% 26.1% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 64.3% 63.2% 64.3% 37.5% 50.0% 53.5% 
Don't know Count 3 1 2 5 2 13 
% within Q18. Nature of influence RB 23.1% 7.7% 15.4% 38.5% 15.4% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 10.7% 5.3% 14.3% 15.6% 5.6% 10.1% 
Total Count 28 19 14 32 36 129 
% within Q18. Nature of influence RB 21.7% 14.7% 10.9% 24.8% 27.9% 100.0% 
% within Q2 PQE 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Results of a Kruskal-Wallis H test indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between the perceptions of respondents as to how 
judges’ religious beliefs affect judicial decision-making based on the length of time they had been in practice:  0-5 years PQE  (Mean rank = 71.89), 
6-10 years PQE (mean rank = 65.84), 11-15 years ( mean rank = 75.43), 16-20 years (mean rank = 61.22) and 21+ years (mean rank =58.50) X
2
(4) 
=4.346,  p =.361.  
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Appendix 22c 
 
 
Q9 Attend court  
Total Frequently Infrequently 
Q18.  Unconsciously only Count 26 21 47 
% within Q18. Nature of 
influence RB 
55.3% 44.7% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  35.6% 37.5% 36.4% 
Both consciously and 
unconsciously 
Count 37 32 69 
% within Q18. Nature of 
influence RB 
53.6% 46.4% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  50.7% 57.1% 53.5% 
Don't know Count 10 3 13 
% within Q18. Nature of 
influence RB 
76.9% 23.1% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  13.7% 5.4% 10.1% 
Total Count 73 56 129 
% within Q18. Nature of 
influence RB 
56.6% 43.4% 100.0% 
% within Q9 Attend court  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The results of a Mann Whitney U test showed that there were no statistically 
significant differences between respondent views as to how judges’ religious beliefs 
affect judicial decision-making based on the frequency with which they attend court: 
Frequent attendees (mean rank =66.96), Infrequent attendees Family (mean 
rank=62.45), U=1901.00, z = 1901.00, p = .447.
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Appendix 22d 
 
 
Results of a Kruskal-Wallis H test indicated that there was no statistically significant 
difference between the perceptions of respondents as to how judges’ religious beliefs 
affect judicial decision-making based on their religious beliefs: Christian (Mean rank 
= 60.80), Non-Christian (mean rank = 62.50) sand Unaffiliated ( mean rank = 66.77), 
X
2
(2) =.945,  p =.624.  
 
 
Q8 Religious beliefs 
Total Christian 
Non-
Christian Unaffiliated 
Q18.  Unconsciously 
only 
Count 27 2 15 44 
% within Q18. Nature of 
influence RB 
61.4% 4.5% 34.1% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB 36.5% 28.6% 34.1% 35.2% 
Both 
consciously 
and 
unconsciously 
Count 42 5 21 68 
% within Q18. Nature of 
influence RB 
61.8% 7.4% 30.9% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB 56.8% 71.4% 47.7% 54.4% 
Don't know Count 5 0 8 13 
% within Q18. Nature of 
influence RB 
38.5% 0.0% 61.5% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB 6.8% 0.0% 18.2% 10.4% 
Total Count 74 7 44 125 
% within Q18. Nature of 
influence RB 
59.2% 5.6% 35.2% 100.0% 
% within Q8 RB 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX 23 Frequency distribution for SPQ Q13.1 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 1 .6 .7 .7 
Disagree 13 8.2 9.6 10.3 
Neither agree not 
disagree 
22 13.9 16.2 26.5 
Agree 90 57.0 66.2 92.6 
Strongly agree 10 6.3 7.4 100.0 
Total 136 86.1 100.0  
Missing System 22 13.9   
Total 158 100.0   
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APPENDIX 24 Frequency distribution for SPQ Q13.2 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 4 2.5 2.9 2.9 
Disagree 19 12.0 14.0 16.9 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
27 17.1 19.9 36.8 
Agree 79 50.0 58.1 94.9 
Strongly agree 7 4.4 5.1 100.0 
Total 136 86.1 100.0  
Missing System 22 13.9   
Total 158 100.0   
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APPENDIX 25 Frequency distributions for response to SPQ 23 
 
Please indicate whether you support or oppose having a specialist panel of judges 
‘with a proven sensitivity and understanding of religious issues’ to hear cases 
involving such issues as suggested by Lord Carey in McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd? 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Support 26 16.5 19.1 19.1 
 Neither 
support nor 
oppose 
35 47.5 55.1 74.3 
 Oppose 75 22.2 25.7 100 
 Total 136 86.1 100  
Missing  22 13.9   
Total  158 100   
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APPENDIX 26 Frequency distribution for SPQ Q25 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 3 1.9 2.2 2.2 
Disagree 4 2.5 3.0 5.2 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
21 13.3 15.7 20.9 
Agree 65 41.1 48.5 69.4 
Strongly agree 41 25.9 30.6 100.0 
Total 134 84.8 100.0  
Missing 99.00 24 15.2   
Total 158 100.0   
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APPENDIX 27 Frequency distributions for response to Q26  
 
Do you agree or disagree that the judiciary's current focus on increasing gender and 
ethnicity diversity in the judiciary should be extended to include any of the following 
characteristics? 
Appendix 27a: Age 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 4 2.5 3.8 3.8 
 Disagree 15 9.5 14.2 17.9 
 Neither agree nor 
disagree 
25 15.8 23.6 41.5 
 Agree 52 32.9 49.1 90.6 
 Strongly agree 10 6.3 9.4 100 
 Total 106 67.1 100  
Missin
g 
 52 32.9   
Total  158 100   
 
Appendix 27b: Disability 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 4 2.5 3.8 3.8 
 Disagree 8 5.1 7.5 11.3 
 Neither agree nor 
disagree 
27 17.1 25.5 36.8 
 Agree 52 32.9 49.1 85.8 
 Strongly agree 15 9.5 14.2 100 
 Total 106 67.1 100  
Missing  52 34.7   
Total  158 100   
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Appendix 27c: Gender re-assignment 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 7 4.4 6.7 6.7 
 Disagree 12 7.6 11.4 18.1 
 Neither agree nor 
disagree 
37 23.4 35.2 53.3 
 Agree 40 25.3 38.1 91.4 
 Strongly agree 9 5.7 8.6 100 
 Total 105 66.5 100  
Missing  53 33.5   
Total  158 100   
 
Appendix 27d: Sexual orientation 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 7 4.4 6.7 6.7 
 Disagree 10 6.3 9.5 16.2 
 Neither agree nor 
disagree 
30 19.0 28.6 44.8 
 Agree 48 30.4 45.7 90.5 
 Strongly agree 10 6.3 9.5 100 
 Total 105 66.5 100  
Missing  53 33.5   
Total  158 100   
 
Appendix 27e: Social class 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 5 3.2 4.7 4.7 
 Disagree 5 3.2 4.7 9.4 
 Neither agree nor 
disagree 
21 13.3 19.8 29.2 
 Agree 55 34.8 51.9 81.1 
 Strongly agree 20 12.7 18.9 100 
 Total 106 67.1 100  
Missing  52 32.9   
Total  158 100   
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Appendix 27f: Political beliefs 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 16 10.1 15.2 15.2 
 Disagree 19 12.0 18.1 33.3 
 Neither agree nor 
disagree 
37 23.4 35.2 68.6 
 Agree 24 15.2 22.9 91.4 
 Strongly agree 9 5.7 8.6 100 
 Total 105 66.5 100  
Missing  53 33.5   
Total  158 100   
 
Appendix 27g: Religious beliefs 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 13 8.2 12.4 12.4 
 Disagree 15 9.5 14.3 26.7 
 Neither agree nor 
disagree 
31 19.6 29.5 56.2 
 Agree 38 24.1 36.2 92.4 
 Strongly agree 8 5.1 7.6 100 
 Total 105 66.5 100  
Missing  53 33.5   
Total  158 100   
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APPENDIX 28 Frequency distribution for SPQ Q15 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 12 7.6 8.8 8.8 
Disagree 39 24.7 28.5 37.2 
Neither agree not 
disagree 
31 19.6 22.6 59.9 
Agree 49 31.0 35.8 95.6 
Strongly agree 6 3.8 4.4 100.0 
Total 137 86.7 100.0  
Missing 99.00 21 13.3   
Total 158 100.0   
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